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Public sector accounting reforms have a vast potential to impact on the developing world (Hopper 
et al., 2016) but the explication of reform performance is only partial in the neo-classical 
economics framework. Accounting scholars have called for a deeper understanding of the context 
and conditions of accounting reforms in the less developing countries and emerging economies 
(LDCs/EEs) (van Helden and Uddin, 2016; Nyamori et al.,2017; Hopper et al., 2016; Goddard and 
Mkasiwa, 2016; Manning and McCourt, 2013; Abdul-Rahaman et al., 1997).  
This research sets out to understand the context of the public financial management (PFM)reforms 
using Ghana as an example of LDCs/EEs. The tools embedded in the institutional logics approach 
(ILA) are mobilised, as a meta-theoretical framework encompassing symbolic interactionism and 
grounded theory, to offer a constructivist-interpretivist account of the reforms. 
This research found that accounting changes through the PFM reforms in Ghana have been 
challenging to implement, and reforms outcomes have been poor to mediocre. Empirically, this 
study identified budget credibility as the core category in public sector accounting reforms in 
Ghana. The reform outcomes are reflected and constituted in the budget logics, such as over-
centralization of controls, gaming, and unpredictability of flow of funds to the ministries, 
departments and agencies (MDAs), that have constrained the reforms. This study relates the core 
category to the other five main empirical categories, namely: accountability, professionalism, and 
financial re-engineering, automation, and policy credibility) which emerged from the study. 
Longitudinally, the research found that, dating back to the pre-independence era, only limited 
improvements have been made in the transformation of the public financial management practices 
to support economic development in Ghana. Opportunities to decentralize financial controls were 
not taken the 1980s, and the successive recent reforms have only centralized both the reforms and 
financial management controls. This research explains why sub-optimal accounting practices 
endure, the paradox of embeddedness, and constraints and possibilities of collective action to effect 
accounting change through reforms.  
The study examines the dynamics and the interplay of budget credibility and the other categorical 
elements within the “vampire state”, and the impact of hegemonic influences of the international 
community on local actors institutionalised in the polities through objectification and 
exteriorisation of culture. 
The implications of the budget credibility are explored further through the development of a 
substantive theory on the reforms, a processual analysis, and interinstitutional orders comprising 
national community logics, state logics, and international community logics that shape public 
sector accounting change in Ghana. This research opens up the possibility of further theoretical 
and empirical studies in other resource dependent countries where reforms are influenced by 
external donor development partners. 
Key Words: PFM reforms, public sector accounting change, budget credibility, international 
donors, organisational change, institutionalism, institutional logics approach, hegemony, culture, 
less developing countries (LDCs), developing countries (DCs) and emerging economies (EEs).
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1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this research is to explain accounting reforms in less developed countries and 
emerging economies (LDCs/EEs) by deepening the understanding of how accounting practices 
emerge and can be transformed within the public sector reforms. Public sector accounting (PSA) 
change in the LDCs/EEs is a critical but neglected developmental policy issue affecting the socio-
economic development of a large proportion of the world population (Hopper et al, 2016). Vast sums 
of money and effort have been expended on PSA reforms in the LDCs/EEs without marked 
improvements, especially in Africa. Academic researchers have mobilised a wide range of 
methodologies and philosophical approaches (Alawattage et al., 2016; Liguori and Steccolini, 2014) 
to explicate change and stability in public sector accounting practices in less developed countries and 
emerging economies (LDCs/EEs).  
Accounting researchers traditionally relied on neo-classical economic theory to rationalise 
developments in accounting techniques and systems (Dillard, 2004). Often in the LDCs, research 
have been conducted relying on neo-classical economics and rational choice theories to explain 
change, but such theories have been challenged even among economists (Walker, 1998; Abdul-
Rahaman et al, 1997; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Scholars have critiqued neo-classical economic 
theory as fatally flawed for being rooted in atomistic individualism, and not relevant for explaining 
accounting change. Some have held that such studies are concerned with investigating the conditions 
of equilibrium (Burns and Scapens, 2000) and not the processes of change, noting that the empirical 
failure of efficient market theory, agency theory, and contingency theory has created a new awareness 
(Dillard et al., 2004). Others have also provided evidence that neo-classical economic theory is 
simply not adequate for giving an account of human behaviour (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; 
Scapens,1994) and as such their explanations of both human behaviour and change are not complete 
and need to be supplanted by other social theories.  
Historically in explaining accounting change researchers had focused on financial accounting issues 
such as accounting standards and the role of professional accounting bodies, in neglect of 
management accounting (van Helden and Uddin, 2016), and this impacted on how accounting change 
was explained in the LDCs/EEs. The earlier literature (in the 1960s and 70s) considered accounting 
as neutral and unproblematic, as such they often focused on how best to transfer Western accounting 
technologies to non-Western countries (Alawattage et al., 2016). As they argued the impact is still 
felt today: 
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Thus, they were, and still are, in mainstream accounting circles, driven by the managerial 
ethos and the ‘business’ of selling Western management accounting technologies to their 
non-Western counterparts (Alawattage et al., 2016 pp288).  
However, recent accounting scholarship has directed attention to a better understanding of how 
accounting is influenced by multiple agencies, organisational processes, and institutions; and how 
accounting in turn is influenced by them (Dillard et al, 2004). Circa the 1980s onwards, with the 
awareness of the social embeddedness of accounting change (Baxter and Chua, 2002), there has been 
a steady flow of literature drawing on social theories that places accounting in both its organisational 
context (Hopwood, 1983, 1987) and societal context (Burchell et al., 1985). The outcome of this 
development has spun a considerable literature on accounting and organisational change research 
such as (Loft, 1986; Preston et al., 1992; Miller and Rose, 1990; Miller, 1991; Miller and O’Leary 
1994, Boedker and Chua, 2013, Ahrens and Ferry, 2015, 2016), which has been extended to the 
world-wide new public management (NPM) reforms (Hood,1991, 1995; Lapsley,2009; Manning, 
2001; Steccolini, 2019). 
Alongside this development emerged the new public management (NPM) and public sector 
accounting reforms in the LDCs, where scholars have drawn on a variety of theoretical lenses to 
interpret the empirical evidence of their research (Alawattage et al., 2016), but the ‘normative’ and 
functionalist literature are still driven by neo-classical economic theory1. There have been some 
efforts to explore the public financial management and integrated public financial management 
(PFM/ IPFM) reforms (as a variant of the global NPM reforms), but there are still many questions 
on how the reforms have been and are being implemented in LDCs/EEs, and scholars have argued 
the need to deepen our understanding of both the processes and the contexts of these reforms (van 
Helden and Uddin,2016; van Helden and Ouda,2016;  Abdul-Rahaman et al., 1997).  
In recent years, a vibrant stream of literature has emerged from the LDCs /EEs on PFM reforms 
which has provided a useful platform on which to build, but with a few exceptions (such as Goddard 
et al., 2016, Alsharari et al., 2015; Alkaraan, 2018) they have been disparate theorising rather than 
resulting in what Modell (2009) has termed in another context as cumulative theorising and a 
programme of research2 . Recent studies provide evidence of reform landscape shaped by both 
 
1 Normative as used here refers to the accounting practitioner literature which tends to be prescriptive (see 
Goddard 2010). 
2 Modell (2009) for example found that in the areas of performance measurement and management as a 
subsector of public sector accounting, institutionalism offers “one of very few substantial and reasonably 
coherent research programmes in an area that has recently been characterized as having an overwhelmingly 
descriptive and prescriptive emphasis and suffering from a lack of cumulative theorizing” (pp.278).  
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national and international interests. Reform failures and poor performances have been attributed to 
both internal implementation mechanisms as well as wrongful and ineffective pressures exerted by 
external donors (Lassou et al.,2019). Reforms in some of the African countries are shaped by the 
power relations between neo-colonialists’ interests and indigenous political leaders and government 
officials (Lassou and Hopper,2016). They argued that most accounting reforms emanate from the 
‘North’ (otherwise termed as the West), but shaped by indigenous civil servants, who sometimes 
manipulate the reforms to their advantage. Others have highlighted the problems of corruption and 
fraud by showing that the roles of key agencies such the Accountant General’s Department and the 
Auditor General’s Department were undermined by senior government officials (Rahaman (2009). 
Rahaman argued that understanding the context of reforms is important, and that one should go 
beyond the mere enlistment of these functions, as they can be manipulated by officials to suit their 
interests. Hooper et al (2009) argued that reforms are influenced by ex-colonial powers, who 
continued to pursue their neo-colonial interests in the guise of the international financial institutions. 
This is reinforced in a situation where governance problems in the developing countries have been 
commodified in the shape of reforms. Neu and Ocampo (2007) argued that the World Bank translated 
the problems into numbers that often were compiled as academic exercises in order to grant a loan, 
but subsequently became the reality that countries had to live by upon signing the loan agreement. 
The World Bank therefore had exerted indirect control through the implantation of such mundane 
and quotidian practices. In some cases, the improvements through reforms cannot be sustained, as in 
Ghana Roberts and Andrews (2005) reported that the initial gains in budget planning, introduced 
with the implementation of the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) were quickly reversed 
in subsequently years. In a longitudinal case study of management control in a textile mill in a 
traditional Sinhalese village in Sri Lanka, Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005) found that accounting 
reflected as well as constituted its environment. In that context they found that budget improvements 
led to overall improvements of organisational performance, and a decline in the budget function led 
to deterioration of performance. In a previous paper he and his colleagues had asserted that what 
drove market-reforms in developing countries was the failure of bureaucratic mechanisms to deliver 
development goals, and the dependence of such countries on donor support (Wickramasinghe et 
al.,2004). They found that the external donors, especially the World Bank, had driven neo-liberal 
reforms that developing countries were compelled to adopt to get their support. They argued that 
supply-side economic policies depended on efficiency in bureaucracies for effectiveness.  
Olowo-Okere and Tomkins (1998) compared lessons learned from the UK’s experiences of reforms 
to Nigeria’s case. They argued that the UK’s reforms were driven by principles, rather than by a 
master plan. The UK government did easy things first, while tightening accountability through the 
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establishment of the National Audit Office. They asserted that reforms were more likely to succeed 
where civil servants identified with the principles that drove the reforms than where they did not 
agree. In Nigeria, they observed that the reforms were instigated by external agents who also 
determined most of the content. The implementation of reforms was affected by the frequent changes 
in government. Most of the proposed changes were not implemented, and those implemented 
decoupled (in the sense of a gap between official pronouncements and reality).   
A number of the existing studies on PFM reforms have focused primarily on why reforms fail in 
LDCs/EEs, but not how they are implemented. As a result, some of these studies have failed to create 
a deep understanding of both how and why changes in accounting practices occur or persist in the 
LDCs/EEs. One theme that appears to run through these studies is the role of external donors in 
originating and determining the content of reforms. These studies have also espoused macro-
structural factors such as neo-patrimonialism, patronage and corruptions as the main internal cause 
of reform performance (such as in Lassou et al, 2019, Lassou, 2017, Rahaman, 2009).  
These papers share similar objectives with this research in explicating the reforms in LDCs, but some 
of the existing studies were drawn from different countries other than Ghana (such as Neu and 
Ocampo ,2007; Olowo-Okere and Tomkins ,1998; and Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). Most 
of the papers adopted frameworks that treated government as a single monolithic entity operating in 
a homogenous environment. Those that had drawn on neo- institutional theory, did not 
wholeheartedly address the applicability of that theory in non-Western context.   
Whilst this thesis builds on the extant literature, it aims to address some other concerns as well: 
Firstly, political economy theorising suffer from fatal inadequacies and their explanation of reforms 
are not complete. Secondly, the existing studies adopting variants of institutional theory have focused 
on either the macro-level or the micro-level effects, with a few exceptions, they have not developed 
a combined approach (Zucker, 1977). In the LDCs, as far as we know, the integrated approach has 
not been applied in any empirical studies. Thirdly, neo institutional theory has been critiqued by 
scholars (such as Thornton et al.,2012 and Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) for its weaknesses in 
uncovering the role of cultural agents (who are portrayed as cultural dupes) in the explanation of 
change. Instead, the institutional logics approach offers a more convincing account of change or 
stability by allowing for heterogeneity in the environment, and treating reform actors not as a single 
unit, but pluralistically. Fourthly, institutional logics place emphasis on the strategic use of 
persuasive language in narrating and explaining change (Thornton et al., 2005; Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005). Other scholars have reached the same conclusions as found in the works of 
Foucault, Pedersen, Wittgenstein and several other theorists; and it affirms institutional logics as a 
better framework for articulating change. For example, it reflects translation of practices instead of 
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mindless diffusion often associated with neo-institutional theory. Lastly, institutional logics support 
a processual account of allows for the possibility of exteriorisation of culture from the societal 
environment. It departs from a mechanistic internalisation or organismic diffusion. Therefore, it 
offers a much deeper explanation of change or stability that is non-deterministic, non-linear, non-
rational and transrational.  
This research aims to address the lacunae in the extant literature by mobilising institutional logics as 
a meta-theory to extend the existing corpus of research, and to contribute towards the deepening of 
our understanding of the context and performance integrated public financial management (IPFM) 
reforms.  
This choice of framework is not just to address some of the shortcomings in the extant literature. It 
reflects the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the Weberian philosophy of verstehen, 
which is a subjectivist approach that aims to create understanding from within. Scholars have argued 
that there is a clear distinction between subjectivist ontology and constructivist epistemology as 
against objectivist-realist ones (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). In this research, by adopting a 
subjectivist-constructivist philosophy, the study found a clear line of sight between adopting 
grounded theory-informed methods and a processual narrative that mobilises institutional logics and 
symbolic interactionism as theoretical lenses. This framing allows this study to give voice to the 
research participants, while providing a narrative that addresses how the reforms have been 
implemented in Ghana at both macro-historical and micro-processual levels (Lounsbury and 
Boxenbaum, 2015). 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
For over two decades governments in low to middle income economies in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, and South-East Europe have been undertaking accounting reforms, under the rubric of 
integrated public financial management reforms (IPFM). According to the World Bank publications, 
by early 2017, about one-hundred and fifty countries had undertaken at least one Public Expenditure 
and Financial Accountability (PEFA) report as part of their efforts to further strengthen their financial 
management reforms (Fritz et al., 2017). These reforms are driven by the global initiatives founded 
on new public management (NPM) principles (Goddard and Mkasiwa, 2016; Hood,1991, 1995, 
Lapsley,2009). The reforms are often ascribed technical rationalities such as the improvement of 
efficiency as part of the public sector transformation agenda. But this view has not gone 
unchallenged, as some see it as a backdoor for international financial institutions and western- 
industrialised countries to further their aim of influencing government policies and implementing 
neo-liberal and neo-colonial policies in LDCs (Hopper et al.,2016; Neu and Ocampo, 2007).   
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Despite the scale of effort and resources that have gone into public sector accounting reforms there 
is considerable evidence that the results have been disappointing (Allen, 2009; Manning and 
McCourt, 2013; Hopper et al, 2016) and have continued to be so. According to WB estimates, from 
2002 to 2017 over $20 billion had been spent by LDC/EEs’ development partners DPs on these 
reforms; “however, following nearly two decades of intensive effort, what has been achieved, where, 
and why is not very clear” (Fritz et al., 2017 p. xi). 
The PFM reforms as implemented to-date have been packaged within the new public management 
(NPM) philosophy which puts emphasis on managerialism and accountability in the public service 
(Hood 1991, 1995). In developed industrialised countries the uptake and impact of NPM reforms 
have been mixed (Hood, 1995); cruellest disappointment (Lapsley, 2009); hailed and praised 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). In LDCs, to-date, the results have been preponderantly skewed towards 
failure.   
The extension of NPM-type reforms to the LDCs/EEs has been backed up by the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and other development partners, who have exerted considerable pressure 
for the reforms to be implemented. The combination of the pressure exerted by the IFIs (WB/IMF) 
to implement international best practices in LDCs and the poor reform outcomes continue to raise 
questions about the role of the IFIs, and the conditions under which the reforms are being 
implemented.  The underlying neo-liberal philosophy of the NPM, and similarity of the advice 
proffered by the IFIs to LDCs in the design and implementation of the reform have often elicited the 
tag of “one-size-fits-all” reforms. The reforms are often implemented with the loans from the World 
Bank (WB) that come with conditionalities that have raised into question their role as ‘honest 
brokers’. The WB claims that they have developed a new approach based on ‘best fit’ for each context 
(World Bank, 2012), but they do not make clear what constitute ‘best fit’, and under what conditions 
it will emerge. Further, they have acknowledged that inasmuch as the Banks’ staff have accumulated 
a vast amount of tacit knowledge on public sector management (PSM) reforms, what is ‘strikingly 
limited’ is ‘the explicit theory and evidence base for understanding what works and why in public 
sector reform’ (Ibid pp 6). With a few exceptions (Lassou, 2017, Hopper et al.,2016; Goddard et al., 
2016, Sarkar 2006) both the role of the international community in the LDCs and the conditions 
under which the reforms take place have not been sufficiently explored in the existing academic 
literature. 
 The notions of decoupling and loose coupling have been adopted from institutional theory to 
describe the reform, and that is reflected in the extant literature. But as Modell (2009) has argued 
research is beginning to move on from simplistic notions of decoupling (and loose coupling) of 
practices “to pay greater attention to how it is implicated in the formative stages of institutional 
processes and the role of agency exercised at different levels of analysis” (pp. 293).  This thesis 
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argues that to address such challenges require re-visiting neo-institutional theory and its new variants, 
which have not been sufficiently developed and applied in the existing research in the EEs/LDCs. 
Unfortunately, the few studies on LDCs research that have applied any form of institutionalism (such 
as Andrew, 2009; Lassou, 2017, Simpson, 2015; Ohemeng and Ayee, 2016) have not given sufficient 
attention to the appropriateness and relevance of that theoretical framework in the non-Western 
context. Secondly those studies that have factored in the international community in  reform 
performance (Lassou, 2017, Lassou et al.,2019; Lassou and Hopper, 2016, Hopper et al, 2016) have 
explicated reform performance in terms of neo-colonial and globalisation influences without 
addressing the question of modern polity (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991; Killick, 2008), and bringing 
together the interplay between internal and external influences. Whilst this thesis critiques some of 
these studies, it is done with the acknowledgement that they serve as useful platforms on which this 
study builds to deepen our understanding of reforms in Ghana and elsewhere in LDCs.  
For these reasons there is a gap in the literature, and there is a need to deepen the contextual research 
in one country to place the reforms in the societal context within which they are implemented. I have 
therefore positioned this research to focus on why less than optimal arrangements persist in 
accounting change in Ghana over time. This study aims to create a better understanding of the sources 
of heterogeneity and the processes that generate institutional change or otherwise.  
This research asks what is going on with these reforms by looking at the reform phenomenon from 
an emic perspective, therefore, adding to the knowledge and the understanding of the conditions 
under which accounting change may (or could) occur under the integrated public financial 
management reforms in LDCs.  
1.3 MOTIVATION FOR CHOOSING GHANA  
This research has selected Ghana as a case study because it provides an ideal site for the empirical 
study of LDCs integrated financial management reforms for both its intrinsic and instrumental 
attributes (Stake 2000). An intrinsic case study is undertaken for its particularity and ordinariness, 
but it is also instrumental as it has the potential to provide insights into issues of general nature. For 
that reason, whilst this research focuses on the Ghanaian context, some of its’ findings has general 
applicability as Ghana can be a good representative of the sub-Saharan context. Ghana has been at 
the forefront of developing countries financial management reforms, with many other African 
countries looking up to Ghana PFM systems (Ghana PEFA Report, 2018).Yet its performance has 
been poor to mediocre judged from our own field evidence, the practitioners’ ‘normative literature’ 
such as the successive PEFA reports, and from scholarly research (such as Simpson, 2015; and 
Andrew 2005).  
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After decades of socio-economic decline through four republics, Ghana adopted an economic 
recovery programmes in 1983 that brought the country from the brink of disaster, which was hailed 
as one of the best success stories in Africa by the international financial institutions (IFIs). Building 
on its democratic governance reforms the country enacted one of the most comprehensive and 
ambitious financial management reform programmes anywhere in the world on 10 October 1996. It 
was one of the first such experiments in the LDCs/EEs, designed and financed by the World Bank 
working closely with the IMF, the Government of Ghana, and a crew of international donors. The 
reforms had eight components covering (i) budget preparation; (ii) budget implementation; 
(iii)accounting; (iv) cash management (v) aid and debt management; (vi)revenue; (vii) public 
procurement; (viii) auditing (Technical Annex-WB, 1996). Following this initial staging post, Ghana 
signed two further agreements with the World Bank (on 27 May 2010 and 31 March 2015), all trying 
to fulfil the earlier goals set in 1993 and 1994 through its public expenditure review processes.  
Relative to the significant funds expended on Ghana’s public financial management (PFM) reforms 
from 1996-2018, success has been largely disappointing. The government has encountered 
significant challenges in implementing the financial management reforms. The most substantial 
progress however has been found in the promulgation of new PFM laws 3 (Betley et al., 2012) which 
often have been not implemented as intended. Several official assessments of Ghana public financial 
management, some of them pre-dating the current reforms have shown a system littered with a litany 
of woes (Premchand and Talat, 1986, Premchand et al., 1990, PER 1993, PEFA 2006, PEFA 2009, 
PEFA 2012, and PEFA 2018)4. The recent efforts have led to a successful implementation of an 
Oracle Enterprise Resource Planning system (ERPs) which, arguably, fulfils half of its functionality. 
An official assessment of the project indicated that it covered only 66 per cent of government 
expenditure and had not resulted in a significant change in transparency of the PFM (WB-PPAR, 
2016). This IPFM performance experience is not limited to Ghana alone, as other developing 
countries and emerging economies implementing these reforms have had similar challenges 
(Woolcock et al., 2018; Allen, 2009). 
Similarly, the NPM reforms in western countries introducing a new set of market principles and 
managerialism in the public sector have had mixed results and generally have fallen short of 
expectations (Liguori and Steccolini, 2014). The differences between the Ghanaian, and for that 
matter most of the DCs, from the western country context are that of poverty (Hopper et al., 2016) 
and hegemonic influences (Neu and Ocampo (2007). There are cultural differences too, but as we 
 
3 Ghana PEFA 2018 stated regarding Ghana PFM system: “The main strength is a solid legal and institutional 
setting for PFM, accompanied by a skilled, dedicated and well-led civil service”. 
4 I provide the details, tracking the shortcoming identified in these documents in Appendix 11. 
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argue in this thesis, ‘culture’ must not be construed in the Hofstedian sense as the entire way of life 
of a people, but as a way of making meaning (Swidler 1986). 
1.4 THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND THE INTELLECTUAL PUZZLE OF THE RESEARCH 
The existing literature on PFM reforms have begun to improve our understanding of the conditions 
of accounting change in developing and emerging countries, but the context differs from country to 
country. The conditions under which the reforms take place have not been sufficiently addressed in 
the existing academic literature, with a few exceptions such as Alkaraan (2018), Lassou and Hopper 
(2016), Goddard et al. (2016), and Sarker (2006). In addition, there have been very limited studies 
of the context of the PFM reforms focusing on the dynamics of change.  Many of the PSA researchers 
have identified the importance of ‘context’ (such as culture, tradition, and institutionalised way of 
doing things). However, there have been very little evidence in the extant literature of any attempt to 
relate the conditions of the reforms to the context of the LDCs/EEs in a systematic manner. The 
existing literature has not sufficiently explored the analytical categories of the PFM phenomenon and 
their properties; and how these categories go to explain the reform, its processes, and consequences. 
Reflecting on Burns (2000, pp. 568) argument that an understanding the dynamics of accounting 
change requires contextual research in specific settings, this study have found that there has been 
very minimal attention (with exceptions such as Priestley, 1974) devoted to explaining how public 
sector accounting has evolved in the manner that it has in LDCs in general and within specific 
countries. Thus, I have not discovered any empirical study on the PFM reforms that has attempted to 
relate the conditions of accounting change, context, and properties of the major categories and their 
dimensions, or attempted to provide a processual analysis of accounting change in the LDCs. 
This study builds on the insights from previous research (for example Lassou and Hopper, 2016) by 
asking how individuals and their public sector organisations acting rationally or otherwise, can 
improve accounting practices. We do that by investigating longitudinally how reforms have been 
implemented in the Government of Ghana context- simply by asking ‘what is going on’ with the 
reforms. Given the gaps in the knowledge of the PFM reforms, the central question of this research 
is: 
How does accounting change happens in financial management reforms (PFM) in the context 
of developing countries; and why less than optimal practices persist over time in developing 
countries such as Ghana? 
At the heart of this research question are three-interacted intellectual puzzle : Firstly, the study asks 
why practices persist even though actors consider them sub-optimal; secondly how human actors can 
change institutions from within even when their intentions and actions have been conditioned by the 
very institutions they aim to change; and thirdly how collective actions, such as reforms, emerge and 
are implemented. Collective commitment to reforms has been a concern (Lassou, 2017) which raises 
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the question why ‘atomised’ individuals may desire reforms but collectively the outcomes may not 
be as desired. This paradox has been labelled as the problem of collective action in latent groups 
(Merton, 1968; Douglas, 1986).  
 Among the existing studies on accounting change from LDCs only a few (example Alsharari and 
Abougamous, 2017; Alsharari et al. 2015) has mobilised a unified framework based on neo-
institutional theories to explain the PFM/NPM reforms. To the best of our knowledge none has 
adopted the institutional logics to explain accounting change in the LDCs/EEs. In addition, the 
research did not discover any longitudinal study that has analysed the context of the Ghana IPFM 
reforms.   
1.5 FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The study mobilised grounded theory-informed methods to provide a causal explanation of the 
performance of PFM reforms in Ghana by deriving and endogenizing the core and main categories 
of the reforms empirically to develop a substantive theory on PFM reforms in Ghana. This was done 
abductively by relating the core category (budget credibility) of the reforms to the main categories 
using the paradigm model (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This research has conducted a longitudinal 
field studies examining the historical as well current change processes to provide processual accounts 
of Ghana reforms from pre- to post-independence in 1957 as an antecedent to the substantive PFM 
reforms from 1996 to 2018. This methodological approach has important implications in advancing 
our knowledge of the institutional effects of the reforms.  
This study mobilised institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, Thornton et al 2012, Friedland 
and Alford, 1991, Jackall, 1988) as the theoretical framework of the research. In addition, the study 
draws on the insights from institutionalism on how best to implement national reforms (Campbell 
and Pedersen, 2001). The novelty of this research is that it develops and apply a unified robust 
institutional framework based on institutionalism and symbolic interactions to diagnose the 
performance of the PFM reforms in Ghana. Firstly, the old institutional and new institutional theories 
are adapted to provide a framework salient for the polities in LDCs. Secondly, we used that to provide 
a platform for deriving the institutional orders and their elements to explain reform logics. The 
research therefore makes a theoretical contribution by expanding the scope of institutional logics and 
demonstrating new ways in which logics can inform our understanding of public financial reforms 
context and accounting change.  
1.5.1 Findings: 
Empirically, the study found that the budget credibility logics determine the advancement of the 
reforms, which is interrelated to five other fundamental categories (namely, professionalism, 
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accountability and transparency, automating and financial re-engineering, and political and 
development partner interventions in the budget processes, and policy credibility). That is, the Ghana 
reforms, as a phenomenon, can be explained through the credibility of the budget, in the sense that 
the absence of credible and predictable budgeting has retarded the advancement of the reforms. By 
understanding the properties and dimensions of these conditions, the research provides a causal 
explanation of the reform’s performance. In the case of Ghana, budget credibility has become the 
constraining factor which has the properties of persistency of large variations, and budget informality 
which have been institutionalised as an accounting practice. 
Longitudinally the research shows that only limited improvements have been in the transformation 
of the public financial management system to support economic development in Ghana from the pre-
independence era. Opportunities to decentralize financial controls were not taken in the 1980s, and 
the recent reforms have only centralized both the reforms and financial management controls.  
In applying the lens of institutional logics, the study found that sub-optimal practices endure as a 
result of the interplay of budget rigidities, wish-listing budgeting and gaming within the “vampire 
state” (Frimpong- Ansah, 1991). The budget credibility and ultimately the reforms are impacted by 
the hegemonic influences by international community on local actors institutionalised in the polities 
through objectification and exteriorisation of cultural practices. 
1.5.2 Contributions: 
A novelty in our approach of explicating reforms in developing countries is in combining the 
paradigm model and institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, Thornton et al 2012, Friedland 
and Alford, 1991, Jackall, 1988) as our theoretical framework of the research. We develop and apply 
a unified robust institutional framework based on institutional logics to diagnose the performance of 
the PFM reforms in Ghana.  Firstly, we adapt the interinstitutional ideal types to provide a framework 
salient for the polities in Ghana (as an example of other LDCs). Secondly, we used that to provide a 
platform for deriving the institutional orders and their elements to explain reform logics.  
The research therefore makes theoretical contribution to the accounting literature in three respects: 
Firstly, by showing how the paradigm model can be adapted to explain public sector accounting 
change. This study makes a theoretical contribution in explaining the dynamics of the reform by 
extending the political economy narrative of corruption, neo-patrimonialism and patronage to wish-
list budgeting and gaming of the system by the acting units. Thus, we go beyond the existing accounts 
of PFM reforms to enrich the understanding of accounting change in DCs.  
Secondly, this study expands the scope of institutional logics and demonstrates new ways in which 
logics can inform our understanding of public financial management reforms’ context and accounting 
change. The study has re-framed public sector accounting change in Ghana and created new insights 
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of the relevance of institutional logics to public sector accounting change in non-Western context. 
Through this approach the study found evidence of objectification and exteriority of culture, instead 
of the conventional view of internalization of practices, and the existence of translation instead of 
diffusion of accounting practices in a DC context. This contribution has important implications in 
advancing knowledge of the institutional effects of the reforms. 
Thirdly by analysing the evolution of PFM reforms in Ghana, the study has created new knowledge, 
and has advanced the understanding of accounting change in Ghana and other developing countries. 
This study contributes, also, to the policy debate on best-practice and sequencing of public financial 
management reforms’ literature from emerging and developing countries. It offers alternative 
insights into how complex accounting reforms with several components can be sequenced and 
implemented.  
1.6 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The rest of this thesis starts in Chapter 2 by conducting a literature review, summarising and 
critiquing the tendencies and trends in the research literature; accounting change in the context of 
LDCs reforms; identifying both empirical and theoretical gaps that formed the basis of our research 
question. From the extant literature the study reviews what is known about accounting change 
generally, before extending the search to the specific literature from developing and emerging 
economies on integrated public financial managements, and then to the existing literature on Ghana 
reforms. The study noted (with a few exceptions such as Alsharari et al.,2015) the limited application 
of institutional theory in the extant literature from LCDs, especially in its application to the PFM 
reforms. This thesis critiques and builds on the foundation laid down in the extant literature from the 
LDCs, especially those from Ghana, drawing on institutional theory such as Lassou (2017), Simpson 
(2015), and Andrews (2009, 2012). 
Chapter 3 sets out the methodology and methods of the research by discussing the research 
philosophy, and how the study was conducted. This chapter addresses the challenges of conducting 
qualitative research in the social sciences by mobilising the Weberian philosophical approach of 
verstehen; and provide the justifications of adopting grounded theory informed methods in data 
collection and analysis. In the search for an appropriate theoretical framework, the study adopted a 
systematic combining approach (Dubois and Gadde, 2002) by mobilising institutional logics 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, Thornton et al 2012, Friedland and Alford, 1991, Jackall, 1988) 
symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969, Mead 1934), grounded theory informed methods (Strauss 
and Corbin 1998; Corbin and Strauss, 2015; Charmaz, 2014; Gioia et al., 2012), and a processual 
narrative (Buckley, 1967; Dawson, 1994). To ensure rigour in qualitative research I adopted 
ethnographic methods in collecting and analysing the empirical data from the field. The study 
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developed the causal explanation of accounting change based on the paradigm model (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998) by relating the core category (budget credibility) to the main categories from the 
empirical data. This chapter presents the properties of the core category on the Ghana IPFM reforms 
and engage in theory building by relating the causal conditions, context, intervening conditions, 
strategic actions and interactions, and their consequences on the reforms. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the context of accounting change and the PFM reforms 
longitudinally using insights from the processual approach. Firstly, it provides an introductory 
literature review to contextualise the three periods of public sector accounting reforms from pre-
independence to the post 1992 reform efforts. It places the present-day reforms in the context of the 
recent governance reforms.   
Chapter 5 draws on Strauss and Corbin’s paradigm model to discuss the empirical elements the 
properties of the budget credibility logics as the central category in the performances of the IPFM 
reforms.  
 Chapter 6 provides a processual narrative of Ghana IPFM reforms, showing longitudinally the 
evolution of the public financial management system from pre-independence to-date. Drawing on 
the processual framework developed by Dawson (1994) this chapter provides an evolutionary 
narrative, explaining the conception of change, processes of transition, and the operation of new 
practices and procedures. The empirical findings are theorised by using institutional logics as a meta-
theory to conceptualise the reforms.  
Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the budget logics through the theoretical framework based 
on notion of rationalised modern polity in Ghana and institutional logics of the reforms. This chapter 
explores the wider implications of the logics of the community, state, market, professionalization, 
family, religion, and corporations through the categorical elements of national community logics, 
state logics and international community logics. 
Chapter 8, as the concluding section, links the work done in this research to our original research 
question to demonstrate our contribution to knowledge within the constraining factors of the data 
and our methods. Building on the work undertaken in this thesis. this chapter takes account of recent 
developments since this study commenced and points the way to future research in this area. 
Additionally, this chapter provides the principal policy and practice findings; and discusses the 
implications of this work for the future direction of public sector accounting research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This literature review chapter is divided into five main parts to reflect: (i) the centrality and relevance 
of  accounting change in PFM reforms; (ii) theories that are usually mobilised to explain accounting 
change; (iii) the theoretical development of institutionalism, including the institutional logics 
approach (ILA); (iv) some of the accounting change studies that used  institutionalism and 
institutional logics  as their theoretical framework (including studies from LDCs); and (v) accounting 
change literature from developing countries context. This review paves the way to the construction 
of the research question and the identification of a couple of intellectual paradoxes in the penultimate 
section of this chapter, and the potential contribution is outlined in the final section before the 
conclusion. 
The purpose of this literature review is to create an understanding of the reforms through the review 
of the literature on accounting change and organisational change in general, and public financial 
management reforms in EEs/LDCs. Public financial management reform, as an offshoot of the global 
NPM reforms is concerned with managing accounting change and innovations in planning and 
budgeting, the regulatory space in accounting and reporting, financial management, and transparency 
and accountability mechanisms. This review therefore relates the research to the wider on-going 
dialogue in the extant literature (Creswell and Creswell, 2018).  
2.2 EXPLAINING ACCOUNTING CHANGE 
2.2.1 Introduction to accounting change 
Accounting change is at the heart of the NPM reforms (Liguori and Steccolini, 2014). Reviewing the 
extant literature on accounting change helps to establish a platform for exploring some of the theories 
that explicates reforms, leading to the development a conceptual framework for the study in Chapter 
3. 
The extant literature has critiqued the earlier notion of accounting change that focused almost 
exclusively on accounting as a technical subject (Roberts and Scapens ,1985; Burchell et al.,1985; 
Hopwood, 1983) drawing mostly from neoclassical economics and managerial sciences. The earlier 
notions of explaining of accounting change adopted transactional cost theory, agency theory and 
contingency theory. Explaining accounting change was construed as a phenomenon with rationally 
determined outcomes, and that view continues to prevail outside the narrow confines of academic 
research, especially in developing and emerging economies. Burchell et al. (1985, pp.381) had noted 
accounting was “coming to be seen as a social rather than a purely technical phenomenon”, social as 
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well as economic. The interpenetration of the accounting and society was such that “it will be seen 
that the social, or the environment, as it were, passes through accounting. Conversely, accounting 
ramifies, extends and shapes the social” (Burchell et al.,1985 pp. 385). Accounting technologies have 
social dimensions; and it has been argued that ‘accounting is not what it seems to be; it is essentially 
something else’ (Justesen and Mouritsen, 2011 pp.163). Accounting is constituted by and reflective 
of a broad range of disciplines in the social sciences. Dent (1991) observed that accounting practice 
as a common feature of “work technologies in organisation is not a purely technical-rational affair. 
Rather, it is embedded in a cultural system of ideas (beliefs, knowledges) and sentiments (values), in 
which actions and artifacts are vested with symbolic qualities of meaning” (pp706). Scholars have 
even argued that accounting data stir emotions therefore its reach extends to the psychological 
sciences. In the latter sense, accounting is an affective technology (Boedker and Chua, 2013) which 
has both technical and social aspects (Burchell et al., 1985). Potter (2005) has also argued that 
accounting has both social and institutional dimensions in addition to its technical aspects. 
The awareness of the pivotal role accounting plays in the functioning of organisations (Hopwood, 
1983) and the social, or the environment (Burchell et al, 1985) requires accounting change to be 
studied in its organisational and societal contexts to create a deeper understanding of it. Accounting 
change is required to be studied in the organisational context by relating accounting practices to all 
the other functional practices in an organisation (Roberts and Scapens ,1985; Burchell et al.,1985; 
and Hopwood, 1983). Therefore, studies that have focused on one aspect, such as technology, in 
explaining an accounting phenomenon in neglect of the social and institutional dimensions only 
provide partial explanations, which are often misleading. The contextual issues of accounting change 
often go beyond intra-organisational to extra-organisational factors. 
 In more recent years there has been a shift in the overall thought collective Douglas (1986) among 
accounting scholars which called for the reconceptualization of accounting and organisation change. 
Part of this shift was in recognition that the various neoclassical based economic theories (such as 
efficient market theory, principal-agents theory, and contingency theory) do not provide an adequate 
explanation of the development of accounting techniques and systems (Dillard et al., 2004). The 
other part is perhaps attributable to the emergence of alternative insights from social and 
psychological science disciplines (especially, sociology, social psychology, and anthropology) about 
organisational and institutional change. Scholars have argued that the operation of work technologies 
such as accounting is ‘embedded in a cultural system of ideas (beliefs, knowledges) and sentiments 
(values), in which actions and artifacts are vested with symbolic qualities of meaning” (Dent 1991 
pp706). Consequently, accounting is constituted by and it is reflective of a broad range of disciplines 
in the social sciences.  
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In the reconceptualization of accounting, accounting scholars are being asked “to refocus their efforts 
toward the better understanding of how accounting influences, and is influenced by a multiplicity of 
agents, agencies, institutions and processes” (Dillard et al.,2004 pp 506). Roberts and Scapens (1985) 
found that emphasising the technical view of accounting led to accounting research that was 
accounting-centric and piecemeal focusing on specific elements of accounting systems such as 
budgeting, investments, and inflation accounting with the objective of improving their efficiency. 
Their concern was the absence of a framework for an integrated view of accounting that embraced 
the emerging insights of accounting as reflective of its environment, shaped by ideology (Gilling 
1976), or that which was constitutive of behavioural and political aspects. Roberts and Scapens 
(1985) suggested that accounting was to be viewed as practice that was embedded in other functional 
areas within organisations such as procurement, marketing, human resource management, and 
production to understand accounting change. 
 Accounting has ways of shaping how organisational processes are seen, controlled, and managed 
for the ends they serve. It has the capacity of changing the interpretive schemes in other functional 
domains in an organisation, which has been termed as accounting colonisation in the literature 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997). Hopwood argued that accounting is fundamental to the proper 
functioning of organisation, but not much was known about the organisational nature of accounting 
practice. Studying accounting practice at the organisational level enhances our understanding of how 
that practice interfaces and interacts ‘with other organisational practices, decision processes, and 
power structures’ and ‘the factors that give rise to the accounting phenomenon and induces it to 
change’ (Hopwood, 1983 p.288). The nature of accounting varies from context to context, and the 
meaning of accounting emerges from its organisational and social setting. In that sense, Hopwood 
saw accounting practices as both dependent and independent variables (implying that accounting 
changes should be explained endogenously) Accounting practices are therefore not to be taken for 
granted as exogenous phenomena, but something that shape and are being shaped by the social 
context within that organisation. 
Accounting scholars have asserted that context is paramount and understanding the context of 
accounting change requires exploring the organisational change as a process rather than a snapshot 
of events (Burns, 2000). Change is a dynamic process, and its major influences include power over 
resources, decision making, and meaning making (Burns, 2000). Some of the earlier studies on 
accounting change in the 1990s had focused on such things as ‘accounting systems, accounting 
techniques, the accountancy profession, and the role of an accountant’ (ibid pp. 567). Burns (2000) 
lamented over such studies for paying minimal attention to “understanding and explaining why and 
how accounting evolves in the manner it does, through time, and within specific organisational 
settings” (pp 568). The rational model is not just aprocessual, but also ahistorical and acontextual 
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(Pettigrew,1990) which sees change as a shift from one optimal position to another and focus on 
outcomes. Whereas the processual approach is evolutionary and departs from studying the ‘rational’ 
behaviour of actors. It focuses on studying context by taking into account both intra-organisational 
and extra-organisational factors.  
Burns (2000) observed: 
A processual approach means exploring the temporal dimensions of change, unfolding 
over time, through reference to the past, the present and the future. Explanations and 
explanatory ``factors'' are ``fluid'' rather than fixed…’’…it teases out the characteristics 
of change over time, but also the continuity of settled patterns of behaviour’ (ibid pp. 
568) 
Understanding accounting change through the processual approach has been deemed to be beneficial 
because understanding the change process dynamically allows managers to be better positioned to 
influence the trajectory of change, the potential impact on their programmes; and to help them 
anticipate problems that may occur. 
2.2.2 Earlier notions of accounting change  
Going back to the 1960s and 1970s academic accounting research relied mostly on positive methods 
and mathematical analysis using survey questionnaire and databases with little or no empirical 
content. Researchers described accounting practices in case studies and surveys but with no 
theoretical framework (Goddard, 2010). There were normative papers 5  that were developed to 
describe new practices and to advocate for organisation to adopt them. Accounting functionalists’ 
research aimed to be objective driven by regulatory stance, economic theories and traditional 
managerial theories directed towards technical reforms. Notions of accounting change were therefore 
mostly conceived in terms of managerial /organisational theories and economic traditional utility-
based decision-making theories drawing on agency theory, transaction theory, and contingency 
theory. 
 
Despite the realisation of the linkage of accounting and the social, technical reforms took precedence 
over social understanding of accounting change (Burchell et al, 1985). The works of Gilling (1976) 
and Wells (1976) provide examples of earlier accounting research that were not pre-occupied solely 
with technical reforms as the others (Robson, 1991; and Burchell et al., 1985). These two scholars 
offered examples of contingency models of accounting change as well as some initial insights into 
the dialectics of accounting and its environment. These two scholars attempted ‘to explicate and 
 
5 Normative is used here to denote the practitioners’ type literature which tends to set recommended 
benchmarks for accounting practices and techniques. This type of literature is produced by scholars and 
practitioners in the WB, IMF, OCED, Brookings Institution and Regional Development Banks and 
consultants commissioned by them. Much of this normative literature tends to adopt positivist- functionalist 
stance; and their methods are therefore nomothetic.   
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develop a general description and characterisation involved in the interaction of accounting with its 
social context (Burchell et al., 1985 pp. 382). Gilling (1976) offered some understanding of the social 
and institutional forces underlying accounting change; arguing that accounting responded to changes 
in its environment with a time lag. The inertia of change was explained in terms of the incapacity of 
the accounting professions to decide, or rather agree, on the appropriate modifications to be made in 
accounting practice (what they termed ‘immobilisation of the agency’ of the accounting profession 
as a result of accounting ‘ideologies’). However, as the environment develops or evolves it requires 
accounting to reflect the environmental needs. In the extreme scenario in this model accounting 
change is environmentally determined as it reflects the environment and nothing else. 
 
Wells (1976) presents a constitutive view of accounting change caused by the accounting profession, 
in contrast to the Gilling’s (1976) reflective view. Wells (1976) maintained that accounting 
developments whilst essentially internal in origin, have the power to affect their environment. In this 
formulation the process of accounting change is produced through relatively autonomous intellectual 
innovations within the practice. The argument advanced by Wells (1976), since it involves an 
autonomous accounting profession, shows the sensitivity and vulnerability of professional 
developments to the courts, public opprobrium, and the opinion of the business community in 
influencing accounting change. In other words, Wells (1976) emphasised the notion of change that 
is dependent of the thought-collective of professional bodies. This idea of change has been described 
subsequently by Douglas (1986) as Durkheimian-Fleck theory of change. This conception of change 
is not necessarily a closed-ended system but that which is opened and influenced by the wider society. 
 
Gilling (1976) and Wells (1976) represent an earlier models of accounting change based on the 
professional accounting community and the social structures of society.  Burchell et al. (1985) show 
that whilst these two conceptions of accounting change appear to be directionally opposed in their 
depiction of the relationship between accounting and its social context, they both recognize the 
reflective and constitutive aspects of accounting's relationship to its context. Taken together both 
theories present arguments based on the duality of ‘structure-agency’. Subsequent scholarly inputs 
have noted that they both failed in their presentation to maintain consistency of argument and purpose 
because whilst each starts with a particular direction of causality of change, this direction is not 
maintained consistently throughout, and their arguments can be reversed (Robson, 1991)  
However, in these earlier conceptions of accounting change one sees, what Burchell et al. (1985) 
described as the inter-penetration of accounting, society, and institutionalism. Also coupled with this 
is the possibility, of evolution of the “thought-collective” of the accountancy profession impacting 
on change.  
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2.2.3 Understanding the context of accounting change  
Many scholars have contributed to explaining accounting change in the context of organisation and 
society. Hopwood (1983) noted that studying accounting at the individual level was not as promising 
for reforming the practice and technology of accounting as studying it in its organisational context. 
Following Hopwood’s clarion call for accounting to be interpreted in its organisational context, the 
ensuing explanation (or theorising) of accounting change, for example Burchell et al. (1985), built 
on the existing contingency theory approach developed in Wells (1976) and Gilling (1976).  
 
Burchell et al. (1985) attempted to overcome the limitation of accounting change models based on 
the ‘duality contingency models’ by embedding accounting change in societal change, and in 
mobilising what was later described as ‘a genealogical narrative of contingencies’ (Robson 1991).  
But understanding accounting practices in their organisational (or society) contexts requires more 
than a technical description of accounting information systems (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). It 
requires the technical to be embodied in the practical organisational systems of accountability (Ibid).  
 
For public sector organisations there are compelling reasons to interpret accounting and accounting 
change in the broader society context. Burchell et al. (1985) demonstrated the relationship between 
accounting change and society change more explicitly through the notion of determination and 
representation of accounting concepts such as value added in the UK. For public sector accounting 
change research, the notion that accounting both reflects its context and assists in constituting that 
context, through accounting of its environment is very pertinent. The relationship of individuals and 
their collective action, and the relationship between accounting and society can best be understood 
in accountability terms (Roberts, 1991). He distinguished between hierarchical forms of 
accountability and socialising forms of accountability. Accounting for oneself and for organisations 
works through a system of either hierarchical accountability or socializing accountability. There “is 
an unavoidable interdependence of action both within the organisation and between the organisation 
and the communities in which it operates…. One of the principal problems of accounting information 
is that if it is treated as a mirror, it seems to reveal only independent entities. At worst, the practice 
of accountability is taken in by this image and uses information in a way that seeks to locate 
responsibility and blame unequivocally” (ibid pp. 367). 
 
Hopwood (1987) argued that very little was known about the pre-conditions, processes, and 
consequences of accounting changes. Accounting is often implicated in not only in the management 
of organisations but also in the wider economic and social environment in which it is located. These 
forces also in turn impact on both the accounting processes and accounting change. At the time of 
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Hopwood’s writing, accounting research mostly focused on the technical aspects of accounting with 
a view to improve existing practices; and the historical accounts tended to be ahistorical. 
2.3 REVIEWING THE ACCOUNTING CHANGE LITERATURE TO GUIDE THE CHOICE OF 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. 
The literature (both academic and practitioner-based research) has established that reforms are 
context dependent (Adhikari et al. 2019; Manning and McCourt, 2013). The central challenge of 
explaining the context of accounting change and reform revolves around resolving the structure-
agent dilemma that lies at the heart of all social science investigation. This dichotomy corresponds 
approximately to the objective-subjective distinction, and macro-level theories versus the personal 
sensemaking and meaning construction theories Justesen and Mouritsen (2011), that are often 
mobilised in accounting research. To explain accounting change theories that can be adapted as the 
conceptual framework of this study, following the lead provide by 
Below I discuss the key conceptual of frameworks commonly found in the accounting research 
literature to justify why this study adopted the ILA approach (with SI) as the conceptual framework 
of this research. The list includes (i) political economy theories, (ii) actor-network theory, (iii) 
governmentality, (iv) Bourdieu’s practice theory, and (v) Gidden’s structuration theory. (vi) 
organisational-institutional theories. This study argues that while institutionalism stands as a 
distinct intellectual effort, the ILA as a meta-theory of institutionalism is more appealing because it 
mobilizes elements from the recent advances in the social and cognitive sciences into accounting 
research. This is not an exhaustive list, and at the end of the section I list a few theories that are 
sometimes used in combination with these major frameworks or with others. I exclude institutional 
theories from this list and present it separately in section 2.4. 
2.3.1 Political economy theories 
Scholars have argued that NPM reforms can be explained in terms of new institutional economics 
(NIE) rooted in public choice, transactions cost theory, and principal-agent theory (Hood, 1991). 
These political science and economic doctrines generate a set of ideas such as contestability, user 
choice, transparency and incentive structures that have been embodied in the NPM public 
administration reforms. Not surprisingly, some of the earlier LDCs accounting research papers that 
explicated the performance of the PFM reforms, as a sub-set of the NPM reforms, followed the 
path of transactions cost and principal-agent line of theorising (Abdul-Rahaman et al.1997). 
However, more recent researchers have drawn on cultural political economy framework (Hopper et 
al., (2009) that has been extended to structural explanations such as neo-patrimonialism and 
globalisation (Lassou, 2017, Lassou et al.,2019, Hopper et al., 2016). Whilst these lines of 
theorising have provided some insights into the reform outcomes, their heavy emphasis on 
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structural factors like poverty, colonialism, and international aid institutions seem to give only a 
partial understanding of the context of accounting change.  More importantly, political economy, 
like other structural theories, can explain but they have limited abilities to give account of the 
dynamics of the reforms because they suppress the role of active human agency.  
2.3.2 Actor-Network Theory 
In contrast, the actor-network-theory (ANT), as an alternative framework of accounting change 
explains as well as provides the dynamics of change. It dwells on a constructivist perspective 
(seeing change as non-linear, and not based on rational improvements or functionalism (such as the 
“functional adaptations to new demands in a changing environment). “Instead, accounting 
dynamics are viewed as the outcome of historical, contingent processes in which new accounting 
constellations (Miller, 1991) appear because heterogenous elements, such as different groups of 
people, different vocabularies and various technologies are temporarily linked together at a 
particular moment in time”. (Justesen and Mouritsen, 2011 pp.164). ANT’s constructivism eschews 
the distinction between the objective and subjective, arguing that the dichotomy is unhelpful and 
should not exist. Thus, ANT keeps the social ontology flat, and as Justesen and Mouritsen (2011) 
argued ‘there is no “backstage” reality behind the appearance and therefore the dichotomy of 
appearance/reality is rejected. ANT is anti-dualist and anti-reductionist in the sense that 
observations are not reduced to a set of general explanatory factors “behind” the scene or 
“underneath” the surface’ (pp163-164). Context in ANT’s terms is provided by the accounting 
calculations and conditions, as Justesen and Mouritsen (2011) avers that” inscription and 
calculations are central to explaining activities and not just the effects of conditions and contexts 
even if the accounting entities derive their power from associations between calculations and 
conditions (Latour,1986)” (pp 164). ANT has influenced accounting research since the 1990s by 
putting “back the role of calculations as central object in the study of accounting phenomena” 
(Justesen and Mouritsen, 2011pp.161). Examples of leading “agenda setting” work combining 
ANT with Foucauldian and/or neo-institutional perspectives, include Miller (1990, 1991), Robson 
(1991, 1992) and Preston et al. (1992). In the view of Justesen and Mouritsen these papers are 
agenda setting “because they set the scene for the development of ANT-inspired accounting 
research” (pp.166). ANT has been popular among accounting researchers such as Briers and Chua 
(2001) on the implementation of activity-based costing; Quatrrone and Hopper, (2005), Dechow 
and Mouritsen (2005) for management accounting control and integration. In the developing 
country context, How and Alawattage (2012) adopted an eclectic use of ANT, neo-institutionalism 
and political economy to investigate accounting change in a Malaysian company. One of the 
attractive attributed of ANT, which stands as useful contribution to the development of institutional 
theory is that it introduces the notion of ‘translation’ which refutes the ‘mindless’ diffusion often 
associated with conventional institutionalism. ANT brings many attributes that are found in the 
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other conceptual frameworks, and notwithstanding adopting some of these attributes for the 
conceptual of this study, this study questions and goes beyond ANT’s key assumption of flat 
ontology.   
2.3.3 Governmentality 
The Foucauldian governmentality “analytics” framework provide both substantive theoretical 
insights as well as epistemological and ontological method of investigation (Dessalegn Getie 
Mihret Bligh Grant, 2017). For example, it provides a lens for looking at the relationship between 
knowledge and power. “Governmentality” was formulated by Foucault as a concept to capture the 
essence of “governing the self” and to “governing others”. (Foucault 1978, Dean 1995; Lemke 
2001). As a research conceptual framework, it directs researchers to question in terms of how 
discursive practices emerge, are maintained and transformed (Gordon, 1991; Dean1995). 
Governmentality lays the foundation for exploring both the “mentalities” and the “rationalities” of 
government in neo-liberal modern states. It shifts the traditional notion of governmental power 
derived from sovereignty to “conduct of conduct”. The governmentality approach is useful for 
investigating government reforms because it brings together the interplay of the political, 
economic, and social forces, as well as the “effective” history shaping society. The concept lends 
itself to examine how particular forms of governmental practices have emerged, including 
accounting practices in their diverse ways. The pillars of the “analytics” of government (Dean 
1995) are visibilities, knowledge, techniques, and identities created from the financial management 
reforms. As Dean has pointed out, these pillars are matters of empirical substance to be 
investigated through research. Governmentality has inspired a corpus of accounting research in 
western industrialised countries such as Loft, 1986; Miller (1991); Miller (1992); Miller & 
O’Leary, T. (1987); Miller & O’Leary (1993); Miller & O’Leary (1994); Miller & O’Leary (1998); 
Preston et al., 1992; Miller and Rose, 1990; Miller 1991; and others. Governmentality accounting 
research that have emerged from the developing world include Neu et al, 2006; 2007; 2014; 
Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001b; Uddin and Tsamenyi,2005 and more recently Alawattage and 
Azure, 2019.Governmentality research is in the ascendancy in developing countries as indicated in 
the application of  the theory of epistemic connections (Alawattage et al. (2016) However, the 
focus of governmentality research is at the macro-context and would not have the same explanatory 
power to bring forth the personal sense making and meaning construction that is the focus of this 
study. 
2.3.4 Bourdieu’s Practice Theory 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice emerged from addressing the dialectics of agency-structure to explain 
the institutional realities of modern society. He starts by rejecting on the one hand Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s notion of existentialism as untenably voluntaristic and on the other the Levi-Strauss 
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structuralism as too rigid for reducing human culture into cognitive templates that hovers over 
individuals’ heads (King, 2005). At the same time, Bourdieu’s identified with the positive aspects 
of these theories to create a marriage between phenomenology and structuralism. Similar to 
Mead/Blumer, he argued that the objectivists’ stance, as external observers, taken by some social 
scientists as artificial and not possible. That is, it only leads to misrepresentation of the social 
realities that they investigate. For the lack of practical mastery of the subject, social scientists 
create ‘cultural maps’ that they impose with the “risk of reducing cultural life to a wooden system 
of rules which imposes itself on the actors.’ (King, 2005 pp221). To address this, Bourdieu 
advocated “a ‘reflexive sociology’ in which sociologists try to theorize rigorously their own 
position in relation to the practice of the participants of their studies (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992) (King, 2005 pp 221). Bourdieu’s ‘reflexive sociology’ and ‘practice theory’ are 
therefore joined in the agency of the participant and that of the researcher.    
 To implement these philosophical insights Bourdieu developed the concepts of field and habitus to 
re-cast the excessively objectivist’s and excessively subjectivist’s stances in social research. 
Habitus was developed to overcome subject-object dualism in which individuals are endowed with 
agency that assumes boarder social significance that comes from the culture of which they are 
members. Culture in this sense has objectivity that cannot be understood in individualistic and 
voluntaristic terms as it precedes the individual knowledge and understanding. A habitus – 
“systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures pre-disposed to functions as 
structuring structures (Bourdieu 1990/1980 pp 53). The habitus operate in a wider institutional 
setting which he termed as the field which is a network, or a configuration, of objective relations 
between positions (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, pp.97). 
Bourdieu’s practice theory makes linguistics play by referring to concepts such as noesis – an act of 
knowing; and noema- background information (all that is known); - and capital- as the ‘energy of 
social physics’ (Bourdieu 1990/1980 pp.122) which is the medium for the operations of the field, 
that connects it to the habitus. Bourdieu made a distinction between economic capital and social 
capital. In addition, “drawing a distinction between the actual; structure of the social system in its 
multidimensional stratification and the symbolic products which arise from it’ (Grenfell, 2011 
pp.33). Bourdieu referred to his approach as ‘structural constructivism’ or, “constructive 
structuralism’ (Grenfell, 2011).  Bourdieu’s practice theory has been mobilized in accounting 
change research. For example, Kartalis et al. (2016) adopted Bourdieu’s notion of field and habitus 
in combination with accounting and organisational boundary maintenance to explicate NPM 
reforms. In the developing world an example of the application of Bourdieu theory is found in 
Rahaman et al.’s, 2007 study of the water company in Ghana. 
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2.3.5 Structuration Theory 
Giddens structuration theory also aimed to provide a bridge between structure and agency in the 
development of social practice. Like Bourdieu’s practice theory, structuration theory seeks to 
explicate the reproduction of social structures by individuals’ agency within cultural rules and 
resources. Structuration refers to the process by which individuals reproduce society’s major 
institutions such as the state, legal, and administrative systems and its social, class, and economic 
structures. Giddens asserted that it is the structure that ensures that the individual acts in a way that 
reproduces the social system as a whole. Structuration works through the “duality of structure” 
whereby the structure is both the medium of social action and the outcome of social action. 
Giddens illustrate the ‘duality of structure’ with how we use a language. When we speak a 
language, grammatically (or according to its rules) we are speaking it in a structured way, and at 
the same time contributing to it. “in other words, social agents reaffirm and reproduce the rules on 
which they draw in their actions” (King, 2005 pp219). “In structuration individuals contribute to 
reproducing the whole system of social rules whenever they act. Structure underpins social practice 
to ensure that it takes a meaningful and relatively predictable form” (King, 2005 pp220) 
Structuration theory is a synthesis of Talcott Parsons’s notion of ‘structural functionalism’ in which 
individuals internalize certain values in order to reproduce institution in society. Giddens 
developed the structuration to overcome a shortcoming in Parsons scheme where the individuals 
are over-socialised by structures and became ‘cultural dupes.’ Giddens response to cultural dupes 
was the notion of ‘acting subjects’ (a concept borrowed from the interactionists (Mead (1934); 
Blumer (1969) and ethno-methodologists Goffman and Garfinkel) which emphasized individual 
agency without ‘lapsing into subjectivism (Giddens, 1979 pp.44). Gidden’s structuration therefore 
comes close to symbolic interactionism as King (2005) declared: “Structuration theory is ultimately 
a synthesis of interactionist and interpretive thinking on the one hand, with its emphasis on agency, 
understanding and subjective meanings, and functionalist and structuralist thinking on the other 
hand, with its focus on the operation of social systems and the resilience of objective structures”. 
Pp.218 
“Structuration theory is designed to explain the reproduction of institutional orders through the 
knowledgeable agency of individuals. It is a kind of fusion of the work of Durkheim and Parsons 
on the one hand and the work of Weber, Schutz, Mead, Goffman, and Garfinkel on the other”. 
Pp.21 
Social theories such as Bourdieu’s practice theory and Gidden’s structuration theory have been 
critiqued for being either excessively determinism on the one hand or for being methodological 
individualistic on the other hand. In both theories, structures determine individual action to varying 
degrees (more in Bourdieu’s than Gidden’s) King (2005). The challenge for both theories is that if 
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human actions are determined by rules that habitus or structure impose on them, of which they are 
not aware, then human agency tends to be denied (King, 2005). Bourdieu’s concept of the “habitus 
has a tendency to emasculate human agency, to reduce dynamic and uncertain social interaction to 
the inevitable reproduction of institutional structures. The habitus impose certain forms of conduct 
on the individual. Individual agents reproduce the institutional structure of the field because they 
are determined by these unavoidable cultural predispositions.” (pp 229). 
Similarly, in Gidden’s structuration ‘the structure is inexorably attached to the social system and 
therefore that for the most part individuals automatically reproduce the system. The implications of 
Gidden’s theory is that structure ensures that individuals always act in a way which is compatible 
with the system”. A further implication is that ‘individuals necessarily act in a way which is 
consistent with social order.” (King, 2005 pp229). Therefore, the structuration process reproduces 
itself and cannot explain change. 
Both theories insist on the freedom of agents to choose their direct line of action, therefore these 
theories deny determinism (see Giddens, 1984 pp75) and Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 pp134). 
But King (2005) argued that the problem is that if individuals are free to choose different lines of 
actions and the structure or habitus is not that constraining, then they can always choose different 
lines of action all the time. King (2005) avers that: “The danger in Giddens and Bourdieu’s theory 
is that individual only choose to follow structure or habitus. And if they only choose to follow 
structure or habitus, they could at any moment choose not to follow them. Regular social 
interactions here seem to be explained finally only by individual choice” (pp229). 
The dilemma is that structure-agency thinking leads to determinism or descend to randomness of 
choices on the other hand. These theories therefore fail to explain the persistence and resilience of 
regular social institutions (King, 2005). That notwithstanding, the notion of structuration has been 
applied by institutional theorists to provide the micro-foundation for neo institutional theory as in 
Barley and Tolbert (1997) structuration. This has been followed up by accounting research studies 
such as Dillard et al., (2004); Burns and Scapens (2000), and Uddin and Hopper (2005).  
2.3.6 The trajectory of theorizing accounting change in LDCs 
Theorizing LDCs accounting research has followed a trajectory mapped out in Alawattage, et al. 
(2016) which were divided into four phases. The initial stages of pre-independence era in the 1950s 
to the 1980s represented the prescriptive management accounting phase. Accounting theorising was 
based on neoclassical economics-contingency theory of development/ underdevelopment. This 
phase was dominated by the functionalist paradigm, and references to culture drew on Hofstede’s 
theory of culture. These two have been critiqued, highlighting the importance of understanding the 
context of accounting and accounting change but not in the Hofstedian sense of culture as the entire 
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way of life of people, such as differences in religion, and race. Culture has been taken as way of 
sense making (Swidler,1986) explained in section 2.6.2 of this thesis. In the context of accounting, 
others have argued culture as the conditions of accounting change within different environs, such 
as domination, poverty, and political economy (with the social elements added) as in Hopper et al. 
(2009).  
The other three phases in Alawattage et al.’s (2016) scheme include: (ii) theorising the political 
connections; (iii) theorising the epistemic connections (through post-Foucauldian and post-
structural analysis); and (iv) theorising the civic connections. In these more recent phases of 
Alawattage et al.’s mapping puts governmentality and post-structural theories at the centre stage of 
LDCs’ accounting research. The concepts in governmentality has the potential to be combined with 
other theories to advance accounting change research in LDCs. For example, governmentality been 
combined with other theoretical traditions such as ANT to undertake contextual accounting change 
research (Justesen and Mouritsen, 2011) For the developing world, the potential for 
governmentality research is great for its capacity to provide a complete integrated conceptual 
framework that would join the macro level (political economy) analysis to the micro level (of 
“governing the self”) drawing on multi-disciplines to investigate the complex social relationship 
associated with IPFM reforms and to look beyond the obvious (Scheurich and Mckenzie, 2005) to 
create deeper insights. 
In the LDCs the literature has drawn on various theories, such as: 
• Ekeh’s colonialism and two public theory of the two publics as used in the paper by Killick 
(2008); Goddard et al. (2016); Lassou et al 
• Discourse analysis as in the political economy theory of development discourses as 
employed in van Helden and Uddin (2016) review paper; and Ashraf et al. (2019) draws on 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) discourse theory to explain why NPM type reforms failed in 
Pakistan 
• Hegemonic and colonial/ neo-colonialism theory as used by Ashraf and Uddin (2016) to 
explain why international consultants abandon their free roaming activities in LDCs; and 
Goddard (2002) on hegemonic analysis 
• Negotiated order – as used by Rahaman and Lawrence (2001a) 
Other researchers have opted for new institutional theory to explain the PFM reforms (for example 
Adhikari and Mellemvik, 2011 for accrual accounting reforms) and grounded theory methods (for 
example Goddard and Mkasiwa, 2016 for NPM budget reforms in central government of 
Tanzania). But new institutional theory is a theory of stability and not noted for its ability to 
explain change. This study argues that the ILA as a meta-theory has the benefit of bringing greater 
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insights into the context of the reforms in Ghana. Richardson (1987 pp. 352) has pointed out: “It is 
perhaps most important where authors are using hybrid or multiple perspectives in order to identify 
aspects of studies where multiple interpretations of data are possible and conceptual ambiguity is 
most likely”. 
2.4 INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES AND THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS APPROACH 
2.4.1 Introduction 
To understand change, scholars have argued that we must understand, among other things, individual 
and organisation behaviour and those behaviours must be located in a social and institutional context. 
The “institutional context both regularises behaviour and provides opportunity for agency and 
change” (Thornton et al, 2012 pp. 462). However new institutionalism, as originally conceived by 
scholars, is a theory that explained stability and not change. To explain change, scholars had to merge 
the old and new institutionalism in neo-institutionalism and strengthen its micro-foundations. 
Institutional logics (Friedland and Alford’s (1991) went beyond neo institutionalism to frame the 
belief systems in which actors are embedded to understand them better (Nath, 2019). Logics can be 
mobilised to explain accounting change and PFM reforms, which involves complex interactions 
between myriad actors. In this section, the study reviews the literature to explain how and why the 
institutional logics approach (ILA) departs from neo-institutionalism in explaining change. 
 
The institutional logics typology as a variant of institutional theory, according to Thornton et 
al.,2012, departs from new institutionalism in very important respects. In mobilising institutional 
logics as our conceptual framework, this study argues that this departure provides a richer 
understanding of accounting change (especially in the LDCs context) than new institutional theory 
as advanced by (Meyer and Rowan 1977, and DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, and 1991). To create a 
better understanding of what follows in the review of the current institutional literature, this section 
takes a little detour to explain the differences between the old and new institutionalism and to suggest 
their relevance in non-Western context. In addition, this section sets out the tenets of institutional 
logics approach and how it provides a theoretical bridge to agency and change. In Chapter 3, I build 
on this to adapt the institutional logics framework (Thornton et al. 2012) for theorising the empirical 
findings of the research. 
2.4.2 Institution and Institutionalism 
The institutional logics approach (ILA) explores the interrelationships between individuals, 
organisations, and society; and it was developed as a variant of institutional theory insofar as the 
latter focuses its “attention on norms and mandates such as laws and regulations, belief systems, 
cultural pressures, and social comparison processes” (Palmer et al., 2008 pp. 739). The ILA is a 
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variant of institutionalism, which is arguably the most potent meta-framework for studying 
organisations and accounting change. Contemporary scholarship, even those rooted in neoclassical 
economics, recognises the organisational environment, especially the institutional environment as 
the prominent requisite place for economic organisations (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991). Modell 
(2009) while referring to public sector performance management, as an aspect of PFM reforms, has 
noted that institutional theory has the potential of offering “cumulative theorizing” (pp. 278) of 
reforms. This study translates Modell’s cumulative theorising to mean a theory (or a hub) that leads 
to empirical results that can withstand systematic examination leading to the construction of middle-
range theories and accumulation of knowledge. 
Burns and Scapens (2000) identified three institutional theories commonly used in the accounting 
literature in explaining accounting change: old institutional economics (OIE), new institutional 
economics (NIE), and the new institutional sociology (NIS). To Burns and Scapens’s list may be 
added the old institutional sociology (of disorder and conflict of interest) as one of the variants 
potentially available for researchers to deploy. To put all these variants in their proper perspectives 
requires an explanation of the conceptualisation of institution and institutionalism. 
What has come to be termed as the ‘new-institutionalism’ is found in a variety of forms in the social 
science disciplines such as economics, organisational theory, political science and public choice, 
history, and sociology (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Institutional theory has a long tradition in the 
social sciences, especially in economics dating back to Veblen (1898) who worked on the mechanism 
through which social and economic action occurred; but its current conceptual formulation, as neo-
institutionalism, is rooted in institutional sociology. Reflecting the different disciplines, the variety 
of assumptions and goals behind institutionalism diverge depending on their origins in the social 
sciences.  
There are many variants of institutions and institutionalism making it difficult to have a universal 
definition (Scott 1987). Institution connotes many things. For example, the old institutional 
economics (OIE) saw institutions as ‘a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, 
which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of a people’ (Burns and Scapens, 2000 
pp. 5-6). However, to the ‘father’ of OIE, Veblen, institutions are to be seen in biological and 
evolutionary processual terms. He argued that human behaviour is moulded by habitual tendencies 
that evolve over time, but also there is an element of ‘idle curiosity’ in that behaviour, which is new 
ways of thinking and doing things that bring about change (Burns and Scapens, 2000). In contrast 
the new institutional economics (NIE), deriving its root from neo-classical economics, utilitarianism, 
and equilibrating mechanisms, see institutions in terms of gains made from lowering transaction cost. 
Its focus is on “why” for optimal reasons change might occur, but not on the “how”, which is 
concerned with explaining the process in moving from one equilibrium state to another.  
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Institutions and institutionalism have come to have different meaning from the perspectives of the 
various social science disciplines. To the rational choice theorists (namely, the. neo-classical 
economists and political scientists), institutions are very similar to conventions as they are deemed 
to be a phenomenon at temporary equilibrium; but to the neo-institutionalists (new sociological 
theorists), institutions are more than mere conventions, for they take on rule-like character, which 
for participants are taken for granted. From this emerges different definitions of institutions. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) provide snapshots of the way rational choice theorists define 
institutions to include: temporarily “congealed tastes”; or framework of “rules, procedures, and 
arrangements”; or “prescriptions about which actions are required, prohibited, or permitted”; or “sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area…” (pp.8). 
Economists (and political scientist) and behaviourist in the rational choice tradition, generally, tend 
to consider institutions as epiphenomenal. They interpret collective action as an aggregate 
consequence of individual choices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Contemporary accounting research 
has not yet shaken off the shackles of this economic lineage, and that has influenced the 
understanding of accounting practitioners of institutional theory especially outside the narrow 
confines of academic institutionalists. The economists’ version of institutional theory (especially the 
OIE) has the limitations that it takes organisational change as evolutionary and constrains the 
explanation of agency (or human action).  
 
In analysing markets for example, economic analysis runs into difficulties “when confronted by the 
real world of firms, states, and courts. Put simply, the problem is that institutions (formal law, rules, 
and informal practices), governments, firms, and the network of relationships among collective actors 
within markets operate to produce more social structures than makes sense for most economic 
theorising” (Fligstein,2001 pp xiii).  
In contrasts neo-institutionalism, reflecting its sociological roots, began as macro-theorising of 
cultural (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and structural (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) explanations of 
institutionalisation to provide legitimation and rationalization of organisational action.  It focused on 
three central concepts, institutional rules, legitimacy, and isomorphism (Thornton et al., 2012). 
Zucker (1977) tested and verified at the micro level the macro theorising provided in Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) ‘that the taken-for granted rules or institutions are perceived by individuals as “facts”’ 
(Thornton et al., 2012 pp 23). 
The neo institutionalism in sociology, organisations studies, cultural studies drew new insights from 
how anthropologists viewed institutions, that emphasised socially constructed meaning and symbolic 
action (for example see Douglas, 1986). From this discipline where behaviourism and functionalism 
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were never fashionable, they defined institutions as social thoughts and actions that have rule-like 
status (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Thus, unlike the economists, for the neo-institutional theorists 
the only conventions that counts as institutions are those that have rule-like status (ibid). In addition, 
they defined institutionalisation in phenomenological terms as a ‘process by which certain social 
relationships and actions come to be taken for granted’ (ibid, pp. 9).  
Whilst accepting the latter definition as provided from anthropological insights, for the purpose of 
putting accounting change in its organisational and social context, we find it more meaningful to let 
institutions reflect the historical, organisational, and structural aspects of social phenomena. 
Jepperson (1991) provided further insights by arguing that an institution is a social order or social 
pattern that has some permanency through a specific reproduction process. The process of 
reproduction is relatively self-activating to the extent that it achieves a status of routine and does not 
require any recurrent active management by the collective for it to perpetuate itself. Notably, “when 
departures from the ‘pattern are counteracted in a regulated fashion, by repetitively activated, socially 
constructed controls – that is, by some set of rewards and sanctions – we refer to a pattern as 
institutionalised” (Jepperson, 1991 pp.145). Thus, institutionalised practices or social myths are 
embedded in other social myths and practices that tend to reproduce themselves and support each 
other.  
Other scholars have deepened our understanding of institutionalisation by showing that it is a 
cognitive process (Zucker, 1983), socially constructed by human actions (Scott, 1987; Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967) especially in their day-to-day routines. For example, human beings are 
institutionalised to create and accept social order, even when not constrained by their instincts (Scott, 
1987). The process of institutionalisation is ‘typified’ by Berger and Luckman’s three ‘moments’ of 
externalisation (of action), objectification (of reality), and internalisation.  
Scott (1987) noted that many scholars appear to converge on the definition that:  
institutionalisation is viewed as the social process by which individuals come to accept a 
shared definition of social reality—a conception whose validity is seen as independent of the 
actor's own views or actions but is taken for granted as defining the "way things are" and/or 
the "way things are to be done," (pp. 496).  
Another convergence of meaning among scholars is that institutions are establishment of 
distinctively social sort that is relatively permanent (Hughes 1936, Zucker, 1977). Zucker (ibid) has 
argued that institutionalisation and culture persistence go together, and that it is not necessary for 
internalisation to occur for institutionalisation to manifest itself. She argued that “For highly 
institutionalised acts, it is sufficient for one person simply to tell another that this is how things are 
done” and individuals are motivated to comply to enable their actions to be understood (ibid, pp. 
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726). But it is only when norms are internalised that institutionalisation can be identified and said to 
have occurred (ibid).  
New institutionalism rejects the individualistic rational actor models and functionalist explanation of 
phenomena: Scholars have found that empirical evidence does not accord with rational-actor or 
functionalists’ explanation of organisational behaviour (March and Olsen ,1984; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983/2015). For example, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983/2015 reported that “Hospital 
administrators are less concerned with the efficient use of resources and more concerned with status 
competition and parity in prestige”. 
To quote DiMaggio and Powell: 
Administrators and politicians champion programmes that are established but not implemented, 
managers gather information assiduously, but fail to analyse it, experts are hired not for advice 
but to signal legitimacy. Such pervasive findings or case-based research provoke efforts to 
replace rational theories of technical contingency or strategic choice with alternative model that 
are more consistent with the organisational reality that researchers have observed” (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991 pp. 3).  
 
The empirical evidence from the IPFM reforms in Ghana tends to accord with such findings.  
2.4.3 Old versus new institutionalism: A variant of institutional metatheory for LDCs 
Institutionalism tried to offer everybody something, out of which has emerged hegemonic claims to 
‘true” institutional theory. The aspirants to “true” institutionalism are many, ranging from those 
bringing perspectives from ethnomethodology, anthropology, cognitive psychology, neo-classical 
and evolutionary economics, and old and new sociology (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997).  For this 
research we argue that whilst the old and new institutional sociology are useful platforms to theorise 
the research, they can be transcended by institutional logics as a variant of neo-institutionalism. To 
demonstrate that, we review the literature to highlight in this section the key contradistinction 
between the old and new institutionalism and show why and how neo-institutional theory need to be 
modified to take account of the context of non-Western societies. In Chapters 3 and 6 we deepen this 
approach by mobilising this framework to propose the salient interinstitutional orders for Ghana as 
an example of non-Western society.  
Institutions constitute actors as well as constrain them, by shaping organisational structure and action 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) and individual actions. However, the meaning of contemporary 
institutionalism varies between the disciplines of economics and political science to sociology and 
organisational studies. Prior to this conceptual diversity, institutionalism had a dominant 
functionalist turn. In the Parsonian view, institutions functioned to integrate one organisation to 
another using universal rules, contracts, and authourity (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). With the 
emergence of new institutionalism in the 1970s, the focus of institutionalism changed to legitimation 
and rationalization of organisational actions at the macro level (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and 
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cognition and culture at the microlevel (Zucker, 1977). Among the neo-institutional theorists (from 
the new institutional sociology), the notion of institutions was the taken for granted rules leading to 
isomorphism in the formal structures of organisations (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  
 
To neo-institutional theorists, there are significant points of divergence between new institutionalism 
in organisational theory and sociology from the new institutionalism in economics (rational choice) 
and political science (conveniently labelled as the public choice theorist) (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). They have argued that there is a distinction between the new sociological institutionalism and 
the old sociological approaches to organisations and institutions. This distinction they argued 
provides the path to the affinities between the new institutionalism and social theory particularly to 
the development of action theory (ibid, pp. 11). The roots of the old institutionalism can be traced 
back to Selznick (1957) and even further to Parsons (DiMaggio and Powell,1991). For example, the 
new institutionalist emphasised that whereas the old approach was “straightforwardly political in its 
analysis of group conflict and organisational strategy”, the new emphasised the relationship between 
stability and legitimacy, and the power of common understanding.  This is not surprising since 
conflict theory went out of fashion (Burrell and Morgan (1979), but Dahrendorf’s (1957) conflict 
theory appears more relevant in the context of LDCs where political traditions have not been well 
established and direct conflictual politics and physical struggle for power have been prevalent. The 
two paradigms also identify with different sources of what constrains change. It follows that the old, 
emphasised with the element of prevailing individual and group interests, would generate vested 
interests, which will inhibit change. But this element could be double-edged in the sense that it can 
also enhance change. The new institutionalism does not offer a direct theory of change (Greenwood 
and Hinings (1996) other than reference to the imperative of legitimacy (as in DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). Powell has subsequently attempted to re-dress this shortcoming by reworking the micro-
foundations of institutional theory emphasising the logics of practical everyday action of ordinary 
people in Powell and Colyvas (2008); and practice theory in Powell and Rerup (2016). However, in 
these areas the old institutionalism provides deeper insights appropriate for the conditions in the 
LDCs such as Ghana.  
 
Given some of these obvious shortcomings of new institutionalism, theorists such as Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) avers that institutional theory is not known as a theory of organisation change. But 
they argued that neo-institutional theory could explain change by bringing together the old and new 
institutionalisms and developing an “archetypes model”. However, others have argued that new 
institutionalism has weak micro-foundations, and weak theorising of action (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 
1997 pp412). Thornton et al, 2012 have shown that the critique of DiMaggio and Powell (1991) of 
Selznick (1957) theory of leadership and action undermined their own position in developing an 
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institutional theory that had better micro-foundations. By doing this Thornton et al argued that 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991)) ignored their own prior call in DiMaggio’s (1988) for agency and 
institutional entrepreneurs, and Powell (1991) own call for considering power in expanding the scope 
of institutional analysis.  In addition, their notion of cognition ignored mindful agency and action.  
Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) have argued that the “much of the wide popularity of institutional 
theory stems from its apparent success in bridging traditional chasms between organisational theories 
emphasising action and those focussing all their attention on structure” (pp. 407). Therein lies the 
strength and the benefits of ILs as a variant of institutional theory that puts change at the centre of 
theory.  
The blending of the old and new institutionalism around multiple themes has been labelled as neo-
institutionalism (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Institutional scholars have suggested the 
convergence of all the elements of the old and new institutional theory (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996). Others have not been so far reaching. With that, Thornton et al. building on Hirsch and 
Lounsbury (1997) critique of new institutionalism have asked:  
Would it not be better to include Selznick’s (1957) theory of leadership and action so that 
further theory growth could occur possibly through integration and a more sophisticated 
capacity for multilevel and multi-metatheoretical research (Thornton et al.,.2012 pp32) 
Furthermore, we extend the critique of new-institutional theory by averring to the argument by 
scholars that “Western property rights and organizing forms are rare and unlikely constructions” 
(Jepperson and Meyer (1991, pp 204). Modelling of non-Western societies based on unadulterated 
forms taken from Western sources are therefore often misleading.  Based on the empirical evidence 
from the LDCs (in this case Ghana) we propose the following variant of neo-institutionalism that 
bridges the old and new institutionalism appropriate for non-Western institutional environment. On 
that basis we propose an adaptation of neo-institutionalism as outlined in column 4 in the Table 2.1 
below.  
Table 2.1: A variant of institutional metatheory based on LDCs environment 















Sector of Ghana 











of vested interest 
combined with 
authouritarian 
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Symbolic role of 
formal structure 
Ambiguous  
(All are relevant) 










(All are relevant) 







(All are relevant) 




Organisation Field or society 
 














needs to be 
explained 





Theory of action 
 
























(All are relevant) 
Both old and new 
institutionalism 









the effect of 
Education-(see 
Jepperson, 1991 
pp: 156)  
Cognitive basis of 
order 




Goals Displaced  Ambiguous 
 
Ambiguous  
(All are relevant) 
Evidence of 
misplaced goal 
and ambiguity of 
goal in the public 
sector 
Agenda  Policy relevance  Disciplinary 
 
Ambiguous  
(All are relevant) 
Both old and new 
institutionalism 
Source: Adapted from DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
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Accepting the call for convergence of the old and new (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997) we adapt the 
neo-institutional framework, for the conditions in LDCs/EEs, based on the elements presented in 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991).  
Scholars have argued that institutional logics is a variant of new institutional theory as part of the 
organisational theory community (Thornton and Occasion, 2012; Palmer et al.,2008). But that raises 
the question whether new institutionalism is a theory or an amalgam of theories, as Palmer et al. (pp. 
740) state: “a more cynical appraisal might be that the new institutionalism represents merely an 
umbrella for a diverse array of theory and research seeking a legitimate pedigree”. Following 
DiMaggio’s (1995) lead, Palmer et al. presents three types of theory: covering  law theories- as 
generalisation of the world as we see it and measure it (which is a positivist’s approach identifying 
the ‘what’ of phenomenon); narrative theories- as accounts that explain the way the world works (the 
how and why of phenomenon); and enlightenment theories- as hybrid of theories in combinations to 
compensate for their respective strengths and weaknesses. DiMaggio explains that the enlightenment 
theory is more exciting because it is rich in paradoxes and has “a set of categories and domain 
assumptions aimed at clearing away conventional notions to make room for artful and exciting 
insights” (pp. 391). 
Following DiMaggio (1995) argument above, we therefore adopt institutional logics as an 
enlightenment theory, and adapt it as a meta-theory. 
2.4.4 New variants of neo-institutionalism and the Institutional Logics Approach 
Neo-institutional theories have been one of the dominant theoretical perspective researchers have 
drawn on to explain new public management reforms (Modell, 2009). There are many variants of 
neo-institutional theory (Scott, 1987), of which the institutional logics approach is one. Moving on 
from the older versions of neo-institutionalism to its new variants, institutional logics approach 
overcomes some of the shortcomings in institutionalism and brings many insights about explaining 
change. Modell (2009) sees institutional logics “as the higher-order templates of a material as well 
as symbolic nature which condition actors’ interpretations of organisational realities and thus provide 
meaning to actions and structures ….” (pp.278). 
As a variant of neo institutional theory, Friedland and Alford (1991) developed a non-functionalist 
conception of society, that focused on “social construction of interests and the contradictions that 
different institutional logics generate” (Kamens,1993, pp 1494). Friedland and Alford developed 
institutional logics in terms of the different societal spheres in society, and the content of the belief 
systems that differentiate one from the other. In situations where the content of these belief systems 
may not necessarily be in harmony, it creates the possibilities of different believes for the same 
activity in any given society. Different institutional logics are generated because any given activity 
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such as productive work or governance can have multiple meanings and conflicting or contradictory 
focus (Scott, 1987).  
In Friedland and Alford’s conception, society has three levels made of individuals, organisations, 
and institutions. Individuals with different interests compete and negotiate, and equally organisations 
with different interests generate conflict which they resolve through coordination. There are also 
several institutions, each with its own central logic, which generate inter-institutional contradictions 
and interdependencies. Friedland and Alford critiqued theorists who focus on individual level as 
becoming either excessively subjective or hold human nature as invariantly universal (such as the 
economists’ utility theory). They argued also that theorists who focus on organisations (such as the 
nation-state or corporations) tend “to overstate an omnipresent, disembodied power which enables 
elites to discipline and punish without resistance, or assume that they have extraordinary latitude to 
make strategic choices determined only by their access to material resources” (pp.241-242). For our 
purposes in this thesis, Friedland and Alford’s argument against theorising at the organisational level 
is very fundamental because they found that such theorising may explain for example the state’s 
capacity to make strategic choices to solve particular problems, but it does not help us to understand 
the source of the problem and the details of the strategic choices. Equally, Friedland and Alford 
argued that, theorists who focus on society level tend to emphasise structural functionalism (like Karl 
Marx, Parsons) which yields teleological deterministic outcomes (such as modernity, rationalization, 
or revolution). For these Friedland and Alford posits that the analyst must examine all the three levels 
to provide an adequate explanation of what is going on in society.  
Institutional Logics, as conceived by Friedland and Alford (1991), aimed to put the potential tension 
between the levels of analysis and the institutional orders to explain the success and failure of 
institutionalisation by theorising the exteriority of society. It was not simply critiquing new 
institutionalism for its inadequacies but providing better micro-foundations to neo-institutional 
theory by fusing the duality of interest and culture (alternatively construed as action and structure) 
found in DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983,1991) exposition of that theory. The new institutional 
theorists argued that institutionalisations took place at the level of organisational fields, independent 
of the institutional order in which they were found. Theoretically they assumed that the institutional 
fields were homogenous, and that led them to arrive at isomorphism. In DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983) isomorphism was the outcome of the structuration (Giddens, 1979) of the organisational field. 
Organisations responded to the dynamics of structuration than the need for efficiency in their internal 
processes and/or competition. The structuration processes, according to DiMaggio and Powell are 
driven by the activities of the state and the professions (Thornton et al., 2012 Chpt. 2). 
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By re-working the micro-foundations of institutional theory Friedland and Alford (1991) put interests 
back in the maintenance of social order. Under the old institutionalism, the notion of interests was 
central to that paradigm, in the sense that conflict of interests was considered as source of inertia to 
change and societal order (Dahrendorf 1957, Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Under the new-
institutionalism interests was relegated; instead, legitimacy and isomorphism became the central 
issues. Putting interests back as the shaper of institutionalisation meant the pendulum had swung 
back (in the order-conflict dialectics) from those who argued stability in social order to those who 
argued change, conflict, and coercion in social structures.  In this sense Friedland’s and Alford’s ILA 
was not new, it went back to re-discover the old institutionalism. 
 
Friedland and Alford’s ILA adopts the subsystems approach6 to analysing institutions and the content 
of culture, in contrast to the normative approach adopted by Jackall (1988). The subsystem approach 
theorises institutions by way of sectors such professions, the state, and competition (as a view of 
markets), which was first identified in DiMaggio and Powell (1983), as the main source of 
rationalization. The normative approach of institutional analysis, on the other hand, explains the 
persistence of rules and regulations (norms) through the mechanisms of internalisation (Thornton et 
al, 2012).  
 
Friedland and Alford (1991) reworked these three sectors in an attempt to make them more 
comprehensive to embrace five core institutions of Western society, identified as: the capitalist 
market, the bureaucratic state, families, democracy, and religion; each has a central logic that 
constrains the means and ends of individual behaviour. Thornton and Ocasio, 2008 streamlined them 
into six categories, namely: markets, corporations, professions, states, families, and religions and 
further expanded them to seven in Thornton et al., 2012 (by adding the concept of community).  
In addition, Friedland and Alford (1991) brought another insight to the theorising of rationality. 
Rationality to some institutional theorists is a cognate term that comes from rationale or giving “an 
account that makes past actions understandable and acceptable to others” (Scott and Meyer, 1991). 
The meaning of rationality in Scott and Meyer’s sense is tied to accountability, through rendering 
accounts for past actions. Organisational and individuals past actions, or actors’ behaviours are 
rationale or nonrational as argued by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) and Scott, 1995) in the 
sense that past actions are accounted for (rational) or not accounted for (nonrational). Friedland and 
Alford questioned the economists’ position that they tend to study rational choice of consumers, 
while “other social scientists study irrational bases that prevent people from choosing. We argue that 
 
6 “The sub-system approach defines and identified institutions with specific clusters of sectors such as the 
state, professions, the family, and the market” (Thornton et al.2012 pp.42)  
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the theoretical tension is not that of rationality and irrationality, but between different transrational 
orders.” Friedland and Alford, (1991, pp. 235). Thornton et al., (2012 pp. 42) furthered this argument 
by stating that “rationality is a relative concept depending upon the location of individual and 
organisations in one or more of the institutional orders (cultural subsystems) of the inter-institutional 
system”. Friedland and Alford mobilised the insights of both cognitive psychology and anthropology 
to critique rational-choice theory which does not show theoretical concern of how preferences are 
formed, but rather assumes that sovereign individuals approach the world in “an instrumentally naïve 
way” (pp. 251). Rationality according to anthropologists, such as Douglas (1986), is shaped by 
learned routines, individual strategies and “certain institutional priors” (Friedland and Alford, 1991 
pp.251). As Friedland and Alford went on to argue, as a result of our general ignorance about how 
people end up behaving the way they do, it is more appropriate for us to take alongside instrumental 
rationality other types such as maximising, satisficing, and scheming behaviours. That is, 
organisations and individuals may “have transrational view of reality depending on the root 
metaphors, values, and practices of their dominant or home institutional orders” (Thornton et 
al.,2012, pp.45). 
 
Institutional Logics based on the subsystems approach to institutionalism, in contrast to the 
normative approach, moved institutional theorising forward. Firstly, it helped to resolve the 
perplexing question of which norms were more important that had always niggled at the heels of 
institutionalists, because they were working with uncompleted subsystems. The ILA helped to solve 
this problem with its complete theory of the subsystems. Secondly, the ILA “incorporated the 
normative approach by specifying norms as a variable element or attribute of the institutional orders 
(Y-axis)” (Thornton et al., 2012 pp. 43). The normative approach7  involves internalisation and 
socialisation mechanisms as found in Parsons (1951) and Selznick (1957). 
 
The ILA as a variant of neo-institutionalism have some resemblance to the other neo-institutionalists’ 
theory of how culture is transmitted.  Under the old institutional theory individuals are socialised into 
culture, which goes hand in hand with internalisation (Thornton et al pp. 24). The neo-
institutionalists, generally, posit that culture is transmitted through cognitive processes that do not 
necessarily involve internationalisation. Rather the enculturation processes involve objectification 
and exteriorization (Zucker, 1977: The role of institutionalisation in culture persistence). Cultural 
understandings are communicated from one actor to another (could be within one generation or in 
between generations) as objective facts. The quality of exteriority and objectivity define the reality 
 
7 I use term ‘normative approach’ institutionalism as in Scott (1995). In his three- pillar approach to 
integration of institutionalism he assigned economists and political scientists to the regulative pillar, classic 
or “old” sociologists to the normative pillar, and “new” institutional theorists to the cultural–cognitive pillar. 
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for these actors, and the notion of micro and macro levels become inextricably intertwined (Zucker, 
1977). Other neo-institutional theorist such as DiMaggio and Powell (1991) have theorised the 
cognition dimensions leading to taken for granted understanding and behaviours (Thornton et al., 
2012), while others (Scott, 1987) have theorised it in terms of handed top-down organisational 
classification, routines, schema, and scripts. In contrast, under the ILA, culture is objectified and 
exteriorised to individual and organisations from interinstitutional orders operating in society 
(Thornton et al, 2012 Chpt. 2). The ILA’s concept of institutional orders demonstrates that there are 
some organising principles within institutions which challenge the idea of mindless cognition and 
isomorphism (Thornton et al., 2012). It shows that even within the same country, or even the same 
society, there can be heterogenous culture (Douglas, 1986), and that the homogenous culture 
assumption (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is unduly restrictive.  
 
In explaining change, the ILA externalized institutional practices (as culture) and vocabularies (as 
symbols) that shape both habitual actions and the strategic decisions of organisational participants. 
The institutional orders are framed as specific cultural systems, each generating its own values and 
attributes that are potentially available from which the individual could choose. Thus, being 
confronted with different types of instrumental choices, an individual decides on which course of 
action to take depending on their interpretation of rationality which then shape behaviour actions. 
Change may occur depending on the individual’s interpretations and sensemaking within the context 
of specific institutional order (Friedland and Alford 1991, Thornton et al., 2012) 
 
The idea of the existence of multiple institutional orders, and multiple interpretation in the ILA 
introduces the possibility of multiple logics and contradictions within the inter-institutional system, 
which become the source of change and deviancy, but also stability. Thornton et al. (2012) have 
argued that “Moreover, the interinstitutional system can be transformed by individuals and 
organisations exploring how to interpret and manipulate symbols and practices and thus contesting 
the contradictions between the institutions of different institutional orders” (pp. 44).  
 
This study argues that the ILA as a meta-theory has the benefit of bringing greater insights into the 
context of the PFM reforms in Ghana. Richardson (1987 pp. 352) has pointed out: “It is perhaps most 
important where authors are using hybrid or multiple perspectives in order to identify aspects of 
studies where multiple interpretations of data are possible and conceptual ambiguity is most likely”. 
For this reason, this study argues that institutionalism and processual narratives have become one of 
the leading concepts for researchers investigating accounting and organisational change. I explore 
the development of the institutional theory literature in section 2.5 below. 
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2.5 A REVIEW OF APPLICATION OF INSTITUTIONALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS APPROACH 
TO EXPLAIN ACCOUNTING CHANGE 
2.5.1 Introduction  
In this section we summarise and discuss both the general literature on institution and institutionalism 
to show how they have been mobilised to explain accounting change. In the next section we offer a 
brief review of the frameworks advanced by institutional theorists as foundation to understanding 
the benefits offered in institutional logics.  
2.5.2 Explaining accounting change through neo-institutional theory 
Within the extant literature there is a discernible thrust in describing the process of accounting change 
through the notion of diffusion. The notion of diffusion of practices has been given pre-eminence, 
especially in the theoretical explanations of change based on institutional theories. But it makes 
individuals passive recipients of knowledge, who are acted upon by institutional structures. The 
notion of diffusion has been emphasised in various studies such as Malmi (1999), and Neu and 
Ocampo, 2007. For example, Neu and Ocampo described the diffusion of quotidian practices by the 
World Bank in the education field in Latin America. The process follows a lifecycle and a trajectory 
of diffusion through drivers of diffusion. Efficiency factors tend to drive the early adopters who 
among their peer organisations are the trend setters, to be followed by the secondary stage adoption 
when the localised accounting technologies are embedded (Malmi, 1999). It was found that later 
stage adopters (the laggards) tend to be influenced less by fashion setting organisations, than by being 
influenced by mimetic behaviour and efficient choice considerations. 
The extant literature from the LDCs/EEs that draw on institutional theories have followed two paths 
pioneered in Burns and Scapens (2000) and Dillard et al., (2004). They have been mostly relied on 
old institutional economics’ (OIE) and ‘new institutional sociology’(NIS), which are on occasions 
supplemented by other theories such as Giddens’s structuration theory (van Helden and Uddin 
,2016). But in addition, there are variants of institutional theory offered in Modell (2009) as 
extensions of Lounsbury (2001, 2008) which as far as we know have not featured much in the 
LDCs/EE literature. In reviewing the literature on institutional theory, we provide an example of the 
use of old institutional economics (Burns and Scapen,2000), and new-institutional sociology (Dillard 
et al., 2004), neo institutional theory Modell (2009) 
Burns and Scapens (2000) provide an example of using the old institutional economics paradigm 
supplemented by a modified version of Gidden’s structuration theory that allows for ‘time’, to 
develop an operational framework for studying management accounting change. The framework they 
developed for conceptualising accounting change goes beyond a mere explanation. They sought to 
investigate why and how an organisation’s management accounting becomes what it is, or is not, 
over time. That is, they sought to explain management accounting change as a process’.  
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Burns and Scapens (2000) drew on the notion of rules and routines to explain the process of 
institutionalising management accounting change. Their operational framework explored the 
relationship between agency and structure dynamically (over time) using the notion of rules and 
regulation. They explained that:  
whereas institutions constrain and shape action synchronically (i.e. at a specific point in 
time), actions produce and reproduce institutions diachronically (i.e. through their 
cumulative influence over time). However, change processes in the institutional realm 
occur over longer periods of time than change in the realm of action. (pp. 10) 
In their scheme, starting from any time, the operational routines of the organisation will embody the 
existing institutional principles whilst contributing to shape incoming new rules. These in turn will 
shape the ongoing routines. They call this an ‘encoding process’ that derives from the ‘taken-for 
granted assumptions, which comprise the institutional principles, through their instantiation in 
existing meanings, values, and power’. (pp. 10) 
The framework can allow the impact of for external changes (shocks such as technology changes, 
crisis), and effect of resistance to change. It specifies the conditions under which conscious change 
may occur, as well as when unconsciously change may occur. They said: “Conscious change is likely 
to occur only if actors are able to assemble the resources and rationales necessary to collectively 
question the existing rules and routines. However, unconscious (i.e. unintended) change may occur 
in the absence of systems to monitor the execution of the routines and where the rules and routines 
are not sufficiently understood and/or accepted by the actors” (Burns and Scapens, 2000 pp. 10) 
Burns and Scapens (2000) argued that any change, whether it is the actors affecting routine or vice 
versa, will depend on the existing institutions to shape the process. In that sense in using the 
framework one should not be ‘overly deterministic’ about it, and its expected outcomes. However, 
they argued that “It seems likely that management accounting change which is consistent with the 
existing routines and institutions will be easier to achieve than change which challenges those 
routines and institutions”. 
The awareness that emerges out of the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework is that the processes of 
change are shaped by a combination of systematic and inertial forces. The outcome cannot be pre-
determined because the process is more complex than a rational selection of an ‘optimal’ solution 
(procedures and techniques) would suggest.   
They also pointed out the need to understand the context of change:  
Thus, managing change in general, and management accounting change in particular, 
requires a thorough understanding of the current context of the organisation, especially its 
routines and institutions. This involves much more than a knowledge of the formal 
systems; it requires an understanding of the habits of organisational members and the 
underpinning assumptions which are taken-for-granted in day-today activity. It requires a 
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questioning of the ‘unquestionable’ and as such can be difficult for insiders-although 
outsiders will have to acquire detailed knowledge of the complex processes which are 
involved (pp. 13). 
Burns and Scapens (2000) study, provided several insights to accounting change. They did so 
because they allowed for cultural differences.   
Dillard et al., (2004) provided a four-level framework for understanding accounting change in 
organisations by synthesising Weberian notion of societal norms and values, DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) isomorphism, Meyer and Rowan (1977) decoupling, Barley and Tolbert (1997) structuration. 
Their framework has inspired other researchers because it illustrated how a more comprehensive 
conceptual framework of change could be developed to explain accounting change considering the 
socio-economic factors, political context, and the processes of change. Their framework therefore 
aimed to provide a more credible account of the emergence, acceptance and disposing of institutional 
practices than Burns and Scapens (2000).  
 
Dillard et al.’s (2004) framework focused on explaining organisational behaviour within 
interorganisational context or organisational fields within which organisations are institutionally 
embedded. They assumed an organisational field in which some norms are given, while others are 
socially constructed. Depending on the context, highly institutionalised fields results in isomorphic 
behaviour to ensure organisational survival. Organisational structuration takes place in a dynamic 
way over time through competition, cooperation, and co-optation with the environmental elements. 
In this sense Dillard et al.’s model is comfortably situated in DiMaggio and Powell (1983) of 
isomorphic behaviour, the structuration processes elaborated in Barley and Tolbert (1997), and the 
decoupling of formal organisational structures from actual managerial and operational processes of 
Meyer and Rowan (1977). In such an organisational field, efficiency may be desirable, but it is not 
the primary focus of management as they incorporate rationalised elements in the organisational 
structure for gaining legitimacy first and foremost. The contribution of Dillard et al. (2004) was that 
they attempted to incorporate the elements of power and group interests that are missing in new 
institutional sociology theory. The power structure in Dillard et al.’s framework is both reciprocal 
and relational between actors, and it is incorporated in the recursive reproduction processes of 
institutionalisation.  
 
There are some similarities between Dillard et al. (2004) and Burns and Scapens (2000) because they 
both draw on Barley and Tolbert (1997) in introducing Giddens structuration processes as the micro-
foundations of institutional theory. The difference is that Burns and Scapens framework is rooted in 
OIE, and that “they do not consider the links between the organisational practices and the 
organisational field, or the possible influence of societal factors or influential actors (Dillard et 
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al.2004 pp.511). That is, Burns and Scapens (2000) framework limits our ability to understand and 
motivate change at the organisational level, whereas Dillard et al. take us further into organisational 
fields. Dillard et al. offered a summary critique of accounting change theorising at that point in time 
when they noted: 
While the OIE perspective may be appropriate for the organisational view taken by Burns 
and Scapens, and is significantly broader than most accounting research predicated on 
neoclassical economic theory and its accounting progeny (Scapens, 1994), it is limited in 
recognizing higher levels of social, political and economic issues that influence and define 
the organisational context. Further, it does not address the means by which actions at the 
organisation level may influence the institutional context at the organisational field level or 
the societal level. (pp.511).  
 
Whilst Dillard et al. takes us further through their assemblage to the three levels - individual, 
organisation, and society - found in institutional logics their framework is limited by the homogeneity 
and other limiting assumptions implied in the earlier theorising of neo-institutionalism. Modell takes 
us one stage further by offering to repair some of these limitations in the new variants of 
institutionalism.  
 
Modell (2009) reviews some twenty- eight papers to highlight how neo-institutional sociology has 
developed from its inception some two decades before. In summary he identified three key broad 
areas of the future development of neo-institutional theory. The first area is the evolution of neo-
institutional theory from what he termed as the one-sided isomorphic behaviour to a different 
conception of the relationship between agency and structure. The new approach infuses agency with 
interests and power, resulting in a more complex interplay between structure and agency and different 
possibilities than simplistic isomorphism. This is the path provided by institutional logics. 
The second area builds on the previous critique to question the bifurcation of legitimacy-seeking 
behaviour of organisations and efficiency-centred rational choice made by organisation in adopting 
change. According to Modell (2009), new institutional theorists (such as in DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983 and Meyer and Rowan, 1977) made a relatively strict distinction between the two type of 
behaviours and attributed the latter to technical and economic rationalities in adopting change; 
whereas the former behaved symbolically to gain legitimacy resulting in decoupling. However, 
Modell argued that the value systems behind the two type of behaviours are not necessarily 
inconsistent; and this distinction does not explain decoupling, but the change dynamics involving 
market forces and economic mechanisms remain under-researched.  
The third area of critique and variation from the earlier versions of the new institutional sociology 
has occurred in the shift of emphasis from analysis of organisational fields to institutional field in 
which the main unit is an individual organisation. Thus, Modell posits that there has been a departure 
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from organisational field made up of many organisations to institutional fields where the focus is on 
the role of an individual organisation.  
These perspectives are significant for trying to repair the shortcomings of neo-institutional theory as 
suggested by theorists such as Lounsbury (2001, and 2008). The new variants of institutionalism, for 
example institutional logics, departs from “mindless” diffusion by incorporating translation. It allows 
for the possibility of organisational learning by allowing the possibility of actors to immerse in 
learning the new change processes and using it to shape their organisations (Kjaer and Pedersen, 
2001). 
However, Meyer (2008) makes one more pitch in providing a clear defence of why we may find 
diffusion in institutionalism by saying:  
Institutionalists are told that the analysis of diffusion waves is unscientific – the only 
correct approach is to assume each particle in such a wave is a properly rational and 
interested actor: following this advice would mean giving up on really trying to 
explain the dramatic social and organisational changes of our period. The great 
changes of our period – often poorly recognized by realist social sciences – occur 
much more through waves of conforming non-decision than through networks of 
fully formed and autonomous rationalized actors. 
Meyer’s view has been formed from the common everyday majoritarian perspective, but it goes to 
show why some have criticised the new institutionalists’ position for assuming ‘cultural dupes.’   
2.5.3 Explaining accounting change through institutional logics approach 
One difference between institutional logics and neo-institutional theory is that in the latter it is 
implicitly assumed that for the actor to cause change to occur or resist one, she/he must fully or 
partially be self-emancipated from the institutional ‘chain’. Institutional logics has no such 
assumption, as Modell (2009) argued, all that is required is for the logics to come into play (for it to 
be mobilised). The extant literature points to various ways in which institutional logics impact on 
organisational and accounting innovation and change. Scholars have found that institutional logics 
impact on change or resistance to change in diverse way, such as: implementation of enterprise 
resource planning systems (ERPs); (examples are Heinzelman, 2017; Hyvönen et al.,2009); 
management systems (Wickramasinghe et al. 2007) performance appraisal (Townley, 1997); budget 
practices and stewardship (Ezzamel et al., 2012; Ferry and Eckersley, 2018);  
Institutional logics explain organisational change through the institutional effects of multiple logics; 
and many scholars have shown how multiple logics influence organisational change (Vickers et al., 
2017; Greenwood et al., 2010); how multiple logics influence individual identity (Lok, 2010); and 
management control (Damayanthi and Gooneratne 2017). Dunn and Jones (2010) showed how 
professional practices are impacted by multiple institutional logics. In medicine there are ‘care 
logics’, ‘science logics’, and ‘business logics’, all operating at the same time. In cognisance of the 
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existence of multiple logics, Seo and Creed (2002) have defined praxis as “agency embedded in a 
society of multiple levels of inter-penetrating, incompatible institutional arrangements 
(contradictions)”. They argued that praxis is an essential driving force of institutional change.  
The institutional logics work through tension created by multiple institutional orders and their 
elements. Kaufman and Covaleski (2018) have studied the role of formal and informal budget 
practice change as a tool to manage persistent tension in institutionally complex environments based 
on Friedland and Alford (1991) argument that institutional logics are not just cultural, but also 
symbolic and material. Kaufman and Covaleski (2018) argued that “Budgetary practices emerge as 
an observable, material expression of institutionalised beliefs within a particular setting at a particular 
time” (pp. 3). They found evidence pointing to the underlying tensions between coexisting 
institutional logics and the ‘role played by budgets in managing the tension between the rational 
outcomes espoused by external sources of funding and the actions prioritized by internal 
professionals’ (pp. 4). These tensions generate pressure on the budgeting systems or ultimately on 
the organisation itself, and society on a larger scale. Kaufman and Covaleski, acknowledged the 
contributions from the role of budgeting in managing such tensions, while they focus on the 
mechanisms used by organisations to successfully manage the tensions during times of change.  
I briefly review two key papers in the public sector where logics have been applied (Ezzamel et al, 
2012; Covaleski et al. 2013) for their relevance and to serve as a foundation for this research. 
Ezzamel et al., 2012 have noted that “institutional logics is a way of understanding how actors’ 
selections are conditioned by specific frames of reference that inform the sensemaking, vocabulary 
of motivation and the identities that actors bring to situations”. (pp. 283-284) 
 Ezzamel et al. (2012) in exploring the logics of budgeting in the UK’s educational field found 
different logics at work, including business logic, governance logic and professional logic. For 
example, in their studies, different groups faced different logics as result of their legislative roles, 
professional role, or other roles in the educational field. Headteachers as senior managers of the 
school enterprise were confronted with the business logics), the local education authorities 
(LEAs)and school governors with the governance logics, and teachers with the professional logics. 
Ezzamel et al. (2012) tried to understand how institutional change occurs within the broader 
institutional order by the embedded agency’s ability to switch or combine categories from different 
logics in the education field. The intention of Ezzamel et al. (2012) was to create a deeper 
understanding of “the mechanisms by which institutional logics and budgeting practices work 
through individual actions to achieve, gradually and even painstakingly, institutional change and 
variations…. “. (pp. 284). Their line of enquiry has a broader appeal in other public sector spheres 
where ‘black-boxes’ (or “no-go-areas”) have been created between the accounting practice logics 
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and other professional logics. In some cases, the clash of these logics creates resistance that can work 
against change. 
Covaleski, et al. (2013), showed how, what they termed, ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ were able to exploit 
the politics and inherent tension in the budgeting systems in the public sector. Their paper addressed 
some of the issue of human agency in government reforms from the perspectives of institutional 
entrepreneurs and institutional logics. They argued that budgeting is a socially constructed, and 
institutional logics may serve to transform the power dynamics in the social setting by empowering 
some actors while disempowering others 8 . At the same time, the market logics shape budget 
regulations and endogenizes the state itself in the development of its regulations, which are 
influenced institutionally. 
Covaleski et al., (2013) built on the research agenda emanating from Ezzamel et al., 2012 but in 
contrast they focused on “exploring the dynamics by which knowledgeable, self-aware, calculative  
institutional entrepreneurs seek to overcome the paradox of embedded agency and influence their 
situation, rather than be influenced by it, across multiple locations in an inter-institutional system by 
implementing and resisting a welfare reform effort” (pp. 339) 
In the LDCs/EEs context we found very limited application of logics, especially in the public sector 
where potentially it matters most. The few exceptions such as Ohemeng and Ayee, 2016; Alawattage, 
2011, but Ohemeng and Ayee chose to eschew the meaning of hybridity in terms of cultural elements 
in interinstitutional orders, and rather defined hybridity as a combination of the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches to understanding and explaining public sector reforms.  To our knowledge 
therefore, to date, there is very little research from the LDCs that have applied the full scope of 
institutional logics, as a variant of neo-institutionalism, to the public sector accounting reforms. 
Damayanthi and Gooneratne (2017) undertook a review of studies that have mobilised the ILA to 
explain management control practices in both Western and non-Western countries covering 
government sector, non-profits, firm level and industry level to portray the current use of this 
approach, and to identify possible areas of theoretical development. Their studies found that while 
some researchers had adopted the ILA as a single theory, others had adopted it in tandem with other 
social theories or had used it synergistically with other variants of neo-institutional theory. They also 
identified the gaps in the extant literature that have mobilised the ILA. They found that there was a 
limited exploration of the interplay between external institutions with different logics and internal 
organisational actors whose interests are determined because of different logics they have 
encountered, and how these internal actors strategically respond to external institutions. They, 
therefore, called for more research showing the interplay between individual, field, and societal level 
 
8 Power dynamics between key actors shape the nature of institutional logics (Dodds, 2011). 
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logics. Their studies also appear to confirm our findings that most of the applications of the ILA were 
outside of the public sector, and not in the NPM/PFM reforms.  
2.6 REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING CHANGE LITERATURE FROM DEVELOPMENT COUNTRIES’ 
CONTEXT 
2.6.1 Introduction 
 This section aims to examine the existing literature in integrated financial management reforms 
(IPFMR) and to identify gaps to serve as a basis for the research question. The IPFM reforms, 
characteristically, are in LDCs/EEs as a variant of the worldwide NPM reforms, and often they carry 
an ideological baggage (Lapsley 2009) of neoliberalism.  This thesis argues that the IPFM reforms 
are distinct from the global NPM-type reforms because in the LDCs, they attempt to intervene in all 
aspects of public financial management and its related functional areas (in governance) in an 
integrated wholistic manner. It therefore poses implementation challenges unique to the LDC 
environment where capacity might well be limited.  
There is a vibrant and growing accounting research literature specifically focusing on developing 
countries. Whilst drawing attention to this demarcation, this study argues that making a distinction 
does not mean separation, and that, there are already existing bridges to the broader literature on 
which I build. In that sense, in this review, following the lead of other scholars (Goddard, 2010; 
Rahaman, 2010; Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001a; Abdul-Rahaman et al., 1997) the study 
concurrently reviews the developments of accounting research in LDCs/EEs within the mainstream 
of accounting research. 
This contradistinction enables us to identify in the extant literature what is already known about 
accounting change and NPM-PSM reforms, in so far as they address issues in integrated public 
financial management reforms in LDCs.  
Furthermore, the aim of this section of the literature review is to inform the broader context of the 
research rather than to impose a theoretical framework on the empirical analysis (Goddard and 
Mkasiwa, 2016).  
The purpose of the review is thus, to demonstrate the contribution of this research by positioning it 
in the existing corpus of the worldwide accounting change research (academic journals and books) 
while at the same time linking it to the reform literature based on the LDCs/EEs IPPFM reforms. 
This literature review identifies the gap in the extant literature from the LDCs/EEs and position this 
research in that context (Silverman 2017).  
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2.6.2 Contradistinction between less developed countries and emerging economies 
(LDCs/EEs) and western post-industrial countries accounting research 
The extant literature has attempted to define EEs and LDCs (van Helden and Uddin,2016 for EEs); 
and (Hopper et al., 2016, for LDCs), or simply developing countries (DCs).  I highlight these issues 
for two reasons: (i) For ease of exposition these terms will be used interchangeably throughout this 
thesis. (ii) The extant literature has highlighted the importance of language in current discourses on 
globalisation and socio-economic development of countries (see Lyotard, 1984; and Williams, 2008) 
labelled as the ‘South’ as opposed to the ‘North’ (Lassou and Hopper, 2016; Hopper et al., 2009) and 
the role accounting plays in these discourses. Dating back to the 1970 and 80s scholars used to debate 
about the appropriateness of these labels. They argued that the accolades scholars adopted were 
important, and that the notion of ‘advanced countries’ implied that some societies were socially 
backward. For that reason, this study prefers to use terms such as ‘western industrialised countries’ 
(simply western countries) or ‘post-industrialised countries.’ However, I make the caveat that none 
of these terms is exact. Van Helden and Uddin have noted that “the term ‘emerging economy’ is 
being continually redefined because the parameters are economic development and poverty are 
complex, variable and discontinuous.  
The distinction between accounting research in LDCs from the mainstream western post-
industrialised countries appears to correspond to the distinction   of economic development theories 
from the mainstream economics theories. This separation influenced earlier non-empirical 
accounting research on the LDCs (Abdul-Rahaman et al., 1997). Abdul-Rahaman et al., decried this 
type of research emanating from the LDCs as having been influenced by defunct development 
economic theories. The 1980s saw what was described as a paradigm shift in accounting research, 
which reverberated not only in the post-industrialised countries, but also gradually in the developing 
countries. Up to that point accounting research was a single-paradigm discipline (Lukka, 2010) 
dominated by economics and relying on the objectivists’ end of the functionalist approach and using 
mainly positivist methods drawn from economic principles of rational choice and marginal utility 
(Walker, 2015). 
That shift was accompanied by attempts to redress the balance between financial accounting research 
and management accounting research in the literature. Up to the 1970s the domain of accounting 
research had been in financial accounting, but the need to understand better the role accounting 
played in its organisational context and how it changed from one context to another (Hopwood, 1983, 
1987;) stimulated management accounting research that looked closer at the internal manifestation 
of accounting in organisations. With the rise of management accounting research came the 
application of a wide range of multi-disciplinary theories and concepts, especially from sociology 
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and political science that also fostered critical accounting research. Alawattage et al. (2016 pp287) 
have noted that: 
 Many social theories including orthodox Marxism, neo- and post-Marxism, Weber’s 
interpretive sociology, Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, actor-network theory and various 
versions of institutional theory have been used to shed light on diverse understanding of 
management accounting practices. 
While the mainstream accounting research was going through these changes, in the few and far 
between research that emerged from the LDCs, there was a preponderance of financial accounting 
research over management accounting (Abdul-Rahaman et al.1997; Hopper et al., 2009). This type 
of research continued to be dominated by functionalist methods, which is partly explained by the 
configuration of accounting systems in LDCs that reflects their colonial legacy. That legacy placed 
a lot of emphasis on financial reporting to external stakeholders; and in government reporting to the 
metropolitan colonial offices in London, Paris, Amsterdam, and the others (Tinker, 1980). Such 
institutional practices have been etched into the public administration systems that have become the 
current reality in LDCs governments (Hopper and Lassou, 2017, Lassou et al. 2019, Abdul-Rahaman 
et al, 1997).  
As they have been and continue to persist, accounting and auditing practices tend to be very 
rudimentary in many LDCs (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). Historically financial accounting and 
reporting have been accorded more priority in LDCs, therefore dominated accounting practice. 
Tracing the root back to the colonial period, Hopper et al.,2009 found that the emphasis was on 
financial reporting (for stewardship and tracking remittances) rather abstract notions such as cost 
control (embodied in management accounting) which had no relevance in the context where cost was 
low (especially local labour cost). 
Yet, the centrality of budgeting is in both post-industrialised countries and LDCs (Hopper et al.,2009; 
Enthoven, 1982) alike. The lack of a well-organised general and cost accounting systems, with 
adequate procedures and internal controls, is one of the great weaknesses of most organisations in 
developing nations (Enthoven, 1965), especially in public sector accounting. 
In the last two decades, with the growth of accounting research in LDCs, attempts have been made 
to address the balance between financial and management accounting practices in organisations, and 
this has been accompanied by critical management accounting research drawing on a range of 
methodological-philosophical approaches to reflect the ‘politically and culturally rich idiosyncratic 
contexts’ of LDCs (Alawattage et al. 2016).  
In this research, and in the literature review, we demarcate research emerging from EEs/LDCs from 
those from post-industrial countries. Scholars have argued that EEs, and for that matter LDCs, have 
political and cultural idiosyncrasies that make them unique (van Helden and Uddin, 2016). But in 
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our view, cultural differences per se would not have warranted EEs/LDCs accounting research to be 
given a separate treatment from that of the industrialised world. We argue that it is not ‘culture’ or 
‘politics’ when vaguely defined that makes LDCs/EEs accounting different from the others (such as 
the post-industrial countries). There are cultural differences even within the same country (Douglas, 
1996). However, we are in agreement with van Helden and Uddin (2016) that poverty and 
dependence on external aid create unique circumstances (such as influences of international politics 
within a country, and the relative political instability) that impact on financial management to warrant 
a separate research attention. 
In the cultural discourse, rationality is presented as a Weberian ideal type, which provides the 
requirements or pre-conditions of a bureaucratic state. In this discourse, irrationality is dysfunctional 
and an enemy of a liberal democratic state, despite the limitation on rationality. Alawattage et al. 
2016, has noted the criticism of how culture is treated as a mere variable within studies drawing on 
contingency theory to explain in a positivistic fashion the difference between the East and West; and 
developed and underdeveloped countries. They point out that: 
 However, contingency theory-central cultural studies have been subject to severe 
criticism, especially by critical accounting studies. Within the epistemic parameters of 
contingency theory, culture is conceived only as a taxonomical characteristic rather than 
an underlying force, institution, or process of collective human action, framed within a 
rather positivistic survey-type ‘testing’ of differences and associations. This has been seen 
as an unhelpful conception of culture that is unable to capture the cultural politics 
underlying the historical evolution of accounting and control systems in LDCs. 
(Alawattage et al., 2016 pp. 289) 
As a final cap on the cultural debate, we have found that there is the potential for examining societal 
practices with similar ‘transcultural’ theories to explain rationality, irrationality, non-rationality, and 
transrationality. We argue that re-visiting classical sociology (in terms of linking social-action theory 
to institutional/ organisation theories) provides us with an enhanced toolbox. Institutionalised 
practices and institutionalism provide a better understanding of the taken-for-granted practices than 
‘culture’. However, this institutionalism with its sociological implications, is distinct from that 
defined by economists (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Institutionalist have drawn from anthropology 
(such as Clifford Geertz) who have brought new insights to our understanding of culture. 
Institutionalism have moved away from viewing culture as “the entire way of life of a people, 
including their technology and material artifacts’ to that of ‘publicly available symbolic forms 
through which people experience and express meaning’ (Swidler 1986pp 273). To institutionalist 
culture involves far more than general values and knowledge that one would need to become a 
functioning member of a society (influence tastes and decisions). Culture is now considered as the 
ontological value of actors and action (Drori ,2009) Meyer et al., 1987) in the sense of publicly 
available symbolic forms through which people experience and express meaning. Swidler (1986) has 
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suggested that culture “consist of such symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual 
practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, 
stories, and rituals of daily life. These symbolic forms are the means through which "social processes 
of sharing modes of behaviour and outlook within [a] community take place” (Swidler, 1986 pp 273). 
For our purposes this is how we shall consider culture in this research. 
2.6.3 PFM reforms literature from LDCs and EEs  
In this section we aim to identify the key issues from the extant literature on accounting change and 
reforms in emerging economies that require further investigation. 
 The importance of accounting in the development agenda of developing countries has been 
underlined (Hopper et al., 2016; van Helden and Uddin, 2016) but there is still limited knowledge on 
the conditions of how accounting innovations emerge, are maintained and transformed under 
different conditions, especially in developing and emerging economies (van Helden and Uddin, 
2016; Hopper and Bui, 2016; Hopper et al. 2016; Allen, 2009). 
IPFM reforms in developing countries remain largely an uncharted territory in accounting research 
(Hopper et al, 2016; Lassou 2017; Adhikari and Mellemvik 2011). There are many disparate studies, 
but with a few exceptions (such as Goddard et al. (2016) – Tanzania; Adhikari et al. (2013) in Nepal 
and Sri Lanka; Adhikari and Mellemvik (2011) in Nepal), they are not linked up sufficiently to 
provide both theoretical and empirical explanation of the accounting reforms performance and 
change in the LDCs.  The pressing question of how best to implement integrated accounting reforms 
in the governance context has not been addressed. For example, there has not been much done in the 
extant literature to relate the conditions, context, and properties and their dimensions to explain the 
IPFM reform phenomenon in its social context. Pretorius & Pretorius (2008) has observed that there 
was little knowledge of what made PFM reform efforts successful and what made financial and 
technical support to PFM reforms effective. There are papers that have addressed the phenomenon 
of the IPFM, and within their numbers the ‘normative literature’ dominated. 
Contributions to developing countries accounting research have been made by researchers such as 
Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001a and 2001b; Neu and Ocampo, 2007; and 
Hopper et al.,2009, but there is still very little coverage in the accounting literature on the integrated 
PFM reforms in developing countries.  More recently there have been calls for more qualitative 
research (van Helden and Uddin, 2016; Nyamori et al.,2017) to support better accounting, as an 
essential if a neglected cog in the development mechanisms (Hopper et al., 2016). Lassou and 
Hopper, 2016; (van Helden and Uddin, 2016; Hopper and Bui, 2016;).  
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Scholars have long recognised that accounting practices are historically contingent, and they emerge 
under specific conditions that need to be examined in their historical and geographical context9 
(Miller and Napier, 1993). Contextual factors have been identified as cultural, institutional, ethnicity, 
political interference, nepotism, and over-bureaucracy, whereas conditions are deemed as the 
necessary precursors for successful implementation of reforms (Goddard et al., 2016).  
We reviewed a selection of some of the most recent key papers from the literature to establish both 
the context and conditions of the reforms; the processes of implementation; and the consequent 
reform performances.  
One of the key recent studies is Nyamori et al.,2017, which examined the NPM-type reforms in three 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa) taken to represent broadly the 
west, east and south of the continent, placed the PFM reforms in the broader context of public sector 
reforms. In addition, they summarised several findings from other contemporary accounting research 
from the LDCs/EEs. 
The authors found the accounting reforms that had been implemented across the world had been 
packaged as part of a wider good governance reform agenda instead of narrow economic reforms 
that aimed to reduce the size of the civil service. At the heart of the governance reforms was the drive 
to improve accountability and transparency through civil society participation, combating corruption, 
and the promotion of an enabling legal and political framework. The reform narrative of Nyamori et 
al.,2017 were divided into three phases:1. Shrinking the state in the 1980s; 2. Building capacity in 
the 1990s; 3. Enhancing transparency and accountability in the 2000s). The implied phasing of 
reforms in Nyamori et al. is useful, and it also accords with the historical context of Ghana, which 
we have demarcated into three periodical phases in this thesis:(i) the historical context of the 
 
9 Note that conditions are often interpreted as structure (social, economic political structures) and context as 
values, culture etc. Goddard et al. (2016) noted that Sarker (2006) has found that the existence of a formal 
market economy, the rule of law, and an advanced, efficient level of administrative infrastructure are 
necessary precursors for successful implementation of NPM reforms.  For example, one of the conditions 
necessitating the implementation of reforms have been found to come from pressure exerted by the IFIs (such 
as Nyamori et al. 2017; Rahaman, 2010). Rahaman describe the reforms in LDCs/EEs as ’lender-driven 
reforms’. For clarity I do not find the distinction between conditions and context particularly illuminating, 
and they have been used in the literature interchangeable. For this reason, I have set out to examine what 
previous researchers have found about the interplay between the context and conditions of the reforms in 
emerging economies. I explain later that using grounded theory-informed methods enable us to get away 
from the context and conditions dichotomy, by explaining the phenomenon in terms of its categories, their 
properties, and dimensions. 
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immediate post- independence to the end of the 1970s; (ii) structural adjustment in the 1980s; and 
(iii) NPM reforms from the 1990s onwards). 
Nyamori et al. (2017) found that the paucity of critical accounting research emanating from the 
continent, provided opportunities for accounting, auditing and accountability research. They 
concluded by calling for more critical accounting research that has been lacking in Africa. 
As a condition of accounting change in the developing countries, Rahman (2010) for example pointed 
to the effects of globalization of finance and economic activity and the evolving ‘new’ global 
economic order. His argument pointed to the dependency relationship between the West and 
developing countries, and the possible symbiotic relationship that it engendered. In that sense change 
was perhaps evolutionary and inevitable. However, Rahaman added to this milieu the possibility of 
a clash between globalisation and ‘African traditional accounting and financial management 
practices.’  
Bakre et al. (2017) for example argued that the western type accounting reforms are to improve 
transparency and accountability and corruption in patronage- clientelism based Nigeria. They made 
references to the IFIs (WB-IMF) and the implementation of accrual accounting within the reforms 
adopting the international public sector accounting standards (IPSAS). 
Some of the existing explanations of reforms are derived from contingent factors and are derived 
from atheoretical studies. For example, Ameyaw (2003) accounted for reform failure based 
secondary sources from the World Bank sources that reported that reforms were unsuccessful 
because of the combined influence of inadequate strategies, political resistance, failure to sustain 
long-term reform efforts, and the lack of knowledge about appropriate tools to establish systemic 
change. Another atheoretical comparative studies of NPM reforms in Nigeria and the UK by Olowo-
Okere and Tomkins (1998) is interesting, drawing on pragmatic ideas of ‘basic first’ (van Helden 
and Uddin, 2016).  
 
Scholars have argued that benchmarking of LDCs’ accounting practices against rich countries’ 
practices may induce reforms that are incompatible with indigenous cultures, local democracy, and 
domestic politics (Hopper et al., 2009; Abdul-Rahaman et al., 1997). To improve reform practices, 
it has been suggested that reformers should depart from ‘best practice’ to ‘good enough practices’ 
(Grindle, 2013). This call resonated with the need for in-depth contextual understanding of how PFM 
are implemented. Responding to this call the World Bank opened itself up for ‘disputatious’ 
academics from Harvard Kennedy School of Government and other practitioner- scholars to appraise 
the Bank’s reform record; and to critique their new Approach to public sector reforms dating back to 
2013. In an unusual candid acknowledgement of the WB’s role in the performance of public sector 
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reforms in developing countries, the WB’s staff summarised the deliberations of the panel they had 
assembled by saying that: [Their interlocuters] “are in close agreement about PSM performance in 
developing countries: reform is ‘difficult and frustrating’ (Grindle) and has ‘a poor track record’ 
(Polidano), one that is strewn with ‘frequent reform failures’ (Pollitt). In that light, Pritchett’s 
assessment that PSM is ‘in deep crisis’ scarcely seems an exaggeration.” (Manning and McCourt, 
2013, pg. 392).  
 
For the outcome of these proceedings the WB’s new Approach aimed at “solving ‘functional 
problems’ in a political environment, rather than imposing international ‘best practice’, as the 
essential task of reform” (Manning and McCourt, 2013). Furthermore, the Approach built on 
changing ideas of reform over the last half-century by learning from diagnostic approaches in other 
fields which sought to base reforms’ design on empirical data and finding the ‘binding constraint’ 
and emphasizing adaptation. Thus, the Bank had learnt some of its reform lessons the hard way 
(albeit at the expense of developing countries) by recognising that processes and context matter and 
they must be built upwards. We note that the bank continued to refer to solving ‘functional problems’ 
in its discourse about change rather than more appropriate conceptions such as addressing ‘practice 
challenges’ and their related ‘social conditions’ of change. 
2.6.4 Theorising accounting reforms in the EEs/LDCs: What the extant literature has 
accomplished  
2.6.4.1 Why the accounting reforms are being implemented in LDCs 
There is a broad consensus in the extant literature that the IPFM reforms have been framed in NPM 
terms and driven by pressure from the international financial institutions and other bilateral 
development partners of the LDCs. The NPM, as a global phenomenon has clouded the origins and 
internally perceived need of the reforms. Seen as a global movement, the NPM has left very little 
space for the recognition of the pre-existing demands for reforms going back to pre-independence in 
many of the LDCs whose existence as nation-states emerged out of colonisation. Dating back to 1955 
the United Nations (U.N.) after extensive studies had drawn attention to the importance of 
government accounting and had singled it out as a relational issue between the people of the 
developing world and their government to be addressed (Abdul-Rahaman et al, 1997). Generally, 
accounting reforms formed part of the modernisation transformation agenda that were to support 
socio-economic development (Perera, 1989). Reforms have been considered to have several 
beneficial ends including introducing appropriate accounting practices, bestowing legitimacy, 
addressing issues of corruptions, promoting economic growth, and reducing poverty (Goddard et al, 
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2016). These benefits would occur if the changes were carried out properly in a balanced manner by 
those who they affect, both positively and negatively.  
Hopper et al., 2016 have argued that ‘accounting may seem peripheral to development’ and that 
‘better accounting will not solve poverty’ (pp 1). The first part of their argument is incontrovertible, 
but the second part is too broad and contentious. If through better accounting more credible policies 
get implemented and wanton corruption gets checked, then better accounting will in fact alleviate 
absolute virulent poverty. For the fear of contradicting themselves Hopper et al. developed their 
argument further by saying that better accounting ‘is an essential, if neglected, cog in the 
development mechanisms’ (pp1).   
Following Hopper et al.’s (2016) argument further, if better accounting will not solve the problems 
of poverty, how could better economics solve poverty? This question is pertinent if all economics 
does is to provide policy advice, especially at the macro-level, often without providing the detail 
implementing mechanisms. Hopper et al.(2016) argued for the role of accounting in changing 
development policies by showing, firstly that in the 1950 and 1960s when DCs adopted state-
capitalism (also labelled as socialism), ‘International bodies like the WB and IMF supported state-
led industrialisation’ and the ‘initial accounting research endorsed central state planning, public 
ownership and industrialisation in DCs and recommended improving indigenous accounting 
capacity, data provision, and developing accounting education within a self-governed accounting 
profession’. In that sense, accounting followed the dominant economic policy trend and reflected it.  
Secondly, Hopper et al., 2016 argued that in countries where the prescribed accounting changes took 
place, for example South Korea, economic development occurred, but in those where ‘better’ 
accounting was neglected accounting was used as a charade to gain legitimacy internally and from 
external funders. It was never used to enforce legal rational bureaucratic accountability, allowing 
malpractices to fester in the award of contracts, selling of state assets, and filling of positions. 
Thirdly, Hopper et al. went on to show that in the present times when the DCs have been pressurised 
to adopt neo-liberal policies, because of them being aid-dependent, accounting reforms have become 
very crucial. But the sponsors of the reforms (WB and the IMF) have tended to assume that 
accounting is just a technical matter, a view that has been reinforced by the predominately 
macroeconomic background of the staff of these organisations.  
Just like in the previous period where those countries that adopted ‘better accounting’ were likely to 
do better, in this period there is an additional dimension. The caveat is like in the past where the IMF 
and WB put economic consideration first, and considered accounting as a technical detail, they are 
likely to miss the point that accounting is also social.  For that reason, Hopper et al have pointed out:  
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Critical accounting scholars need to engage with global financial and development 
institutions such as the WB and IMF to investigate how differing globalisation tendencies 
are represented and how they involve accounting, and to formulate effective but tailored 
solutions for DCs. Relevant accounting research is rarely presented in development 
journals and conferences. Accounting researchers’ lack of interaction with officials in 
transnational institutions involved in accounting is surprising, particularly as they tend to 
be transparent and open and interactions with development economists are commonplace 
(pp. 18). 
Currently some, including scholars, see the reforms as indirect control mechanisms by the WB/IMF 
to impose developmental ideologies; and to support hegemonic influences of the ‘North’ on the 
‘South’: “Through implantation of mundane and quotidian practices” (Neu and Ocampo, 2007). The 
‘normative literature’ (Goddard, 2010) mostly authored or sponsored by the international 
development community is replete with exhortation and prescriptions of the type of accounting 
practices and reforms for developing countries to adopt (Goddard et al, 2016). Scholars have warned 
against the crude transfer of accounting techniques from western countries to developing countries 
(Goddard et al,2016; Dean, 1989). 
The literature has highlighted the tendency for the WB to “translate” developmental problems (such 
as in education, health, infrastructure) into financial problems and to solve these problems with 
financial and administrative solutions (Neu and Ocampo, 2007). 
2.6.4.2 The broad conditions of implementing the reforms in LDCs 
The conditions of reforms are multifaceted and are beginning to emerge alongside efforts to correct 
some of the misconceptions. For example, a lack of capacity in LDCs is a widely held view, and that 
is often adduced as an explanation of the poor reform performances. Rahaman and Lawrence (2001a) 
found contrary evidence to the alleged lack of managerial, capacity, including accounting practice, 
in developing countries. They argued that there was not a homogenous lack of capacity by pointing 
to evaluations in a state-owned enterprise in Ghana (the Volta River Authourity) having world class 
accounting systems.  
In recent years scholars’ discourses on accounting reforms have re-ignited the post-World War II 
debates on the power asymmetric relationship between human societies and the impact of colonialism 
in the form of neo-colonialism on the people in the LDCs and the implication of the role of accounting 
in it (Hopper et al, 2016, Chang, 2007). Lassou and Hopper (2016) have elaborated on this by arguing 
that reforms have emerged as a condition of structural adjustment programs initiated by the WB and 
IMF in the 1980s. This view is reflected extensively in the academic research, that sees the reforms 
as part of a package of measures sponsored by the IFIs to orientate the economies of LDCs to market-
based policies, following their fiscal crises (Stiglitz, 2002) 
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This debate has been extended to the unfavourable impact of globalisation on LDCs (Chang, 2007). 
This time around through the hegemonic influences of the industrialised countries working within 
the institutional framework of the operation of the international financial institutions (the World 
Bank, IMF) and the World Trade Organisation. Hopper et al. (2016) have labelled it the neoliberal-
globalisation.  
But the context differs in each specific country case (Abdul-Rahaman et al., 1997). For example, in 
the case of Ghana Lassou et al., 2016 have pointed out the broad conditions of reforms based on 
political economy considerations. Whilst it serves as a useful platform for further research, the 
explanation does not go far enough, and leaves the intellectual puzzle of ‘collective action in a latent 
group’ unanswered (Douglas, 1986, Olson 1965). Thus, the existing literature on the PFM reforms 
(with a few exceptions (such as Goddard et al, 2016) has not paid much attention to the social context 
of the reforms and have left accounts needing further empirical investigations and theorising.  
2.6.4.3 How the accounting reforms are being implemented 
The accounting reforms have been implemented in the LDCs through imposition and diffusion of 
practices by the multilateral financial institutions and aid agencies, thereby they are deemed as a 
continuation of colonial practices (Neu Ocampo, 2007). They argued that contrary to the impression 
created in globalisation discourses that LDCs accounting practices are being transformed through 
de-personalized diffusion of practices, the phenomenon is neither agency-less nor a recent one. The 
WB and the other international development partners engage in discursive practices with local actors, 
such as politicians and senior bureaucrats, that influence future reform actions (ibid) 
Neu and Ocampo, 2007observed that the mechanism of implementation through diffusion of practice 
implies one group (or society or nation-state) attempting to impose a new worldview on others, as in 
this case, liberal democracy. This is one sense where values therefore become engaged in the reform 
processes; and that could result in tensions and latent conflict. It was found that such tensions and 
conflict arose where WB officials, for example, privilege global expertise over local expertise (ibid). 
The extant literature therefore provides evidence of resistance and accommodation (Neu and 
Ocampo, 2007). With a few exceptions (for example Lassou et al.,2019; Hopper et al., 2016; Ashraf 
and Uddin, 2016) there is no clear cut evidence in the literature about the major sources of resistance: 
whether it is as a result of fear of change (as in fear of new technologies), or as a result of resistance 
to neo-colonialism (Lassou et al., 2019 ), or as a result of neo-liberal policies embedded in NPM 
(Hopper et al, 2016).  Hopper et al. (2016) advanced the argument of other researchers who have 
observed that most objectors to globalisation do so for rejecting neo-liberal globalisation and not 
globalisation per se. They further argued that the effects of neo-liberal globalisation have reduced 
the national sovereignty of LDCs making them more vulnerable to global capitalist influences, 
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reducing their tax revenues, engendering their macroeconomic management, and socio-economic 
development.  
Others have argued that resistance to reforms is an unintended consequence, as regressive effects 
(Sieber, 1981) that are founded on both social and psychological levels. Sieber argued that 
interventions that were even meant to be helpful created psychological resistance to change (as in 
the denial of the effects of alcoholism or smoking) or as in social resistance (when a change threatens 
the status quo, or even one group at the expense of the others).  
The notion of resistance to diffusion of reforms, as in Neu and Ocampo (2007,) instead of 
‘translation’ of practices also appears to reflect the pre-imminence of theorizing reforms based on 
the normative institutional theory on change. Institutional theory, especially old institutional theory, 
examines the role of structures at the macro-level, giving us insufficient grasp of human agency at 
the micro level (see Zucker (1977). Neo-institutionalism attempts to bridge this shortcoming by 
providing researchers with a better frame to examine a more active role of human agents in reforms 
processes, based on the emerging concepts (such as structuration, and action theory). But these new 
approaches to theorising, with a few exemptions such as Adhikari and Jayasinghe (2017) in the 
application of Rob Stone’s strong structuration theory, have not yet found extensive application in 
accounting research, especially in LDCs’ research. 
One unintended effect of macro-level analysis is that when attempts are made to theorise the role of 
human agents, especially when they have been based on neo-classical political economy (rational 
choice theory), the outcomes focus predominantly on rent seeking behaviour of officials and 
politicians as in Lassou et al., 2016. The criticism is that rational choice theories suffer from 
reductionism (by aggregating structural effects from individual actions, and not from societal action 
sui generis). Thus, we are misled into generalising from the action of a few. 
Alternative theorising drawing on sociology of translation (see Quattrone and Hopper, 2001; Callon, 
1986, Robson and Bottausci, 2018,) would reveal the cognitive processes involved in reforms, which 
would also give more active role to actors within the government bureaucracy than the passive 
process of diffusion. Others, (such as in Dunch, 2002) have pointed to translation by indigenous 
actors in receiving new knowledge, expressing it locally, and accepting and transforming for local 
use or rejecting it.  Kjaer and Pedersen (2001) have argued that the notion of diffusion is unacceptable 
and at best misleading on both empirical and analytical grounds.  Kjaer and Pedersen further argued 
that language frames reforms, and it is important to make a distinction between diffusion and 
translation in the spread of the neo-liberal creed. The distinction between diffusion and translation is 
significant for our thesis because it brings out the argument advanced by Campbell and Pedersen 
(2001) of the importance of discourse as a strategic action in reforms.  
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Other scholars have also advanced arguments that support the view that reformers should eschew the 
language of diffusion and to adopt that of translation which supports the possibility of active learning 
in the human agency (Busco et al., 2007). In elaborating on management accounting change, they 
made a distinction between diffusion and translation by stating that: 
We do not witness a diffusion of a given practice across space and time, but its translation, 
i.e. a process by which the aim, nature and goal of the management accounting innovations 
are constantly shifted, mediated and renegotiated: management accounting change always 
entails a difference, a movement, a variation, in the nature of what is subject to change 
(Busco et al.pp127).  
In addition, sociology of translation would have raised the vexing question of low remuneration in 
the public service in the LDCs and their calls for better incentives, as instressement, in the reform 
process. Using the metaphor of Christian missionary activities Neu and Ocampo on building on the 
works of other scholars have argued that while the artefact the missionaries aimed to export was 
Christianity, they nevertheless brought with them other wares including ‘medicines, educational 
practices, scientific and administrative technologies.’ What probably the unevangelized wanted was 
secular modernity but they had to accept evangelical modernity (Makdisi, 1997). 
2.6.4.4. Accounting reform performances- challenges 
In the developed industrialised countries, the uptake and impact of NPM reforms have been mixed 
(Hood, 1995); cruellest disappointment (Lapsley, 2009); hailed and praised (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1993). For these countries, the reforms seem to have had moderate success in most cases, even though 
some decoupling has been reported - as in the case of the Dutch (ter Bogt and van Helden, 2000); 
and for the UK the new information generated is neither used nor desired in practice, especially by 
parliamentarians (Connolly and Hyndman, 2006). Researchers have found that the reforms involved 
intense work and massive costs (Ezzamel et al., 2014); some have reported difficulties with the 
techniques, such as accrual accounting. In Germany for example, the NPM reforms have been 
selectively implemented, and in situations where professional identities have been threatened, the 
implementation has required “several interessement devices that were used to enrol them into the 
new practices” (Becker et al., 2014). Resistance to reforms have been found as in UK (Broadbent 
and Laughlin. (1998), and in Germany (Becker et al., 2014). Some researchers have even found the 
idea to be obsolete as noted by Hyndman and Lapsley (2016), but contrarily to this view they argued 
that the evidence shows that NPM is still very much alive.  
 In the LDCs Goddard and Mkasiwa, 2016 have found that many studies have concluded that the 
results have been disappointing and positive impacts have been outweighed by their negative 
impacts. This is especially the case as in the medium-term expenditure framework implementation, 
which aimed to introduce results-oriented management in the public sector (Schiavo-Campo, 2009. 
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Allen (2009) has observed that in some cases where the reforms failed it has been both disruptive 
and chaotic. The performance of IPFM reforms has been stark in most LDCs. This is reflected in the 
language of several academic researchers and scholar-practitioners alike. For example, Adhikari and 
Mellemvik, (2011) reported an unsuccessful accrual mission in Nepal; Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) 
have advanced that: 
The empirics suggest that reforms have failed to achieve improved controls and 
accountability, such as delegated budgets and rewards linking activities to market 
performance. SOEs have maintained the same budgetary activities and rely on their 
political masters for their reasonable targets, rather than the commercially oriented 
budgets expected by the policy makers (pp. 665) 
The evidence of decoupling and unintended consequences has often been the case in LDCs (Lassou 
et al, 2019). Drawing on the Christian missionary metaphor Neu and Ocampo quoted Makdisi, 1997 
as saying: “In some cases, through processes of slippage, the technologies became de-coupled from 
the original spiritual mission that encouraged their introduction” ((Neu and Ocampo, 2007 pp 
367).The evidence therefore shows that the reforms have decoupled (as performance against planned 
schedules), but also the accounting technologies themselves have not been implemented as they are 
meant to be (loosely coupled). 
2.6.5 The modernist agenda through accounting change in LDCs/EEs and Post-Modernist 
turn 
The modernism - post-modernism dialectics is important to this research for two principal reasons. 
Firstly, because much of the accounting change literature is grounded in ‘modernist’ conceptions of 
change (Andon et al.,2007; Quattrone and Hopper, 2001). Scholars have noted that budgetary and 
accounting ‘reforms are not isolated events but are embedded in more global discourses of 
modernisation’ (Hyndman et al, 2014 pp 389). Often change is conceived of as a reasonably ordered 
inputs-output process with even predictable outcomes.  
Secondly, and equally importantly, often, accounting reforms in LDCs is conceived of as part of an 
agenda to modernise their systems of public administration in support of their socio-economic 
development. Discussions of organisational change through modernisation invokes cultural changes 
in the workplace of which accounting practices are implicated. 
The modernists conceive of change as moving from disequilibrium to equilibrium from the 
perspectives of either individualism or contextualism. In individualism the acting unit is atomised as 
an individual in human society, or an organisation among many similar sized organisations, or a 
nation-state among many such nation-states. This acting units is then endowed with the attribute of 
acting purposively to cause change in accordance with an objective, within either a full or bounded 
rationality. The acting unit is envisioned to be autonomous calculating actors, who pursue their goals 
within a given resource constraints. Contextualism on the other hand, brings forth the situational 
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factors and social aspects that shape the actions of individuals. It supports concepts such as culture, 
institutions, and other larger social constructs to explain change. In other words, it builds the 
explanation downwards by emphasising change resulting from institutional pressures, norms, and 
routines. Quattrone and Hopper (2001, pp 403) have observed that: 
But both depict change as the passage of an entity, whether an organisation or accounting 
practices, from one identifiable and unique status to another. Despite their differences over 
whether reality is independent, concrete, and external, or socially constructed, both 
assume that actors (or researchers) can identify a reality to trace the scale and direction of 
changes  
The modernist believe that organisational space and time are unique and linear. This line of thinking 
draws its antecedent from Marshallian thought of continuous progress (Parsons, 1968). As an 
antithesis of this position, Quattrone and Hopper (2001) argued from the point of view of sociology 
of translation and constructivism, proposes ‘a-centred organisation’ and the notion of ‘drift’ to 
problematise the constructions of accounting change that is conceived of in linear terms. 
The alternative view as advanced by Quattrone and Hopper (2001) is that even if change is 
deliberately constructed as a purposeful action, there is no guarantee that it will work out as planned. 
In that sense this model of conception of change is far from being an orderly process with 
deterministic outcomes. The characterisation of accounting change as a drift therefore appears to be 
appropriate in situations where the human agency and environment co-produce the outcomes. The 
notions of ‘a-centred organisations’ and ‘drift’ can therefore be construed as a post-modernist 
response to modernist linear conception of accounting change.  
Other scholars are not so sympathetic towards post-modernism, but rather see it as a handmaiden of 
modernity (Mongardini ,1992). According to Lyotard (1984), modernity is a universal emancipation 
project that has been hijacked by technoscience. As Lyotard argued: “The enlightenment project has 
not only been forsaken but destroyed by technoscience which gives mastery of the subject over the 
object, but not greater freedom, public education and more wealth that is better distributed to all”. 
Mongardini (1992) draws a distinction between post-modernity and the post-modern condition to 
draw attention to the latter as modernity gone wrong. He stated:  
Where modernity until a few years ago was a goal to aspire to, an experience to repeat, today 
modernity makes us feel uneasy. It is something which clings to us, a role we have to play 
but which is out-dated. Out-dated in terms of what? In what ways out-dated? These are 
questions which remain unanswered while the sense of unease increases 
 
Mongardini’s (1992) critical essay on modernity is worth highlighting here for some key insights it 
brings to this research. He argued that change is a drug, therefore possibly implying that reforms 
have become a commodity being sold to developing countries. Neu and Ocampo (2007) have noted 
the WB’s ability to commodify reforms to the LDCs. In addition, people want others to reform, but 
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they don’t want to be reformed, as noted by the WB-Harvard interlocutors that it is doubtful if the 
WB could adopt better ways of implementing reforms in LDCs because of their own internal 
incentive systems. So, in contrast to this, putting wrong things right is not reform but emancipation 
(ibid) 
Mongardini (1992) argued that modernity may appear neutral, but its image in society has two faces: 
oppression and liberation. Whilst it holds the prospect of providing a break from cultural constraints 
and restrictions for the individual to realise their full potential, it oppresses in its unintended 
consequences from technology, information availability and its uses, and alienation in urban life. He 
noted:  
Everything changes in order to stay the same. Personality is deflected, culture is confused 
with sociality, the need for an identity, identification and interpretation is anaesthetized. This 
is the ideology of postmodernity and its role as the last handmaiden of modernity (ibid, pp 
59). 
Modernity is therefore not what it seems, and he argued that postmodernity is not what makes 
modernity outdated; rather postmodernity is modernity’s line of defence. For the individual or society 
looking for change, change becomes a value that can be reified and exploited. The implications for 
most LDCs looking for change through modernisation have to look elsewhere if they are looking for 
“new values and new conventions for collective living” and “to reconstruct a form of control of 
reality which cannot be restricted to the present and change”. (ibid pp. 59) 
From the radical post-modernist position theorising knowledge is important because knowledge in 
the post-modern era, especially scientific knowledge, is a form of discourse (Lyotard 1984), Lemert 
1997, Williams, 2008). Modernity has placed emphasis on metanarratives: ‘The culture by which 
science itself, as well as its knowledge, is a widespread, social faith in grand stories’ (e.g. E=MC2 of 
which the legend of Einstein is a part). 
Lemert avers to Lyotard’s argument that “Science and other forms of knowledge depend on the 
legitimacy in which culture holds them. Modernity, thus, is that culture which believes certain 
metanarratives, or widely shared stories, about the value and “truth” of science, and truth itself. This 
is an important way in which science is a discourse. In short, then, postmodernity is that culture in 
which those metanarratives are no longer considered completely legitimate and, thus, are not 
universally held to be completely credible’. (Lemert, 1997 pp. 39) 
It is in these terms that the concepts of modernity (and post-modernity) provide perspectives on how 
change may occur in western industrialised countries and elsewhere. For developing countries 
moving from colonial (and post-colonial) legacies using mostly manual accounting practices into a 
technology driven environment, this may have different implications. Especially where post-colonial 
and neo-colonial metanarratives still shape institutions.  
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2.6.6 The conditions of how accounting change occurs in the developing and emerging 
economies 
In the developing countries, the international financial institutions and other development partners 
have exerted considerable pressure for an estimated 150 countries to implement integrated financial 
management reform (IPFM) as essential component of the NPM reforms. Scholars are beginning to 
be interested in these IFIs (WB/IMF) driven reforms (Bakre et al, 2017, Hopper et al.,2016; Lassou 
et al., 2019; Goddard et al., 2016).These latest papers add to the then existing small but growing 
academic literature examining the efficacy or otherwise of such policy transfers by exploring the 
implementation of integrated public financial management reforms such as  Olowo-Okere and 
Tomkins (1998) and Ameyaw (2003). These contributions are among a broader set of papers on 
LDCs management accounting research (Tambulasi, 2007; Wickramasinghe, 2015; Ashraf and 
Uddin, 2013, 2016); financial accounting (Hopper et al., 2009); accountability (Rahaman, 2009); 
state enterprises (Rahaman et al., (2004)); and social and environmental accounting (Gray and 
Kouhy, 1993).   
These papers have made valuable contributions, especially towards the understanding of the 
hegemonic influences of the IFIs on the reforms. But we do not know enough about how the 
conditions in developing countries and emerging economies, within and without the pressures 
exerted by IFIs, play out in specific situations and how they affect accounting change. These 
conditions take various forms such as: working conditions (van Helden and Uddin, 2016); financial 
assistance conditionalities ((Chang, 2007); loan conditions (Baker, Biond, &Zhang,2010); conditions 
of adherence to good governance principles (Lassou and Hopper 2016); socioeconomic conditions 
(Rahaman,2010); mundane realities manifested in both structural conditions and agential resistance 
(Alawattage et al., 2016); pre-conditions such as a merit system for promotion (Schick, 1998); real 
world conditions (Andrews, 2008); minimal conditions (Grindle, 2004); social roots of current 
conditions (Manning and McCourt,2013), contextual conditions such as culture, traditions, and  
institutionalised way of doing things (Goddard et al., 2016); a formal market economy, the rule of 
law, and an advanced, efficient level of administrative infrastructure (Sarker, 2006); institutional 
conditions (Batley and Larbi, 2004).   
This is a long list and with some of the factors tending to overlap each other. This research the 
interplay of these conditions, both empirically and theoretically, through the lens of institutional 
logics in Chapter 7 
2.6.7 Defining public financial management 
 There are several operational definitions of PFM used by practitioners, such as the staff of 
international financial institutions (especially the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)) and the others, that refer to the PFM phenomenon in terms of its components such as 
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budgeting, accounting, internal controls, funds flow, financial reporting, and auditing. Some 
practitioners, for example, attached to these components the institutional framework, systems, and 
procedures that govern the preparation, execution, and reporting of the budget, as Allen et al. (2013) 
set it out as: 
PFM is concerned with the laws, organisations, systems, and procedures available to 
governments wanting to secure and use resources effectively, efficiently, and transparently. 
While PFM encompasses taxes and other government revenue, borrowing and debt 
management, its main focus is expenditure management, especially in the context of public 
budgeting [The International Handbook of Public Financial Management- 2013]. 
Practitioners’ definition of public financial management often reflects the cyclical nature and the 
routine operation of these components. As senior official from the Ministry of Finance, participant 
G7, of this research observed:  
If I understand public financial management, it starts from planning through to budgeting, 
through to accounting, auditing, and reporting, then monitoring then you come back to 
planning again.  
Some practitioners, for example, the UK’s Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
(CIPFA) considers that such definition lacks both the functional and teleological essences. The WB 
for example has pointed out that in considering financial management reforms a sole concentration 
on components is not enough. Saying that: “It is also true that reforming budgetary and financial 
management systems without paying attention to the other service-wide systems, processes and 
structures of government is likely to produce little change” (Public Expenditure Management 
Handbook (1998)] 
CIPFA therefore has come to define PFM as: 
Public Financial Management (PFM) is the system by which financial resources are planned, 
directed and controlled to enable and influence the efficient and effective delivery of public 
services goals (The CIPFA FM Model; Assessment of Financial Management in Public 
Service Organisations: Statements of Good Practice) 
The CIPFA’s definition primary focus is on the system for managing public finance and the ends 
they serve (delivery of public services). That view contrasts with the IMF’s exposition that brings 
out the institutional structures. However, in line with the existing academic literature (for example 
Hopwood, 1987; Robson 1991), we define PFM simply as accounting practices in the public sector, 
thereby allowing for the possibility of social, economic, and political influences that are embedded 
in the discipline. Hopper et al.,2009, for example, deliberately broadened the definition of 
management accounting system in order not to “deflect attention from historical, social, political and 
economic factors, and their unanticipated consequences” (pp. 46). More generally they go on to argue 
that “rigid boundaries are dangerous as development issues need open, imaginative, problem-based 
approaches that transgress disciplines and forms of accounting”.   
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The taxonomy of accounting research is not exact; and there are cross-boundary references in the use 
of concepts. For this reason, accounting practice has been defined as what the researcher wants it to 
be (Justesen and Mouritsen, 2011). For exposition, any reference to ‘accounting practice’ in this 
thesis encompasses management accounting (including, planning and budgeting), financial 
accounting, audit, and the oversight practices in the public sector.   
2.6.8 Integrated IPFM Reforms as a new phenomenon 
‘The term "full integration" does not imply that a single integrated system is needed for both budget 
preparation and budget execution, but that data is defined in the same terms and flows seamlessly 
from one set of functions to the other’. [ WB- Treasury Reference Model, WTP 505, 2001) 
The reform approach, as a search for integrated solution for the myriad challenges of developing and 
improving systems, draws on the very definition of public financial management. However, the 
phenomenon of integrated financial management in developing and emerging countries is a recent 
development drawing its antecedents from the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) implemented 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (WB/IMF) in the 1980s. 
Ghana like many developing countries had gone through various economic, political, and social 
crises requiring a broad range of governance reforms. Integrated financial management reforms 
emerged from the package of governance mitigating measures provided by the IFIs in these countries. 
They addressed democratic and economic structural reforms but have paid scant attention to the 
social consequences.  
The concept of integrated public financial management is relatively a recent phenomenon in 
accounting research. Public sector financial management reforms, as used here, broadly includes 
planning and budgeting, financial accounting reporting, management accounting, auditing, 
accountability, and oversight functions. Dechow and Mouritsen (2005) highlighted the issues that 
arise from implementing integrated management and control solutions through enterprise resource 
planning systems (ERPs). Whilst their case studies were drawn from the private sector, it brings out 
the issues of management control and integration as applied in the public sector. Enterprise-wide 
resource planning systems (ERPs) attempt to integrate all corporate information in one central 
database that allows data once captured to be processed into information that is available at many 
different locations in the organisation. They are touted to offer visibility of operations and 
management control from distance, but the achievement depends on the management’s desire for 
integration, which is an unending process that is produced concurrently and episodically. 
However, ERPs do not define what integration is and how it is to be developed, rather it introduces 
a techno-logic into the operations of an entity. This techno-logic conditions how control can be 
performed through financial and non-financial representations because they distinguish between an 
accounting mode and a logistics mode. 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




Dechow and Mouritsen (2005) argued that ERPs are particularly interesting for what they make 
impossible, and we can draw out several lessons concerning accounting change involving ERPs: (1) 
that management control cannot be separated from the context, including the underlying technology 
that makes it possible. The ‘infrastructure’ is provided by ‘the meeting point of many technologies 
and many types of controls’(ibid, pp 691); (2) ‘that management control in an ERP-environment is 
not a property of the accounting function, but a collective affair where local control issues in different 
parts of the organisation are used to create notions of global management’(ibid, pp 691). Dechow 
and Mouritsen (2005) reviewed the work of several scholars in the extant literature and divided them 
into three main strands according to the positions they take on ERPs.  
 
Firstly, they argued that as much as integration is appealing it is a formidable task. The appeal of 
ERPs is that they have the potential to making organisational objects more visible. They facilitate 
information on different organisational positions can be compiled. ERPs are sometimes rejected 
because of their complexity, and sometimes entertained as an investment. Within this group are those 
who maintain that involves a learning curve, and those implementing it should be prepared to invest 
in it before they reap the benefits of their investment. This strand of the literature builds on the ‘stage-
maturity model’ which was often adopted to support the ERPs implementation processes by 
consulting firms. 
 
The second strand of literature on ERPs is a bit ambivalent on the financial and productivity effects 
of ERPs based on concerns with their performances and the fear of disruptive effect integrated 
information that does not work well. Within this strand there is cautious optimism that ERPs will 
have positive financial and productivity effects, provided they are installed properly. Among these 
are those who argue that the new ERPs technologies illustrate the potential to become 
complete calculation machines governing all activities and affairs of an organisation. However, 
others remain sceptical about the claims made for ERPs, and the jury is still out; and the available 
empirical evidence, even within industry, does not seem to support the positive claims for ERPs. 
Dechow and Mouritsen have argued that at best the ERPs impact is very moderate, ‘partly because 
they are not typically designed with change in mind’ as ‘they replicate the structure of the existing 
systems’ (pp. 692). This is especially the case in the context of LDCs’ public sector accounting 
reforms. But others using the same evidence have argued that ‘ERP systems are enormously powerful 
juggernauts that not only may be difficult to control but that eventually also may strike back’ (ibid 
692). 
  
The position of scholars in the third strand is much more complex, as these scholars are “concerned 
with how ERP technologies are made to work as ‘systems’ in the ‘context of numerous organisational 
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concerns and conditions that play themselves out in complex ways” (ibid). Among these are scholars 
who see ERPs implementation as non-linear and a ‘drift’ that never stabilizes because change is 
constant; others who ‘relate the impact of ERP to the transformation of the roles of management 
accountants’; and those who ‘follow the implementation of ERP through social and technical 
networks’. These scholars ‘identify noteworthy and sometimes huge effects of ERP systems both in 
the process of design and in the process of use’ and they have argued that ‘to understand the impact 
of ERP requires a heightened attention to control as practice across’ the organisation (ibid). This line 
of thought presages a number of developments, including: (1) the clerical accounting work or 
bookkeeping being shifted out of the accounting function; (2) the growth of ‘hybrid-accountants’ 
where all organisational members become engaged in some form in the production, availability, 
accuracy and shareability of data; (3) as a corollary of the first two development, the ‘accounting 
function is possibly not necessary for information production’(ibid). 
 
Dechow and Mouritsen provided a deeper understanding on how ERPs work and operate, and the 
processes of engaging with ERPs when they are viewed as an actor alongside other actors; and how 
their interaction impact and challenge the existing understanding of management control. For the 
purposes of this research, I eschew therefore “the simplistic notions of cause and effect” as an 
explanation of “how ERP systems work and operates and the process of engaging with ERP 
systems…” In addition, we draw on the notion of techno-logics into the discourse of reforms.  
 
In addition to the above developments summarised in the paper by Dechow and Mouritsen, other 
researchers have found that integration makes accountability more complex. The concept of 
integrated financial management spreads the reach of accountability beyond its narrow focus of 
financial record keeping to efficiency and effectiveness of all government operations (Iyoha and 
Oyerinde, 2010). 
2.7 RESEARCH GAP AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The extant literature has laid the foundations for understanding of public financial management and 
accounting change in developing and emerging countries. Whilst their contributions have established 
a valuable platform to build on, it is less clear how the reforms are being implemented and the 
conditions for change or stability of the public financial management system. With a few exceptions 
(Alkaraan, 2018, Goddard et al., 2016, Sarker 2006) the conditions under which the reforms take 
place have not been sufficiently explored. As Hopper et al. 2009 have argued poverty brings 
distinctive uncertainties, and the crux of the problem lies in the interplay of historical, cultural, 
economic, and political context unique to LDCs as nation states.  
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We have witnessed a wave of literature reviews assessing public sector reforms accounting research 
(for example: Abdul-Rahaman et al, 1997; Hopper et al., 2009; van Helden and Ouda,2017; Helden 
and Uddin, 2016; Nyamori et al.,2017) all of which have called for more qualitative research to 
support better understanding of accounting, as an essential if not a neglected cog in the development 
mechanisms of LDCs (Hopper et al., 2016).   
There has been very little in the extant literature from the EEs/LDCs, sui generis, addressing public 
sector accounting reforms as an integral part of organisational and institutional change from the 
perspectives of the inter-institutional orders generated by technology, markets and other sectoral 
influences. We aim to fill this gap by positioning LDCs’ accounting reforms in its organisational and 
institutional context.  
Given the dearth of knowledge of the IPFM reforms, the central question of this research is how are 
the financial management reforms being implemented? And, what explains the results we see in the 
LDCs?  Related to these central questions, we also ask why accounting practices persist, even when 
they have been considered as sub-optimal? What are the conditions for implementing accounting 
change in Ghana, and how does change in practices occur? In order words, how have budgeting, 
accounting and accountability been formed, maintained, and transformed over time under the 
successive IPFM reforms?  
The research will aim to uncover what is ‘going-on’ with the IPFM reforms from the perspectives of 
research participants. Theoretically we also aim to contribute to the existing academic literature by 
identifying the institutional regimes and interinstitutional orders likely to be prevalent in the LDCs 
context.  
2.8 THE IMPACT OF THE LITERATURE SEARCH ON THE RQ AND CONTRIBUTION 
Emerging from the literature is the question of how may LDCs implement PFM reforms that are 
context-specific, not overly ethnocentric, (that is not driven by Eurocentric best practice or overly 
localised) and mobilising relevant and appropriate accounting technologies. Eurocentric accounting 
practices are often taken to be the ‘best practices’, that form the yardsticks for judging EEs/LDCs 
accounting systems (Hopper et al.2016). Abdul-Rahaman et al.,1997 have highted the problematics 
of ethnocentricity/Eurocentricity in the mainstream literature.  
Both the normative and the academic literature have said that there are contextual issues to be 
investigated (especially in identifying binding constraints) in LDCs accounting reforms (Manning 
and McCourt, 2013; Pollit, 2013). Whilst there are studies that have aimed to explicate accounting 
reforms in LDCs, often they are disparate and not linked-up enough to address the full contextual 
issues. This study aims to address this gap by providing a linked-up approach between a detailed 
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empirical account of how reforms are implemented, explain how and why they do not perform well, 
and present a substantive theory to predict future performance. 
The extant literature has also identified a paradox of reforms where individuals who are in key 
positions have expressed commitment to reforms, but collectively they cannot make it happen, even 
when resources have been made available (Lassou et al, 2019). This phenomenon of the ability for 
individuals to change institutional practices from within has been labelled in the literature as the 
paradox of embedded agency (Granovetter, 1985; Holm 1995; Thornton et al., 2012) 
The rational choice theorists have argued that it is technically possible to explain society by the 
rational motivations of individuals. But rationality cannot explain this paradox, which lies at the heart 
of reforms’ performance, because rational choice theory starts with the individual, acting in their 
self-interest, and aggregate their choices to the collective level. From this perspective there is a clear 
micro-macro dichotomy, and society (macro) is seen as an aggregation of ‘atomistic’ individuals 
(micro), as opposed to ‘the image of society as macro entity or structure that exist over and above 
individuals’ (Collins, 1986). 
In addition, rational choice theorists’ sole focus is on the self-interests of individuals as the prime 
motivation, and they deny explanations that involve concepts such as culture being a determinate of 
human behaviour. With this line of reasoning, one could draw the inference that if there is a 
difference in performance of reforms among countries, then it boils down to the differences in the 
self-interests of the individuals that compose that society. This explains the proliferation of academic 
papers drawing on neo-patrimonialism and corruption as explaining reform performance.  
As an alternative to this line of enquiry, this study starts without questioning the veracity of the 
declared commitment to reforms by officials by assuming that they are not hypocrites (what they say 
and what they do are not different (Cooper et al. 1981; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983). Instead, I 
offer transrational arguments,10 that the whole is greater than the parts, by seeking explanations 
within the collective level (the whole society), as well as the relevant action units (the individual 
members and the organisations in which they operate).  
Our approach is based on institutional logics, that enables us to focus on transrational institutional 
orders, which stand in contrast to the explanations offered in the literature based on either old 
institutional theory focusing on ‘action’ in neglect of ‘structures’, and new institutional theory 
focusing on ‘structure’ in neglect of ‘action’. This study therefore makes a clear distinction between 
the new institutional economics (NIE) and neo-institutional theory, as previously discussed in 
 
10 As Friedland and Alford (1991) points out: “Economists tend to argue that they study rational making 
choices, while other social scientists study the irrational bases that prevent people from choosing. We argue 
that the opposition is not between rational and irrational, but between different transrational orders.” (pp. 
235) 
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Section 2.4. I take these discussions further in the methodology section where I relate the research 
philosophy and methods to the institutional logic framework.  
2.9 CONCLUSIONS 
This literature reviewed has argued that accounting change and innovation is central to reforms and 
this chapter has provided an overview of accounting change and the theories applied in explicating 
accounting change. The review has also shown how these theories have evolved over time from 
economic theories and managerial administrative sciences to those derived from other social 
sciences. The literature has shown that in the last half-century there has been a drastic change in the 
understanding of accounting and the nature of accounting change. The ontology of accounting has 
been perceived by accounting scholars to be not just technical, but also social which is both 
constitutive and reflective of its environment. The extant literature has reinforced this notion by 
emphasizing the strong correspondence between accounting practices and their organisational and 
institutional context.  
However, the relationship between accounting and its environment is not restricted to the immediate 
locality. Otley (1994 pp291) has argued that ‘no longer is the local environment the only, or even the 
major influence on what is considered desirable or appropriate’. These changes have impacted on 
accounting craft in many ways than one. Firstly, it has impacted on the knowledge and skills 
paradigms among accounting scholars and practitioners alike, which in turn has also exposed the 
inadequacies of the traditional functionalist paradigms for assessing accounting change. Secondly it 
has shown the multi-dimensionality of accounting which have called forth multiple theories in 
explaining accounting change. 
The failure of functional explanation of accounting change and innovation is partly because of the 
shortcomings of the neoclassical economic paradigm and partly because of the emergence of superior 
insights from other social and cognitive sciences that can account better for the context and the 
dynamic of change. This thesis aims to explain PFM reforms through the notion of public sector 
accounting change (PSAC), and the literature in public sector accounting reform has asserted that 
the nature of accounting change is not static nor linear, rather it is dynamic and variable over time, 
therefore has non-deterministic outcomes. The dynamics of (accounting change) were clearly 
manifested in the interactions between individual and collective action and also in accountability 
relationships. As we shall see in the subsequent chapter this implies that it is highly important to 
recognize the role of history, culture, and material (or economic) forces on accounting change. These 
factors can be classified analytically as internal as well as external factors that impact on the reforms. 
Such discoveries above have underlined the importance of understanding the context of accounting 
change. Understanding the technical, but also social and organisational requires researchers to 
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develop an appropriate framework “to interrogate the actual conditions and consequences associated 
with the development and application of accounting practices in particular organisational and social 
settings” (Potter 2005 pp 266). In the Western context, accounting research in the earlier literature 
was more concerned with the preconditions, processes, and organisational consequences of 
accounting change Hopwood (1987). Whilst these are equally important considerations in explicating 
the current PFM reforms, context goes beyond the narrow confines of the technical into the 
institutional in the widest sense.  
In the accounting change literature, scholars have progressively refined our understanding of 
accounting change in the Western world by mobilising various theoretical frameworks. But as 
evident from this review, in qualitative research, a number of them have gravitated towards 
institutional theory (sometimes in addition to discursive practices). The literature from the LDCs that 
has mobilised institutional theories have tended to be inspired by new institutionalism or versions of 
neo-institutionalism. Often, they have not paid much attention to their adequacy and relevance in 
developing countries and non-Western environment. The public sector accounting environment in 
the developing countries, such as Ghana, is characterised by various contradictions and tensions that 
require researchers to go beyond a bifurcated typology of old institutionalism and new 
institutionalism to explain change. Recent advances in knowledge have eschewed various forms of 
dualities and have called for an integrated explanation of phenomena, including accounting change. 
In the developing countries the focus of research has been on how to transfer accounting technologies 
to that environment, and to a large extent continues to be so today. As scholars have argued, 
accounting research in Western environment has moved on in studying the processes of change. 
Studies are often directed at studying the dynamics of change, “-rather than a static and set-in-time 
view of accounting change, where the final outcome continuously evolves and redefines itself over 
time’ (Liguori and Steccolini, 2014 pp.321) 
The public sector environment is inherently a multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary, and amongst 
the various frameworks that have been developed by scholars to explain accounting change (such as 
actor network theory, structuration theory, Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, and Foucault’s 
governmentality) this literature review suggests that institutionalism, as a meta-theory, provides a 
deep insight into accounting change. When neo-institutionalism is suitably adapted and modified for 
non-Western environments, this thesis argues that it has the potential to provide a holistic framework 
for interrogating public sector accounting reforms in developing countries. The ILA brings new 
insights and overcomes some of the shortcomings of conventional neo-institutional theories. 
In the next chapter I propose a methodology for conducting the research, by providing the design and 
its justification for this study; including the research philosophy; a review of the literature of the 
research methodology and methods, and data collection processes, and data analysis.  
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3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I explain how the research was undertaken; the reasoning behind the overall research 
strategy; the design of the studies and the techniques used in preference to other possible methods 
(Silverman, 2017).The strategies I adopted for this research addressed four key issues, namely: what 
question to study about the accounting reforms; what data are relevant; what data to collect; and how 
to analyse the results (Yin, 2009; Philliber et al., 1980). I have previously addressed the construction 
of the research question in section 2.6, which was derived from the gap in the literature buttressed 
by the continuing demand by accounting scholars for deeper qualitative research to understand the 
context of public sector accounting reforms in LDCs. This chapter therefore focuses on the 
methodological strategies and steps I took to ensure that I collect the relevant data and the analysis 
was qualitatively rigorous.  
The remaining sections of this chapter are divided into five broad parts as follows:  
Sections 2 and 3: Provide the strategical considerations of the research through discussions of the 
philosophies and other theoretical considerations of the methodology.  
Section 4:  Provides an overview of the proposed theoretical framework for theorising the research, 
and the outlines of the processual framework and institutional logics.   
Section 5 and 6:  Give the justifications for the research design and the methods of data collection 
including the adoption of grounded theory informed methods.  
Sections 7 and 8: Address the data collection methods and the processes adopted in collecting the 
data from the field 
Section 9 and 10: Provides the data analysis followed by the conclusion in the last section.  
I start by setting out the research philosophy and how it informed the design strategy and the 
conceptual framework of the study.  
3.2 THE RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY   
3.2.1 Research philosophy and the research design strategy 
In this section I address the underlying philosophical assumptions of qualitative research: ontology, 
epistemology, axiology, and methodology. The philosophy underlying the conceptual framework 
and the methods of this study bring insights from the action-structure dialectics to show their 
potential relevance in explaining accounting change (or reforms) in LDCs. The stance of this research 
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is therefore in contrast to the argument advanced by scholars, such as Donaldson (1997), who defend 
the positivist’s tradition and argued that the action-structure approach is infeasible. 
This study has chosen the fundamental Weberian philosophy of social science investigations, namely 
verstehen (understanding); ideal types; and conception of society as the product of meaningful human 
action (Collins 1986) to serve as our framework of reference. The ideas embodied in Weberian 
principles say that we cannot hope to explain the material world, including any social phenomenon, 
without filtering it through our subjective consciousness (ibid; Blumer, 1969).  
Underlying the methodology of this research is the neo-Kantian epistemological idealism philosophy 
that does not deny that the external world (as the ‘thing in itself’) does not exist, but it could only be 
perceived and explained through the concepts and categories we, as human beings, impose on it. The 
material world as it unfolds on daily basis, or its history, involves billions of people and phenomena, 
but we interpret it through the categories we impose on them, and a particular pattern we choose to 
frame them (Collins, 1986).  
The role of researchers therefore depends on the patterns and categories they, as researchers, establish 
in the research. In this research, I evaluate the patterns against the benchmarks (as Weberian ideal 
types) of the categories that emerge by studying their characteristics (and properties). For example, 
the Weberian ideal type of ‘bureaucracy’ envisages a rationalised organisation with a clear chain of 
command, but that is an idea that does not happen perfectly in reality. The pattern for studying an 
organisation, according to Weber, is within the pattern of bureaucratic and unbureaucratic space 
(which he called patrimonialism) centred around personal networks and cliques (Collins, 1986). For 
example, ‘neo-patrimonialism’ as applied in the extant literature (Lassou et al, 2019) has emerged 
out of the Weberian category of patrimonialism as an ‘institutionalised unbureaucracy’.   
Weber shows us that the history of nation states is characterised by fluctuating between the 
bureaucratic- unbureaucratic continuum; and one can show the conditions that push a state towards 
one end or the other of the continuum. This then enables us to pin a phenomenon (such as accounting 
practice in the bureaucratic/unbureaucratic space) down to a certain reference point (or ideal type), 
and to be able to propose a definite theory about how it has operated. (Collins, 1986).  
Colignon and Covaleski (1991) identified examples of specific areas where Weber’s philosophies 
translate to explicate accounting practices in their socio-historical context. Colignon and Covaleski 
(1991) advanced the argument that accounting is not only central to the Weberian framework, but 
Weber’s insights facilitated the establishment of the link between capitalism, the corporation, and 
accounting practices; the distinction between the notions of formal and substantive rationality; and 
brought to the fore tensions within corporations and accounting practices. All these three dimensions 
are important to our explanation of accounting phenomena in the LDCs/EEs.   
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Our aim is not to produce a general law, as might apply in the natural sciences, but to interpret and 
understand the meaningfulness of the phenomenon within the unique historical flow of a particular 
situation. That gives us our knowledge reference point as ideographic (implying researching an event 
or situation, or the idiosyncratic) as opposed to nomothetic (or deriving a general law) (Collins, 
1986). In this way we establish, the verstehen or the understanding of the reform phenomenon. Thus, 
we share Weber’s position in rejecting positivism in social science which employs methods that 
collects ‘facts’ and attempt to formulate them into general laws as in the physical sciences.  
Colignon and Covaleski (1991) posit that “Weber’s work addresses multiple levels of analysis, from 
micro social actions to broad macro social-historical structures and processes” (pp. 141).  Like 
Weber, this study does not just want to interpret history (by describing events), but to say something 
about causality. Weber’s ideal type (or its equivalent in grounded theory methods) enables us to work 
out not only the categories, but also an idealised model of the causal connections by which things are 
brought about (Collins 1986). For the defence of seeking a causal explanation the study draws on the 
insights from Elster (983); and Simon (1957) 
Establishing verstehen of history based on human social relations require us, as researcher to always 
project ourselves into the positions of the people who created it; or see it through their eyes. 
(Blumer,1969; Collins, 1986). This shows the link between Weberian philosophy and Mead/Blumer 
methodological philosophy. But also, there is a link between Weberian philosophy and the 
philosophy of Schopenhauer (willpower) as further articulated by Nietzsche and Freud. This 
philosophy posits that society is not just made up of ideal types, or thinkers with ideas in their minds, 
but of actors who can make choices ((that ideas are not merely reducible to will, but they are affected 
by choices actors make). By choosing to take a line of action, we have the ends in mind (even if we 
do not establish them formerly) and that depends on our values.  
The primary question we seek to answer is how individuals acting in state organisations arrive at 
collective commitment (as collective actions) to reforms, that enable them to implement them 
successfully. In Weber we find the philosophical underpinnings of the conception of will, as opposed 
to ideas. His notion of means versus ends (and of the free choice of ends) provides us a 
methodological view of the role of values in answering this question, but also it provides us the 
foundations of the theory of social action and modern polity that we mobilise in this study to answer 
this question.  
3.2.2 Symbolic Interactionism and pragmatism  
In addition to the Weberian philosophies of social science investigations, this study mobilises Mead 
(1934) and Blumer’s (1969) symbolic interactionism (SI) in two important methodological respects 
to provide an account of how individuals negotiate the social order in the process of reforms. Firstly, 
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SI posits that human beings do not directly react to each other’s action, rather they react to their 
interpretation of actions. Thus, in human communication we do not merely react to what the other 
person is saying, but we attach a meaning to each other’s actions before we react. In interactions we 
interpret or ‘define’ each other’s actions into our terms by use of symbols to ascertain the meaning 
of other people’s actions. That is, there is a three-stage process of action-interpretation-reaction in 
human interaction; and we apply it to ourselves just like we do to any external ‘other’. Blumer (1969) 
attributes the spelling out of the implications of this process of interpretation in the understanding of 
human actions and human association to H.G. Mead.  Human capacity to separate the ‘self’ from the 
‘I’, enables us to act towards ourselves as a separate ‘object’ just as we act towards others (ibid). The 
separation of the self is implicated in innumerable human actions such as goal setting, and other 
forms of self- indications.  
By “object” and “self-indication” Blumer explains that an object is anything that an individual 
indicates to himself; and self-indication is the action that human beings construct after interpreting 
(or creating) an object in their senses. In Mead’s terms: 
 instead of the individual being surrounded by pre-existing objects that which play upon him 
and call forth his behaviour, the proper picture is that he constructs his objects on the basis 
of his on-going activity (Blumer 1969, p.80).  
Thus, instead of objects possessing intrinsic characters (outside an individual human being) that play 
on his senses, the opposite is the case: in the sense, that the meaning or character of an object is 
conferred on it by the individual.  
Furthermore, as Blumer says self-indication is a process in which a human being constructs his 
conscious action “is a moving communicative process in which the individual notes things, assesses 
them, gives a meaning, and decides to act on the basis of the meaning” (Blumer 1969, p.80). There 
are important attributes to the process of self-indication which Blumer carefully sets out. Firstly, self-
indication cannot be considered as part of presumed internal or external forces that play on individual 
to produce his behaviour.  The process of self-indication is not subservient to both internal or external 
stimuli (such as environmental pressures, and external stimuli) or internal considerations (organic 
drives, wishes, feelings, ideas and so on) because the individual in that process is interpreting the 
appearance or expression of an object that he has created and creating actions in accordance with 
how he has defined it. Secondly, it cannot be accounted for by factors antecedent to the act. Thirdly 
Blumer argued that self-indication exists and must be accepted and studied as such. This simply says 
that human beings can make-up their own minds even under coercion. They may not say what they 
are thinking, or even act on their thinking, but nothing can come in-between them and the 
interpretation of the actions of others, even if the “other” is themselves.  
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The second methodological significance of SI is that it helps explain the process of how an individual 
construct his conscious action to “group action” of a community, Mead and Blumer recognised that 
group or collective action consist of the alignment of individual actions. This alignment is created 
by the individual interpreting and considering each other’s actions. In this sense social action is 
accomplished by individual fitting their respective lines of action to each other’s through the process 
of interpretation. This contrast with conventional views of sociology analysis that treats human 
groups as “social systems” and regards collective actions as created by social systems.  
The methodological implications for IPFM and accounting reforms research is immediate and 
profound. First is the notion of ‘acting unit’, as Blumer (1969: pp. 85) explains: “Human society is 
to be seen as consisting of acting people, and the life of the society is to be seen as consisting of their 
actions. The acting units may be separate individuals, collectives whose members are acting together 
on a common quest, or organisations acting on behalf of a constituency”. Under this scheme 
therefore, the unit of analysis in this research are defined as the “acting unit”. In some cases, the 
acting units can be individuals, or ministries, or political parties, or the different branches of 
government.  Blumer authoritatively states (and this researcher agrees) that “any scheme of human 
society claiming to be realistic analysis has to respect and be congruent with the empirical recognition 
that a human society consists of acting units” (pp85).  
This approach appears to be a satisfactory way of resolving the binary tension between individual 
agency and the collectivists approaches and micro versus macro analysis. This methodological-
epistemological standpoint is different from the sociological approach which studies human beings 
and human society in terms of “structure or organisation and to treat social action as an expression 
of such structure or organisation” (Blumer, pp87). 
These views are reflected in Charmaz who posits that SI is a theory and methodology combined. For 
example, in analysing the data, we coded the interviews from the position of the acting units, and 
that helped us to understand the interpretive processes of the acting unit: “catching the process of 
interpretation through which they [acting units] construct their actions” (p.86). This process cannot 
be captured by referring to either the conditions antecedent to the process, or the overt actions which 
is the product of the interpretation. Blumer (1969 pp86) observes: 
To catch the process, the student [researcher] must take the role of the acting unit whose 
behaviour he is studying. Since the interpretation is being made by the acting unit in 
terms of objects designated and appraised, meanings acquired, and decisions made, the 
process has to be seen from the standpoint of the acting unit. 
 Blumer argued that to do otherwise will lead the researcher to ‘fill in the process of interpretation 
with his own surmises’ which risks the worst kind of subjectivism. There is a difference between this 
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and “going native”. By remaining aloof as an “objective” observer, the researcher risks not 
understanding the interpretation process from the standpoint of the acting unit. 
Blumer’s second methodological suggestion is addressed to how to study social change, or 
organisational change. Based on his prior analysis of individual and collective behaviour Blumer 
states that acting units “do not act towards culture, social structures or the like; they act towards 
situations” (Blumer 1969, p 88). This requires researchers to acknowledge and analyse the prevailing 
conditions under which units operate. Such conditions include the situation in which the action takes 
place, and how the unit interprets the situation before forming or constructing its action. The 
situational analysis would include things that the unit consider important such as opportunities, 
dangers, and threats, means, demands and so on. Individual or groups as acting units develop acts to 
address the situation with which they are confronted.  
Blumer critiqued studies that view human society as organisations effecting change, and overlooks 
the role played by acting units in that change process. Generally, he showed that the conventional 
procedures of sociologists and other social scientist in studying social change using deterministic 
approaches are unsatisfactory. The conventional procedures usually follow the lines such as: (i) 
identifying some established or organised form of human society undergoing change; (ii) identifying 
some factors or conditions that might be at play; (iii) collecting data on the organisation and such 
factors; (iv) using these observations to make propositions that a given factor played upon a given 
organisation to form a given new form. From this procedure the researcher, to varying degree of 
sophistication, might draw a conclusion such as industrialisation causes urbanisation. Blumer (1969, 
pp 88-89) takes umbrage with this: 
My concern here is not with the validity of such propositions but the methodological position 
which they presuppose. Essentially, such proposition either ignore the role of the interpretive 
behaviour of acting units in the given instance of change, or else regard the interpretive 
behaviour as coerced by the factor of change.  I wish to point out that any line of social 
change, since it involves change in human action, is necessarily mediated by interpretative 
on the part of the people caught up in the change- the change appears in the form of new 
situations in which people have to construct new forms of action. 
That is, in studying social change, researchers would be wise to recognise the mediating role of the 
acting unit, the interpretative process, and the situation which confronts the acting unit.  
Blumer’s final words on methodology, observing the frustration of social scientist trying to catch up 
with the physical and biological sciences, is that:  
These efforts continue to ignore or to explain away the interpretative process by which 
people act, individually and collectively, in society. The question remains whether human 
society or social action can be successfully analysed by schemes which refuse to recognise 
human beings as they are, namely, as persons constructing individual and collective action 
through an interpretation of the situation which confront them. (pp 89) 
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The understanding the “self” from social psychological perspective is very important to this research. 
This is not in the sense of Freudian psychoanalysis, but in the sense of the interaction either within 
the human self: distinguishing between “me” and “I” (Mead 1934) or between people in their 
interactions. 
3.3 OTHER THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
METHODS 
3.3.1 The ontologies of accounting  
By the ‘ontology of accounting’ I imply the nature of ‘reality’ or how ‘truth’ is determined in 
accounting practice. The role of ontology in empirical investigations can best be explained by 
distinguishing between ontology-in-general (which is ontology at its most abstract and generalised 
level) from ontology-in-situ (which is ontology at its ontic- level)11. Stones (2005 pp77) has shown 
how the concept of general ontology is translated to the ‘empirically informed, substantive details 
and specificities’ at the ontic-level through intermediating concepts from the meso-level. He averred 
that ‘this entails taking the ontology-in-general and pointing it towards the ontic, towards the realm 
of particular concrete and/or situated entities in the world with their particular qualities, relations, 
shapes, tone, texture, colour and so on’ (ibid pp76). 
In this sense, at the generalised level, several scholars who have argued that accounting has multiple 
ontologies (Andon et al, 2007; Dugdale, 1999; Law, 1999; Mol, 1999;). Mol for example has argued 
that ‘the reality we live with is one performed in a variety of practices’ with the consequence that 
there are multiple realities (Mol 1999, pp. 74).  For an object that is performed (such as accounting), 
Mol explicates that it will have multiple ontologies. Mol argued if accounting is ‘a chameleon’ and 
has the attribute of adaptability depending on the context and the situations, then there is very little 
justification to expect it to be the same or compel it to assume the same form when the situations and 
conditions are different12. In this sense, at the ontic-level accounting scholars have found accounting 
to be neutral without pre-ordained identity or fixed essence ((Andon et al, 2007; Miller and Napier 
1993). 
This impacts on how theorists explain accounting change. Quattrone and Hopper (2001) by observing 
the relational and experimental nature of accounting change developed the concept of accounting 
drift as a metaphor for change. Andon et al (2007) extended the metaphor to ‘relational drift’, and in 
 
11 Stones (2005) has argued that the concept of ontology-in-general embraces both ‘philosophical ontology’ 
and social ‘scientific ontology’.  
12 Mol argument is based on performance, not on ‘perspectivalism’ or constructivism, which she said are 
bedfellows that do not easily coexist and do not follow from each other. 
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so doing built on it to draw attention to the configurations of human and non-human elements that 
may influence an accounting change. They argued that much depended on the ‘morphology of these 
configurations that not only harbour the potential of accounting change to emerge in unpredictable 
ways.’ Andon et al. (2007) therefore emphasized that it is the quality of that relational drift that would 
determine the outcome of a change process.  
The ontology of accounting change therefore depends on its ‘performativity’ (namely, the role it is 
made to play) and its ‘relational drifting’, none of which is certain (Vosselman, 2014). Accounting 
can play a mediating role in the discourses that brings theoretical statements from economics to life. 
Vosselman (2014) argued that accounting technology preceded writing, and while it is able to 
represent real life economic flows and stocks, accounting practice can ‘mirror, stores, and transport’ 
these values through space and time. Vosselman shows that the ability of accounting practice to break 
through the “spacio-temporal” barriers, enables it to be used not just as a mediating instrument 
between agents-and principal, but to act and create something new. “That is, accounting is 
performative” in the sense that it comes to represent reality on which decisions are based (Vosselman, 
2014).  
However, scholars tend to accept that accounting as a knowledge object is characterised by ‘multiple 
ontologies’ and subject to relational drift (Andon et al., 2007; Miller and Napier 1993). Andon et 
al.,2007 have noted:  
That is, something that is “more than one, but less than many” (Law, 1999: p. 11), sustaining 
variant constructions of identity, whilst still maintaining a coherent quality. For example, ‘it’ 
(accounting) could be a performance measurement system, a means to a more 
‘commercialised’ future, a symbol of a new organisational regime and/or way to monitor 
and reward. The ‘same’ accounting processes could take on these partial and loosely 
connected ‘realities’. (Andon et al., 2007 pp.279). 
These scholars have asked how we could be certain of the viability and stability of accounting as a 
singular knowledge object when it is incomplete and has an unfolding nature which is neither solid, 
nor immutable. Since there is no clear answer to the paradox of accounting ontology, that makes 
accounting change problematic. More generally in the development context Wildavsky (1975) 
cautioned against ‘a policy of drift’ in discussing the task of national planning to improve the living 
standards for the vast majority in poor and newly independent countries. Wildavsky contrasted the 
virtues of a ‘policy of drift’ to those of ‘deliberate action’; and argued that such experimental nature 
of change would not address: 
an urgent need to improve living standards, to restore to the people that rightful inheritance 
up to now misappropriated by their colonial masters, to establish economic independence 
and social justice’ (pp. 254).  
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In that context, accounting change perhaps should, if possible, assume a more ‘positive thrust’ to 
give those societies a confident new direction towards national goals. The dialectics of accounting 
change therefore become more deliberate and purposive in that environment.  
3.3.2 Distinction between accounting function and accounting practice  
In this research our concern is with the context and conditions of how accounting practices emerge 
and what role practice plays in any given setting. However, having defined the PFM in terms of 
accounting practices, we do not want to neglect the role accounting plays in organisations. Our 
primary concern though remains with changes in accounting practices. We therefore make a 
distinction between accounting practice and its potential functions. 
 
In making such a distinction between function and practice, Robson (1991) observes that the 
evidence of a practice is not explained by reference to its ultimate function. The effects of a practice 
may be intended or unintended. The unintended effect of practice could be a result of several events 
such as mistaken calculations, or assumptions; conflicting multiple logics and rationales (Robson, 
1991; Hindess, 1988).  Robson goes on to explain why we must look elsewhere to explain the origins 
of a practice and its historical emergence in any setting, and not the function assigned to it.   
Contrariwise, linking accounting practices to the function of accounting does not help us to 
understand how that particular function came about, and will continue to exist, or change if need be 
under varied, or perhaps even hostile, conditions (Robson, 1991). The examination of accounting 
change therefore presents its own distinctive historical issues, and should be kept separate from the 
conditions, origins or intentions of an accounting development; and from its eventual outcomes and 
effects (Robson, 1991; Burchell et al. (1985).  
 
Herein lies the limitation of a functional explanation of accounting change13. It by itself, does not 
help us to examine the conditions, origins, or intentions of accounting change. For an empirical 
explanation of accounting reforms, as a technical change, we must look at causal and intentional 
explanations (Elster 1983). But to adopt causal explanation Simon (1957, Chapter 1) draws our 
attention to Hume’s critique of empiricism in both the physical sciences (as in quantum mechanics 
and thermodynamics, and many of the social sciences 14. A satisfactory response to Hume’s critique 
 
13 Elster (1983) provides the technical definition of a functional explanation. Its exacting nature shows that 
most explanations that pass as ‘functional’ will fail that test (Douglas, 1986). In summary, functionalism is 
argued to be ‘a mode of explanation whereby outcomes are attributed to their beneficial consequences’ 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991 pp4). 
14 Simon argues that “empiricism has adopted Hume’s critique that necessary connections among events 
cannot be perceived (and hence can have no empirical basis. Observations reveals only recurring 
associations”.  
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requires that: (i) empiricisms move from deterministic to probabilistic conception of reality; and (ii) 
causation must be seen to be no more than “functional relationship” or” interdependence”. 
 To illustrate the nature of the problem in assigning causation, Simon (1957) argued that: 
When we say that A causes B, we do not say that B causes A; but when we say that A and B 
are functionally related (or interdependent), we can say equally that B and A are functionally 
related (or interdependent) (pp11).   
 
Simon shows that interdependence probably carry a better meaning, than causation, However, it is 
worthwhile retaining causation in the lexicon to denote the possibility of the asymmetrical 
relationship between variables. The second condition in which relationships can be defined among 
variables is by tracing the sequence in which they occurred. Whilst sequence and asymmetry may 
conceivably impact on each other, Simon argued that “time sequence does, indeed, sometimes 
provide a basis for asymmetry between A and B, but that the asymmetry is the important thing, not 
the sequence” (pp. 12).  Thus, Simon provides us with convincing arguments of why causality has 
validity as an explanatory concept, which we shall apply in relating the major empirical categories 
of this research to one another in Chapter 5. 
3.3.3. How the research philosophy is linked to the conceptual framework and methods  
The ontological matters of objectivity and subjectivity of social reality have been at the centre-stage 
of all scientific enquiries and have yielded different responses from social scientists. Scholars have 
argued that there is no fixed methodology waiting to be applied in social science enquiries, and that 
it has to be derived to suit the circumstances (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Burns 2000 (see pp. 572); 
Dawson, 1994, Blumer, 1969). A researcher adopts the appropriate methods for the research task at 
hand each time. Its usefulness is that it enhances the potential of ‘reflexive sociology’ in which a 
researcher theorises his or her position in relations to the research question and the research 
participants (Bourdieu 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).  
In this thesis we shall be arguing from (i) a causal explanation; and (ii) creating a technical 
evolutionary understanding explanation that is intentional and transrational through institutional 
logics approach. The rationale of the theoretical framework is to provide (1) a consistent framework 
or a meta-theory to support both the empirical approach and theoretical explanations of the research 
(2) a bridge between various scholarly contributions (3) and a bridge between the theory and the 
empirics. 
 
The research combines the Weberian philosophical approach to social science investigations and 
symbolic interactionists’ philosophical orientation. The combined philosophical positions serve to 
provide the links between action and institutions to give an in-depth understanding of both 
accounting and organisation changes. Thornton and Ocasio (2008) have argued that institutional 
logics provide the link between action and institution. In addition, in this research institutional logics 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




provided the theoretical frame that guided the choice of grounded theory informed methods (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998; Corbin and Strauss, 2015), and the theoretical discussions of the study’s 
implications.   
We therefore aimed to contribute to the accounting literature by providing explicit links between 
organisational institutionalism and reform actions. We build on Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) and 
Thornton et al. (2012), to make the fundamental point that social action straddles both the old and 
new institutionalism, which institutional logics bring together in one framework. This thesis argues 
that institutional explanations are better theorised in terms of institutional effects (Jepperson, 1991), 
and to advance this argument I mobilise Jepperson’s ‘Lines of Theory in Organisation Analysis’ 
matrix set out in Figure 3.1 below: 
Figure 3.1: Level of Theory in Organisational Analysis 
 
Jepperson (1991) developed the matrix above to differentiate between different sociological 
arguments, but it also shows the link between symbolic interaction and institutionalism. The columns 
represent “levels” as low order (individualist) and high order (structuralist); and the rows represent 
degree of construction (high construction indicate phenomenological conception of events) and low 
construction (realist conception). In this schema, for example institutionalism is a product of 
phenomenological and structuralist conceptions, whereas symbolic interaction is a product of 
phenomenological and individualist conception. 
 
The crucial feature of this representation is the degree to which the acting units are socially 
constructed. In institutionalism and interactionism (both high construction), it is assumed that the 
units being studied are complex social objects, non-linear in characteristics ‘reflecting context 
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specific rules and interactions’ (ibid pp. 153). The study of units in Cell 1, invokes the discipline of 
social psychology, already noted in the institutionalism literature (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  On 
the other hand, for low construction (or the realist) scenario the objects are ‘socially pre-given’ and 
‘autochthonous’.  
 
The benefit of Jepperson’s matrix is that it provides an additional insight for our analytical framework 
and provides a justification for considering symbolic interactionism and institutionalism together. 
Interactionism and institutionalism represent investigations into high construction phenomena at 
individualist and structuralist levels, respectively. Thornton et al, 2012, have shown how the 
institutional logics approach is rooted in interactionism. Both institutionalism and action are 
interlinked, as Jepperson has argued that: “institutional arguments are structural ones that also 
preserve the content of social actions and interactions,” and “social relations are content-filled control 
structures” (pp. 156). 
This study adopts the institutional logics approach because, compared to the alterative frameworks, 
it provided a better fit in theorising accounting and organisational changes that from the empirical 
data are undergirded with tension and conflicting interests.  More also, scholars have argued that “the 
institutional logics perspective provides a widely resonant and generative set of ideas that speak to 
many of the problems that have been plaguing neo-institutional theory for decades” (Lounsbury and 
Boxenbaum, 2015pp. 5). The new institutionalism derived its gravitas from new institutional 
sociology that emphasised structure shaping actors’ behaviours (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997, 
Thornton et al., 2012). The micro-foundations of the earlier neo-institutional theory was therefore 
narrower than institutional logics, which is undergirded by social constructivist philosophy, culture, 
and sense making (Lounsbury and Boxenbaum, 2015). The earlier variants of neo-institutionalism 
had been based on assumption of homogeneity and exteriority of organisational fields; and offered a 
two-stage approach to organisational change - the first adopters innovated and adopted change for 
technical efficiency reasons, and the later adopters copied their peers in order to be competitive. This 
version of neo institutionalism has been described as anachronistic, and for that matter later versions 
of institutionalism have had to jettison the homogeneity assumption in preference of heterogeneity 
in order to explain individual and organisational behaviour (Lounsbury, 2008, 2001). 
 
Institutional logics approach emerged out of neo-institutional sociology as a reaction to the lack of a 
satisfactory account of agency in the earlier versions of neo institutional theory. Instead of 
internalisation and socialisation as posited by old institutional theory, and exteriority of organisations 
(of new institutional sociology), institutional logics emphasise individual and organisations 
exteriority in society as a source of change. The institutional logics approach (Friedland and Alford, 
1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al, 2012,) overcomes the shortcomings in neo-
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institutionalism. Scholars have argued that institutional logics approach, by putting back ‘interest’ of 
actors in institutionalism, has more robust micro-foundations to explain change. The institutional 
logics approach (ILA) emphasises conflict (or competition) and contradictions in human interests 
that create different institutional orders in society. Logics are constraining, but it also offers 
opportunities for change to occur by the transposition between different institutional orders that 
generates hybridity. Accounting itself symbolises an interpretation of financial transactions, yet there 
is very little in the literature analysing accounting phenomena through the understanding and insights 
of symbolic interaction. 
3.4 THE PROPOSED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THIS STUDY 
3.4.1 An overview of the theoretical framework 
For the conceptual framework of this research, I mobilise institutional logics to explain the logics of 
the reforms, coupled with a processual account of their evolution. Institutional logics provides one 
of the many frameworks of conceptualising institutional theory (Scott, 1987) to provide insights to 
the behaviour of an organisation’s party to collaborative arrangements (Nath 2019; Dormady, 2012). 
Institutional logics is conceptually more appealing because neo-institutionalists often focus on the 
macro-structural level and neglect the underlying processual issues thereby creating “black boxes”.  
Zucker (1991) has observed that “neo-institutionalists ordinarily operate at the macrolevel, focusing 
on the role of an institutionalised environment (“the state or “law” or “constitutional orders”) in 
legitimizing organisations and their structures” (pp 103-). She goes further to summarise that the 
neo-institutional approach usually focuses on the content and structural issues at the macro-level; 
and how organisations become isomorphic when they are subject to similar institutional or 
environmental pressures. That is, macro-level analysis considers institutional effects as binary and 
discrete rather than a continuous process of change. Whilst micro-institutionalists have improved our 
understanding of the nature of institutional change from advances in the cognitive sciences. Micro-
institutionalists posit that actions vary in their degree of exteriority and objectivity, but this has not 
always impacted at the macro-level where emphasis continues to be placed on examining 
dysfunctional or irrational aspects of institutional systems such as myths and rituals (Zucker, 1991).   
In summary Zucker (1991) has argued micro-institutionalists have focused on: (i) institutionalisation 
as a process rather than as a state; (ii) upon the cognitive processes involved in the creation and 
transmission of institutions; (iii) upon the maintenance and resistance to change, and (iv) upon the 
role of language and symbols in those processes.   
Following Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) critique of neo-institutionalism and the insights provided 
by Thornton et al. (2012), Jepperson, (1991), and Zucker (1991) I adopt a processual framework as 
suggested by Dawson (1994), which I explain in Section3.5.2 below.  
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3.4.2 The processual model of organisational change 
The processual approach is rooted in Symbolic Interactionism, of which many theorists (including 
scholars such as G.H. Mead) have contributed to its development. It was the predominant 
sociological approach to the question of organisational change early in the twentieth century inspired 
by the ‘Chicago school’ who received its philosophical orientation from several prominent German 
sociologists. The processual approach pre-dates cybernetic modelling, and its basic principles 
probably influenced cybernetic process modelling of change, but they are not the same. In principle 
the organic processual approach is far more complex than cybernetics because it eschews the notion 
of equilibrium, even though on occasions it can accommodate it. The processual approach is 
analogously organic, as distinct from mechanical and organismic (or biological) approaches to 
change. Processual theorists construct two mental models, one organic and one mechanistic, to show 
the contradiction organic and mechanistic approaches. In the organic model the organisation moulds 
itself “appropriate to changing conditions, which gives rise to innovation, and the continual 
willingness to tackle fresh problems and unforeseen requirements. It is characterised by a network 
structure of control, authourity and communication, a reliance on expert knowledge for decision 
making, the continual redefinition of individual tasks through interaction with others, and the spread 
of commitment to the firm beyond any formal contractual obligation” (Dawson, 1994pp.18). 
Whereas in contrast, mechanical systems work to achieve equilibrium in the long run, and biological 
systems functionally evolve to achieve some stability with its environment, processual systems do 
not have deterministic outcomes. Building on the insights from Park, Buckley argued that “the world 
of life is full of strife and resultant accommodation and temporary equilibrium. Social equilibrium is 
in itself expressive of temporary accommodations” (Buckley, 1967 pp.19). In other words, from the 
perspective of the processual theorists, equilibrium is only temporary, if it happens at all.  
The process approach views social “structure” as an abstract concept moulded from ongoing 
interactive processes. As such it is transient in nature, which can be best described as a temporary 
accommodative representation of ongoing social interactions. From this perspective, “societies and 
groups continually shift their structures as adaptations to internal or external conditions. Process, 
then, focusses on the actions and interactions of the components of an ongoing system, such that 
varying degrees of structuring arise, persist, dissolve, or change” (Buckley, 1967 pp 18). 
The processual theorists’ view on historical force as source of change and its links to institutionalism 
is also consistent with our general methodological approach framed by institutional logics and 
symbolic interactionism. The economist Veblen, writing as far back as 1989 to emphasise the role of 
history in the processual approach, said:  
The economic life history of the individual is a cumulative process of adaptation of means 
to ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, both the agent and his environment 
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being at any point the outcome of the past process. His methods of life today are enforced 
upon him by his habits of life carried over from yesterday and by the circumstances left as 
the mechanical residue of the life of yesterday (pp. 391).  
Veblen reference to “the mechanical residue of the life yesterday” reflected what was fashionable in 
his times, but he was talking about a process shaped by “the entire organic complex of habits of 
thought that have been shaped by the past process” (pp.393).  
The process theorists share with the Marxists the view that history is a dialectic process whereby the 
new structures emerge from conditions inherited in the previous ones. But they depart from the 
Marxists, by holding the position that the outcomes of group or collective actions are not 
deterministic because they find that highly structured human associations are relatively infrequent. 
“In sum, institutionalised patterns constitute only one conceptual aspect of society, and they point to 
only part of the ongoing process” (Buckley,1967, pp.22). In addition, they see the role of interests in 
social processes and their conflict and adjustments as the true key to a dynamic sociology. There is 
therefore a linkage between the processual approach and institutionalism, particularly the “old” 
institutional theory and institutional logics in explaining change. 
Interactionism of Dewey-Mead-Blumer and the processual approach are inter-linked. Social 
phenomenon, in processual terms is deemed to be a product of continual interaction between 
individual consciousness and objective social reality. These theorists have argued “that it is from the 
process of ongoing interactions itself that life gets its main features, which cannot be adequately 
analysed in terms of fixed attitudes, ’culture ‘or social structures, nor can it be conceptualised in 
terms of mechanical structure, the functioning of an organism” Buckley (1967, PP. 21). The trend of 
process-conscious general system approach in the physical sciences and philosophy encouraged the 
development of the process approach in sociology. Methodologically, it impacted on how 
sociologists have ended up representing societal progress in terms of social processes and not just 
structures.  
The process approach therefore shed light onto our intellectual puzzle of collective action. Buckley 
summarises this by saying that the process approach, irrespective of the theories that contributes to 
it, aims to solve one basic problem: “how do interacting personalities and groups define, assess, 
interpret, verstehen, and act on the situation?” (ibid pp. 23). To Buckley it doesn’t matter whether 
our cognitive theories are converging or diverging, mathematical or non-mathematical, congruence, 
balance, or conflicting, so long as the researcher focuses on the group’s decision processes of 
understanding and acting on their common problem.  
3.4.3 An empirical processual framework for explaining change  
Whilst Buckley (1967) gave us an additional theoretical cover to relate institutionalism to 
interactionism and collective action, he did not provide an empirical guide on how to study 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




organisational change through the processual approach. Dawson (1994) started from the same 
position as Buckley by observing that ‘change is a complex and dynamic process which should not 
be solidified or treated as a series of linear events” (pp.3). Generally, this view has been echoed by 
other theorists (Quattrone and Hopper, 2006; Quattrone and Hopper, 2001; and Andon et al.,2007). 
However, Dawson argued that “a rational analytical structure should be used to ensure that 
reconstructed explanations are able to incorporate the non-rational and non-linear processes of 
change”. This, he argued may appear paradoxical, but “a failure to deconstruct complex processes 
into manageable analytical sections is likely to result in highly abstract and largely impenetrable 
explanations which are of no practical value. In short, the construction of data categories is useful 
for sorting data on change and for aiding our understanding of what is a complex and dynamic 
process”. (pp. 41) 
This study argues that the processual framework provides the most appropriate analytical approach 
to understanding the substantive, contextual, and political processes of accounting change in the 
LDCs/EEs (Dawson, 1994). 
Dawson posits three determinants of change that are in the timescales of a processual narrative, 
covering: (i) the substance, (ii) politics, and (iii) the context. The substance of change for this research 
addresses the type and scale of budgeting, accounting, and auditing change, which include the 
development of ERPs alongside improvements in financial management (new techniques and 
technologies). Dawson argued that understanding the characteristics of the constituent of change is 
an important prerequisite to understanding the outcomes of that change because they determine the 
opportunities and constraints available to management from the overall programme.  
The politics of change come from both internal and external political activities generated by the 
change programme such as conflict and resistance to change, organisational and individual learning, 
consultation, and negotiations. Internal political activities include the conflict between civil servants 
and consultants, between central and periphery government organisations, and within the reform 
management groups. External politics include between government and the development agencies, 
and between the development agencies. Dawson (1994 pp. 42) argued:  
These individual or groups can influence decision-making and the setting of agendas at 
critical junctures during the process of transformational change. 
 The third dimension is the context matrix which is made up of internal and external circumstances 
of the organisation’s, past, present, and projections and expectations into the future (Dawson, 1994). 
In the case of LDCs PFM reforms, external circumstances past, present, and future have been given 
some attention in the research in the twin-themes of colonisation and neo-colonialism (Lassou et 
al,2019); and globalisation (Hopper et al, 2016).  
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The internal past, present, and future circumstances narrative would include, say, legislative changes, 
and remunerations levels and so on. Dawson summarises these as: “human resources; administrative 
structures; technology; product or service; and history and culture” (pp. 42). In the LDCs the human 
resource management has been labelled as capacity constraint, and that has been given a great deal 
of attention in the ‘normative’ literature and continues to be singled out as one of the important 
determinants of reform outcomes. In Ghana, some attention has been given to the administrative 
structures and public sector products or services in the past (Sai, Agble and Wiredu, 1996) and 
technology (BPMs and PUFMARP design report, 1996), but very little attention has been given to 
the history and culture.  
For that reason, history and culture requires to be explicated for clarity. Dawson argued that whilst 
the other contextual determinants are analytically distinct a change in one often has repercussions on 
the others. Consequently, it is important to view the determinants, (comprising the human resources, 
administrative structures, technology and, and public sector services) not only as they exist now, “but 
as they are perceived to have become legitimised within the organisation” (pp. 43).  This trajectory 
forms the history and culture of the organisation, which is also the evolution of these determinants 
that have become the shared beliefs and assumptions within the organisation. Dawson draws 
attention to the multi-layered nature of history and culture by distinguishing between the surface and 
deeper level elements.  He observed:  
Surface level elements are taken to refer to those things in an organisation which are readily 
accessible and which we can observe direct, such as espoused values articulated in company 
documents, office layout and dress codes. In contrast, the deeper aspects of culture relate to 
this underlying assumptions and beliefs which evolve as groups attempt to make sense of 
their collective experience within the work environment (pp. 45) 
Dawson argued that culture and history are key because they serve as internalised controls by 
influencing how organisational members think and act. 
3.4.4 An institutional Logics Framework 
The ILA offers a non-deterministic, a non-functionalistic alternative for theorising change that is 
based on the exteriority of society (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Both Thornton et al.2012 and 
Friedland and Alford (1991) have argued that the seven institutional orders (family, community, 
religion, state, market, professions, and corporations) should not be reduced by researchers to the 
dynamics of organisational fields. In this framework individuals and organisations need to be situated 
in the institutional context of society to understand their behaviour. In addition, they have argued 
that within the institutional orders, values generated cannot be traded off against alternatives, and 
that each of the levels is ‘nested’ in each other (from individual to organisation to institution). Each 
level offering progressively higher levels of opportunities and constraints. The framework that 
Friedland and Alford’s (1991) offered, which I have adapted and built on as a theoretical framework 
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for this research in Table 3.1 below, explains how individuals and organisations behave by 
understanding how they are situated in the cultural institutions of different institutional orders. In 
developing and expanding the interinstitutional orders to seven Friedland and Alford and Thornton 
et al. have shown the limitation of what was offered by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) based only on the influences of the state and the professions as the institutional orders 
of rationality and modernism.  
The revisions made in Thornton et al., 2012 apart from expanding the scope of the analysis makes it 
possible to bring forth other underlying value systems that generate differences or may be the sources 
of compromise and conflict. Importantly it helps to take the framework from its original paradigm 
of Western countries to the rest of the world, which might not necessarily follow the Western 
conception of modernity.   
This study argues that the framework developed by Friedland and Alford (1991) and Thornton et al. 
(2012) is robust but must be modified for non-Western societies. The main thrust is that there are 
interdependences between the institutional orders and their elemental categories constituting the 
interinstitutional system. Change in whatever form (whether developmental or transformational) 
takes place within this interinstitutional system as shown in the inter-institutional ideal types for 
Ghana in Table 3.1.  
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Table: 3.1 Adapted Interinstitutional System Ideal Types for Ghana 
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Source: Adapted from Thornton et al., 2012 (pp. 73): Changes have been shown as bolds words   
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3.4.5 Institutional Logics as a meta-framework theory 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) have noted that theory and methods go hand-in-hand and that 
institutional logics approach (ILA) have been received favourably by scholars because it allows a 
wide variety of mechanisms to be emphasized in research and theoretical development.  Five 
principles underlie IL’s use as a meta-theory, which is characteristically flexible generating 
opportunities for its refinement and theory extension (or theory development). 
 
There are five (5) meta-theoretical principles of institutional logics that have been derived from 
creative developments of methods (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008 p109). Firstly, the notion of 
embedded agency is a key metatheoretical assumption of the ILA. It posits that within society the 
‘interests, identities, values, and assumptions of individual and organisations are embedded within 
prevailing institutional logics’ Thornton and Ocasio, 2008 pp.103). Embedded agency is taken to 
mean how institutional logics shape action. Alternatively, it can be taken as the social action that 
is culturally rooted within the institutional logics (Thornton et al.,2012). Embedded behaviour 
generally means how constrained individuals and organisational actors (who are neither over-
socialised or under-socialised) pursue their self-interest to meet their individual and organisational 
needs. In this realm, what separates the IL’s perspective from rational choice theorists is that the 
latter presume individualistic interests. The constraints are also different, in the sense that the 
constraints in the ILA is imposed from the other two levels (the organisation and institution), 
whereas the constraints in rational choice is about the interplay between the means and ends. The 
ILA is also distinct from other institutional theories that emphasize the primacy of structure over 
agency such as in the new institutionalism; and from the Parsonian (1956) perspectives on 
institutionalism which draws a line between economic or technical sectors and institutions. 
Embedded agency in the ILA means a partial autonomy of action because the three levels of society 
is inextricably intertwined, therefore denying full autonomy to individual and organisational 
actors. Institutional cross-level effects within the institutional orders are therefore important in 
understanding of how action is taken in modern societies. However, the relationship between the 
three levels also offer possibilities for both organisational and institutional change (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 2006; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). The concept of embedded agency was originally 
developed by DiMaggio (1988) to address the shortcoming of the lack of agency in organisational 
institutionalism. Drori (2009) has extended the embedded agency further to a supra-national level 
where, because of globalisation, nation-stated are embedded in a world society ecology.  
The second notion is to conceive society as an inter-institutional system. From the IL’s perspective 
society is made of different institutional orders, each with its own logic. “Viewing society as an 
inter-institutional system allows sources of heterogeneity and agency to be theorized and to be 
observed from the contradictions between the logics of different institutional orders” (Thornton 
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and Ocasio, 2008 pp. 104). For the purpose of this study, I extend this inter-institutional system to 
include the international bodies (either bilateral or multilateral). The international bodies bring 
their logics into the interplay of markets, the state, professions, corporations, religion, and 
community. The notion of inter-institutional systems reinforces non-deterministic outcomes, as no 
institutional order, including it associated principles and logic of action is given priority over the 
other. This therefore supports the greater potential of deriving the categories of knowledge ground-
up from the analysis. 
Thirdly, the ILA assumes that all the seven interinstitutional orders operating in society have both 
material and cultural dimensions; and the logics as a meta-theory does not privilege one of these 
two characteristics over the other. The interinstitutional orders provide the material (economic) 
and cultural foundations of social institutions (such as family, religion, and the others) through the 
interplay of these two forces affecting each other. This interplay generates the second notion, 
namely, ILAs does not privilege any institution but recognises that these institutions are shaped 
(namely, developed and changed) through the interplay between cultural and economic forces. 
Logics theorists attribute the failure of theories that emphasize the economic dimensions of society 
(market mechanisms, aggregate atomistic individual preferences , organisational competition, 
technology, and resource dependency) to their failure to recognise that the cultural and social 
dimensions (families, religion and profession, community) are the sources of the values and 
utilities upon which they depend (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). 
Thornton and Ocasio (pp. 105) further argued that: 
these values and utilities cannot be traded off as simple economic alternatives instead the 
argument is how the comparative conflict and conformity of institutional logics (which are 
both material and cultural) influence human and organisational behaviour.  
Within the cultural element, the ILA incorporates three dimensions- the symbolic, cognitive, and 
normative. The logic theorists, reluctantly include a role for social norms, fearing the danger that 
it would imply acceding to internalisation of universalistic values in explaining human behaviour, 
while acknowledging that ‘a highly contingent set of social norms’ is a critical dimension of 
institutions and their underlying logic (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008 pp 106). Following March and 
Olsen (1989), Thornton and Ocasio averred that inclusion of social norms reinforce the logic 
‘where behaviour is driven not by a logic of consequences but by a logic of appropriateness’ (pp. 
106). Thus, they argue that human social behaviour is better explained by people thinking and 
working through what is right and appropriate and not because they are driven by deeply 
internalised values, institutionalised universalistic norms, and morality. The ILA terms this as 
over-socialising (implied in Parsons’s (1951) conception of norms which they reject), while 
labelling the neglect to include social norms (as in resource dependency theories and political 
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economy -type theories) as under-socialising. Thornton and Ocasio have observed that norms do 
not necessarily have to abide by universalistic principles. They argued that both dominant and 
subsidiary norms co-exist, and what prevails in shaping behaviour is probabilistic rather than 
deterministic.   
Fourthly ILA provides for the analysis of institutions at multiple levels. It supports research and 
institutional analysis at various levels and many other logics (such as societal-level logics, 
organisational, inter-organisation, markets, industry). This aspect of the ILA requires researchers 
to be sensitive to the theoretical mechanisms operating at the different levels of the analysis. For 
example, this element of the theory could operate at the societal, organisational fields, or individual 
level which is different from the main phenomenon being theorised (Thornton and Ocasio (2012). 
This requirement means that in applying institutional logics as a meta-theory the researcher is 
expected at all times to specify clearly whether the institutionalisation is operating at the societal 
level (for example corrupt practices across society), organisational level (peer-group pressure to 
engage in rent-seeking), inter-organisational (gaming of the budget allocation), individual level 
(school admission and other practices as a source of initiating corruption in children). These 
theoretical mechanisms are what Stinchcombe (2002) has labelled as micro-mechanisms of 
institutionalisation, of which he identified three alternatives to rational action: evangelism as an 
alternative to coercive, mimetic and normative mechanism; a modification of network theory; and 
the sociology of competition among comparable’ people or organisations.  
Lastly in the ILA’s meta-theory is the assumption of historical contingency (discontinuities and 
cyclical rather than linear progression). The historical contingency notion resonates with 
Foucauldian insights, while progress being cyclical or non-linear resonates with the Pareto 
conception of progress (Parsons 1968). Having identified the seven inter-institutional orders of 
westernised modern society (markets, corporations, professions, states, families, religions, 
community) their preponderance effects on society, organisations, and individuals have not been 
at even levels in the historical development of society. For example, religion and family dominate 
the early stages of development, whereas in the western capitalist modern state, the logics of the 
state, markets and corporations command more attention. Thornton and Ocasio (2008) observed:  
However, note with the current rise of religion in world discourse that institutional logics, 
both in their elaboration and relative pattern of dominance between institutional orders, 
are not simply an evolutionary or linear model of development driven by scientific 
progress or market rationalization, but an interplay of institutions within nation-states (pp 
108).  
To explain this further, for the purpose of this research I mobilise the insights of world society 
theory to provide a better understanding of supra-level logics within which the macro-level of 
nation states is situated (Drori, 2009). World society theory emerged as an institutionalists’ 
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response to the globalisation phenomena; and as a direct challenge to the realist assumptions 
embodied in international comparative studies. Nation-states are embedded in the global 
environment and are institutionalised just in the same way as individuals in society or organisations 
are institutionalised by their culture and other cognitive processes to which they are subjected to.  
In the globalization discourses today, world society theory situated nation-states within even 
broader environment, and challenged the dominancy of the perspectives drawn from dependency 
and modernization theories in comparative sociology (ibid). It highlights the global as 
institutionalist and cultural that provides a common core to all nation-states. It sits at a supra-level, 
above, and additional to the international and transnational levels.  She said:  
globalization includes an additional conceptual shift toward the universal and is thus a 
cultural process in addition to being an economic and political process…… the era of 
globalization reflects not only a remarkable intensification of global exchanges and 
flows and a dramatic thickening of international and transnational webs of relations, but 
also a change in the organizing logic from the particularistic (national, ethnic) to the 
universal (human, standardized, formal). This special consideration given to the global 
is more than a methodological point about a higher level of analysis. Drawing on the 
idea coined by Peter Berger (1968), the consolidating global dimension of globalization 
acts as a ‘sacred canopy,’ or a commonly accepted world culture …. (ibid, pp 455) 
Drori draws a distinction between ‘comparative institutionalism’ and the world society theory. The 
former refers to the studies undertaken by pre-80s scholars focusing on global operations and 
networks, while the latter refers to the work by scholars post-1980s studies led by John W. Meyer 
and the others who emphasised culture in developing the phenomenological side of 
institutionalism. The tenets of world society theory provide institutional insights in the context of 
current debates about globalization. Drori argued that whilst the world society theory and 
neoliberalism are both realist theories, they differ on almost every aspect of globalisation. 
Neoliberal globalists see globalisation as driven by rational individuals through a system of 
transactions among competing yet cooperating nation states. The effect of this brings efficiency to 
all parties and modernisation and progress to LDCs/EEs. On the other hand, world society theorists 
see the world system as structured around capitalist units acting through a capitalist system to 
produce greater profits for the shareholders, marginalising the poor and disadvantaged even 
further.  These different perspectives generate different logics. But Drori provides a caveat that 
one should not hastily conclusion that one school stands for globalisation while the other opposes 
it. She argued that there are many theorists from both schools who oppose globalisation. 
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3.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.5.1 Constructivist -Interpretivist research approach 
This research adopts a qualitative-interpretivist approach by departing from the positivist-
functionalist perspectives that leads to claims being made for accounting but with very little 
understanding of how such claims had been accomplished. The nature of qualitative research is 
that it’s not just empirical but profoundly theoretical; and it reflects the researcher’s interest 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2007).This research is constructivist- interpretivist (Denzin and Lincoln 
(1994) in the sense that I set out to conduct the research abductively, working with the field data 
from the ground upwards and drawing on a theoretical framework iteratively to theorise the 
empirical findings. This approach can be explicated by drawing out the difference between four 
basic inquiry paradigms developed by Guba and Lincoln (1994) 15 : (i) positivism, (ii) post-
positivism, (iii) critical theory, and (iv) constructivism.  
I offer the justification of my approach through these paradigms by an example taken from Ravitch 
and Riggan (2012).They argued that scholars have shown that in research, we are either postulating 
that X causes Y (as saying that smoking causes cancer or raining causes flooding); or we are saying 
that X and Y are related, without one necessarily causing the other (as in race and identity, or 
mental health and poverty) (Ravitch and Riggan ,2012 pp. 17). What theory does is to explain the 
causation or relationship between X and Y. A positivist approach assumes that X and Y can be 
ascertained as objective facts and the researcher will therefore confine herself or himself to the 
examination of X and Y, by trying to exclude all other considerations, including herself or himself.  
By an extension, a post-positivism (Creswell 2005) would take the concepts X and Y to “exist as 
independent constructs, treated as objects under study, and more or less accepted at face value. In 
the example above, this means that it is assumed that we all have roughly the same ideas about 
what race and identify (or smoking and cancer) are, or at least what conceptual building blocks 
constitute them”. (Ravitch and Riggan, 2012, pp.17) 
In contrast to the positive-post-positivist paradigms, an interpretivism (or subjective) paradigm 
would investigate both the relationship between X and Y as concepts, and the relationship between 
him or her (as the researcher) as well as X and Y (Ravitch and Riggan,2012). However, this study 
goes beyond that to adopt the constructivist’s approach for using comparative data analysis, 
allowing for emergent possibilities, and its open-endedness (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz 
2014).  
 
15 I combine this classification with Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) four sociological approaches to aid 
organisational analysis that they labelled as paradigms, namely, (i) functionalism, (ii) interpretivism, (iii) 
radical structuralist, and (iv) radical humanism. 
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Charmaz (2014) distinguishes the GT’s social constructivist approach from the conventional social 
constructionist approaches. She argued that the social constructionists aim to render the world as 
they study it sometimes from individualist’s stand (or radical subjectivism) bordering on radical 
humanism (as in Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Social constructivists (such as Yvonna Lincoln) on 
the other hand ‘stress social contexts, interaction, sharing viewpoint, and interpretive 
understandings’ (Charmaz, 2014 pp14) 
The constructivist also emphasises an iterative process, between field data gathering, and 
qualitative coding and analysis; and action and meaning that is rooted in the pragmatist tradition 
(Charmaz 2014). There is also room to use the method flexibly as Charmaz argued that indeed 
“Constructivist grounded theory highlights the flexibility of the method and resist mechanical 
applications of it” (Charmaz, 2014, p 13). By using the theoretical framework as suggested by 
Charmaz (2014), I weave the extant theories into the study’s empirical discoveries as the need 
arises (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Critics of the constructivist approach often, erroneously in our view, highlight the authoritative 
voice of the researcher in interpreting the responses of participants.  This research is possibly open 
to this kind of criticism because of the previous role of the researcher in the IPFM reforms and 
intermittent advisory role in Ghana PFM. However, this study starts by rejecting the assumption 
that there is an objective external reality, and that the researcher’s role should be a passive, neutral 
observer undertaking a detached narrow empiricism. Blumer for example has argued against 
aloofness in social research, by arguing that ‘genuine’ interpretation requires the researcher to take 
the position of the “acting unit” (Blumer 1969)16. As Charmaz explains “If, instead, we start with 
the assumption that social reality is multiple, processional, and constructed, then we must take the 
researcher’s position, privileges, perspective, and interactions into account as an inherent part of 
the research reality. It, too, is a construction”. In this sense the research effort is characterised by 
relativism, rather than an objective process that adopts “unproblematic prescriptions and 
procedures” (Charmaz, 2014, p13). 
Underlying the constructivists’ position is the basic notion that the research acts are constructed, 
and not “given” to be “discovered”. These views create room for researcher reflexivity, about their 
actions and decisions, that is an important part of the constructivists’ approach.   
The interpretivists put emphasis on the subjectivism traditions by adopting approaches such as 
grounded theory, ethnomethodology and ethnology and structuration theory (Goddard, 2010). 
 
16 The concept of the ‘acting unit’ in Symbolic Interactionism is defined as an individual or a collection of 
individuals in an organisation. Blumer 1969, pp85 states: “There is no empirically observable activity in a 
human society that does not spring from some acting unit”. 
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The fourth paradigm, critical theory derives from either of the two radical traditions found in 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) taxonomy, namely radical structuralism, and radical humanism. As 
Lukka (2010) has pointed out: “The critical paradigm(s) rest on the assumption that there are deep-
seated structural contradictions and conflicts in society, of which people need to be aware, and 
from which they need to be emancipated; consequently, analysing the status quo is not sufficient”. 
For the purpose of this research, scholars have acknowledged that the influence of the critical 
paradigm on accounting research is “scattered over several schools of thought, typically following 
in the footsteps of certain original social science thinkers, such as Marx, Habermas, or Foucault” 
Lukka (2010 pp112). In the LDCs/EEs the influences of Bourdieu reflexive sociology and 
Gramsci’s hegemonic theory, among others, are also felt in critical accounting research. With the 
combination of these different schools and paradigms the notion of critical accounting research 
has come to mean different things to different people (Lukka, 2010; Cooper and Hopper, 2007). 
But Alvesson and Deetz (2000 chpt4) have identified several sources that have inspired critical 
theory, including power-knowledge asymmetry, dualistic constructionist account of experiences 
and language, historically based social conflict theory, and radical humanistic trait giving rise to 
complex human subjectivism.  
Despite accounting being a multi-paradigmatic discipline, until recently accounting research has 
been characterised by factors that support the notion of incommensurability of paradigms. The 
dominant paradigm has been the functionalists (especially in North America).  and there have been 
considerable barriers between paradigms, especially between the functionalists and the others, with 
very little communication across the paradigmatic boundaries (Lukka 2010; Hopwood, 2007). 
However, the argument that the practice of accounting research supports the notion of 
incommensurability of paradigms is only superficial because that argument is based on a lack of 
fully appreciating the ontology of accounting 17 . Lukka (2010) has argued against the 
incommensurability of paradigms by saying that ‘a more profound analysis would question such a 
conclusion since, for instance, it seems close to impossible to conduct interpretive accounting 
research in a way that faithfully adopts the relatively narrow premises of the interpretive 
paradigm’.  
The philosophy underlying this research questions any notion of strict incommensurability of 
paradigms. The study starts from the fundamental assumption that human beings are active agents 
in their lives and in their worlds rather than being passive recipients of larger social forces 
(Charmaz 2014, p9). As Strauss argued: it is process, not structures, that is fundamental to human 
existence. If we consider the persuasive argument that structures are created by human beings 
 
17 As I have argued previously the ontology of accounting change depends on the performativity and the 
relational drift of accounting, which are neither fixed nor deterministic.  
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through engaging in processes, creating social meaning through “our use of language and emerged 
through action” (Charmaz 2014, p9) then a firm basis has been established for the interpretations 
of the analyses of the study. This study therefore builds on the insight that it is the construction of 
action that is the central issue to be addressed in IPFM reforms.  
These philosophical assumptions are embodied in pragmatists’ methods such as symbolic 
interactions and institutional logics that I have mobilised to theorise the outcome of the analysis. 
3.5.2 Addressing researcher bias in qualitative research  
This section highlights the challenge of researcher bias in qualitative research and how it has been 
addressed in this study. Scholars have drawn attention to the tension in qualitative research as 
straddling the poles of researcher subjectivity and scientific objectivity (Blumer 1969). Blumer 
(1969) has argued that the only difference between the natural sciences research and the social 
sciences research is that there is a tension in the latter to be explicated. It is this tension that 
separates qualitative research from other research methodologies that rely on nomothetic methods. 
I seek to explicate this tension and address it reflexively at the beginning of this inquiry.   
The researcher has been involved in public financial management reforms in several countries as 
reforms’ adviser, and naturally brings to this study a degree of theoretical sensitivity on reforms. 
Scholars consider theoretical sensitivity as potentially beneficial to the research effort, but with a 
caveat (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Gioia et al.,2012; and Charmaz, 2014) of a greater chance of 
researcher bias and the danger of ‘going local’ and missing the salient points. Addressing these 
two contradictory forces calls for introspection and reflexivity that influenced our choice of using 
grounded theory (GT) informed - methods. The GT informed research methods such as 
ethnographic methods with intensive interviewing, and the constructivist philosophy, allow 
research participants’ voice to emerge much earlier in the research and perhaps better than other 
qualitative methods. And at the same time, abductively, it allows an active engagement between 
the empirical data and existing theories; and between the participants’ and the researcher in 
constructing theory. 
3.5.3 Justification for using grounded theory informed methods in this study 
This study is designed as a qualitative research using grounded theory informed methods. In 
adopting grounded theory informed approach, the study seeks to address a common shortcoming 
that often plague qualitative research, for being descriptive rather than analytical. Rahaman et al. 
(2004) pointed out that: “A new wave of critical and interpretive researchers have not been able to 
ground their theorising in the actual practice of accounting”. 
By adopting grounded theory informed methods, the study aims to achieve rigour (Gioia et al., 
2012; Riggan and Ratvich, 2012) while allowing the dialectical interplay between objectivity and 
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subjectivity (Hopper et al, 2009) in otherwise a study which make subjective interpretation its 
prime focus. Blumer advocates for the use of scientific methods of investigations, and to him 
scientific methods are universal tools that could be applied to the natural sciences, social and the 
psychological sciences alike. As alluded to previously, the only difference between the natural 
science and social science is that there is a tension in the latter to be explicated by the researcher. 
Hopper et al.,2009 have argued that studies based exclusively on discourse and texts do not 
sufficiently address the effects of socio-economic structures and can fail to connect to practices 
and their inherent challenges. They therefore advocated political economy approaches that 
combined grounded, institutional data, and iterative theorising. However, there are variations to 
this approach, and in this thesis, I draw from political sociology principles (Collins,1994) which 
combine grounded theory and institutionalism, with systematic combination theorising, 
emphasising the interplay between action and social structures. 
This research aims to support theory development (Dubois and Gadde, 2002) by building a bridge 
between the ontological concepts and empirical evidence (of accounting change) (Stones and Jack, 
2016). This study considers that an adoption of grounded theory informed methods and ‘systematic 
combining’ provide a distinctive methodology for achieving that outcome (Parker and Roffey, 
1997). As Rob Stones has pointed out in building this bridge we are “thinking about the concepts 
and combinations of concepts you need, that are relevant, and then thinking about the relationship 
between those concepts and combinations of concepts, the shapes of the concepts, and the bits of 
the evidence you attach to these, as it were”(Stones and Jack, 2016 pp. 1147).  
In other words, in studying IPFM reforms the study is aims to identify the relevant ontological 
concepts and relate them to the interactions between different players in the ‘contextual field’. In 
Stones words, one is trying to get to ‘the depth of hermeneutic-structural purchase’ that is 
embedded in the minds of various agents in that field. This hermeneutic structure is made up of 
‘people’s streams of consciousness, their internal life, what Margaret Archer would call their 
internal conversations, their emotions, their reasoning, and the interweaving of these’ (Stones and 
Jack pp.1147 to 1148).  
GT has an inherent property to provide a clear path to context analysis using the paradigm model 
(to provide the properties of the phenomenon). To achieve our aims for this study, a good way of 
getting the ‘in situ agents’ perspective and understanding of the contextual field is through 
grounded theory informed methods. Recognising that GT offers clear methods (such as 
ethnography) of giving voice to indigenous actors. •According this study pays ‘indigenous beliefs 
and social structures due respect in the face of the agendas and rationalities of political reformers’ 
(Hopper et al. 2009 pp.472) 
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From both the academic literature and also in the ‘technical’ literature of financial management 
reforms (of which the WB-Harvard axis on public sector reforms (Manning and McCourt, 2013) 
may fall in the middle), this study has identified that the lack of ‘context analysis’ has become the 
Achilles heel of public sector reforms. As Pollitt (2013) have noted:  
Perhaps a more modest, adaptive, locally informed, context-sensitive approach to public 
management reform would be of benefit to the developed world too? (Pollitt (2013). p 586) 
I adopt GT for this research because it supports the possibility of not prematurely defining the area 
of investigation or related prior assumptions (Parker and Roffey, 1997). Parker and Roffey have 
said:  
Grounded theory research is directed towards making sense of the data collected and 
giving them a structure, with a view to determining their meaning and significance for the 
actors, the researchers, and readers. There must be a genuine attempt to understand the 
world of the actors as they have consciously or unconsciously constructed it, and to 
provide the foundations for developing a theory that will serve as a future basis for 
explanation (Pp. 214). 
That is, it allows the issues which are important to the participants to emerge, rather than impose 
a priori restrictions (Goddard, et al., 2016).As has been noted by researchers GT is useful for 
studying phenomenon where only little research has been done to reveal its categories, properties 
and dimensions to provide an in-depth understanding of ‘what’ and ‘how’ to lead to the ‘why’ 
(Boadu and Sorour, 2015) or new phenomenon of which very little is known (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990). For example, Sorour and Howell (2013) investigated the corporate governance phenomenon 
within the Egyptian banking sector, and found it helped to identify the drivers, barriers, context, 
and consequences of this phenomenon, thereby providing practitioners and policy makers an in-
depth understanding of it. 
3.5.4 Advantages and limitations of GT 
In GT the researcher gets the benefit of a closer relationship to the participants’ point of view and 
uses the language that they use to capture the processional details of a phenomenon. So, if the 
study develops a category from the data, as abstract as it may be, it emerges from a concept 
participant are used to, and I do not have to struggle with both participants and scholars to get 
agreement on the meaning of that category. This contrast, when categories are taken from existing 
theory it may be difficult for participants to relate to the tentative relationships the analyst would 
postulate. GT therefore offers a detailed understanding of the categories in terms of their properties 
and dimensions and help us to establish the relationships between categories (Boadu and Sorour, 
2015). 
Empirically, GT allows substantive concepts in each phenomenon to emerge, but it may sensitively 
draw on existing formal theories as needed. Glaser and Strauss point out that GT by ‘allowing 
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substantive concepts and hypotheses to emerge first, on their own, enables the analyst to ascertain 
which, if any, existing formal theory may help him generate his substantive theories. He can then 
be faithful to his data, rather than forcing it to fit a theory. He can be more objective and less 
theoretically biased’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967 pp. 34).  
They go on to explain that by using this process the analyst cannot merely apply pre-existing 
categories from formal theories, at the start of the analysis, but ‘wait to see whether they are linked 
to the emergent substantive theory concerning the issue in focus’ (pp. 34). For example, in this 
study after developing the concepts, categories and their properties, and a substantive theory, I 
found a link between the emerging theory and institutional logics. 
GT also has the benefit of helping to generate new grounded formal theories and to reformulate 
previously established ones. In this study, our substantive theory may suggest ways to re-formulate 
Schick’s ‘basics first’ approach to public sector reforms. If GT is be used to generate formal theory 
it requires multiple substantive theories, other ethnographic studies, and further data collections 
and comparative analysis. Thus, GT allows the possibility that other multiple theories can exist in 
a substantive form, in contrast to the directly monopolistic implications of logico-deductive 
theories, which its formulators claim there is only one theory for an area, or perhaps even one 
sociological theory for all areas. GT therefore suggests that there may be a need for multiple 
theories on the substantive level because one theory cannot handle all relevancies, and by 
‘comparing many theories we can begin to arrive at more inclusive, parsimonious levels.’  
GT provides a means of analysing phenomenon not merely describing it, therefore providing a 
deeper understanding. It is a methodology cum philosophy of researching a phenomenon. Goddard 
(2010) has said “Grounded theory is not inherently an interpretive methodology but in practice 
PSA researchers, along with other accounting researchers have, adopted the approach, following 
Parker and Roffey’s (1997) exhortation to use it in such a way”. 
GT pays attention to the fact that every event, happening, and phenomenon is unique, but in so 
doing researchers are limited to the number of cases that can be covered in a study. 
3.6 METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS USING GT 
The link between GT and symbolic interactionism (SI) is well established (Charmaz, 2014; Gurd 
2008; Stern, 1994, p. 215; Bowers, 1988; Chenitz and Swenson, 1986; Lye et al., 1997; Locke, 
2001). This fact buttresses the use of ethnographic methods in the GT approach, which can go 
beyond SI to incorporate more critical stance (Gurd, 2008). GT collects data through ethnographic 
studies and employ basic strategies such as coding (open, axial, and selective), memo-writing, 
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theoretical sampling, and comparative methods. Ethnographic methods call for intensive 
interviewing of research participants conducted through open-ended questions. 
GT employs comparative analysis of facts to develop conceptual categories and conceptual 
properties before going on to develop generalised relations among the categories and their 
properties (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Charmaz (2014) provides GT data collection and analysis 
methods that distinguishes it from other approaches in a nine-point summary as follows:  
• Conducting data collection and analysis iteratively throughout the studies 
• Analysing the actions and processes rather than themes and structures 
• Using comparative methods 
• Drawing on the data in developing new categories 
• Developing inductive abstract categories through systematic data analysis 
• Emphasizing theory construction rather than description or application of current theories 
• Engaging in theoretical sampling 
• Searching for variation in the studied categories or process 
• Pursuing the development of a category rather than covering a specific empirical topic.  
In the analysis phase the initial step is in developing the open codes, but the focus is on developing 
categories and their properties. Glaser and Strauss (1967) draw a distinction between ‘category’ 
and ‘property’ as there is a difference between a building and the building materials used in its 
construction. A category is the building block of the substantive theory, and it stands as a self-
contained element of the theory. In turn, property is a conceptual element of a category. 
Categories and properties once indicated in the analysis, by the data, are quite robust in the sense 
that they do not stand on the validity of the evidence that generated them or their ‘truthfulness’. 
Strauss and Glaser have explained that they emerge from the data, but they are not the data itself. 
They noted:  
Once a category or property is conceived, a change in the evidence that indicated it will 
not necessarily alter, clarify, or destroy it. It takes much more evidence- usually from 
different substantive areas- as well as the creation of a better category to achieve such 
changes in the original category (Glaser and Strauss, 1967 p36).  
Identifying the central category and relating it to other main categories is the final step in the 
development of the substantive theory. 
3.6.1 Version of GT and justification thereof  
Charmaz, (2014 pp16) has stated that ‘in their original version of the methods, Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) invited their readers to use grounded theory strategies flexibly in their own way’. This 
invariable has resulted in various studies using different versions of GT that emerged subsequently. 
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For this accounting researchers are encouraged to explicate the version they have adopted (Gurd 
2008; Boadu & Sorour, 2015) and to provide their ontological and epistemological stance (Gurd, 
2008). In other words, in explaining why a researcher has adopted a version of GT, a better 
justification requires their choice to be embedded in the research philosophy.  
From a review of studies claiming to have adopted GT methods Gurd (2008) identified four main 
versions employed by researchers as: 1 Glaser (1978) approach; 2. Strauss (1987)) approach; 3. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990); 4. The fourth approach has been a largely unrecognised methodological 
contribution of GT based on dimensional analysis found in Schatzman (1991) and Kools et 
al.(1996). In addition, this study adds recent contributions made in the literature by theorists such 
as Gioia et al., 2012 and Charmaz, 2014. 
In this research we adopt the Strauss and Corbin (1998) version, as adapted by others (such as 
Gioia et al., 2012 and Charmaz, 2014), which emphasises open coding, axial coding for category 
development, and theoretical sampling. These are interpretive-constructivist tools that overcomes 
some of the weaknesses of qualitative research by making it more analytical than descriptive.  
No matter which version of GT is adopted, Charmaz, 2014 argued that GT remains a constellation 
of methods rather than an array of different methods. She argued that GT methodologist have in 
common an inductive logic, a rigorous comparative data analysis, a development of theoretical 
analysis, and a focus contributing towards policy and practice.  
3.7 APPLYING THE METHODOLOGY TO CONDUCT THE STUDY 
By applying the theories and methods discussed in the preceding sections, the rest of this chapter 
sets out (i) the data collection design, and (ii) data analysis. I conclude this chapter by discussing 
the implications of the theories guiding the methodology and their impact on the data collection 
and data analysis. 
This study consisted of thirty-one interviews with participants (some multiple times) comprising 
officials from the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Controller and Accountant General (CAGD), Ghana 
Audit Service (GAS), PFM Reform Secretariat, Parliament, and the Ministry of Health, and 
Education and two external consultants. Some of the officials had active responsibilities in current 
reforms in Ghana, and others had retired after their earlier involvement. The study was interested 
in finding out what had gone on with the earlier attempts to implement the reforms and what was 
going on with the current one at the time of the research. There are many reasons why the Ghana 
PFM reforms have not performed as expected, some captured in official documents (for example 
see Government of Ghana, Issue Paper on PUFMARP, November 1999) and other sources such as 
Roberts and Andrews (2005); and Betley et al.,2012. In this study I asked participants to recount 
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their involvement in the reforms, and to tell us what actions they have taken, what they have seen, 
what they think, and how they relate to the reform performances.  
Some of the participants had been involved in the reforms at the beginning of their careers and had 
risen to senior ranks as directors, others were in the middle or towards the end of their careers. 
With some of the participants looking back, others narrating what was happening currently, and 
others looking into the future, a dynamic picture of the reforms unfolded.  
 Most of them spoke openly and freely about their experiences of the reform, using the anonymity 
safeguards of this research; others saw it as an opportunity to ‘sell’ the performance of the reforms, 
appearing to be reading from some official script. One or two of the participants came across as 
guarded in their responses and stunted the flow of conversation. Where there were doubts about 
the information provided by participants, the issues were addressed through comparative analysis 
and triangulation of the interview data with other data sources. Overall, this did not present 
formidable difficulties because what was important was not the ‘truth’ as the participants brought 
but the concepts embodied in their narration of events. I extract these concepts through the coding 
process to provide the ‘what’ of the reforms. Focusing on the ‘what’ from the participants’ point 
of view, was the key to the constructivist-interpretive approach. They (namely, the concepts) 
became the building blocks of the categories which the study developed through comparison 
(going forward and backwards between the data based on what other participants had said, using 
documents and the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity). Using these coding techniques in building 
the relationships between concepts and categories enabled us to answer the ‘how’ of the PFM 
reforms; and through that the ‘why’ of reform performances.   
3.8 DATA COLLECTION 
In this data collection section, the study outlines the data collection design, which addresses the 
key practical challenges of the study including access, the scope of IPFM reforms, choice of 
research participants, what data to collect, and how to collect them. 
3.8.1 The data collection methods  
Several decisions points arose in the data collection process, including deciding on the study 
population, the sample frame, interview selection, data collection strategies, and the miscellaneous 
project management challenges (such as international travel dates and logistics) that needed to be 
addressed.  
Decision on the study population centred around (i) how many government agencies to be covered, 
(ii) whether to include central as well as local government(iii) whether to include the Government 
of Ghana organisation alone or to include donor agencies operating in Ghana, including those 
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funding the IPFM reforms. For emic reasons, the focus of the research was on Government of 
Ghana ministries, department, and agencies (MDAs), and those with direct experience of the 
reforms (consultants). For reasons of costs and logistics the geographical reach of the studies was 
limited to the government offices located in capital city, Accra. But Ghana being a unitary-
centralized state all the key MDAs that were required could be reached from Accra, including the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF), Controller and Accountant General (CAGD), Ghana Audit Service 
(GAS), Parliament, Office of the Head of Civil Service, Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
Education. In deciding to limit the geographical reach of the studies to Accra, I did not foreclose 
the possibility of looking at fiscal decentralization issues when the need arose during data 
collection process (Yin 2014). Ghana’s central IPFM reforms extend to the district assemblies 
(local government), but the DAs are treated just as any other government central MDA, so they 
did not necessarily generate a different set of reform issues.  
To decide who to interview I adopted purposive sampling method to select participants on the 
bases of either occupying a reform position or being a head of an organisation connected with PFM 
reforms (as an acting unit) or have had close involvement with reform issues. After going through 
the gatekeepers, some participants were suggested through snowballing for their knowledge of the 
reforms. One of the implications of selecting research participants through snowballing was that 
the number of research participants could not be pre-determined. Rather the interview process was 
extended to the saturation point, where no new data emerged from subsequent interviews. 
The interviews were conducted in open free style semi-structured interactions where participants 
were asked to provide an account of their involvement in the reform processes and to express their 
views on whatever aspect of the reforms, depending on their involvement and knowledge of the 
reforms. The aim of the interviews was to check on ‘what is going on’ with the Ghana reforms 
from the viewpoint of the participants. The study aimed at obtaining retrospective or real-time 
account from people who have experienced the reforms from key positions or were experiencing 
it then at the time of the interview. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed, except for 
theoretical sample interviews that were recorded and not transcribed. The researcher administered 
a research protocol that promised anonymity, without confidentiality to the research participants. 
Once assured that the recording tapes were on, the researcher consciously decided not to take any 
notes in the interviews. This generated more fluid interactions between the researcher and the 
participants. The duration of the interviews was on average approximately 39 minutes.  Some 
conversation took place with five of the seven gatekeepers in government who approved this 
research that were not taped, but notes were taken.  
Several challenges were addressed in the data collection process. From the initial stages I realised 
that access to government official could be difficult to get. Officials might suddenly become 
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elusive or agree to talk off-record only. Recording interviews was a potential hurdle to overcome 
(Lassou 2017), especially in the Ghanaian context where officials are sometimes guarded in 
sharing information with the public. However, this presumption proved false, as participants 
agreed to the recordings once the research protocol was explained. There was one participant, who 
showed some hesitation, but agreed after his questions were fully addressed. The researcher 
depended on prior professional contacts with key gatekeepers to facilitate access to government 
departments.  Secondly the constructivist stance required the researcher to walk a fine line between 
appearing naïve and knowledgeable at same time. The intention has been to get participants’ views 
to come across unobstructed, but that sometimes proved challenging. Often the approach worked 
well, but at least on one occasion a participant felt uncomfortable with the semi-structured 
interview approach, and instead preferred more detailed and specific questions. In other situations, 
the researcher observed some participants went from being knowledgeable to being out of their 
depth because of the wide range of issues covered in IPFM reforms. On occasions the researcher 
observed some participants being cautions in what they say, by trying to produce what they 
considered as ‘appropriate’ responses to frame the reforms in the ‘right’ light; or simply proffering 
statements that seemed to the researcher that the participant was talking from an official script. 
These issues were addressed in the coding processes of the research where attention was given to 
similarities and differences in concepts provided by participants in their account of reform 
processes, actions taken, and views.  
Methodological concerns about objectivity- subjectivity in the research were addressed by letting 
the participants’ interpretation come through, and by the active positional stance taken by the 
researcher. Blumer (1969) argued that to catch the interpretation process, the researcher must catch 
the participants’ interpretation whilst they are doing it, by taking their position. Active positioning 
of the researcher such as in autoethnography is prone to the risk of “going-native”. As Gioia et al. 
(2012) have cautioned that being too close to participants, and essentially adopting their views 
risks losing the higher-level perspective necessary for informed theorizing. Other researchers have 
dealt with this possibility by appointing, in a multiple research team, one person to be an 
‘independent’ devil’s advocate “whose role it is to critique interpretation that might look a little 
too gullible” (Gioia et al 2012). But in this case, the researcher used insights from theoretical 
sensitivity, data triangulation, and by opening the analysis to external reviews.  
The underlying interview method was based on three basic assumptions that: (1) an organisational 
world is socially constructed (Gioia et al.,2012); (2) that the people constructing the government 
organisational realities are “knowledgeable agents” and that they know what they are trying to do 
in the reforms, and can explain their thoughts, intentions, and actions (Gioia et al (2012); (3) that 
as researchers we reflexively assume that we are knowledgeable people who are able to “figure 
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out patterns in the data, enabling us to “surface concepts and relationships that might, escape the 
awareness of the informants, and that we can formulate these concepts in theoretical relevant 
terms” (Gioia et al., 2012 p.17). In furtherance of this point, Denzin and Lincoln (2003) cast the 
role of the qualitative researcher as bricoleur, who is producing a bricolage. The approach of this 
research is to “enact these assumptions in a way that enables us to be true to the informants’ 
experiences while also meeting a scientific criterion of presenting evidence systematically” (Gioia 
et al., 2012, p17).  
The use of intensive qualitative interviewing techniques in this study assumed that the interviewees 
had substantial experience and the process is “open-ended yet directed, shaped yet emergent, paced 
yet unrestricted” (Charmaz 2014 p.85). Intensive interviewing as Charmaz points out “focuses the 
topic while providing the interactive space and time to enable the research participant’s views and 
insights to emerge’ (ibid.).  We aimed to achieve a balance between the interviewer and the 
interviewee, and to ensure some correspondence between the intensive interviewing procedure and 
grounded theory data analysis. 
Charmaz argued that intensive interview enables the interviewer to assume direct control of the 
construction of data than most other qualitative methods would allow. As she said: 
grounded theory methods enable researchers to take successively more analytic control 
over their data collection and emerging theoretical ideas.  
The interviews elicited a range of responses from participants who differed in their historical 
exposure to the reforms, degree of participant, and attitudes to reforms. Depending on what they 
had done in the previous reforms, they reflected on the directions and activities of the current 
reforms, sometimes justifying their past actions, achievements, disappointments, and failures. At 
other times, some reflected on the future directions of the reforms. The responses were therefore 
fairly complex, sometimes candid, and other times guarded but in an overall sense open and 
constructive; sometimes reflecting shared discourse between the researcher and participants and 
other times pulling in different directions. The interview therefore called forth reflections and re-
appraisal of events on the side of the researcher.  
3.8.2 Interviewing participants 
In November 2017, letters were sent to the key gatekeepers in the MoF, CAGD, Ghana Audit 
Service, and selected MDAs. These letters were hand-delivered to the gatekeepers, sometimes 
telephoning ahead of time, and in the other cases calling in to the office in person to meet with the 
approver. In the MoF, after the approval of the letter by the gatekeepers, the ministry took it upon 
itself to arrange subsequent meetings with key directors and some institutions. Copies of the 
approved letter were sent to relevant officials by the budget reform office from the MoF. In the 
Audit Service, there was an initial meeting with the Auditor General and after his approval 
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subsequent interview meetings were arranged with other officials. A similar pattern emerged in 
the CAGD.  Anticipating that there may be a need to undertake additional interviews outside of 
this core group, a general letter “to who it may concern” letter was prepared and issued to 
individuals who did not fall into these categories. The researcher followed up wherever the 
investigations led; being guided by the research question and the propositions. This approach is 
helpful for “uncovering new concepts to develop” (Gioia et al., 2012), as compared to the 
traditional approach of standardising the interview questions for all participants.  
Issuing a topic guide to participants in semi-structured interview approach  
In addition to the research question (RQ), the researcher developed a topic guide (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003) and some key propositions (Yin 2014) to guide the semi-structured interviewing 
approach. Topic guides and propositions are useful because as Yin argued, the “how” and “why” 
in the RQ do not sufficiently tell us what we should study in the research. By focusing on what 
evidence to collect in the field, the RQ was turned to a series of topics to guide the participants. 
Included in the topic guide were extra issues to broaden the discussions. At least in one instance, 
a participant suggested extra topics to be included.    
Objectives of the study: 
Explore the social history of the Government of Ghana public financial management (PFM) 
reforms 
Explore reform design, processes, and procedures of implementation 
Explore the organisational and institutional arrangements and impact of the reforms 
Bridge the gap between the academic literature and practice in public financial management 
reforms 




1. The rationale behind PFM reforms in Ghana 
2. Design of the PFM reforms  
3. Ownership of the reform  
4. Techniques deployed in implementing the budget, accounting, and accountability 
reforms  
5. Impact on government programmes 
6. Processes of knowledge and skills generated through reforms  
7. Impact on control mechanisms- compliance improvement 
8. Professionalization and impact on the identities of managers, or planners, or 
economists, or accounting staff in the public service 
9. Credibility of the reforms 
10. In addition, participants were given unrestricted range to comment on any issue they 
consider pertinent to the study objectives 
 
 
Propositions behind the research question and topic guide: Yin (2014) has suggested two levels of 
questions: Level 1 questions that were directed to the participants in the topic guide; and the Level 
2 questions that are asked of the case and specified in the propositions. By doing this the researcher 
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distinguished between what the verbal line of inquiry was from the mental line of inquiry. The 
propositions direct attention to what must be studied, that was held by the researcher, and guided 
evidence collection. For this study, the researcher developed four propositions are set out below: 
1st Proposition: 
 
Accounting Practices are changing because of the reform; or 




There has been diffusion/ translation/internalisation of the key reforms 
There has not been any diffusion/ translation/internalisation of the key reform at the collective 




Participants really understand the rationale for the reforms and understand the key concepts in 
their areas of operations 
Participants do not understand, or partially understand the rationale of the reforms and only 




The reform interventions aim at behavioural reforms (changing attitudes and impacting new 
values, instituting new practices, and deinstitutionalising obsolete practices) 
The reform aim at just technical fixes and legislative changes and do not address behavioural 
changes sufficiently 
 
In the semi-structured approach, participants were asked to provide an account of their involvement 
in the Public Financial Management reform processes and to express their views on whatever 
aspect of the reforms depending on the extent of their involvement and knowledge. The aim of the 
interviews was to check on ‘what is going on’ with the Ghana reforms from the viewpoint of the 
participants. To allow a reasonable period for the iterative process of data collection including 
interviews and participation observation, the data collection process was spread over 
approximately one and half years: from November 2017 to May 2019 and observations beyond 
that to period approximately March 2020. With this duration the researchers reached a saturation 
point in data collection.   
The total duration of recorded interviews and other materials was approximately twenty-five (25) 
hours with an average of thirty-nine (39) minutes per event as evidenced in Appendix 2.  
3.8.3 Observations 
The covering letter to the gatekeepers requested for the researcher to attend some of the reform 
meetings, but that to a large extent did not happen. However, on one occasion the researcher was 
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invited to attend an IMF conference in Ghana where reform issues were discussed by Ministers 
and other senior officials in an open forum. It was possible to record and transcribe the relevant 
portion of a minister’s speech. Observation methods for this research did not depend on the 
attendance of internal official meetings. I have adopted what Tedlock (2005) has described as 
autoethnographic methods which mainly require closeness and engagement with officials in 
government offices in Ghana. The observation went beyond observing participants to “observation 
of participation” in the reform (Tedlock 2005), thereby turning the “anthropological gaze” inward 
as well as outward in several directions creatively. For example, the researcher recorded Ghana 
TV and radio broadcasts when reforms were discussed. I followed Ghana TV stations, which 
regularly broadcasted the proceedings of Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) and discussed 
reform issues by government officials. The websites of the Ministry of Finance and the Ghana 
Audit Services (especially the later) discuss reforms issues on U-tube which offered valuable 
materials for the research. 
3.8.4 Documentation reviews 
Secondary data sources were provided by officials to the researcher, sometimes from private 
archives as listed in Appendix 1. Most of the documents which should have been in public domain, 
but often were not. None of the materials collected are official secrets but some are confidential, 
considered as “proprietary” with access given at the discretion of the official depending on the 
approval (tacit or otherwise) from a ‘gatekeeper’. Like the interviewing process there was a degree 
of snowballing in collecting working documents which were made available to the researcher, 
sometimes voluntarily, and other times upon request. Other sources of documentation such as 
archives and websites were used.  
3.8.5 Ethical considerations 
Every interview participant was given an information sheet and a consent form ahead of the 
interview. The participant’s information sheet clearly stated the purpose of the research and the 
data protection protocol. Participants were made aware that the interview would be audio recorded 
and transcribed; and that they could withdraw at any stage during the research process, without 
giving reasons. The researcher in addition promised anonymity, but not confidentiality. It was 
made clear that where anonymity needed to be broken, the participant’s permission would be 
sought. In the interviews undertaken, all participants agreed to be recorded; in addition to signing 
the consent form. 
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3.9 DATA ANALYSIS 
3.9.1 First cycle coding 
The research has applied systematic conceptual and analytical discipline to undertake a credible 
interpretation of the field data (Gioia et al, 2012). The transcripts were coded using gerunds 
(present participles) to bring out the process of the reforms (Charmaz 2014). The first cycle coding 
procedure produced several thousand codes as I tried to adhere to the informants’ terms, focusing 
on emerging concepts, without aiming to identify categories.  Using a “process” and “in vivo” 
coding techniques (Saldana, 2016), in the first cycle I coded 26 transcripts of field interviews. 
Coding with gerunds gave a strong sense of action and sequence, as well as supported the analysis 
from the perspective of the research participants by preserving the fluidity of their experiences 
(Charmaz, 2014).  
The underlying strategy was to interpret an insider’s view rather than an outsider’s view, by not 
standing on the side-lines, but by interacting with the data, and intercepting the meaning from their 
perspectives. Ethnographically, every effort was made to meet the participants where they were 
(Ellington, 2015) with the understanding that the process was heuristic (Saldana, 2016)  
3.9.2 Memo writing 
Accompanying the coding processes, the researcher wrote analytical memoranda based on the 
observations from the field, documentary evidence and prior knowledge of the subject to explain 
the data. In the case of this research a typical 1-hour of transcribed data generates about 150-200 
initial codes, the same provided about 20 memos. The contents from the memos from each 
individual script were compared; and were deployed in pruning down the codes, leading to the 
development of the categories in the data structure. The list of the key memoranda produced during 
the process of the research has been attached as Appendix 3. 
3.9.3 Identifying the Core Category 
The first cycle coding opened the interview data, while the axial coding helped to bring them back 
together. I adopted the paradigm model suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998) (causal conditions, 
phenomenon management, intervening conditions, strategic actions/interactions, and 
consequences) to provide an analytical description of the reform phenomenon. The concepts that 
emerged from the first-cycle coding were further developed into axial codes from which the 
categories and sub-categories were identified. The study also derived the properties and 
dimensions of these categories to yield a narrative of the reform phenomenon.  
The participants’ interview responses reflected the various stages of the reforms including their 
initiation, design, implementation, challenges, and the achievements and other categories and sub-
categories. These categories are abstractions developed by comparing the concepts coded from the 
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individual interviews, and so they go beyond the contribution from an individual, or an 
organisation. Based on our analysis we hypothesized and grouped the 69 concepts from the open 
coding into six central categories: automating systems; budget credibility; re-engineering financial 
management; professionalising financial management; reforming for accountability; and reforms 
credibility. By relating these six categories I developed a substantive theory based on the budget 
credibility logics as the core category. This is reflected in the data as well as grounded in practice. 
As an abstract concept, it captured Ghana’s IPFM reform experience. 
3.9.4 Theoretical Sampling  
During the axial coding and analysis, I developed tentative answers to the question of “what is 
going on” by discovering that budget credibility logics was the binding constraints of the IPFM 
reforms. The second order analysis led to the formulation of questions on budget credibility which 
were used in subsequent interviews. Developing the central category drew on theoretical sampling 
and interviewing four key participants. These four additional interviews supported the selective 
coding of the main categories.  
3.9.5 Axial coding 
In the analysis I moved from a mere description of phenomena; and begun to provide an account 
of events, incidents and happenings through a rigorous theoretical process using the paradigm 
model suggested by Strauss and Corbin,1998 (causal conditions, phenomenon, context, 
intervening conditions, action/interaction strategies, and consequences). 
To reduce the number of codes to a manageable proportion I developed axial codes for all 
categories (as a way of putting the data back together by relating the categories through their 
properties and dimensions) based on the phenomena present in the interviews (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). The axial coding process, by asking questions and making comparisons, performs four 
analytic functions almost simultaneously: 
These are:  
(a) The hypothetical relating of subcategories to a category by means of a statement 
denoting the nature of the relationship between them and the phenomenon- causal 
conditions, context, intervening conditions, action/interactional strategies, 
consequence. 
(b) The verification of those hypotheses against actual data. 
(c) The continued search for the properties of categories and subcategories, and the 
dimensional locations of data (events, happenings, etc.) indicative of them. 
(d) The beginning exploration of variation in phenomenon, by comparing each category 
and its subcategory for different patterns discovered by comparing dimensional 
locations of instances of data Strauss and Corbin (1978 pp. 107, with emphasis by the 
authors) 
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The operations of these steps are provided in the matrices for each of the axial codes with the 
mapping of the sixty-three sub-categories into the six main categories shown in Appendix 5.    
Glaser and Strauss have said that: 
Although this use of comparative analysis is not, of itself, our goal, it is definitely 
subsumed under our goal. To be sure of the veracity of our evidence, we checked from 
reform documents and cross-referenced to what other participants said.  However, we were 
not concerned with hundred percent accuracy, for even if some of our evidence is not 
entirely accurate this will not be too troublesome. For the purpose of generating theory it 
is not the facts upon which we stand, but the conceptual category (or a conceptual property 
of the category) that was generated from it. As concept may be generated from one fact, 
which then becomes merely one of the universes of many possible diverse indicators for, 
and data on, the concept. These indicators are then sought for the comparative analysis. 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967 pp. 23). 
In this study the 69 axial codes (which have been set out in Appendix 5) were reduced to 10 
categories. These 10 categories were then further pruned down to six categories, out which 
emerged the core category from which the study developed a substantive theory of Ghana PFM 
reforms.  
3.9.6 Selective coding and theory articulation 
In selective coding I explored the interrelationship between the categories (Creswell, 2005) as part 
of the theory building. In the analysis I related the core category (Budget Credibility) to the other 
five main categories to provide the context of the emerging substantive theory. In deriving the six 
categories, I developed their properties and dimensions, that brought together all the 69 categories. 
In the selective coding I focused on relating the 6 categories to each other.  I did this with a view 
to ‘make it possible to evaluate the adequacy of the research procedure and its outcomes’ (Dubois 
and Gadde ,2002; Eisenhardt,1989). Dubois and Gadde argued that in a good theory development, 
researchers should abide to the principle of parsimony by being selective in what they present, and 
not making the theory ‘overly complex and say very little about very much’ (pp. 559).  
 The data collection proceeded along with the remaining analysis in a complementary manner, 
focusing more on the emerging core category (budget credibility). For example, I sought to clarify 
how budget credibility was affected by the prevailing view of government officials that the annual 
appropriation (passed by Parliament) is only an estimate, not a law.  
Table 3.2: Relationships between the Core Category, the main categories, and sub-categories 
 Sub-categories  Categories Paradigm 
components 
1 Medium term development planning/ 
budget planning and 
formulation/coordinating and preparing the 
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Procuring /composite budgeting/ 
monitoring budget transfers/rigidities/fiscal 
discipline/transitioning (ABB and PPB)/ 
monitoring performance/domestic 
revenue/MTEF/managing cash and TSA 
2 Social accountability/ Improving 
Auditing/logistics for audit/oversight/audit 





3 Changing identities/rent seeking/fiduciary 
role/ 
Professionalism  Phenomenon 
Management -
Context 
4 (politicising allocations/payroll 




5 Learning/ selecting consultants/ integrating 
solution/ designing of systems/ using 
technology 
 
Capturing financial transactions in GIFMIS/ 
Budget Execution/ Sector financial 











6 Initiating reforms/ designing the reforms/ 









This research leads to a substantive theory based on budget credibility as the core category. The 
relationship between the budget credibility and the main categories and sub-categories, derived 
empirically, has been provided in Table 3.2. The last column of the table shows that the causal 
condition of budget credibility is the failure of accountability and transparency; the management 
context if provided by the professionalism of public servants. The strategic actions and interactions 
for addressing budget credibility issues is the automation of systems and financial management re-
engineering. The intervening conditions are both internal and external provided by government 
political interventions in the budget processes and donor conditionalities, respectively. The 
consequences are the reform and polity credibility. 
Derived from these relationships, the emerging substantive theory in the Ghana case has three 
elements that state that: 
(i) in situation of poor accountability and transparency in public expenditure, there will be a lack 
of budget credibility resulting in poor to mediocre reform outcomes.  
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(ii) In a situation of poor budget credibility, internal political and external donor interventions in 
the budget processes weaken both the budget and PFM reforms. 
(iii) The PFM reform strategic actions and interactions, including actions such as automating 
financial systems and financial procedures re-engineering, must focus on improving 
professionalism, and professional accountability by reducing donor and political interventions in 
the budget implementation processes 
This substantive theory is reflected in the data as well as grounded in practice in the government 
of Ghana. Without a credible budgeting process (mostly at the implementation stage) in Ghana, it 
has been impossible to implement meaning reforms. This may not be the case for other countries 
that have embarked on PFM reforms. For those countries, their contexts will determine the most 
important singular critical factor. (Glaser and Strauss, 1967 pp. 23) have said: 
In discovering theory, one generates conceptual categories or their properties from 
evidence, then the evidence from which the categories emerged is used to illustrate the 
concept. 
They have noted that in grounded theory one does not aim to know the whole field or to have all 
the facts through a careful random sampling approach, or to provide a perfect description of an 
area, rather I aim to develop a theory that accounts for much of the relevant behaviour. The analysis 
is therefore to “-generate general categories and their properties for general and specific situations 
and problems” as a theoretical guide (Glaser and Strauss, 1967 p.30) to PFM reforms actions in 
Ghana. 
In developing this substantive theory for PFM reforms, the study adopts the strategy of 
comparative analysis for generating theory, which places a high emphasis on theory-as-process 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). That is with theory-as-process, our aim was not to generate a perfected 
product, but an entity that has a feeling of ever-developing to it, and ‘allows it to become quite 
rich, complex, and dense, and makes its fit and relevance easy to comprehend’ (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967 pp.32) 
This study has developed this substantive theory based on the three waves of IPFM reforms that 
have been implemented within the last three decades in Ghana, all of them performing poorly to 
mediocre. The key message that emerged from the interviews was that whilst the reforms have 
faced challenges there have been successes in drawing up new legislations and in implementing 
automated electronic systems. But substantive reforms have not happened, and temporary 
improvements are often reversed. The study theorises that this is due to the prevalence of poor 
budget credibility. The credibility of the reforms itself has come to depend on the credibility of the 
budget (for not implementing it as intended).  
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This chapter has discussed the research methodological issues, starting with the personal context 
of the researcher, and the research philosophy and paradigm. The research philosophy and the 
personal context motivated the selection of an interpretivist- constructivist paradigm for this study. 
This choice was made after evaluating the relative merits of the dominant positivist-functionalist 
and the post-positive paradigms. The philosophical assumptions are embodied in pragmatists’ 
methods, including grounded theory informed methods adopted for this research. 
With the failure of the functionalist literature to address context of reforms adequately, the 
rationale for adopting the interpretivist-constructivist methods was that PFM reforms, 
incorporating accounting change, is associated with a number of problematics that were addressed 
in the research strategy, the design, and the techniques employed. In the nature of the problematics 
of public sector accounting change is the implicit assumption that the units being studied are 
complex social objects, non-linear in characteristics that reflect their context specific rules and 
interactions. Accounting has multiple ontologies, and accounting change is a drift with no pre-
determined outcomes 
An interpretivist- constructivist approach creates deeper understanding that goes beyond 
functionalists’ explanation of reforms because accounting functions do not help explain what 
makes it change (for the function does not examine the conditions, origins or intentions of 
accounting change) 
In addition, the interpretivist-constructivist approach has the potential to support a causal and 
intentional explanation of reforms. Causality enables researchers to relate the empirical category 
to each other to develop a substantive theory ground-up.  
The non-functionalist and non-deterministic framework adopted for this study supports both the 
institutional logics and processual narrative approach. The processual narrative undergirded by 
symbolic interactionists’ pragmatists philosophies in combination with institutional logics 
approach bring out novel ways to accounting change and reforms through the perspectives of 
individuals, ministries, political parties and so on, rather than through structures. This flexibility 
in studying accounting change calls forth an interpretation of group action through the notion of 
acting units. This study addresses this through the various polities of Ghana.  
The chapters that follow takes the framework forward by examining the dimensions of history and 
culture and economics and culture in chapters 4 and 6 using the processual narrative. Chapter 5 
deepens the discussions on the budget credibility as the core category and the substantive theory 
developed in this chapter by applying it within institutional logics framework. This if followed in 
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chapter 7 which uses takes the institutional logics framework to discuss why and how suboptimal 
accounting practices are maintained in the Ghanaian public sector. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONTEXT OF CHANGE OF GHANA’S INTEGRATED PUBLIC FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT (IPFM) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided the theoretical grounding of the processual approach, and how it 
has been translated into studying organisational change (Dawson, 1994). This chapter sets out the 
contextual background of the study using a processual narrative which outlines the evolution of 
the Ghanaian public financial management practices. 
4.2 LITERATURE ON GHANA IPFM REFORMS 
There is a paucity of specific academic literature on Ghana’s IPFM reforms, with a few exceptions 
(Roberts and Andrews ,2005; Lassou,2017; Lassou et al., 2019; Rahaman,2009) the existing 
literature is mostly on the general public sector administrative reforms as opposed to public 
financial management (for example Ohemeng et al.2015). The extant literature on Ghana budget 
and accounting reforms (such as Roberts and Andrews, 2005), Betley et al.,2012) are ‘normative’ 
in the sense of being prescriptively political economy, in their explanation of the reforms.  
There is a broader Ghana public sector reform literature, but they are mostly concerned with 
accounting or performance issues in individual state-owned enterprises, such as the Ghana Food 
Distribution Corporation (GFDC) (Uddin and Tsamenyi,2005), and the Volta River Authourity 
(Rahaman and Lawrence, 2001a ); or in a specific sector ministry (such as Abekah-Nkrumah and 
Nomo, 2012). Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) drew on Giddens idea of dialectics of control to 
examine reforms in the GFDC. For example, Rahaman and Lawrence (2001a) paper mobilised the 
constructs of “negotiated order” to explore how it could illuminate accounting practice within the 
social and organisational contexts of the Volta River Authourity in Ghana. Their paper brought 
together the notion of balance of power and the specific historical context of the organisation as 
the important preconditions underlying the accounting system and its change. The process of 
change was achieved through shifting the balance of power through power dynamics in the 
organisation. Whilst making references to Foucauldian conception of power and Gramsci 
hegemonic influences, their studies focused on technical rational, socio-historical, and socio-
economic perspectives and how they impact on the management processes including accounting 
systems design and change. The researchers found that contrary to the technical merits of the 
financial management system in place in that organisation, accounting took place in a context of a 
negotiated order; and that the accounting procedures did not relate to the conventional notions of 
economic rationality.  
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Their paper’s main contribution was that accounting systems design, maintenance and change 
processes are interwoven in organisational negotiation processes (or the social relations) that is 
often neglected in conventional analysis in the development countries’ context. It gave a useful 
insight to accounting practices in one of the state-run organisations in Ghana but not the reform 
processes in central ministries, agencies, and departments.   
I briefly highlight below three papers (Rahaman, 2009; Lassou et al., 2019, and Killick, 2008) on 
the broad IPFM reforms to position our current effort. Rahaman (2009) examined the role of 
independent financial auditing as a crusade against financial management through a Foucauldian- 
inspired theoretical framework drawing on concepts such as ‘technologies’ of government and 
‘visibilities’ made possible through financial auditing. This paper takes on an aspect of the IPFM 
reforms but does not deal with the intricacies of a full-blown financial management reforms, and 
the author acknowledged the limited reach of his findings.  
Lassou, et al. 2019 put on a cultural political economy lens (Hopper et al., 2009) to compare the 
Ghana reforms to another west African country, Benin. He mobilised the neo institutional concept 
of decoupling to describe the performance of the reforms, of which he attributed the poor 
performances to neo-patrimonialism and neo-colonialism. This recent paper went further than most 
in providing a theoretical explanation of the IPFM reforms. However, it did not attempt to address 
the social practices and the myriad institutional issues that inform neo-patrimonialism and 
patronage behaviour.   
Another salient paper that has some bearing on our research is Killick (2008). He provided an 
analysis of Ghana budget management drawing on three theoretical strands to explain the neo-
patrimonial behaviour of public official in Ghana: political economy explanation; Ekeh (1975) 
‘two publics’; and Frimpong-Ansah’s (1991) notion of ‘vampire-state’. Killick paper focused on 
Ghana, but it provides an example of an analysis that can easily be extended to the rest of Africa. 
Killick’s paper showed that the application of neo-patrimonial theory has been around for a while 
and recently re-applied as in Lassou et al. (2019) and Goddard et al (2016). Killick’s paper is useful 
platform to build upon as it advanced the importance of the concept of polity, and the need to 
understand it better, in the political economy analysis of Ghana’s public expenditure management. 
4.4 CONTEXTUAL COUNTRY BACKGROUND   
Ghana was the first sub-Sahara African country to gain political independence from British 
colonial rule in 1957 under its first prime minister Kwame Nkrumah, who subsequently became 
the president of the first republic in 1960. Ghana was the first African country to experiment with 
socialism from 1961 to 1966 under a “Seven Year Plan for Work and Happiness” programme. This 
plan was abrogated after by the first coup d'états in 1966, then the Second Republic, and the 1971 
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coup d'état, followed by military rule that lasted almost two decades (1992), intermeshed by a short 
period of civilian rule in 1980/81. 
At the point of independence, the political leadership continued to use the systems, structures, and 
personnel left over by the colonial administration for at least the first three years (1957-61) of the 
administration. There was a process to Africanise the public service, including the senior military 
staff, but qualified personnel were in short supply and the changes were done on a voluntary basis. 
The main systems, including the financial management systems, were therefore left intact. The 
prevailing philosophy at the time was that to achieve rapid economic growth, what was deemed 
necessary was for Africans to run the colonial institutions themselves (Fitch and Oppenheimer, 
1966). This strategy complemented an economic policy that emphasised attracting foreign capital 
to industrialise the country, eponymously called the Lewis Era.18 ‘During the “Lewis Era” Ghana 
experienced a rapid deterioration of her balance of payments position, loss of huge amounts of 
external reserves, and failure to attract anywhere near the amount of foreign capital that Lewis 
counted on to assure Ghana’s industrial future’ (Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966 pp 83). It was during 
this crisis and the decision by the government to Africanise the military top-brass, due to neo-
colonial aggressions in other parts of Africa (in Congo and Rhodesia), that led to the first coup 
d’état in 199619. 
After several coup d’états followed by military dictatorships, there was economic and social 
decline and extreme hardships in the 1970s and 1980s. Ghana began to stabilise under the 4th 
Republic in 1992 when she returned to democratic rule in 1992. In official documents Ghana prides 
herself for being a “star pupil” of the IMF (CSPIP Diagnostic Report of MoF, May 1998). Ghana 
has been an African model for democracy after three peaceful transitions of power between 
different political parties. The results of both the 2012 and 2016 closely contested elections, 
coupled by three peaceful transitions of power between different political parties since 1992 has 
confirmed the country’s overall commitment to democracy and the rule of law20. 
Ghana’s population has grown rapidly from about 15 million in 1990 to the current level of 
30,417,856 in 2019 (and 30,911,321 in 2020) (World Population report 2020). The Human Capital 
Index ranking, that shows how well a country is developing and deploying its human capital 
potential, places Ghana 84th in 2016 (among 130 countries) and 116th in 2018 (among 157 
 
18 The pre-1961 policy was formulated by W. Arthur Lewis a renowned economist and the author of the 
Theory of Economic Growth, London, 1955 
19 There are several accounts of the causes and effects of the 1966 coup given by people of different 
political and economic persuasions (for example see Business Abroad, March 21, 1966, Vol.91, pp.13-14 
for the pro-business view of why Nkrumah’s overthrow was welcomed) 
20 The 4th Republic started in 1992. The results of the 2012 and 2016 elections were on a knife-edge and 
tested the country’s commitment to democratic elections. 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




countries)21. In 2016 Ghana’s score of 64.70 (out of 100) puts it ahead of many African countries 
including South Africa, Botswana, Kenya and Nigeria, but well below the best-performing 
countries such as Finland (ranked first with a score of 85.86). In 2018 the score had fallen to 44 
(out of 100, but still ahead of (South Africa, Botswana, Nigeria but not Kenya). 
Despite some progress and achievements there is a wide poverty gap in Ghana. The Ghana Living 
Standards Survey of 2013 estimated that, of the population of about 26.3 million, 20% of those 
over 15 years and above have never been to school compared to 14.7 % who have acquired 
secondary/ senior secondary school or senior high school (SHS) or higher-level education. Poverty 
is pervasive, and about a third of the population is estimated to live below the poverty line. The 
6th Ghana Living Standard Survey conducted in 2012/13 showed a reduction in poverty from 
31.9% (2005/06) to 24.2% (2012/13). The Gini coefficient remained at 0.42 points, however, with 
significant inequalities visible between the north and the south as well as between rural and urban 
areas. In addition, the structural transformation of the economy over the past decades has been 
slow and unemployment remains a challenge; specifically, youth 
unemployment/underemployment is considered as a challenge to security and peace22. 
Ghana’s economic performance has been mixed. GDP stood at about $5.2 million in 1990 (with a 
per capita of $400). After lacklustre performances in that decade and the early 2000s, however, 
Ghana experienced an average growth rate of 8% in between 2007 and 2013, buoyed by oil 
revenues and the strong export performance of gold and cocoa. The re-basing of the GDP to a 2006 
base-year increased Ghana’s GDP per capita to over US$1,000 in 2010, propelling Ghana into the 
ranks of middle-income countries. The strong economic growth during that period was reflected 
in a reduction in the levels of poverty, but inequality nevertheless has persisted. Ghana has not 
always been able to use its potential to achieve sustainable economic development. Despite its vast 
natural resources, including cocoa, gold and other minerals, Ghana has not been able to re-structure 
the economy away from being a producer of primary produce, and to remove the barriers that stand 
in the way of faster development progress. Government debt February 2017 stood at 74% of GDP, 
thereby creating limited fiscal space (PEFA 2018). There are weaknesses in the financial position 
in several state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the utility sector, and large quasi-fiscal activities and 
extra budgetary spending.  
There are budget rigidities caused by extensive revenue earmarking for statutory funds, high wage 
bills and interest payments that exceed revenue, severely constraining fiscal space. Table 4.1 
below, demonstrates what has been a chronic situation of deficit financing of the budget, often 
accompanied by absorption of expenditure in employee costs and repayment of interest on debt. 
 
21 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Capital_Index 
22 The source of data is taken from the (GLSS 6 of 2012/13) 
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In addition, there is revenue erosion through pervasive exemptions and lack of compliance 
weakening the tax base. 
Table 4.1: Comparison of Budget and Programmes (percent of Budget of GDP 2017 to 2018) 
 2017 2018 
Budget Projection Projection 
Revenue 
(Revenues are net of the revenue authourity, 
GRA’s, retentions and tax refunds. It includes net 
internally generated funds (IGFs) by ministries, 
departments and agencies channelled through the 
budget) 
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  7.9 
 
  7.8 
    
  6.9 
 
  6.5 
 
  5.9 
    
  4.6 
 
  4.4 
 
  4.3 
 
   1.7 
   
  1.3 
 
  1.2 
  
  3.6  
   
  3.2  
  
  3.3 
 
   1.8 
 
  1.8 
 
   0.0 
Overall Balance   -6.8   -6.3   -3.8 
Source: IMF 2017 Article IV Consultation, 4th Review.  September 2017 
Arrears accumulation is another recurring problem, which reflects the government’s inability to 
formulate and manage credible spending plans (IMF Article IV Consultation, 2017). Under a 
recently completed IMF programme the immediate priority of government to institute fiscal 
discipline in a credible adjustment path, which went beyond the central government’s operations 
to encompass the broader public sector. The IMF report drew the conclusion that whilst progress 
has been slow, the coming on stream of oil production and the development of the gas energy 
infrastructure and the petrol-chemical industry have the potential to transform the economy, to 
develop the value-added chain, and to build a more diversified agro-industrial base. The report also 
found that prospects of Ghana were good provided it could improve the performance of its public 
financial management systems to improve the efficiency of the government machinery to deliver 
programmes and policy goals. 
Historically, there seemed to have been some consensus that ‘state- failure’ was the main cause of 
Ghana’s decline between 1950-83 (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991; Rimmer, 1989, 1992; and Austin, 
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1996). However, the root causes of decline are much deeper, and persistent as argued in the Ghana 
Institute of Fiscal Policy Brief (No.2, January 6, 2017). They found that: 
The Ghana economy has maintained virtually its “colonial structure” for over 60 years 
after independence as it still depends largely on cocoa, gold, timber - and recently oil - as 
the main export commodities. Exported raw and unprocessed form, these commodities 
fetch low prices in international markets, where Ghana is a price taker, rendering the 
economy vulnerable to terms-of-trade shocks.  
This developmental challenge has persisted from the colonial period to present times. It seems 
there is high political costs in attempts to transform the economy. Whitfield (2010) has identified 
such costs to include a land tenure system dominated by tribal chiefs, an unaccountable civil 
service structure, and a neo-patrimonial political system. The public sector has been inefficient 
resulting in macroeconomic instability and barriers to private sector investment (Whitfield, 2010). 
Adding to these woes is that Ghana has become aid dependent, which is confirmed by the rhetoric 
of more recent political regimes who want to change it.  
Ethnicity as a cultural factor in influencing politics and public administration in Ghana has also 
been highlighted (Hopper et al., 2009). Arguably, they noted that Ghanaian politics follow ethnic 
lines. However, that argument can easily be countered because Ghana’s situation cannot easily be 
reduced to simple ethnic differentiation and stereotypes as in other countries. Political parties are 
nationwide and past presidents have come from different ethnic groups some of them not 
necessarily the largest. In that sense there are other major determinants of political power than 
simplistic ethnic line in Ghana. 
Religion has always been part of the social structure in Ghana: either in terms of the traditional 
belief system; or axial religion such as Christianity which came as part of the European colonial 
heritage, and Islam which dominated a large part of Africa before the European colonisation. 
However, recently religious evangelism has become an influential factor in social and political 
lives, almost eclipsing the idea of a secular state, and producing its own brand of values and 
selective contradictory morality mixed with a ‘get-rich-quick’ salvation.  
Political and economic ideologies have varied over time going from African socialism and one-
party rule heralded by Nkrumah and Nyerere (of Tanzania) in the early 1960s, to a liberal-
conservative ideology in the late 1960s. The current political ideology wavers between liberal 
democrats and social democrats, even though against the backdrop of neoliberalism propagated by 
the IFIs, this bifurcation is superficial. The policy differences between the two main political 
parties in Ghana are insignificant with both supporting state-capitalism. Political power derives 
from a culture of personality worship fuelled by the traditional ancestral belief systems, the 
presidential system of government and the low levels of literacy, and superstition. (Hopper et al. 
2009) sums the situation up by noting that: 
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State capitalism assumes a populace and state committed to nationalism, modernisation, 
legal rational governance, and secularism but in variegated ethnic, religious, or cultural 
environments political survival is fraught and bureaucratic rationality difficult to maintain. 
Educated elites, politicians, and senior civil servants are inter-linked, powerful, and can 
reap large benefits from office, sometimes illicitly. 
The personality driven political power drove Ghana’s financial management system into the abyss 
starting in the 1960s which was aggravated throughout the 1970s under military dictatorship 
leading to a popular military-cum civilian revolution of 1979. In 1984 the newly revolutionary 
government accepted the IMF/WB package of measures to implement an economic recovery 
programme. 
This study argues that the successive reforms that followed are best understood against the 
background of successive failures of development policies during and after the cold war years’ 
increasing globalisation (Hopper et al., 2016), world society insights (Drori, 2009; Meyer et al, 
1997), pernicious corruption in public life (Lassou et al., 2019), rapid technological advancement; 
poverty on a continental scale; and international hegemonic influences on national policies. These 
are just a few of the influences on the Ghanaian society and its quest to transform the 
implementation of administrative policies and accounting practices.  
With the occurrences of several coups the period before 1979 coup d’état and the ‘revolution’ and 
thereafter witnessed a persistent breakdown of the social relations and established institutions of 
society. This was manifested in the dealings between store owners, street peddlers and the general 
public in the markets; the general public in obtaining public services from the schools, hospitals, 
police, and even from the military. This can be described in Durkheimian terms as anomie 
evidenced by a disorganised and chaotic public sector management including absenteeism, 
moonlighting and kalabule23; nation-wide student strikes. Corruption that was always present 
became an institutionalised way of doing business in Ghana. Parsons avers that “Anomie is 
precisely this state of disorganisation where the hold of norms over individual conduct has broken 
down. Its extreme limit is the state of “pure individualism” which is for Durkheim as it was for 
Hobbes the war of all against all” (Parsons, 1968 pp 377).  
In the public sector accounting little attention was paid to the official budget, accounting, and 
auditing functions. With escalating inflation officials found the inflation and exchange rate 
assumptions behind the ‘approved’ budget figures to be unrealistic24. This meant that figures 
became extremely malleable, and that initiated an institution of not implementing the budget as 
planned. The accounting function was undermined by the lack of qualified accounting 
 
23 Kalabule is the local name of arm-twisting antics of officials. 
24 Ghanaian officials maintain to this date that the approved budget figures are only estimates. 
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professionals in the public service, turning the accountants into bookkeepers and the function as a 
control tool and very little else. The accounts were not prepared resulting in over a decade backlog 
of public accounts by 1992. The auditors were brought into transaction management, giving pre- 
spending approvals, and not focusing on their accountability role.  
As the empirical data reveal, these states of affairs, to varying degrees, persist at the time of 
conducting this study between 2017 and 2019.  
In the rest of this section, I analyse the phases of financial management reforms in Ghana within 
the context of institutional evolution. 
4.5 PRE-INDEPENDENCE TO 1966 
The post-independence financial management systems in Ghana were shaped by the pre-
independence systems in colonial administration. Priestley (1974) highlights the design issues of 
British colonial financial management reforms dating back to the 1930s, which led to the creation 
of the present-day Ministry of Finance, Accountant General Department, and the Treasury.   
There was a gradual transition marked by collaboration at pre-independence between1951 to 1957, 
that historians have defined as the diarchy (Austin, 1976). But the post-independence changes were 
just in personnel and not the underlying system and institutions.  
During the period of the immediate post-independence all the civil service positions were mostly 
manned by British personnel, but there were Ghanaians in political positions. After independence 
on 6 March 1957 some of the British civil servants stayed on years after independence, but by 1961 
most of the British staff were replaced by Ghanaians. However, the system itself was not given 
much of a facelift even after Ghana adopted a socialist political system from 1961 to 1966. The 
cover of the civil service rule books changed, but not much of the content. This is what Robert 
Dodoo (the former head of the OHCS) described in another context as ‘“badge engineering”- 
changing the label but leaving the product untouched (Dodoo, circa 1994 pp. 19).   
In public financial management, attempts were made to adapt practices to post-independence 
aspirations of economic development, but any gains were reversed by the subsequent economic 
decline in the 1970s. At the time of independence, the Ghana had a traditional budget system of 
line-item budgeting. The budget was structured based on “heads, subheads, items, and subitems of 
expenditure with appropriate account numbers” (Premchand and Talat, 1986). The system at that 
time was designed to facilitate line-item control of the budget, and not to support development 
planning and economic analysis. The first attempt to implement program and performance budget 
goes back to 1960-61 when it was introduced “in phases in order to ensure an orderly evolution of 
the system” (Premchand and Talat, 1986). That change required departments to provide the 
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narrative for their programmes, which were divided into activities and then to six items and their 
sub-items of expenditure.  The budget was made of two primary books, namely the “Annual 
Estimates” and ‘Project Analysis and Salient Points’. The latter contained the classification of the 
budget on the bases of economic and per functions of government. In 1966-67, after the first coup, 
a sectoral classification was introduced to enable programmes to be identified within sectors., 
which were broad sectors of the economy. Each sector was divided into chapters, which 
represented administrative units responsible for a given programme. The programmes that were 
introduced remained in those few sectors, but even for them the classification was not fully 
implemented.  
The existing narrative is that Ghana was the best-in-class in Africa at the time of independence 
measured in terms of per-capita, economic growth rate, literacy rate, cocoa, and production 
(Tsikata, 1999). In more recent times this narrative has been expanded to international comparisons 
with Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia which emerged as nation states about the same time as 
Ghana (Ghana Government reforms broadcast on Ghana Radio throughout October 2019). The 
rapid decline of the country in the 70s and 80s is traced back to this period’s heavy government 
interventions, dirigiste policies of public sector expansion, and Nkrumah’s political ideology.  
Such accounts are institutionalised scripts of macro-structural analysis, which tends to neglect the 
social history and the polity of Ghana. For example, comparison with Korea is misleading (as most 
international comparisons often are, unless they are controlled for the critical factors). Korea’s 
social orientation and work ethics causes a lot of stress, and the country tops the world in 
dissatisfaction in life ratings, and suicide rate for the young (10-19 years old) (Yoon Min-sik, 
2015). Whereas Ghana’s ‘national character’ fosters a more laidback approach to reforms and in 
delivering developmental outcomes. About how not serious Ghanaians take reforms, a few 
participants said: 
look leadership is very important in reform, you can’t be playing [games] with the 
leadership, over the past ten months I’ve seen three heads of GIFMIS, are we kidding? 
(Participant G4, from Ghana Audit Office) 
Please let us be serious. We are not getting our required amount of revenue from these 
telcos [telecommunication companies]. Either we don’t understand their operations, or 
they don’t understand it (A cabinet minister, G23) 
These indicate that there is a lacking sense of urgency in delivering performance results, but it goes 
beyond that to what some scholars have argued as ‘our culture’ where there is ‘a certain reluctance 
to pursue excellence or perfection’ (de Graft-Johnson, 1986 pp.227).  
There is also another narrative implied in Fitch and Oppenheimer (1966). They portrayed a country 
with colonial export orientation (of minerals and cocoa), mostly illiterate population, and peasant 
cocoa small holdings that were over-taxed in the colonial period and continued after independence. 
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Eventually it sapped the energy and motivation from the population. Everybody wanted to have 
freedom, and the country did not generate skills for people to be gainfully employed. When the 
promises of the “Lewis Era” did not materialise, Ghana sought official foreign direct investment 
assistance from wherever possible (East and West). The political leadership became caught up in 
the cold-war and Nkrumah joined up with Nasser, Nehru, and Tito to form the Non-Aligned 
Nations forum in a putative attempt to counterbalance the two superpowers with a third block. 
Within Africa also, the continental politics including the liberation of other African countries were 
perhaps given more priority than internal socio-economic development.  
The Africans in the civil service in pre-independent Ghana were office messengers and a few 
‘clerks who served as underlings of the British colonial administrators until independence. At that 
time there were hardly any African in decision making position, except for the few token lawyers 
who were co-opted into the colonial legislative council. African graduates were few, and they were 
mostly lawyers, doctors, and classical scholars and educationalists.  Whilst some of the few 
graduates (particularly the doctors and educationalists) worked in the public service, they were not 
in senior positions until after independence. After independence, the few graduates became the 
post-colonial elites (Chazan, 1983), especially those who had been trained in Europe and America. 
But as others have pointed out the elites, “party and military governments alike were drawn from 
the English-speaking educated minority of which by far the greater number were still middle-
school-educated and very little more than that” (Austin, 1976, pp4.). 
 It is this limited cadre of graduates that is often referred to in the literature as finest in Africa 
(Ayee, 2001). He delineated the period between the immediate post- independence to mid-1970s 
as the “good days” of Ghanaian civil service during which time civil servants were well trained, 
and well paid and resourced. But the question of Ghana having a well-trained civil service at the 
period of independence is a moot point, for it failed to transform itself from what has been 
institutionalised as a colonial organisation for exploiting the population, into a development tool. 
Instead, the civil service continued with what they inherited and fashioned government into an 
exploitative tool to continue to treat the population, made mostly of peasant subsistence farmers, 
petty traders, fishermen, and labourers as subjects. Not surprisingly ex-senior public servants who 
enjoyed the spoils of the new nation state have described the Ghanaian state as a “Vampire State” 
(Frimpong-Ansah, 1991, Killick, 2008). In that sense, institutional persistence and continuity have 
prevailed in the administration of the public service in Ghana.   
The initial crop of the Ghanaian post-colonial elites were the lawyers, medical practitioners, and 
educationalists (mostly missionary workers), and the traditional rulers (also called chiefs) joined-
up with career politicians. The challenges of managing a modern economy with a few seasoned 
colonially oriented administrators, supported by inexperienced new graduate recruits opened the 
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country to wanton exploitation from international multinational corporations. The colonial past 
made Ghanaian pre-disposed to consider modernity as something to aspire to and that could only 
come from the international cosmopolitan centres (London, Paris, New York, Rome and so on). 
Gift-making has always been part of the traditional culture of Ghanaians. These two factors 
combined to promote corruption on a large scale, resulting in the loot of national coffers. 
Accounting became implicated in this loot by placing emphasis on symbolic internal controls and 
external reporting.     
4.6. POST-1966 COUP D’ÉTAT TO 1992 
The post-independence social history is marked by competition between the elite groups, and in 
that struggle those who the state had mandated with the monopoly of violence emerged as the 
temporary winners. The 1966 coup marked the beginning of the armed forces and police, as a 
coercive force, imposing authouritarian regimes on the civil population, and changing the power 
dynamics in Ghana.  
During this period, until about 1975 budgeting was effective as an economic management tool but 
begun to decline with the adoption of policies such as price control for commodities deemed 
“essential” for Ghana. Not-surprisingly, this include imported canned sardines, tinned milk, sugar, 
rice, wax cloth and whatever came from the international cosmopolitan world. Closely associated 
with the price-control regime, was the exchange rate controls that readily became not just an 
economic, but also a social indicators of a failing economy. Lowly fixed official rates drove out 
foreign exchange, and traders and travellers scramble for what they could get at higher rates outside 
the banking system. The government imposed higher taxes on both exports and imports of goods, 
and on services to fund even higher government expenditures. These measures proved to be 
destructive, resulting in more corruption and moral decline (Tsikata, 1999). 
Finding ways to by-pass official classifications, schema, scripts, and norms became part of the 
daily routines of Ghanaians. The national budget signalled the increasing trading prices and falling 
exchange rate for the cedi. These subsequently sent ripples through to the market traders (albeit 
they operated from the street corners) instead of the stock exchange (which was non-existent until 
the 1990s). When government increased public service pay, that immediately signalled commodity 
price increases, which were officially controlled, and that led to traders withholding their wares. 
‘Kalabule’ and other forms of informal practices thrived; and making a quick gain through informal 
channels (Tsikata, 1999), became widespread in society. Corruption became institutionalised in 
both the public and private sectors. 
Default on foreign loans by the military government in 1972 was followed by loan re-scheduling 
in 19974 (Third World Resurgence, 1992). This begun the downward spiral of the economy of 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




Ghana that the military attributed to both the economic and social injustice in the international 
monetary arrangements including unfair commodity pricing. Defaulting on the loan repayment to 
the international lenders, however, resulted in the imposition of sanctions against the country until 
the military regime imploded in 1979. In military parlance what started as a “changing-of-guards” 
within the ranks of the senior military cabal who formed the government, resulted in a whirlwind 
that swept them aside by the lower ranks who were dissatisfied with the scale of corruption in the 
country that the military regime had engendered. Like the two previous coups, here again it was 
the social dynamics within the military as an organisation and the society that propelled changes.  
During this time, the military administration developed a Financial Administration Decree (1979) 
and accompanying financial regulations. This marked the first real attempt to move the country 
away from the colonial financial management arrangements since the initial attempt under the first 
republic in 1961. But by the time the economy was already on a downward spiral, and the chance 
of a true transformation suffered a stillbirth.    
Between 1979 and 1981 Ghana had the third civilian administration under a 3rd Republic, under 
President Limann. That government hardly made any impression on the political, economic, and 
social scene before it was overthrown by the same military group that handed power to them.  One 
notable event in that period was that for the first time in Ghana’s public financial management 
history, the government budget was defeated in Parliament.  
Ideological struggles have been a latent force in Ghanaian politics from the pre-independence days. 
Ghana experimented with a brand of socialism that came to be labelled as African Socialism, but 
it was in this period that the opposition between ideologies came to a head. Intra political party 
infighting in Ghana has always been among social groups (as between the new elite and the 
disposed groups or between tribes). The pre-independent break within the UGCC that led Nkrumah 
to form the CPP was a fight that highlighted the emerging class struggle in Ghana (and all over 
Africa too). Nkrumah’s success was attributed to his ability to organise the “Veranda Boys”, being 
the urban unemployed youth and low skilled workers. During the time of the military governments, 
the struggled was between the political class (elites) and the military (as bureaucratic elites). This 
line of characterisation has not always been so straightforward as the military co-opted civilians 
into their administrations. But the social tensions took one form or the other: sometimes 
manifesting itself as a struggle between socialists and capitalists, and other times as a struggle 
between elite political groups and the armed forces. 
Under Limann’s government two left-wing groups, the June Fourth Movement (JFM) and the New 
Democratic Movement (NDM) emerged as the focal points of leftist activism, challenging the 
internal established political classes and the international capitalists’ hegemonic interest in Ghana. 
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The details are outside of the scope of this thesis, but for our purposes here in the short run it 
appeared that a populist movement under JJ Rawlings, as a charismatic leader, appeared to have 
been on the side of the ordinary people and aiming to carry out decisive reforms and change. 
Starting with initial discussions and dissensions within the groups, there were those who rejected 
the orthodox economics solutions in preference for a tabla rasa approach, relying on Ghana’s own 
resources. The country’s economic situation was precarious, a series of near national disasters 
conspired to make the dire situation in 1982-83 worse. Amidst two failed coup attempts, in-
fighting, and the failure to secure alternative source of funding from the East Bloc countries, Ghana 
went back to negotiate terms with the IFIs and western donors (Tsikata, 1999).  
The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), as the new populist government settled on a 
far-reaching economic stabilisation and reform programme that lasted throughout the 1980s until 
1992 when the 4th Republic emerged. The first set of measure were introduced under the Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP) which started in 1983 with the support from the international financial 
institutions and donors. This was followed by a series of programmes such as the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP), Programme and Actions for Mitigating the Social Cost of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD) and so on.  
In public financial management, the fiscal year was changed in 1983 to correspond to the calendar 
year and attempts were made to introduce zero-based budgeting at the same time. But due to 
capacity constraint the entire budgeting system declined and failed. The programme budget system 
that had been introduced in 1960-61 in phases was still incompletely done by 1986 for the few 
sectors in which they had been introduced, and it has not been extended to cover all MDAs 
(Premchand and Talet, 1986) 
There was a struggle between political ideologies, which was disguised as struggle between 
militaristic left-wing alliance and ‘technocratic’ solutions. In that decisive struggle for alternative 
paths, the ERP was presented as a victory of the technocrats (Tsikata, 1999), albeit it was more a 
victory for the western international financial structures and institutions. As Tsikata explained:  
In April 1983, the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was presented in the budget. By 
this time, political momentum had shifted in favour of the technocrats. The ERP’s 
economic thrust was essentially the same as the government’s programme announced on 
December 30, 1982. The main difference was the language— all references to exploitation 
and anti-imperialism had been dropped. The program was supported by a stand-by 
arrangement with the IMF and a multi-sector rehabilitation credit from the Bank (Ibid pp. 
18). 
In theoretical terms there was an interplay between agency (in the form of the exercise of 
leadership) and structure. In the end the technocratic and international institutional structures won 
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the day. For the next 16 years (from 1984 to 2000) the technocratic-logics and international-logics 
held an uninterrupted sway. Tsikata continues:  
By 1984, technocrats held the day. A small high-quality group of professionals made 
economic decisions. Many in the group knew each other previously, and there was a high 
degree of trust within the group. The emphasis was on finding meaningful and practical 
solutions for Ghana’s problems. Also important was “packaging” the reforms for 
presentation to the PNDC. For the rest of the decade there was remarkable continuity as 
there was little turnover. The group was also sheltered from the political battles to some 
extent. This concentrated, centralized decision making worked well in the early stages 
where there was more of a crisis mode, and quick and flexible decision making essential. 
However, as we will see, it became increasingly more difficult to implement reform this 
way as the decade went on (ibid pp. 19).  
Economic reforms were put ahead of governance and accounting reforms, and that has been found 
to be influenced by the economic-centred views in the international financial institution (Hopper 
et al, 2016, and Rahman, 1997). Governance reforms started under National Institutional Renewal 
Programme (NIRP) around 1996.  Accounting reforms were considered as technical and 
unproblematic, which was the dominant view at time. But “the small high-quality professionals” 
failed to appreciate the import of the framework and opportunity offered by the IMF advisors at 
the time to eschew financial control-logics in favour of management-logics as Premchand et al. 
(1990) stated:  
The proposed framework will involve a lesser exercise of direct control by the MFEP and 
greater delegation of responsibilities to the spending agencies. Financial consciousness is 
a shared responsibility, and it can be converted into day to day operations only when the 
spending agencies are given adequate responsibilities and opportunities to fulfil those 
responsibilities. Delegation of such responsibilities must be rendered in a context of 
adequate checks and balances. Thus, the suggested framework provides for more frequent 
institutionalised review procedures to oversee budget implementation, introduction of 
evaluation procedures, and more vigilant working on the part of the Audit staff attached 
to various ministries. In addition, to ensure active and full voluntary compliance, the 
spending agencies should be provided with incentives to improve their own management 
(pp. 3). 
This advice was not heeded to, and the control-logics became institutionalised under the economic 
structural adjustment programme (SAP) and “Oscillating Reforms” programme of 1991 onwards. 
For better clarity, in the illustration in Table 4.2 below, the economic reforms that were initiated 
in Ghana have been divided into three parts: the stabilisation under the Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP), SAP; and the Oscillating Reforms 
Table 4.2: Ghana Economic Reforms- Phasing and Sequencing of Reform Policies (the 1980s 
and half-1990s) 







Pricing Policy §Currency devalued 
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§ Energy prices 
§ Infrastructure prices 
§ Interest rate 
liberalization 
Fiscal Policy Tax reform 
§ Consumer subsidies 





Structural Policies  § Simplify tariff regime 
and make more 
uniform 
 
§ Reduction of negative 
list 





§ Investment promotion 
 
§ Divestiture of SOEs 
§ Cocoa price to 
farmers raised 
§ All cocoa subsidies 
for production 
removed 
§ AGC floated 




 §State enterprises’ 
management 
§ Civil service reform 
§ Capacity-building in 
core ministries 
§ Planning process 
§ Statistical and 
information system 




§ Coordination of 
donor 
support for public 
sector management 
Source: Tsikata (1999) Ghana: Country Assistance Review (1996), various World Bank and GOG document 
On the vertical axis are the substance of policy including: 
Pricing policy: The change in policy direction with the start of the ERP was the introduction of   
free market-based policies in the determination of commodity prices, utilities, currency exchange 
rates, and remuneration. Whilst. there have been policy inconsistencies (example with wage 
restraints), generally price controls that had characterised earlier economic policies have been 
removed. 
Fiscal Polices: There was a drive to raise more revenues, but the medium-term planning policy 
was not implemented until 1998, after the financial management reforms (PUFMARP) began in 
1996. The economic narrative of fiscal performance provides an example of institutionalised script 
that does not reflect the social conditions of most of the population. For a country where the 
infrastructure has run down, and public services such as schools and hospitals have collapsed, it 
seems strange to parade fiscal surplus as an indicator of successful reforms, as indicated below:  
On the fiscal side, Ghana’s fiscal deficit was significantly higher than the rest of Africa in 
the seventies, reaching over 11 percent in 1976, more than double the average of the 
continent. Beginning in 1982, Ghana’s fiscal position improved tremendously; between 
1983 to 1991 it registered smaller deficits (and eventually larger surpluses) than the rest 
of the continent. While Ghana’s fiscal deterioration in 1992 resulted in a larger deficit than 
average, by mid-nineties it was registering surpluses and was again performing above the 
Africa-wide average (Tsikata, 1999 pp 29- emphasis original).  
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Structural policies: introduced international logics and supported market-logics through 
privatization of state enterprise and opening the country to face international competition of 
imports while its least prepared to export anything but raw agricultural produce for which it’s a 
price-taker.  
On the trade side, Ghana made early and rapid progress compared to other African countries. 
While it was classified as “closed” according to the Sachs-Warner definition in 1980, by 1985, it 
was one of only four countries in Africa that was classified as “open” (out of thirty-six countries). 
By 1996, several other countries were now classified as “open” (14 out of 36). The World Bank’s 
country policy and institutional assessment ratings for 1998 bear out Ghana’s superior 
macroeconomic management and structural reform record of accomplishment. In both cases, 
Ghana scored above the average for the countries in Africa (Tsikata, 1999 pp 29- emphasis 
original). 
Institutional reforms: These reforms dealt with organisational and administrative issues in the 
public service. It saw the initiation of civil service reforms in the Civil Service Reform 
programme (CSRP) from that morphed into the Civil Service Performance Improvement 
Programme (CSPI) (Dodoo, 1997). The wider aspects of the public service organisational 
reforms were attempted to be addressed under the NIRP that was implemented between 1997 and 
2000 (Sai-Agble- Wiredu, 1996). 
These reforms managed to stabilise the economy that was at a brink of disaster, but barely went 
beyond the stabilisation of the economy into socio-economic development. The economic 
transformation did not happen, but it left the country opened to greater international forces. The 
lessons from Ghana show the limits of charismatic leadership to effect change. But it also confirms 
the limitation of explanation based solely on agency and rational-actor models in the contexts of 
Ghana and other LDCs (and as the physical conditions of the large segment of the population show 
poor developmental outcomes). It indicates the potential benefits of exploring other explanations 
of reforms through interinstitutional orders and logics, for example.  
4.7 1992 TO THE PRESENT (THE HISTORY OF THE PRESENT) 
There has been continuity in economic policy from the time of the Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP) and the subsequent implementation of the WB/IMF instrumentalities, such as the SAP and 
the PFM reforms. The implementation of these strategies happened in stages, and they are 
renowned for their affective acronyms (such as SAP and PAMSCAD and their euphemisms such 
as ‘retrenchment’ – for laying off government workers) rather than their transformational result. 
This notwithstanding Ghana’s economic reforms was held as one of the leading success stories in 
LDCs by the donor community (Hearn, 2001).   
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




After attempting and failing to break away from the scruples of the international financial 
institutions in the early 1980s, technocratic-logics, market logics, international-logics, and state 
centric-logics have been dominant in Ghana since 1984. The only main difference in the period 
after 1992 was that the governance arrangements changed to parliamentary democracy. Tsikata 
argued that with the need to plan and strategize for electioneering, the “political types are now in 
the ascendant (rather the technocrat)” (pp. 20). This might result in a tax law that does not get 
passed because it will be politically unpopular or pre-election public servants pay increases and 
public expenditure increases resulting in fiscal imbalances.  For example, researchers have argued 
that the run up to the fourth republic in 1992 was marked by wage increases that derailed the 
reforms started in the 1980s, and that much of Ghana’s time in the 1990s was spend trying to regain 
sustained fiscal balance (ibid pp. 13).  
The fortunes of reforms and inability to sustain meaningful reforms, especially of PFM reforms, 
are often attributed to fiscal imbalance (see Tsikata, 1999). PFM reforms are meant to address the 
sources of fiscal imbalance, such as election-related wage increases and government expenditure.  
The public financial management laws in post-independent Ghana were first written in 1961 and 
re-written in 1979, has been revised in 2003 and more recently in 2016 (Whitfield (2010 pp. 723). 
But the underlying practices appear to remain unchanged despite the high hopes of legislations 
bringing about change.  
The post- 1996 IPFM comprehensive reforms were part of the democratic governance reforms that 
was initiated in the 4th Republic.  
Within the public service there was an orchestrated move to improve the performance of state 
organs (including state enterprises under State Enterprises Commission (SEC)), and the 
performance of Ministries, Commission and the Presidency- under NIRP; the performance of civil 
servants (under CSPIP) and the financial management systems (under IPFM). 
4.7.1 The central state logics 
 Decision making and controls centred around a few key agencies (such as the Public Service 
Commission, Office of the Head of Civil Service and the MoF). Whitfield (2010) argued that that 
made aid coordination for example a problem. Aid agencies sometimes dealt with line ministries 
directly without the MoF being aware of what was going on.  Other cases include the proliferation 
of statutory funds which the minister of finance could not control, even if he/she were aware of 
their existence. Decentralising government agencies was a central aim of the reforms to improve 
management autonomy, operational control and efficiency, but this direction was reversed into 
recentralising all budget and accounting processes. The centralization drive has been taken even 
into local government for which Tsikata (1999) has observed:  
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The 1992 constitution contains the most explicit and comprehensive provisions in Ghana's 
postcolonial constitutional history regarding the system of local government as a 
decentralized form of national administration (pp. 20).  
This provision has been translated into a partial political decentralization only with creation of 
districts, and creation of regions (mostly for Gerrymandering reasons). There has not been any 
meaningful fiscal decentralization by giving local government more autonomy to raise revenue 
and spend at the local level. With this background, central reforms have been extended to local 
government from top-down, resulting in centralising local government and its reforms.  
Central state logics has meant the centralization of all decision-making, and that has not augured 
well for accounting reforms and multi-party pluralistic governance in Ghana. Ministries remained 
highly centralized and managed through authoritarian leadership styles. In the earlier reform some 
of the SAP-type initiatives were not popular, especially the privatization and taxation reforms. 
Privatisation was used as ruse to sell state assets to political cronies, and tax reforms have been 
used to increase taxes. Facing popular public back-lash protestations have turned violent. For 
example, in the case of the introduction of the new value-added tax (VAT), during which 7 people 
died in July 1995 and the tax had to be withdrawn and re-introduced (Tsikata, 1999). 
Democratic - logics do not always appear to support reforms, as the historical analysis indicate that 
the most rapid reforms in Ghana occurred under the non-elected period (Tsikata, 1999); and 
democracy (especially unmatured-type) slows down reforms. In Ghana’s recent history there has 
been growth without socio-economic transformation (Whitfield 2010 pp 723). The arguments put 
forward as explanation are all plausible, but they are not adequate to the task. The underlying cause 
is state vampirism- as a state captured through political and administrative mechanisms set up by 
a select group of elites working with international collaborators to exploit the resources of the 
country.  
4.7.2 Ghana public service organisational and administrative reforms 
Consistent with the theoretical lens for the study, I situate the PFM reforms and accounting change 
within the general reforms in the public sector and society of Ghana. The policy space in Ghana 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s was characterised by discussions concerning accountability 
and service delivery efficiency and effectiveness took place which was intertwined with concerns 
of civil service performance and low emoluments levels, and ‘retrenchment’ of staff. The language 
of economic performance was strongly influenced by price and exchange rate stability, rather than 
growth per se or employment. These were issues that were stipulated by the IMF and the 
international donor community as pre-conditions for greater aid support.  
In the official literature of the period concerned with public administrative practices as accounting 
and payments systems, problems were diagnosed and solutions proposed (Premchand, 1986; PER 
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1993, 1994). Accordingly, the terms of the discourse were organised around the notions of 
efficiency and democracy, decentralization, probity, and accountability. Some of these ideas, as 
values, are not commensurable and produced contradictions in practice.  Notwithstanding that 
these themes undergirded the system-wide public sector reforms that were implemented in the 
period and have continued in one form another namely Civil Service Reforms Programme (CSRP), 
Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP), National Institutional Renewal 
Programme (NIRP) and IPFM, and Fiscal Decentralization. These reforms were placed under 
different leaderships: OHCS, The Presidency through the Public Service commission (PSC), and 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF), and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
(MLGRD) respectively. In theory coordination should not have been a problem, however in 
practice the resulting constellation drew an impasse. Whilst the related public sector reforms have 
been identified here, it is outside the scope of our research to go into their details as they have 
evolved over time since they were conceived in the 1990s. Instead, we briefly highlight them and 
refocus on the IPFM reforms. 
All the reforms were set up as projects and funded by donors either by aid or loans. The 
programmes folded up when the projects ended, often with no visible impact on civil service 
efficiency or effectiveness. In other words, they were actions that did not create institutions in 
terms of the distinction between the two made by Jepperson (1991). CSRP/CSPIP, NIRP, and FD 
have since folded up, or re-fashioned in different forms, but they related to the financial 
management reforms in a way that requires them to be explained together for better understanding 
of the integrated financial management reforms in Ghana. 
4.8 AN OVERVIEW OF GHANA PFM RELATED REFORMS 
The Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) and the Civil Service Performance 
Improvement Programme (CSPIP) 
Accompanying the ERP/SAP was the CSRP that ran from 1987 to 1993 with the purpose of re-
shaping the Ghanaian civil service and making it fit for purpose by focusing it on policy 
development, monitoring and evaluation. The CSRP had a three-pronged approach of (i) divesting 
the MDAs of their implementation functions; (ii) improving the personnel management practices; 
(iii) and enhancing the civil service pay through the consolidation of numerous civil service 
allowances (NIRP, 1996). The NIRP official summary concluded that: “By September 1993 when 
the CRSP came to an end the expected gains from the reforms had not been realised” (NIRP, 1996 
para 1.3). 
The differences between aims of the CSRP programme and how they were translated explain why 
the reform was not successful. The expected gains of the CSRP were to reduce the salary bill by 
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reducing the bloated numbers on the payroll; recruit professional staff on merit; and reward them 
on improved remuneration. However, the process was translated into laying off “36,000 lowly paid 
messengers, drivers, watchmen, labourers etc.” that only resulted in net savings of .02 percent of 
the total wage bill (op. cit. para 1.3). The core part of the reform process intended to create hybrid 
organisations by creating agencies and services to improve the pay of professionals and to improve 
public service delivery. Some of the sector succeeded in creating service organisations (Ministries 
such as education, and health) and technical wings (such as Ministry of Energy) but it did not bring 
about the improvements in service delivery that was anticipated. There is anecdotal evidence that 
some of the more senior staff took the redundancy package and ‘bribed’ their way back into the 
service, while others took the package and turned themselves into ‘consultants’.  The underlying 
personnel practices remained the same, and the official documents make very little references to 
family ties, and the ‘old-boys’ network practices that thwart reform efforts. Officials chose to mix-
up the manifestations of the phenomenon with its underlying causes. The NIRP report (para 1.3) 
averred that poor civil service performance was due to the lack of performance monitoring:  
Civil Service management and professional capacity issues centre on poor resources 
utilisation and performance monitoring. In the absence of these there are inadequate 
prioritisation of task, insufficient attention of senior officers on policy and other strategic 
planning work, poor work distribution, poor co-ordinating of work between composite 
programmes and absence of effective supervision and insufficient delegation.  
No wonder the next phase of the same programme was christened as the Civil Service Performance 
Improvement Programme. This was enacted in 1994 (Antwi et al.,2008) and to bolster it, it was 
preceded by the Civil Service Law 1993.  Thus, CSPIP was designed to support the implementation 
the CSL 1993 that was developed from the CSRP, which had failed in all important respects apart 
from the enactment of the act. After several years of implementation of the CSPIP, an evaluation 
of the programme found that whilst the reforms activities (such as workshops, formation of 
capacity development teams, development of performance improvements plans, and issuance of 
new code of conduct) were undertaken, it had no impact and could not be sustained. Antwi et al., 
2008 found the MoF culpable:  
Despite being a core central management agency, and therefore fully aware of the CSPIP 
under the reform agenda, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) failed to make budgetary 
provision for reform programmes for MDAs and hence no incentives for the relatively 
good performing MDAs (pp 260). 
At the time of CSPIP implementation, the MoF was spearheading the MTEF reform, which was a 
complementary programme, both generously funded by the same project sponsor (UK’s DFID), 
Evaluating the evidence from the time indicates therefore efforts were made to draw the synergies 
between the two reform programmes (for example, involving the CSPIP team in the MTEF 
facilitation), and the only reason why these programmes failed was because the failure to address 
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the ‘crucial system-wide issues of remuneration, decentralization and financial management 
reforms’ that impact directly on the MDAs. These issues lie at the heart of budget logics, and 
without addressing them observers found that not only the MoF was to be blamed, but also officials 
who were happy to attend workshops and enjoy the largesse offered without any real commitment 
to implement changes. 
National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) and other general public sector 
reforms 
NIRP was set up to address institutional issues in the public service of Ghana. An initial internal 
report prepared by the top-trio commissioners and director-general (Sai-Agble- Wiredu, 1996) for 
the NIRP programme found that the Ghanaian public service operated without any commonly 
shared vision or central direction. They argued that that not only makes it difficult to measure and 
trace performance and accountability, but also impossible for it to support the high-growth scenario 
envisioned in the Ghana’s Vision 2020.  
There are overlapping layers in the public administration services, which constitutes the civil 
service machinery alongside thirteen others as the public service (including the judicial service and 
the parliamentary service, and the audit service) under the 1992 constitution of Ghana. Most of the 
others could properly be considered as part of the civil service since they have parent ministries 
but for the quirk of the Ghanaian situation (such as the police service, immigration service,  
education service, prison service, statistical service, national fire service, internal revenue service 
and customs, excise and preventive service (now Ghana Revenue Authourity, and the legal 
service). Mostly these service organisations have been constituted to get around the low 
renumeration in the civil service and budget logics. Each of these services is governed by a 
governing council or a board. 
The NIRP programme was tagged to the NDC regime and folded up not long after the regime 
changed after the elections of 2000. Many successive public sector reform programmes have been 
generated after the end of NIRP. These programmes are often based in the office of the president 
and are utilised as vehicles to appease civic society groups, but mostly for the international donor 
community.   
Fiscal Decentralization (FD) 
Scholarly observants have noted that in rural Ghana is a "footpath economy," with farmers (most 
of whom are women) having to spend much of their time head-loading commodities (Werlin, 
1994). Even a casual observer notices that the presence of the government in rural areas is very 
patchy, and the distribution of developmental services is skeletal.  Until very recently most key 
central government services (for example passport) used to be only accessible in Accra, and it is 
still the case that government services reach the rural areas through delegated authourity of the 
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central ministries rather than through decentralized services provided by devolved government. 
Local government services in Ghana are not developed. 
The causes and consequences are intertwined as Werlin (1994 pp217) has observed: 
All but about two percent of DA (district assemblies- my addition) revenue comes from 
the central government. DAs generally lack qualified staff to do financial planning, 
budgeting, revenue collection, expenditure control, and accounting. The staff sent by the 
central government tends to be inadequate in number, unqualified, poorly paid, and rotated 
every few years without regard for local needs and personal preferences. And their work 
is seldom audited or supervised. Consultations with DAs are rare, even on priorities and 
budgetary needs. 
The purpose of the fiscal decentralization project was to support political and administrative 
devolution to local government. Among its aims was to decentralize the operation of selected 
MDAs (such as Agriculture, Education, Health) to local government; and to support the funding 
of local service through re-constituting of local government budgets (termed as ‘composite 
budgeting’). The FD project was funded by the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), and it was formulated as a sub-unit of the PUFMARP programme, but it took a long time 
to get started because of uncertainty of leadership (Cowater, 2000). At the root of FD’s 
implementation difficulties has been the differences between the Ministry of Local Government 
and Rural Development (MLGRD) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). As the Cowater report 
(para 3.5) observed, whilst the MLGRD saw the FD as a devolution of power from the central to 
local government, the MoF has seen the project mostly in terms of improving the accountability of 
local government to central government by developing their accounting systems. With these 
differences, devolution has been a paper-exercise with very little understanding what it really 
means (Cowater, 2000 pp B-3). Direction of the programme has been ad hoc and successive phases 
of the central PFM reform programme has merely extended accountability tools (such as the 
MTEF, and GIFMIS) to local government to centralize their systems. 
An MoF participant, G7, observed: 
So we have moved the Assemblies budget from line item activity-based now, programme-
based budget, we have moved away from manual with pen and paper to electronic 
platforms to prepare the budgets and then when the budget is prepared what we introduce 
alongside the process was to improve on citizens participation in the budget process, and 
that is why we do what we call social accountability, to improve social accountability. 
Scholars have found evidence in Ghana of the World Bank ‘hijacking’ the PFM reform to promote 
social accountability, but the process they have helped to institute support their hegemonic 
influences and puts efficiency and fiscal discipline ahead of creating a truly democratic social order 
in Ghana (Alawattage and Azure, 2019). This type of reform has not only taken the focus of 
reformers away from central government reforms but have also resulted in a paradox of centralising 
decentralization reforms and reinforcing what Polidano and Hulme (1999) have termed as the 
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‘paradox of the NPM’ reforms in LDCs. No wonder despite Ghana’s efforts to decentralize the 
country since 1988 it continues to be a highly centralized state (Werlin, 1994). 
4.9 CONCLUSION  
A review of the literature on Ghana’s accounting reforms showed the limited extent of research 
coverage of the specific PFM reforms. There is a prevalence of ‘normative’ donor-sponsored 
reviews of the reforms, but such papers are written from functionalists’ perspectives mobilizing 
political economy arguments. There are three directions in the academic literature that are 
noteworthy. The first development has been a stream of emerging literature that have introduced 
social theoretical frameworks but have addressed the reforms at the state-owned enterprises level 
and the sector level, not at the whole of government level. The second is that some of the recent 
literature (Lassou, 2017; Lassou et al, 2019) has made efforts to discuss contextual issues from 
what has been described as cultural political economy (Hopper et al., 2009). There is a third stream 
that have mobilised political economy arguments but have drawn attention to the importance of 
the social dimensions including understanding the importance of modern polity in the analysis of 
reforms. As far as this study could ascertain these emerging theoretical insights but have not been 
taken them further into developing a unified explanatory conceptual framework. We argue in this 
study that all these approaches have provided useful starting point for deepening the understanding 
of Ghana reforms, but this thesis focus has been on developing a framework of analysis that 
emphasise institutionalism. The background offered in this chapter is an element from processual 
narrative to create a sense of understanding of Ghana’s social milieu based on its history, culture, 
polity, and economy. 
Post-colonial experiences showed that addressing the required transformation of the public 
financial management and the public sector organisational has been a challenge in Ghana and the 
rest of Africa (including other developing countries). The contextual issues of political instability 
and economic re-structuring challenges has been exacerbated by inappropriate bureaucracy and 
public financial management practices styled on colonial reporting lines and accountability 
mechanisms. Associated with the above is an aid dependency syndrome that have made any 
transformation agenda dependent on external approbation. This chapter has planted the root for 
what I proceed to discuss in Chapters 6 and 7, about the impact of the wider society of public 
financial management that cannot be ignored. For the religious bodies, schools and traditional 
authorities are the cultural source for the replenishment of societal norms and values.  
The background evidence (both from documents and interviews) shows a history of a failure to 
transform the economy held together by unaccountable institutions (both traditional and state 
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bureaucracies). These translate into budget failure, infused by cultural practices of economic 
mismanagement resulting in anomie.  
This chapter delineates three periods for a longitudinal analysis of Ghana contextual issues to 
enhance the understanding from within the Ghana reforms. A feature common in the post- 
independence period is a culture of superficial improvements in the PFM system labelled as ‘badge 
engineering’, uncompleted reform programmes, and reversals of earlier improvements. Reforms 
as many other aspects of national policy are not taken seriously, reflecting a tradition that is 
characteristically “laid-back”. The social historical narrative from this chapter tells us that sub-
optimal practices have persisted because of these factors, including the lack of desire to pursue 
excellence (de Graft-Johnson, 1986). 
Incentives to undertake transformational reforms have flowed and ebbed. With the emergence of 
the new African bourgeoisie, the earlier social dynamics took the form of competition between 
elite groups (prevalent in the 1960 throughout to the 1980 s and the emergence of the political 
class). The ideological clashes that were both latent and persistent in the Cold War in the same 
period was settled in the 1980 when the Government of Ghana launched the ERP in 1983. The 
ERP represented a remarkable attempt to bring the economy that had failed and was at the brink 
of total disaster back on reform track, but the price was the re-surfacing of the inequities and 
contradictions in society that have been suppressed before the NPM techno liberal reforms. What 
has been evident in these attempts to reform is that the political class and the African bourgeoisie 
did not have any incentive to undertake transformational reforms the reform discourse was 
translated into a desire to achieve greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, but they remained 
rhetorical. Such concepts emerged from the NPM lingo and were alien in Ghana, and perhaps to 
more or less the same degree in other African and DCs. 
Failures by national leadership to comprehend and participate in the “efficiency” of government 
discourses, that constituted the kernel of reforms has made the hegemonic influences of the West 
and other foreign dominance in Ghana more potent. For example, the misunderstanding of the co-
existence of efficiency and decentralization, resulted in centralization and inefficiency. Accounting 
reforms as part of the bureaucratic reforms has had a dual meaning in Ghana’s public sector. On 
the one extreme it aimed to reform to expand the bureaucracy to produce a greater government 
outreach and development, whilst on the other hand it aimed to contain the size of the bureaucracy. 
In both cases the state aimed to achieve efficiency and effectiveness of the government machinery 
to support development policies (Haruna, 2001). The immediate post-independence reforms 
focused on the expansion of the bureaucracy which had been inherited from the British, but that 
only led to the ‘overdevelopment of government with ineffective state and administrative 
institutions’ (Haruna, 2001 pp38). The reforms in the 1980s onwards sought to reverse the 
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expansion of the bureaucracy through market principles, and that only led to social and economic 
inequities (Haruna, 2001) 
This chapter’s findings show that the implementation of accounting innovations through 
techniques such as the MTEF, GFMIS, and programme budgeting emerged primarily as a response 
to external pressures associated with the NPM /PFM reforms. The promises of these innovations 
introduced elements of determinism in reform outcomes that could not be delivered without 
fundamental changes. As the study will show in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.4) the causal link can be 
traced to internal political leadership failures as well as an active external donor agenda and 
interventions. 
In the following chapters I take these discussions forward, by mobilizing a causality framework in 
Chapter 5 to create a deeper sense of how the reforms have performed. These internal factors are 
linked to the analytical discussions in Chapter 6 regarding the politics of PFM reforms in Ghana 
and in Chapter 7 about the impact of hegemonic influences on reforms. 
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5 THE CENTRALITY OF BUDGET CREDIBILITY IN GHANA’S PFM REFORMS   
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study has adopted an interpretivist-constructivist methodology to conduct empirical 
investigations into Ghana’s PFM reforms. To ensure qualitative rigour, this research deployed 
grounded-theory informed methods, such as ethnography and coding, in collecting and analysing 
the empirical data from the field. In Chapter 3, I mobilised the paradigm model (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998) to identify the core category (budget credibility) and the main categories that 
emerged from the coding process. In that chapter, I developed the analysis and engaged in theory 
building, through selective coding, by relating the properties and dimensions of the central 
category (budget credibility) to the main categories to provide a causal explanation of the 
performance of the PFM reforms in Ghana. In this chapter I aim to explain the context of the 
centrality of budget credibility logics within the theoretical framework of institutional logics 
5.2 CENTRALITY OF BUDGET LOGICS: THE PHENOMENON OF BUDGET CREDIBILITY 
The signal that budget credibility is the most important indicator of the credibility of the IPFM 
reforms in Ghana goes back to before the first wave of the NPM reforms in the mid-90s. The 
political and economic meltdown in the 1970s and 1980s had manifested itself in the budgeting 
system, which at that time had become incremental and formulaic during preparation, and 
persistently informal at the implementation stage. Various official reports commissioned by the 
government using IMF technical support (Premchand and Talat, 1986, Premchand et al.1990) and 
internal reviews indicated a poor financial management system and the failure of the budgeting 
system (Public Expenditure Reviews in 1993 and 1994). The subsequent interventions therefore 
aimed to correct these failures, but that poor budgeting situation has persisted after three waves of 
successive PFM reforms in Ghana. How the poor budgeting credibility affects all actors and 
financial management practices have been aptly summed up by a participant (G7) from the MoF 
who observed:  
When we have prepared the budget and we say by the third quarter you’ll get this money 
and you are not getting it, the budget is not credible, people lose interest in what we are 
doing. 
Undermining the performance of the budget and other PFM practices and the entire IPFM reform 
are poor cash management practices and other considerations resulting in cash rationing and 
unpredictable releases of funds to the MDAs after the budget has been approved by the parliament. 
There are budget-cutting exercises and informalities in the budget preparation process but at the 
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heart of the problem is poor budget execution mechanisms. To provide a fuller picture of this, I 
quote a research participant, G4, who has been at the receiving end of the poor budget practices:   
On Wednesday…. they [the MoF] called me about 9pm and said, “do you remember on 
top of your head your budget ceiling?” and I said “what? On top of my head? I don’t 
produce budget from my head”. We produced budget, we …. submitted six copies to the 
Ministry of Finance including soft copy and you are asking from my head, I’m sorry, check 
your records. We delivered the original to the minister, we delivered one to the, Deputy 
Minister, we delivered one to the chief director, one to the budget director, one to the 
schedule officer, and gave one to the secretary of the minister just in case they do not find 
any, we gave six good copies to Ministry of Finance and you can’t find any of the six and 
you want to take the issue from the top of my head? So, you see it becomes a bit difficult 
for some of us 
The budget preparation calendar has always been compressed, allowing the ministries, 
departments, and agencies very limited time to put together their annual estimates. The official 
said:  
Why can’t we start this process a bit earlier in the day and make sure things are done 
properly? If we know that the budget is supposed to be read before the end of November, 
nothing even stops us to start preparing our 2019 budget from February next year [ 2018]. 
And so, let’s think, you know, let’s have time, let’s get it dusted say by July and even 
August we can go back and have a look at it, is this our budget, okay. What stops us? Why 
do we have to wait till the last minute, then we are stampeding everybody? So, the budget 
formulation side that is what I have to say about it, but the Ghana’s problem is not the 
budget formulation, budget execution is the problem, the budget execution. 
Budget execution presents special difficulties for Ghana Government officials. The release of 
budgetary allocation is unpredictable, incomplete, and often done on the bases of ‘favours’ granted 
by the MOF to the MDAs. The official observed:  
There up to today, I must regrettably say that there’s a lack of predictability of resource, 
as I sit here I don’t know when I’ll get my fourth quarter money, today is 21st of 
November, we are left with less than one and a half months then the fourth quarter comes 
to an end, I’ve not received the money to operate in this month. When is it coming? What 
is coming? I have no idea. You can go to, for instance, just about three weeks ago in the 
fourth quarter then we received for the third quarter, the money we are supposed to use to 
operate in third quarter, it came in the fourth quarter. When it came instead of 6.8, they 
gave us 3.1, so I went to the minister and said “if you give me 3.1 and my budget is 6.8, 
what exactly are you trying to say? That I should cut some of these... (programmes), we 
shouldn’t do them? what are you talking about?” “Oh, (Jack) we will see how you resolve 
it”. Later on, they released about two weeks later. It disrupts production. The end-product 
of the end result of it is that service delivery is bad everywhere. Yesterday I was meeting 
a certain group and I said: ‘if you want to improve service delivery, we must look at 
Ministry of Finance, they must have to change budget execution’. Nobody has ever alleged 
or will ever allege that we shall have enough resources but what we are talking about is 
just planning. 
The constitution of Ghana has provided that for constitutional bodies such as the parliament, 
judiciary, and others such as the Ghana Audit Service the budget cannot be reduced arbitrary by 
the MoF. This sometimes, has resulted in ‘game-playing’ between the MoF and such constitutional 
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bodies. But such gaming prevailed throughout the financial management system, and especially in 
budget practices. After years of human effort and financial investment in accounting and reporting 
system participants pointed out Ghana could only get the benefit of the reformed systems after the 
MoF had been able to make resources available, in a predictable way, to the MDAs. When 
approved budget resources do not go to the intended recipients, they do not take the trouble, even 
when they have been provided the skills to use the financial information system (GIFMIS) to 
produce reports. An MoF official, G9, has observed in relation to GIFMIS that they need to make 
sure that the resources flow through the system to have its true value: 
So, a lot of skills, yes. But we need to make sure that the resources flow for the system to 
have its true value. Why am I saying this? I’m saying this because this is the preparation 
implementing stage. Now, the real thing for which you introduced these systems are the 
outputs. One of the outputs is fine, we’re done the release and all, what about the reports? 
The reports have to be used by all these agencies in their management, but I can tell you, 
you have only about 4% to 5% of them using the reports.   
Hopper et al.,2009 posit that budgets are the cornerstones of planning and monitoring; accounting 
information crucial to rational central resource allocation; and financial accounts to accountability. 
Accounting scholars and practitioners alike see management accounting systems (MAS), or budget 
management, to be the most important in the whole chain of financial management as it “assists 
development programming in determining and improving efficiency and productivity” (Enthoven, 
1982, p. 109).  
The practitioners’ literature recognised the centrality of budgeting when it argued that the 
relationships between the components of the budget cycle is such that “weaknesses in one part can 
affect other parts and can constrain the achievement of better budgetary outcomes. At the same 
time, improvements in one area which are not matched by corresponding changes in other areas 
can undermine the initial reforms” (Ghana PEFA report Vol 2, 2006 pp.vi) 
Similarly, others have put addressing the issues of budget credibility in delivering predictable 
resources as a first step in LDCs reforms (Talierco, 2009; DFID, 2005). However, the situation in 
Ghana is that the budget system is not allowed to operate as it should because of institutional 
constraints (the Ministry of Finance manipulating the budget during its implementation to meet to 
requirements of the political executives coupled with periodic interventions by the donors – 
especially the IMF’s staff monitoring programmes that impose fiscal restraints). To construct a 
theory on this, I made a statement of the relationship of concepts associated within a set of 
boundary assumptions and constraints Bacharach (1989). As he argued, a theory is no more than a 
linguistic device to make a complex empirical world simple to comprehend. It is in this sense that 
budget credibility is central in this study because it relates to all the 69 categories and provides a 
logical and consistent explanation of them.   
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5.3 LOGICS ON THE GROUND: IN GHANA’S FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Based on the study’s analysis, in which the centrality of budget credibility emerged, the logics in 
the financial management systems in Ghana were identified to include the budget logics, 
accountability logics, professional logics, intervening logics, techno-logics and financial 
management logics. This is set out in Table 5.1 showing the institutional orders on the y-axis and 
the relevant categorical elements on the x-axis covering the root-metaphors, sources of legitimacy, 
source of authourity, source of identity, basis of norms, and informal control mechanisms.  
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The logics in the financial management reforms are explored further in the sections that follow in 
the order of:  
• Budget credibility logics in section 5.3.1  
• Accountability logics in 5.3.2 
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• Professional logics in 5.3.3 
• Intervening logics (of political interventions in the budget processes and donor 
interventions) in 5.3.4 
• Techno logics in 5.3.5.1 
• Financial management logics in 5.3.5.2 
5.3.1 Budget Credibility Logics as the core category 
The core category of budget credibility spans across the ability to translate national policies using 
the planning processes and implement them economically, efficiently, and effectively through 
medium term financial planning mechanisms and the budget. Going back to 1992 at the 
commencement of the 4th Republic, Ghana developed medium to long terms plans (Ghana Vision 
20-20 policy framework that was abandoned in favour of the Ghana Poverty Strategy document 
(GPRS I and GPRS II) and the current version ‘the Ghana Shared Growth and Development 
Agenda’- GSGDA II (for the National Patriotic Party- NPP administration of 2017-2020)). But 
none of them has been successfully implemented to-date. The failure to sustain a robust medium-
term planning has been both a cause and outcome of poor budget credibility. Years of preparing 
unfunded development plans have eroded the credibility of planning (long, medium, and short 
plans). Budgets are prepared by the MDAs based on a ‘wish list’ of projects and programmes 
which are often not funded even when approved in the budget. An MoF official, participant G15, 
summed up the situation as follows:  
So, there are issues about credibility when we also look at the planning stage of the budget 
formulation. MDAs need to prepare their sector medium term plans. Now the plans that 
they prepare, it’s been observed that the plans are becoming more or less a wish list where 
MDAs come up with a tall list of projects and programs without looking at the resource 
constraints of the country. So, it is a very big weakness that transitions into the budget 
itself. 
The MTEF reforms attempted to improve budget planning to address the wish-list budgeting, 
through prioritisation of programmes and projects, but it failed (Roberts and Andrews, 2005). It is 
not surprising that the MDAs have a ‘tall list of projects and programmes’ that they present to seek 
resources from the limited funding available to government. The appropriate root-metaphor of the 
budget system is therefore ‘wish-listing’ budgeting. The national budget is granted legitimacy as 
approved by the Parliament, and the authourity of the state through the constitution and the PFM 
Act. In addition, budget guidelines and circulars are issued by the MoF as instructions to the MDAs 
in the budget preparation and implementation, and the appropriation act passed but it all dissolved 
into informality as the source of attention revolves around funding. The formal rationality (of 
resource allocation efficiency, effectiveness in the delivery of public services, and fiscal discipline) 
is usurped by the substantive rationality of budget holders’ interests.  
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Based on the analysis of the empirical data the following categories emerged as the relevant sub-
categories that influence and explain budget credibility in Ghana: Medium term development 
planning; budget planning and formulation; the medium term expenditure framework (MTEF); 
coordinating and preparing the estimates; costing of budget; executing; procuring; composite 
budgeting; monitoring budget transfers; budget rigidities; fiscal discipline; transitioning from 
activity-based budgeting to programme based-budgeting (ABB and PPB); monitoring 
performance; domestic revenue; managing cash and the treasury single account (TSA). A 
description of these sub-categories can be found in Appendix 6.  
5.3.1.1. Specific dimensions of budget credibility 
From the empirical evidence, it can be summarised that: the budget credibility phenomenon is 
characterised by a large variation between budget and spending at the individual MDA level; and 
the variations are persistent and systemic. The allocation of resources to a large degree was 
informal; there was power play in the allocation making the flow of resources unpredictable. The 
system was opened to a high degree of gaming and dishonesty between central agencies and the 
line ministries, making enforcement of rules and regulations selective and uneven. (For example, 
in the budget allocation and management of the education sector payroll budget)  
Overall, despite years of reform the budget system was not user friendly and supportive of 
implementing agreed national plans embodied in government policies and programmes25. The link 
to national planning system was tenuous but had improved over the years with more cooperation 
between the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and the MoF. Parliamentary 
oversight was largely weak, but there were some improvements with the introduction of public 
broadcasting of the sittings of the PAC. These properties and their dimensions have been 
summarised in the Table 5.2 below. 
Table 5.2: Properties and dimensions of budget credibility in Ghana  
Properties of Budget Credibility Dimensions 
Budget variance small         v           large 
Duration  one-off v persistence 
 
Institutionalisation of informality systemic structures v non-systemic 
 
Subjectivity of resource allocation  
 
low v high 
 
Formal power play between actors  
 
equal v unequal 
 
 
25 Regarding development planning in Ghana between 1996 to 2017 the government’s official view was 
that “Results so far: Major structural problems, including infrastructure and service delivery deficits, 
remain” (NDPC Homepage 27January 2017 downloaded at 15.52). 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




Predictability in the flow of 
budgeted resources  
 
low v high 
 
Informal Power /Gaming  
 
low v high 
 
Enforcement of regulations  
 
selective v consistent 
 
User friendliness of budget system  
 
tedious and unrewarding v easy and 
rewarding 
 
Linking to national planning 
/medium term planning  
 





effective v ineffective [but getting 
better 
 
(Note: Bold words represent an indication of the current position in Ghana) 
Relevant empirical evidence (quotes) for the budget credibility dimensions: 
Budget Variance: large 
…. Somebody comes from outside, says that our budget is not credible because he takes 
what you have budgeted for and what you spent, do variance analysis and say your budget 
is not credible [MoF Official-participant G11] 
Duration: persistence  
If you take our budgets, even now and in the past one of the indicators of budget credibility 
is to look at the variation or the variance between budget [all things] and projections. And 
if the variation is very big then we know that something is wrong. I mean, you can’t be 
excellent in forecasting but at least when you have the parameters right, a very good 
forecast would be that that minimizes the variation. And we’ve had this problem not only 
now but even in the past. So, there’s a big variation between what the forecasts are and 
what the outcomes are. [ MoF Official- participant G11] 
Institutionalisation of informality: systemic structures 
The issue about the institutionalisation with regards to informality and formality, yes, it’s 
a very important issue. But, again, the way the new law has been crafted, it’s crafted in a 
way that should I say, it has – if you want, codified the processes that we must go through. 
It’s in the law. Processes we have to go through to ensure that ultimately the budget will 
address some of these problems [MoF Official- participant G15].  
In the above quote, the participant interpreted institutionalisation narrowly in terms of the 
codification of processes and the law. In the context where the legal norms are often ignored, 
interpreting institutionalisation as ‘the due process’ is not adequate. In contrast, neo-
institutionalists tend to see institutionalisation in terms of taken-for-granted repetitive social 
behaviour rooted in normative systems and cognitive understanding (Greenwood et al. (2008). 
Subjectivity of resource allocation: high 
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The previous participant’s quote, as above, illustrate the informal dimension of the budget, which 
is expected to be addressed through the PFM laws, but invariably practices remain the same.    
Lack of predictability in cash releases to support budget implementation: low 
If, yes, if you think out of the one million you will get only one hundred, tell me so that I 
can plan. That is all that we are saying, predictability, being able to know that within this 
month “oh finance is going to give me this”. It’s not been done” (Participant G4 from 
Ghana Audit Service) 
Formal power play between actors: unequal 
The entire PFM Act places a lot of, lot of responsibilities on the Minister of Finance, and 
then the Government institutions like the Auditor General as well as the Controller and 
Accountant General and the Internal Audit Agency, but even though the powers are mostly 
vested in the Minister of Finance, it is executed through some offices(in the MoF)”. [ MoF 
Official-participant G11] 
Yeah, yeah, for the reforms, if we take the MDAs, ideally the MDA budget is both bottom-
up and top-down. Ministry of finance sits at the top, collates, and coordinates all the 
MDA's budget. So, based on the programmes that the MDAs ought to implement, it's 
costed, it comes into Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Finance also looks at the total 
envelope and say we can afford this amount 
And then Ministry of Finance still takes it down but knows that they are going to have to 
spend more than allocated in the budget. So that to me would suggest it’s a failure of the 
budget preparation process. It’s not honest enough to say what the actual need is”. 
[Participant G27] 
As the top level of Ministry of Finance to actually have an honest allocation in the budget 
rather than getting it wrong by 20% and knowing they are getting it wrong. Because then 
when it comes to execution that 20% must come from somewhere. And normally that 
means that it comes out with the good and services and investment or whatever else. Or 
greater risk potentially. [Participant G27] 
Enforcement of regulations: selective 
The FAA that you mentioned, the 2003 law, one of the biggest problems it had was that 
even though it had a sanctions regime scattered here and there, those were not biting at all. 
Apart from maybe the Ghanaian, probably, having less affinity to probably enforce 
sanctions. Apart from that, the law itself – the sanctions regime in the law was not strong 
in the FAA. So that’s one of the biggest problems [ MoF Official- participant G15] 
So even though we’ve just started implementation of the law [PFM Act 2016] I think 
people are beginning to realize that, no, this is something we have to be serious about and 
if you’re not careful you can go to jail because of that. So, we’re all aware…” [ MoF 
Official- participant G15] 
User friendliness: tedious and unrewarding 
…. to be honest with you the budgeting process – the national one is laborious. It’s not 
exciting 
Linking the national budget to national planning: ineffective [but getting better] 
Well, there has been some lessons learnt and some of the lessons are being used but I’m 
sure there’s much room for improvement. Now, I can say that the macro is much linked, 
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that’s the planning part – it’s much linked to the budget than before. That’s not to say we 
didn’t have the macro, we had, but the linkage was not just strong. [Senior MoF Official] 
Yes. …. it has been resolved. That is why their [MoF] own budget guidelines indicate that 
their budget should be based on their plans approved by NDPC. [Senior National 
Development Planning Official- participant G28] 
Parliamentary oversight: ineffective [but getting better] 
So, parliament actively participated at the project design stage to enter, because we noted 
that previous reforms that ignore that aspect[oversight], suffered from budget incredibility 
because there was parliamentary oversight and it was weak, so this one tried to close that 
loop to make it comprehensive. [ Parliamentary Official- participant G12] 
5.3.2 Accountability logics- the causal condition of poor budget credibility 
Understanding accounting practices requires it to be embodied in the practical organisational 
accountability systems (Roberts and Scapens,1985). Empirically accountability and transparency 
are causal conditions in this study’s explanation of budget credibility in Ghana. That is, at the core 
of the phenomenon of poor budget credibility is a lack of accountability and transparency in the 
management of national resources. As Pallot (1992) have argued “Accountability of government 
to the citizens, through elected representatives, is the cornerstone of all financial management and 
reporting in government”. I argue in this thesis that you need to change the accountability logics, 
which drives budget logics and budget credibility, to have better financial management reform 
outcomes. For example, changing the accountability relationships became the prime focus of the 
reforms in New Zealand in 1985, which was labelled as ‘new contractualism' (Schick 1998). The 
underlying mechanisms in Schick’s argument mobilised the principal-agent theory (or buyer-seller 
relationship) (for example see Leruth and Paul, 2007). But unlike Schick, in this thesis, I have 
developed those relationships based on the empirical logics of the situation.   
For several years, the public accounts of Ghana were not prepared because of the political situation 
and capacity constraints in the Controller and Accountant Department and across government. 
With the restoration of parliament in 1992 the backlog of accounts was prepared, and that triggered 
the clearance of the backlog of audit reports as well. In a review of audit reports da Rocha (2001 
p3) observed that:  
What the reports covering the period 1993 to 1999 reveal is a frightening and depressing 
picture of public property misused, neglected, or damaged: money stolen or misapplied, 
gross negligence and fraud. It seems that nothing changes from year to year. When the 
figures are added up, the total runs into trillions of cedis lost to the national coffers  
Whilst it was a while back since this report was published, more recent studies have found that 
there have been persistence lapses in enforcing the laws governing accountability in Ghana (Betley 
et al., 2012). The significance of da Rocha’s line, “It seems nothing changes from year to year”, 
still applies, making the root-metaphor of accountability in Ghana, “flagrant violation with 
impunity” an appropriate description.  
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The previous financial legislations [FAA 2003] had some accountability mechanisms that was 
decoupled in practice, but the current law [PFM Act 2016] that replaced it, weakens accountability 
further. It appears to be ineffective in holding central agencies accountable as expressed be an 
official (GAS-D1) in the Ghana Audit Office: 
 … currently I must say that … I’m quite involved in the financial management …, not 
from accounting side of the issues. I must say that my considered opinion is that the 2003 
Financial Administration Act that was promulgated I think it’s still a better law than the 
PFM Act 2016 which is currently in place... I have a few reasons for that. One of the 
reasons is because if you look at Section 15 of the Financial Administration Act [2003] 
you see it creates an obligation, especially Subsection 3, it’s place obligation on the 
accountant general and his team, everybody working on his behalf to ensure that before 
payments are made the expenditure is a lawful charge against appropriation, there is a 
budget for it, and those who are authorising it has the right to authorise, for whom you can 
hold culpable if they didn’t ensure that before making payment. Now you can’t find that 
in the current PFM Act, so under what law are we going to hold people for making 
wrongful payment because the obligation to ensure that that expenditure is a lawful charge, 
that is the money was appropriated for that, there is a budget for it and the one authorising 
is the person who’s supposed to authorise before we pay. That requirement, if it is no more 
there, then against what are you going to hold those officers and the treasury responsible 
for not honouring what the law requires of you?  
The provisions in the PFM Act 2016 did not improve the budgetary accountability by making both 
political heads (Principal Account Holder) and administrative officers (Principal Spending Officer) 
of government entities responsible for the budget without spelling out the accountability relations 
between them. Rather the new law, PFM Act, 2016, centred the MDAs’ accountability around 
reporting to the Minister of Finance and the Chief Director of the Ministry of Finance26. This 
centring of the accountability relationship around the Ministry of Finance has not worked well in 
the past, and the new laws have only codified what has not worked in practice. Accountability 
relationships are weak throughout government, including at the local level, as explained by an MoF 
official (J1): 
That’s social accountability… so we’re trying to gradually build demand for accountability 
from the citizens. For me, my belief is that the citizens demanding for accountability’s 
more effective than central government demanding for accountability... 
Within this main causal condition of budget credibility are embedded the sub-categories of 
accountability and efficiency, social accountability, poor reporting, ineffective audit practices, 
inadequate logistics to support audit, ineffective oversight by the parliament. 
 
26 PFM Act 2016 (Article 102) interprets the position of a Principal Account Holder (the minister of a line 
ministry) and Principal Spending Officer (a chief director or chief executive or the most senior 
administrative officer responsible for producing output) 
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5.3.3 Phenomenon Management - Professional Logics 
The context of the budget credibility logics is conditioned by the state of public sector accounting 
professionalism in Ghana. At the height of Ghana’s economic decline through the 1980s there were 
about three qualified accountants in the entire public service. A massive drive to recruit more 
qualified accountants into the public took place in the early 1990s increasing the numbers to about 
twenty- five in the mid-nineties when the PFM reforms began (PUFMARP High Level Design 
Report, 1996). To attract qualified staff the accountants were put on the payroll of the Internal 
Revenue Service, which had higher remuneration rates than the civil service. Thus, the root-
metaphor of ‘privilege’ befitted professional staff such as qualified accountant in Ghana’s public 
service. Legitimacy was bestowed by the means of paper qualification, rather than skills, 
knowledge, and experience. As Participant G18 in the CAGD complained about qualified 
accountants who occupied higher positions but relied on unqualified colleagues to do the work. He 
observed:  
he’s not ready to learn from the ‘small boys’ who are doing the real job because of pride. 
Professional identity was defined by membership of the Ghana Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(ICAG) which provides the norms of behaviour based on international norms provided by the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and modified locally. However, the unwillingness 
or inability to enforce sanctions have led to situation of gross abuse of public funds by office 
holders (da Rocha, 2001) including accountants:   
And we have records of professional accountants who have gone into embezzlement and 
other things. Because the spirit of the civil service is not in that person. And he can’t go to 
do that thing in the private sector because the checks at the private sector is such that you’ll 
find difficulty doing it. [Controller and Accountant General’s official-G18] 
To a large extent professionalism is missing, with only a few exceptions as a participant observed:  
 What is missing is conscience, conscience in terms of professional conscience in terms of 
even your domestic affairs which is eating into your work. [MoF senior official- 
Participant G11] 
Another official echoed the same: 
We are putting in place some measures which, in a sense, is also addressing the issue of 
professionalism and ethics in our work. [MoF official- Participant G15] 
But professional identity is not to be conferred by ICAG /IFAC alone as PFM extends beyond   
accounting to other disciplines including economics, planning, procurement, valuation, and law. 
This situation has created a crisis of professional identity for PFM professionalism in Ghana. A 
participant observed: 
That's, knowledge is value laden, based on the person, his view might be different, this is 
based on me and my experience. I think that professional identity is not there, it's missing, 
and to me, that is the gap [MoF official- Participant G11] 
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The reforms have created avenues for more professionals to be recruited to join the public service 
as accountants, increasing the numbers to over one thousand today, but paradoxically it has not 
impacted on the degree of professionalism. A participant observed:  
.... I would say to the best of my knowledge… professionalism…it hasn’t been influenced 
by these reforms. I think it’s more influenced by career progressions as they see in the 
sector, and their own personal ambition of improving themselves [Ministry of Health 
(MoH) official- Participant G13]. 
Professionalism is weak, as observed by different participants in different ways. A participant 
relayed his experience with how a qualified chief accountant spent her workday: 
 …. we did the debrief today in her office and we got eight or nine interruptions of her 
having to sign those things. I can see that’s an issue. She is having to do micro level stuff 
when she should be probably be focused on more macro-issues.  
And she herself pointed out there is a real lack of capacity building in financial 
management across the sector and the decentralized level particularly. She needs much 
more [Participant G27] 
Empirically what emerged to be the drivers in the logics of the category of professionalism are the 
sub-categories of professional identity of staff associated with financial management, rent seeking 
activities, and the understanding public officials have of their fiduciary responsibility.  
5.3.4 Intervening conditions - Intervention Logics 
Intervening conditions contribute to the context for managing the budget credibility logics. These 
are internal over-politicisation of the budget system and externals donor interventions in the PFM 
system.  
One aspect of NPM reforms has been the internationalization of organisational best practices 
(Hood 1995). In the developing countries, the extant literature (both normative and academic) has 
found strong influences of international financial institutions (WB and IMF) in PFM reforms 
((Hopper et al., 2016). Neu and Ocampo, 2007 refer to this as the missionary activities of the World 
Bank. This incessant pressures for LDCs to adopt prescribed accounting and budget techniques, 
one after another, have sparked off a charge of crude ethnocentrism against the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and international development partners. The ‘best practice’ principle, 
once advocated by external donors, was based on using western practices as the yardstick of 
accounting practices in LDCs (Abdul-Rahaman et al., 1997). 
However unwarranted interventions in the financial management are not restricted to external 
forces alone, as local political leadership intervene in the budget process sometimes for personal 
gains. Scholars have found corruption and neo-patrimonialism in managing public funds in Ghana 
(Lassou, 2017).  
There are therefore multiple forces, from LDCs’ governments and their international donors, 
exerting pressure on financial management reforms.  The underlying logic is more complex, as 
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explained by the vicious and virtuous cycles of empowerment Lopes and Theisohn (2003) that 
influence development as in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 below:  
Figure 5.1 Vicious and Virtuous Cycles of Employment  
  
Figure 5.2 Virtuous Cycle of Employment  
 
  
In Lopes and Theisohn’s (2003)’ scheme LDCs are caught-up in a trap of vicious cycle of 
disempowerment by local leadership who see bad results and do not often take action to correct 
them. Donors only act to help the leadership to get out of the rot. 
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This notwithstanding, this study found that that relationship serves the interests of the local 
political elite, the IFIs, and the bilateral donor agencies operating in Ghana. For this reason, I argue 
that the root-metaphor of ‘neo-patrimonialism and neo-colonial hegemony’ capture the essence of 
the combination of internal and external intervention logics on the Ghana budget system. 
The study provides the details of the intervention logics below for both internal over-politicisation 
of the budget and external agencies below.  
5.3.4.1 Internal over-politicisation of the budget system 
One of the sources of frustration for implementing the approved budget was the inability of 
Controller and Accountant General (CAG) to reconcile the government cash position on timely 
bases to guide the release of funds to meet government obligations. A well-placed participant 
(G26) who worked on the automation project within government in 1990s and early 2000s 
observed:  
… the Ministry of Finance, the Controller and Accountant General Department, and the 
Bank of Ghana did not necessarily have the same figures on the cash position of 
government. And it was that then, but it was essential [G26- Principal reform consultant]  
Improving cash flow planning and management has been one of the long-standing items on the 
reform agenda, that has gone of forever since the reforms begun in the mid-1990s, but without 
perceptible results. Without the results, there has been cash rationing in the government. That 
rationing mechanism ensures that after the payment of wages and salary, politicised programmes 
(such as school feeding, one-district-one-factory) are given priority in cash releases over all other 
approved government programmes in the budget. But often even this cash prioritisation procedure 
fails, and sometimes cash resources are not enough to meet the cost of those politicised 
programmes, as observed by a senior MoF official, participant G11: 
Even though we know the school feeding project, or school feeding programme, was a 
priority of Government, we have assigned the resources to that priority of Government and 
said two million [cedis], which is spread in one million [cedis] first quarter, one million 
third quarter. The money going to the right place hasn't been met, so the programme hasn't 
been done… 
The logic of the over-politicised intervention is that often the standard government programmes 
approved in the budget are starved of cash resources, that effectively results in budget reduction 
for those MDAs affected, and the building up of arrears. At the same time, politicised programme 
some of which might be new initiatives are ‘catapulted’ into the budget to receive funding. 
An MoF official (G11) said:  
the reform you want to go for… for instance, you want to ensure cash management is 
linked to implementation. Well, cash management is sitting somewhere, and 
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implementation is sitting somewhere [else], let's look at the institutional rearrangement 
that will support the reform we want to implement.  
But to-date that type of reform has not happened, making the budget system not credible. 
5.3.4.2 External donor interventions in the PFM system 
In this thesis I argue that the combined effect of officials’ inability to institute a sound cash 
management system coupled by politicised intervention is that donor resource inflows take on a 
greater role than its relative share of the national budget. It also means that the government become 
more dependent on donor flows to fund development projects. 
Institutionalists have argued that the world society forms an environment within which nations 
states alongside other actors are embedded (Drori, 2009). Developing countries, like Ghana, are 
subject to both the global society’s cultural processes as well as its discourses of developmentalism 
(Ibid). The institutional logic of globalisation impacts directly on ‘cross-national diffusion of ideas 
and practices, and on the rationalising and standardising impact of international organisations, the 
professions, and the universalised model they carry” (ibid, pp. 449). In Ghana, just as in other 
developing countries, the rationalising and standardising tendencies of globalisation are diffused 
through loans and aid conditionalities. 
A well-placed participant from MOF (G15) noted:  
…. a lot of our programs, PFM programs, are supported by donors. DFID is supporting. I 
think USAID also supports. So, donors are in there. But the donor support – if donors are 
supporting, I think it’s only natural that they would come with some request or prior 
actions or certain, should I say requirements. That’s because I am supporting you must do 
A, B, C, D. It is possible?  
Reform funding often come with foreign consultant attached as a conditionality of funding, as 
noted by participant G4 from Ghana Audit Service:  
So normally it comes with that (consultants) but the other side of it is that it comes with a 
lot of foreign knowledge and expatriates who are not too conversant with the local 
environment and local knowledge. And finally, they, some of these expatriates also have 
their own agenda turning their consultancy many times into employment, so they remain 
with us for so long a time and of course if the problem gets solved, he is no more needed, 
so the problem stays on and on and on and on and on …… 
On occasions reform outcomes unwind after cessation of project activities because there was no 
commitment to project driven by development partners(donors) as observed by MoF official: 
[it] unwinds, because within the period, somebody's breathing down your neck, you have 
the commitment, you have the resources, you are trying to implement it, while the person 
who is breathing goes away [it unwinds]. So, it’s a challenge. We say, we are done with 
the reforms [laughs]. That’s why.  
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The intervening sub-categories such as over-politization of budget allocations and funding; 
managing the personnel cost (‘Compensation’ as a budget item); the logics of international 
community (‘donors’) interventions; and tendency of officials to accept standing practices as the 
norm through institutionalised behaviour (Greenwood et al.,2008). 
5.3.5 Actions/Interaction strategies - Technology-Logics (automating), and Financial 
Management Logics 
Two major categories were identified in the empirical analysis as the strategic actions in managing 
the phenomenon, viz; automating the financial system (techno-logics); and re-engineering 
financial management (financial management logics). An inefficient mode of undertaking 
transactions with the public financial management system and doing government business 
sustained itself throughout the financial decay of the 1970s, 80s, 90s and beyond. Part of this was 
put down to personnel capacity constraints across government, especially in the CAGD.  In 
documenting the system for BPEMs computerisation reviewers in 1996 found big gaps between 
what the accountants said they did and what took place under existing procedures. The manual 
system permitted errors, and data were prone to manipulation to suit bookkeepers and preparers of 
financial statement, which inevitably supported financial malfeasance. 
5.3.5.1 Techno-logics 
Automating arose because government spending transactions were executed manually, and 
spending instructions were not channelled through one source, but through multiple sources to the 
central bank (Bank of Ghana) for payment. In addition, reconciliation of the cash book to the bank 
statement was done manually and trialled behind actual spending and revenue inflows. Sending 
spending instructions to the bank from multiple sources meant that the Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
and the Controller and Accountant General (CAGD), which is an almost independent department 
of the MoF, did not know the available cash balances in the bank. Automating the government 
financial management system became a central focus in the reform agenda to help generate 
financial data, support controls, balance cash position of government, and to prepare periodic 
accounts.  The Government’s preferred solution was to implement an integrated financial 
management system using a technology platform which was initiated under BPEMS from 1997, 
revamped as GIFMIS in 2009, and was only partly accomplished when the PFMRP came along in 
2015. 
The primary objective of automating was to support the reporting needs of the CAGD on public 
funds to enforce controls; the reporting of sector ministries was considered as a periphery 
requirement in the original specification (BPEMS), later changing to meet the reporting 
requirements of the sector ministries during the GIFMIS implementation. 
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Further upstream, there was a need to develop a system to manage Government's budgeting (all 
budgeting requirements); but the government’s preferred software (the Oracle Financials) did not 
have, at the time, an appropriate public sector budget module that could meet the specifications for 
performance management.  The failure of the BPEMs computerisation to find an appropriate 
answer to the government’s budgeting requirement complicated its implementation and delayed 
the whole reform process. A substitute ad hoc software solution was developed partly in-house in 
1998 to move the implementation of the budget reform forward. That substitute, an Access-based 
software, competed and effectively displaced the adoption of BPEMs integrated financial 
management solution using the Oracle public sector budgeting (PSB) module for almost thirteen 
years. It was replaced in central government, within the MDAs, only after the existing Activity 
Based Budgeting was revised and replaced with Programme Budgeting in 201427 . The MoF 
purchased the license to deploy Hyperion during the Programme Budgeting (PPB) reforms under 
the GIFMIS and the PFMRP phase in 2014. 
As noted by participant, G2, from the MoF:   
….so, we support the Activate software for the subnational government and then the 
Oracle Hyperion for the national and also serve as a link between the ministry on the 
budgets and then the financials suite. 
The root-metaphor of techno-logics is in promoting modernity; and the source of legitimacy is 
based on advancing progress of national social and economic development agenda. The source of 
authourity, supporting the techno-logics, is based on what are specified in contracts and the skills 
and knowledge of ERPs. Techno-logics are driven by specialised IT and financial domain 
professionals. The source of norms is derived from technical controls, ethics, and personal 
conscience.  Technological solutions get attention because it promotes efficiency in operations, 
and the strategic basis of ensuring that is through client support desk and solving crises that arise 
in a timely manner to minimise downtime. Techno-logics is effective when it gets users support 
through o-operative attitude by IT-personnel and their capacity to engage with not technical 
colleagues 
The empirical data yielded the following the sub-categories under automating: of learning, 
selecting consultants, developing integrated solution, designing of systems, and using technology. 
5.3.5.2. Financial management re-engineering Logics 
The reforms have been a vehicle for re-aligning the financial management arrangements to ensure 
strategic allocation of financial resources; fiscal discipline; and improvements in public service 
 
27 At this time, the Oracle Financials had acquired Hyperion as part of its suite to respond to the 
requirement of public sector budgeting performance management. 
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delivery.  These are standard objectives of financial practices worked out by the IFI’s (WB and the 
IMF) and being diffused to developing and emerging countries through the reforms (Neu and 
Ocampo 2007). Some effort has gone into improve reporting through revising the government’s 
chart of accounts (COA) and improving transactional processes (such as setting up suppliers and 
contractors on the system, ceasing to write manual cheques by adopting electronic payment 
system). However, it was apparent from what participants reported that financial management re-
engineering is misconceived in the Ghana reforms; and it is thought of in terms of procurement 
and computerisation, as participant G4 in the Ghana Audit Service observed: 
So, I say whenever we are talking about the financial management reform, unfortunately 
people start talking about procurement of hardware, software, etc., claiming travel abroad, 
etc  
In addition, a lot of government business activities are done outside of the official budget and 
accounting system (outside of the Consolidated Fund and official GIFMIS system), as G4 pointed 
out:  
Ask them [MoF] to tell us how much is below the budget expenditure[line], and how much 
of revenue goes unaccounted for? Not what they have budgeted for. Total revenue for the 
government. Ask them, the schools. How much school fees do they collect? The hospitals, 
do they collect. Even ministries and MDAs’ internal generated funds, we don’t even know 
how much they are collecting. Then you are talking about activity-programme based 
budget. 
The official budget does not capture all the sources of funding to the sector ministries and some 
revenues go unaccounted for. However, the reforms have not been able to re-engineer the financial 
systems to address such basic requirements of an accountable public financial management system. 
The root-metaphor is ‘enabling controls; and legitimacy is derived from improving efficiency in 
operations and service delivery by helping to transforming post- colonial structures. The Ghana 
constitution PFM Acts and related legislation provide the source of authourity for the financial 
management logics. The identity of the officials who work in this area is defined by their 
membership of professional organisations; and the norms in financial management generated from 
on accounting and financial management techniques, the law and accounting standards.  The 
attention financial management gets depends on the nature of reporting statement prepared, and 
audit reports and management letters. The strategy of financial re-engineering is ability to provide 
sound financial advice; accounting colonisation; and ensuring financial controls 
Under re-engineering financial management, the empirical sub-categories include: Capturing 
financial transactions in GIFMIS/ Budget Execution/ Sector financial management / making 
payment/accounting/ banking. 
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5.3.6 Consequences of the phenomenon 
 The consequences of the budget credibility in manifesting itself on the reform credibility 
encompass sub-categories such as initiating reforms, designing the reforms, knowledge translation 
and diffusion, commitment, ownership, problematizing issues, comprehensiveness, championing, 
and sustaining the reforms.   
The research has shown that in the Ghanaian IPFM context, reform credibility and budget 
credibility are co-joined. An MoF official (Participant G11) noted:  
The reform itself is having an impact both ways, on the way we do our things as well as 
the way we do our things having an impact on the reform. 
In addition, participants’ responses implied that a way to judge the performance and the seriousness 
of the MoF intentions as the champion of the reforms, is to judge the one thing they are responsible 
for: the management of the national budget (which is the credibility of the budget).  I turn my 
attention to answer this question before I draw the conclusion for this chapter.  
5.4 WHY THE REFORM CREDIBILITY HAS COME TO DEPEND ON BUDGET CREDIBILITY LOGICS 
IN GHANA 
In the final section of this chapter I analyse the empirical evidence from participants to, first 
establish the PFM reform credibility in Ghana, and why it corresponds to budget credibility, if it 
is not as a consequence; and secondly explicate why both the budget practices, and the IPFM 
reforms suffer credibility gap. 
The Ghana IPFM reforms are mainly driven by international development partners, whose 
intervention actions on government reforms are often formulated from the observed large variances 
between budget and actuals: An MoF participant, G11, has observed:  
I'm beginning to suspect that sometimes the need for the reforms is not generated from us. 
Somebody comes from outside, says that our budget is not credible because it takes what 
you have budgeted for and what you spent, do variance analysis, and say your budget is 
not credible. I'm using the budget as an example because budget is just a subset of PFM; 
and based on that they say, “Okay, because your budgets are not credible, we need to 
ensure that we make your budget credible, so let's implement these reforms. 
The MoF has had an institutionalised approach to pruning down the MDAs’ requests for funding 
and the implementation of the budget; and it has not changed, despite years of reforms emphasising 
improvement through prioritisation of budget requests.  Participant G4 noted: 
…. They [MoF] go through all their consultation processes, try to massage your ego and 
say bring what you want, etc., but at the end of the day they will cut it without recourse to 
what you will use the money for…. so, you just don’t cut. What you do is you come to me 
and say: “look my friend, yes, I’ve seen your request, but we don’t have that money, this 
is where we can meet you so go and reprioritise within it.” Because either I buy that 
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computer, or I don’t buy that computer but don’t give me a fraction of the money for the 
computer.  
A sector financial manager from an MDA, G20 referring to a diagnostic into their financial 
management systems said:  
Budget preparation is basically the beginning of this PFM (reform) thing… from the onset 
the people who were supposed to use the system did not identify with what was really 
called a budget. It’s one of the weaknesses that they found. 
.... to be honest with you the budgeting process – the national one is laborious. It’s not 
exciting and at the end of the day you do all the budgeting and can[you] be sure that you 
don’t get virtually anything. So, the incentive to even do it well is not there. 
From the position of these Ghanaian government officials the budget therefore corresponds to the 
reforms. The reforms are largely driven by external donor interventions, the reforms have not 
affected the MoF’s approach to the management of the budget to any appreciable extent, after 
several years of reforms, and it has negatively affected the motivation of officials to pay due 
attention to it beyond the mere formalities.   
5.4.1 Why both the budget practices and the IPFM reforms suffer credibility gap 
Government of Ghana programmes are not expected to run well, if at all, because after payment of 
wages and salaries there is very little cash left to distribute to the MDAs for operational activities 
(those line items are termed “Goods and Services”). Officials have come to accept that government 
programmes will not run according to schedule and that has become a self-fulfilling tendency; the 
reforms are not addressing this tendency. Participant (G11) observed:  
…… so ideally to undertake efficient programme-based budgeting……. [if] I am the 
programme manager for expenditure management programme, the compensation, the 
assets and the ‘goods and service’ all come to the programme manager as expenditure 
management programme. But here's a case where probably there is money to pay 
compensation only; so, you pay compensation, but the compensation has a role to play in 
helping deliver the service, but if you pay compensation you've not paid ‘goods and 
services…How do you expect the totality of the programme to run? 
If official know and accept that programmes are not going to work well, then it raises the question 
of why did the government introduced programme budgeting, that is more tasking and requires 
more elaborate expenditure planning sequence, in the first place? 
Ghana PFM reforms suffer credibility gap because reform ownership is construed in political 
ownership terms rather than national ownership, and past improvements in budget practices have 
been reversed with time. The reforms ownership has changed as political administration has 
changed, and the programme suffers as a result. For example, after several initial challenges, there 
was a change in government in 2001, when the first reforms under BPEMs were about to take-off, 
as noted by participant G4:  
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You see, when BPEMs was ongoing I think things were moving pretty well until there was 
a change in government from NPP to NDC and almost everything which was done was 
rubbished and we made sure it deteriorated for a long while before saying now let’s do a 
new reform so that we can attribute it to ourselves. “So, what I’m trying to say is that the 
ownership is becoming political instead of a national ownership, which would transcend 
any government, so that is the problem. 
In addition, techniques are often implemented half-heartedly (loosely coupled), making them 
unsustainable in the long run before any gains made from introducing it are reversed (for example 
the implementation of the Medium- Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)). Improved 
disbursement arrangements of budget funds in 2005 to 2007, where government agencies did not 
have to apply to the MOF for their approved budgets to be released to them, were also subsequently 
reversed. As noted by participant G4: 
….And mind you that’s why I say that these reforms are killed by changes in government, 
as far back as 2007, 2005, 2006, 2007, we introduced that, and we are releasing monies to 
MDAs without them even applying because we said “look, let’s look at our cash position 
and project what we can pay”. So, come the date we credit you, if you remember there is 
something you call bank transfer advice, we introduced it at that time, so we will inform 
you that so much has been transferred to your account, so you can operate. So, to relieve 
this it has all been reverse. 
The reforms therefore do not have consistent direction to sustain and institutionalise improved 
accounting practices. The system is also often characterised misleading notions: for example, on 
revenue projections there seem to be a mistaken belief that the revenue estimates approved by 
Parliament in the budget is just a projection (just as donor pledges of budget support); and that 
approved budgets are only a guide. The unpredictable budget system is a product of these 
misconceptions. Participant G11 summed up an often-repeated statement from the MoF: 
But in reality, even though we have targeted two million for a particular programme and 
we said the first quarter you get one million, the revenue is a projection and it is based on 
the projected revenue that we promised one million for a particular programme in the first 
quarter. The donor inflow is a projection, it is based on that projection that we promised 
the one million, so the moment our forecasts, our projection is not right, or our forecast, 
our projection doesn't materialise, straight away the planned one million to be released to 
this particular project suffers.  
The prediction of donor inflows may be a challenge to government revenue forecasters, but that 
explains only a fraction of the phenomenon. At the root of the unpredictable funds flow to the 
sectors is not just the challenge of forecasting revenues (both domestic and foreign), but over-
ambitious budgets and the prioritisation of the budget during budget implementation using 
cashflows and political factors. 
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 In this chapter, the study mobilised the paradigm model (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and 
institutional logics (Thornton et al, 2012) to explain the dynamics of the PFM reforms in Ghana. 
The process of elucidating the cause-and-effect relationships of problems can in fact lead to the 
redefinition of preconceived interests or to the identification of new interests (Haas, 1992 pp.15). 
This cause-and-effect analysis has shown in this chapter that the Government of Ghana is not a 
monolithic entity operating reforms in a homogenous environment. Rather the government is a 
multi-faceted complex entity operating in a heterogenous environment, and within that framework, 
the concept of ‘acting units’ captured the essence of the multiple players impacted by the reforms 
and their interests. The government faces different internal and external pressures to modernize it 
accounting practices, and various organisations play different roles in the public financial 
management reforms. 
In response to the external pressures the GoG has enacted legislation and has implemented 
automated accounting systems in attempts to effect accounting change. In addition, accounting 
innovations has been introduced especially in the budgeting systems, through the introduction of 
the MTEF and programme budgeting approach. These systems changes have impacted on some of 
the procedures, but they have not impacted on the underlying accounting practice, as they have not 
been able to tackle the key environmental and social factors (including the mind set) that influence 
the existing practices. 
The technical explanation provided in this chapter is intended to highlight the relationship between 
the major empirically derived categories, their properties, and dimensions. The property of budget 
predictability has far reaching consequences that go beyond the credibility of the budget to other 
aspects of accounting practices and reforms in Ghana. The informality associated with the budget 
generated a number of root-metaphors that have been discussed in this chapter. For example, 
budget credibility’s root-metaphor of wish-listing budgeting has been a common feature of the 
financial management practices in Ghana, and it is associated with selective enforcement or 
unenforceable regulations. The other root-metaphors demonstrate the tensional forces and 
contradiction within the financial management system. Attempts to enact accountability fail 
because the financial logics indicate the need to tighten controls whereas in reality accountability 
is characterised by flagrant violation of regulations with impunity. Progress is enacted through 
attempt to modernise through techno-logics whereas in fact it enhances the hegemonic control of 
the IFIs from a distance. 
Hegemony turns the reforms into enforcing central controls rather than, necessarily, enhancing 
efficiency in executing transactions and supporting management decisions. Centralising controls 
within the MoF and the Accountant General’s Department only enhances the notion of 
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professionalism as a privilege and does not address the professional capacity constraints that has 
impeded meaningful reforms. The central controls rather have impeded the smooth operation of 
the budget, especially when it is manipulated during its implementation phase to meet changing 
political and donor requirements.  
Identifying the budget logics as the core phenomenon, highlights the poor practices (such as cash 
management) that result in the prevailing properties and their dimensions. For example, the lack 
of predictability of releasing funds to government ministries, departments, and agencies is 
undergirded by the poor cash management practices. The consequence of poor budget credibility 
logics is the reform credibility which is manifested in the poor to mediocre performance. 
In the following chapter the study provides a processual narrative of the reforms focusing on the 
conception of change, politics of accounting change, implementation actions and achievements, 
before discussing the implications of the analysis on the IPFM reform logics in Chapter 7. 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




6 A PROCESSUAL NARRATIVE OF GHANA PFM REFORMS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the study has mobilised the processual approach to provide an analytical description 
of the Ghana IPFM reforms, building on what has been presented in the previous chapters, 
especially in Chapter 4. I analyse the empirical data to provide a narrative that explains the various 
stages of the reforms including: the conception of the need for change (initiation); processes of 
organisational transition (implementation); and operation of new accounting practices and 
procedures (challenges, and the achievements (Dawson, 1994). Providing this evolutionary 
narrative is important to deepen the understanding of the causal explanation provided in Chapter 
5. In that chapter, the study analysed the conditions and properties of the reform based on the core 
category and the main categories derived empirically from the participants. 
The processual approach adopted in this chapter derives from the view of “society as a complex, 
multifaceted, fluid interplay of widely varying degrees and intensities of association and 
dissociation” (Buckley, 1967 pp.18) that impacts on accounting reforms. Dawson (1994) provided 
three general time frames for an empirical analysis of a largescale organisational change – 
representing the beginning, middling, and ending- namely:  
• The initiation or conception of change 
• Process of organisational transition    
• Operation of new practices and procedures.  
 
Figure 6.1 A Processual Framework of Ghana’s IPFM Reforms  
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In this chapter the study mobilises the Dawson’s processual framework in Fig 6.1 (above) to 
analyse: (i) the politics of accounting change in Ghana’s PFM reforms, (ii) the processes of 
implementation; and (iii) the new operations. We conclude this chapter out the implications of the 
analysis on the reform outcomes   
6.2 CONCEPTION OF CHANGE 
6.2.2 Design of the reforms  
During the first wave of the financial management reforms in Ghana in 1996 six months were set 
aside in the initial stages to produce the overall concept design of the reform programme 
(PUFMARP) and the Budget and Expenditure Management Systems (BPEMS). There had been 
an attempt to implement an ad hoc reform project, Expenditure Tracking Online (EXTRACON) 
dating back to 1991/92, which was in the Office of the President and found to be piecemeal. The 
new initiative, PUFMARP, however aimed to find comprehensive solutions to the problems that 
had bedevilled the systems for ages. EXTRACON was therefore jettisoned before it reached 
fruition, in anticipation of an implementation of a full enterprise resource planning system (ERPs). 
A participant G4 said: 
Okay. Let me say that the reforms are home grown. We thought that our financial 
management was not going right. … the first initiative even before BPEMs, something 
was being done at the Office of the President (called EXTRACON) and we said “no, that’s 
not it 
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For the new project (PUFMARP), one of the big four international accountancy consulting firms 
was selected through a competitive bidding process to spearhead its implementation. The initial 
design was followed by a detailed design, lasting another twelve months, carried out by a sizeable 
team of consultants that went to almost all the MDAs to uncover the roots of problems and to find 
solutions. Whilst there were slippages in concluding these studies, the effort was simply to ensure 
that there was a sound integration of government financial management systems that helped to 
address the business needs of government.  
Having a direct bearing on the achievement of the objectives of the reforms were the aspects such 
as the development of the legal and regulative framework, capacity building, development of 
manuals, development of the information strategy and systems for government, and a 
communication and change management strategy. In addition, the project was to address the issues 
with  the  organisational structure of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) that impacted on the 
management of the national budget, but  the wider organisational aspects  in the Government of 
Ghana were tabled to be addressed elsewhere within other reforms: viz, (i) the National 
Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) and (ii) the Civil Service Performance Improvement 
Programme (CSPIP) which run concurrently. Theoretically this should have worked well if co-
ordination was not a problem. However, each of these reform programmes was run by different 
central organisations headed by politically astute individuals who had direct political access to the 
Office of the President. This created a situation where each of the reforms was run autonomously 
without effective co-ordination amongst them.   
Within the IPFM reforms the central issue was how to accomplish data integration using suitable 
ERPs. The focus was to introduce ERPs that will support better financial data integration, promote 
transparency, and ensure effective management controls. The vexing issue of addressing obsolete 
accounting practices was not explicitly addressed, but it was assumed that introducing automated 
electronic systems would change the accounting procedures and ultimately accounting practices. 
This assumption proved to be false. For analytical purposes however, what is important is that this 
false assumption generated contradictory forces that fed into the accounting logics from the techno-
logics. ERPs promote the diffusion of a specific accounting logic (Heinzelmann,2017), but the 
value of ERPs would not be realised where this logic is contradicted by existing practices.  
The accounting system prior to the reforms had been compromised through over-centralization of 
the transactional and management control arrangements. In a semi- manual system bottlenecks had 
been created at the control points in processing government transactions and there were gridlocks 
in government payments. There was separation of duties that required that all government 
payments went through onerous verifications and counter-verifications by different officials. What 
should have deterred corruption, ended up creating more diversions and greater opportunities for 
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officials’ rent-seeking activities. A single transaction required thirteen signatures, and so it 
required various internal agents and the client (the government’s contractors) to physically follow 
transactions, which could be held up anywhere in the chain for no reason at all, to ensure that 
payments were made. That was the system then in the 1990s, but not very much seemed to have 
changed three decades on apart from passing legislation and the introduction of automated systems.  
In the pre-GIFMIS period government cheques had to be written and signed manually, and banking 
transactions had to be reconciled manually. There was a proliferation of government bank accounts 
in the central bank and the commercial banks, that made it almost impossible to reconcile the bank 
accounts to strike one government cash position. Cheques were written by the Treasury without 
knowing the government cash balance in the bank. In the earlier central bank practices, government 
cheques were not allowed to bounce and that meant that often government went into overdraft at 
the central bank, whilst it may have cash surpluses in the commercial banks (from collection of tax 
revenue for example) or even in “other accounts” at the central bank itself.   
The existing accounting logics at the beginning of the reforms required financial management re-
engineering to streamline the processes and procedures. But ERPs also have their own logics that 
require re-configuring of accounting procedures. Ultimately ERPs tend to support accounting 
colonisation of other functions (for example procurement, human resource management, project 
management, and capital asset management). In addition, it introduces new cultural devices 
including symbols, schemas, scripts, and classification systems. In situations where the ERP 
software has been written for the private sector, it would introduce market-logics that might not 
reflect the full business requirements of the public sector.   
The design also implicitly assumed diffusion of classifications, scripts, and schema (Scott, 1987) 
from central agencies (the MoF and the Controller and Accountant General’s department) to the 
line ministries. It did not allow for the possibility of translation by line ministries in a way that 
supported their business practices for each individual agency. All transactions were to be processed 
the same way and all reports to be prepared in the same way. For some of the line ministries (such 
as Health) that had advanced in-house financial management systems, their own systems 
potentially posed a threat to the implementation of the BPEMs, as a central system. But the most 
insidious competition to the BPEMS did not come from the line ministries but from within the 
champions of the reforms, Ministries of Finance and the Controller and Accountant General 
Department (CAGD). The slower implementation of BPEMs coupled with the initial success of 
the MTEF (as budget planning component of the reforms) required the adoption of a substitute 
software, Activate, developed partly in-house for budget preparing the budget. This software 
effectively displaced the adoption of BPEMs for over ten years. The threat that came from the 
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CAGD involved a legacy standalone software, ACCPAC, for preparing the consolidated fund 
accounts. The presence of this software enabled the CAGD to resist the adoption of the BPEMs.   
Another important element that introduced different interests and conflict were the international 
development agencies that partnered with the Government of Ghana to implement the systems. 
There were several contributing donors, and each tried to be identified with a separate component 
of the reform programme. This behaviour followed the need of each donor being able to make 
visible contributions and to be able to demonstrate their achievements to their home constituents. 
For example, the budget reforms went to the British, Audit to the European Union, and the 
Accounting and Budget integration to the GoG with the World Bank loans, and Fiscal 
Decentralization to Canada. The fragmentation of funding sources (logics of visible contribution) 
worked against the logics of integration.  
Overall, attempts were made to address some of these issues, but the discourses at the time did not 
extend to the identification of conflicting interests and contradictions and so most of the 
contradictions remained latent and not addressed. 
In the interviews, the question of the reform design was intentionally made open-ended. 
Participants were asked about how the project was designed, to enable participants to interpret it 
their own way. Design of reforms meant different things to different people, it therefore called 
forth a wide range of interpretations from participants, reflecting their levels of understanding of 
reforms and the lens they put on. As reflected in the recurring theme in these interviews, the 
participants saw the reforms in mostly technical ICT terms, with the objective of ‘data capture to 
create transparency’. This background echoes a participant’s assertion that the design was carried 
out by technical experts. The participant, G6, from the Ministry of Finance said:   
 When you say design, the design used qualified project financial persons in IT. 
Design could be at various levels: strategic design, tactical design, technical design, and 
operational design, aesthetic design, ergonomic design and so on. Strategic design objectives are 
key, but obviously they must be translated to the day-to-day working level in terms of technical 
and operational design. For example, for the NPM-type reforms initiated by Reagan and Thatcher, 
the strategic objective was to enable market forces in government to improve efficiency (or more 
generally to deliver value for money, and its recent equivalent, -best value). 
However, there were many responses from participants needing some interpretation. Most of the 
participants talked about technical design reflecting components of the PFM cycle. Participant G1 
reiterated the message that the design of the reforms was government-led.  
I would say it is government-led…, PEFA was considered in 2012... So, the bedrock or 
some of the issues, and even the project issues are – when we even did the midterm the 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




Bank said they’ll want to support us for us to do another PEFA this year. So, the PEFA 
issues were things – even about predictability and credibility, these are the key areas PEFA 
normally looks at. And that’s what we used in developing the PFMRP; and the components 
were also designed and developed by government. The budget credibility, IFMIS, the 
oversight and accountability, we look at the whole PFM cycle and look at what are the 
issues with each of the blocks in the cycle. If it’s about budget formulation and approval, 
if it’s about execution, if it’s about execution procurement, internal audit, if it’s about 
oversight, external, parliament, what should be done to enhance the system? So, the design 
is government-led. 
Participants narrowed design down to implementation design, and technology design. In the 
PUFMARP/BPEMS phase the implementation design and technology design focused mainly on 
one component (budget implementation). The Budget and Public Expenditure Management system 
(BPEMS) could not address the other remaining core components of the programme (budget 
preparation, accounting, cash management, aid and debt) in a satisfactory manner, despite making 
references to their modules and interface. Admittedly most of the components overlapped, but each 
required a separate set of activities to address their underlying accounting technologies. The 
documented evidence indicated that the BPEMS consultants focused on delivering the ERPs 
solution during the PUFMARP/BPEMS stage, which was orderly in the initial phases of the 
project, but once its completion delayed, it became unclear where the boundaries of each 
component’s activities started and ended. The ERPs implementation came to dictate the pace and 
performance of the reforms from that stage onwards.   
6.3 POLITICS OF ACCOUNTING CHANGE IN GHANA: IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
There are challenges in conflating international “best practices” with autochthonous systems in 
developing countries like Ghana. Legacies of post-colonial influences on national accounting and 
administrative systems are felt all over the developing world, but even more so in Ghana where 
earlier leadership attempted to overcome them. The singular aim of reforms has been to build 
transparent systems to improve accounting practices, adapt the existing ones, or transform them to 
make them more efficient and effective. Re-modelling accounting systems in LDCs present 
challenges analogous to modernisation of Japan, during the Meiji restoration in 1868 which they 
successfully implemented through adoption and adaption by blending borrowed ideas from other 
countries (Goldstone, 1991). 
While such high-level strategic issues are important, the politics of the IPFM reforms in Ghana 
extend to quotidian issues of co-ordination28 ); the nature and extend of MDAs’ involvement in the 
reforms, the engagement of functional (or domain) and technical experts; the payment of extra 
allowances to government staff involved in reforms, or for participating in reform workshops; and 
 
28 Coordination include decisions on who manages the reform secretariat, the tenure of the reform 
management staff in which organisation the reform secretariat is located 
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the intrinsic value of the technical content of the reforms. Some of these issues are rooted in the 
notion of reform ownership, others emanate from the low remuneration in the Ghanaian public 
service, societal issues, and the interests of politicians and senior government officials of reform.  
6.2.1. Initiation of Ghana IPFM 
The records show that the Public Expenditure Review Process of 1993 and 1994 informed the 
crafting of the initial reform policy. But the background of PFM reforms goes much further into 
the 1980’s after the economic, political meltdown in the 1970s. The conception of change was 
rooted in the ERP of 1983, which was advanced by the IMF reviews undertaken in 1986 and 1991 
following an invitation from the Government of Ghana (Premchand et al., 1986) that led to the 
PERs of 1993 and 1994. In more recent years, the reforms are conceived through strategic plans 
which are developed using formal tools based on PEFA reports29. An MoF official said:  
There were diagnoses. You know, we always have our public expenditure review; 
sometimes external, sometimes internal, we do it. Sometimes we do it through PEFA. All 
these things take place. 
Following the PERs of 1993, 1994, and 1995 that ushered in the initial PFM reforms in 1996, the 
PER 2009 led to the re-engineering and repackaging of BPEMS into the Ghana Integrated 
Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS). In terms of the chronology of the reforms, 
GIFMIS replaced PUFMARP in 2010, and the Public Financial Management Reforms Programme 
(PFMRP) as the latest wave of reforms started in 2015. The PFMRP built on the GIFMIS in 2015, 
and they all share the same components of broad reforms, with slight variations of the details. 
There are claims that the reform ideas came from internal sources leading to frequent references 
of homegrown solution. As a participant G6 said:  
The main ideas came right from the Ministry of Finance and Controller and Accountant 
General, I don’t want to go into the details of who did what”. “It’s alright, just leave it at 
that the main Ministry wrote up what they felt in terms of design, and it was taken up with 
the help of the World Bank to develop the project that supported the implementation, and 
they had co-financing, like I said, from all these other development partners, DFID was 
supporting the MTEF, Canada had some small amounts also, and so were other countries. 
Officials insisted that the reforms are homegrown, that the reforms were designed by Ghana 
Government as an umbrella programme christened as Public Financial Management Reform 
Program (PUFMARP). It started in 1995/96 from which sprang two separate major components 
covering budget and accounting reform. These were the Budget and Public Expenditure 
Management System (BPEMS) and the Medium-Term Expenditure Management (MTEF) 
reforms, respectively. The separate components that were identified to make the reforms 
 
29 The PEFA reports are based on PEFA assessments of which the first was undertaken for Ghana in 
2006/2007, and in total four undertaken by 2019 
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comprehensive included: (i) budget preparation; (ii) budget implementation; (iii)accounting; (iv) 
cash management (v) aid and debt management; (vi)revenue; (vii) public procurement; (viii) 
auditing (Technical Annex-WB, 1996). Some of these components overlapped, but the 
development partners (DPs) ‘carved’ the reform space, choosing components in order to influence 
development policy depending on their preferences (Canada International Development Agency 
(CIDA)– Fiscal decentralization; European Union (EU)- External Audit; UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID)- Planning and Budgeting).   
The government sought to computerise the accounting system by implementing a government-
wide ERPs for budget planning, budget preparation, budget execution, and financial/fiscal 
reporting, and audit. 
6.3.1 Indiscriminate one-size fits all reforms 
The politics of reform has been influenced by indiscriminate one-size-fits all advice that emerged 
from the international financial institutions. The solutions the IFIs proffer to LDCs tend to reflect 
the home background of their staff and consultants, especially the disposition of the French 
working through the IMF mechanisms to influence Africa governments (Lassou et al, 2019; Lassou 
and Hopper, 2016). The approach of the IFIS therefore have tended to ignore specific country 
context, and a genuine quest for these countries to find rationalised solutions to their problems. For 
example, the idea of Ghana establishing a special court to prosecute official malfeasance was 
proposed by the IFIs and rejected. There had been also a proposal to implement an organic budget 
law (another Francophonic idea) suggested by the IMF. An MoF participant, G1, said: 
The PFM Act started through the strategy of GIFMIS. Because under GIFMIS, we had a 
consultant to review all our legislation, then do it within international best practice and 
come out with recommendations. And the recommendation was for us to have …. organic 
budget law, but later it became a PFM Act. …. So last year we had, even, IMF to help us. 
The usual line of influence is through the IMF’s consultants cum staff making ‘impartial’ 
suggestions to the government. During implementation, the strategies and plans were converted 
into concepts notes submitted by the Minister of Finance for the Cabinet’s approval. Proposals are 
submitted to the Cabinet [and sometimes to Parliament] in a package as part of conditionalities 
that must be met before a loan agreement of the World Bank would be signed. The formal Cabinet 
approval is taken as a signal by the IFIs of the government’s commitment to implement the 
proposed plans. As a senior MoF official (E1) explains:  
Yes, it has. Even during the GIFMIS era – in any case, always, before we even embark on 
these reforms there is a concept note to seek the consent of Cabinet, not only our minister. 
Even when we were moving to GIFMIS and to program based, there was a concept note 
that was prepared and submitted to Cabinet. With this new project that we were doing, the 
same thing happened and even [the then] minister and the chief director and director of 
budgeting and the controller had to travel to Washington for – [for discussions and 
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approval]. So, we have the commitment. Then you can see that even with the changeover, 
our new minister is always talking about the PFM Act and all these things…. 
The PFM reforms development processes in Ghana therefore results in the adoption of solutions 
that are heavily influenced by the IFIs and international development agencies directly and 
indirectly through inputs from international consultants.   
6.3.2 International development partners crowding the PFM reform agenda 
The PFM reform agenda are often crowded by the World Bank and the development partners with 
related but different agenda such as procurement reforms. WB’s procurement guidelines are 
suspicious of the high incidence of corruption in developing countries like Ghana, making loans 
disbursement often slow and rigid, perhaps for good reasons. But there is also a power play behind 
the hegemonic influences of international organisations who placed procurement legislation high 
on the agenda of PFM reforms. The first legislative change in the Ghana IPFM reforms was the 
Procurement Act 2003, which was revised in 2016. Participant G6 confirmed the changes in the 
procurement laws that has essentially left everything the same: 
Yes, the public procurement act has been revised, in fact it’s no longer called even a Board, 
it’s an Authourity  now, it was revised because some of the schedules for handling 
procurement were too small, and because of the size of procurement and so yes, revised, 
but the idea is to remain the same, to ensure that procurement are transparent, or that the 
procurement procedures are clear enough when they are tendering,…. 
Inasmuch as procurement reforms are important, when coupled with PFM reforms, it tends to 
crowd the latter’s agenda and detract from it. Whilst a lot of effort has gone into passing laws, it 
seems that it has been easier than bringing about reforms in the sense of fundamental changes in 
practice. 
6.3.3 The carving-up of the IPFM reforms space and the reforms’ performance narrative 
by the international development partners 
International development agencies (such as the WB, DFID, DANIDA, EU) carved-up the reform 
pie without paying attention to the needs of systems integration: An unintended consequence is 
that major reform components are implemented in parallel, coordinated by a secretariat operating 
within given resource constraints and bounded rationality. The PUFMARP, for example, was 
impacted by the design to implement several reform components in parallel, influenced by 
individual donor funding requirement. The institutionalised logics of development agencies is to 
be seen to have made direct demonstrable contribution, and the same time be accountable to their 
home constituents. Often this carving-up is done behind the scenes, especially in negotiations and 
informal agreements between donors who attempt to not get in the way of each other. In each 
country there is a lead-donor to coordinate these arrangements, depending on who exercises greater 
hegemonic influences. In Ghana, these arrangements allowed the WB to give loans to support the 
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techno-systems approach without getting in the way of the DFID or EU (see Lassou et al, 2019; 
Lassou and Hopper, 2016). This phenomenon was highlighted by a participant, G6, in a convoluted 
manner:  
Then on that, the World Bank, the other aspects, the accounting path and the [i.e. 
integration] of allocation and reporting was to be dealt with, so the budget aspect was 
going on a parallel line with the accounting and reporting, and so that was probably the 
first flaw…   
This participant was arguing that there were negative consequences on the reform from the rapid 
progress of the budget reforms (based on the MTEF implementation) without the accompanying 
progress in BPEMs (the financial management, accounting and reporting automation) supported 
with a World Bank loan. She was observing that there was a flaw in the project’s implementation 
design. That, the designers expected different government officials and departments to handle the 
budget reforms (from the MoF) and the budget execution (integration of allocation and reporting- 
by the Accountant General’s department). These reform activities were to happen in parallel 
because they were supposed to be performed by different agencies and departments. But when 
rapid progress occurred in budget preparation alone, without the budget execution and accounting 
modules, the overall momentum of the reforms was lost.   
This argument is valid to an extent. This view has been echoed by other participants. Firstly, once 
the budget preparation component was improved, it had to be accompanied by improvements in 
budget implementation30. But when this could not happen because of delays in implementing 
BPEMs, it held back the overall budget improvements drive.  
The counterview was that remedial steps were taken to maintain the momentum of the reforms by 
procuring an alternative software, Activate, that was procured as a temporary solution. This 
temporary software became institutionalised in Ghana and eventually ended up displacing the 
BPEMs for more than 15 years. Secondly, there was some evidence that the design of the BPEMs 
was in itself flawed by trying to computerise the existing system, as it was, without sufficiently re-
engineering the budget execution processes that continued to refer to ‘allocation of cash’ and other 
practices that were to be changed to accommodate the results-based system under the MTEF. 
Thirdly it was counter-productive for government to desire an integrated solution yet design 
implementation plan that reinforced the existing line of separation between the budget and 
accounting functions in government. This was a problem that a senior CAGD official at the time 
commented on lamenting that the accounting class perceived the PFM reforms only as in budgets 
 
30 Implementation of the budget was what Participant G6 meant by ‘allocation and reporting’- a function 
that was to be performed using BPEMs automated system 
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terms that resided in the MoF, making it difficult for them to relate to it. Observing the re-birth of 
the reforms in 2009 from the moribund BPEMs, participant G4 observed: 
BPEMs... we thought it was time to rehash it and because people were looking at it as 
budget, budget, people didn’t really relate to it, so people thought it is something about 
Ministry of Finance, so we said let’s look at the globe and see what, is there any better 
way or something which may bring the project back home instead of them seeing it as 
something happening at the Ministry of Finance. It was when it was a budget, they say ‘oh 
it’s Ministry of Finance, it has nothing to do with us.’ So, we introduced the Integrated 
Financial Management Information System and be done in Ghana, we prefixed it with 
Ghana, so we called it GIFMIS, Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information 
System. And so now we were going to the people say ‘no, it’s about your financial 
management, it’s not about Ministry of Finance, it’s about you yourself’. 
The narrative usually provided by the international development partners on PFM reforms’ 
performance was often negative but couched in a language that there was some progress, followed 
by a list of remaining challenges to address. Where local participants did not see progress, that 
appeared patronizing. Sometimes they erred on the side of caution by over-compensating, and 
hardly getting the narrative right or even acknowledging their role in the poor outcomes.  
Participant G4 observed that:  
These international communities they’re also part of our problems, they ran to the press 
too much, literally. At a point in time I was hearing oh Ghana, GIFMIS now is so and so, 
and so and so. 
 Running reform components’ activities simultaneously arose when the reforms were divided up 
between different sponsors. In a situation where human resource capacity was limited coordination 
became more challenging than it would have been.  
6.3.4 Slow moving reform components were hindered by faster moving components 
There was a complex set of interrelations between reform components, that was not considered 
and addressed, partly because of the disparate funding sources. The implementation of the 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) was funded by a nimble sponsor, who appeared 
to understand the social and political context and were prepared to experiment with new ways of 
working in the LDCs31. They supported the government to take risks within well prescribed 
safeguards, making it possible to gain the immediate attention of senior officials in the MoF and 
within the wider government. Compared to the lugubrious and bumpy BPEMs (funded with the 
World Bank loans), the MTEF made rapid initial advances in its implementation and quickly 
 
31 DFID (ODA at the time) provided the flexibility in funding and procurement to support the 
implementation of the MTEF  
 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




dominated the PUFMARP’s overall implementation space. However, it resulted in preparing the 
budget on an improved basis that could not be implemented on an improved platform.  
6.3.5 The conflicting public sector budget reform approaches.  
Scholars have argued that the line-item budgeting (traditionally called incremental budgeting) 
cannot co-exist with activity-based budgeting and programme- based budgeting (ABB/ PBB) 
(Wildavsky ,1978). They have argued that the line-item budgeting is so robust and easier to operate 
it would displace any half-hearted attempt to replace it with other budgeting systems. This 
theoretical insight is consistent with what had happened in the Ghanaian case where a partial 
attempt was made to implement activity-based budgeting system that has recently been replaced 
by a half-hearted attempt to introduce a programme budgeting approach. An MOF participant, G2, 
noted that as against the official assertion that the Ghana Government was operating programme- 
based budgeting, he said:   
...the programme-based budgeting now is not being implemented in Ghana. That is my 
opinion, [others in the MoF] will disagree with me. What we have done is just to change 
the budgeting format, the presentation, … from activity-based to programme-based, just 
to report on programmes and then it just indicates there are some output indicators and 
then some measurements; because when you are applying for banks, they just apply for 
funds just like activity-based [before using line items] 
The past efforts and resources that went into the reforms made it difficult for some of the senior 
officials in the MoF to openly admit that after over two decades of reforms the line item still 
prevailed in Ghana.  
6.3.6 Reform ownership politics 
The notion of ownership of the Ghana IPFM reforms raises several intertwined issues that are 
complex to fully address within the limited scope of this research. In PFM reforms ownership 
extends from political ownership to professional ownership to the general polity, and that is linked 
to transitioning the reform between political administration. The issue with political ownership is 
that it changes with changes in political administrations, and with the recent improvements in 
democratic elections in Ghana there has been political changes from one of the dominant political 
parties to another in 2001, 2009, and 2017. What happened in Ghana was that the reforms were 
well under way, albeit with difficulties and the change in government in 2001 brought it to a 
standstill. As participant, G6, a retired official from the MoF narrated: 
Yeah, and so it took time for them to learn the ropes of what was happening. For the new 
administration to understand the systems, that were being operationalised for them to take 
over…. there was some revision, I know they had these consultancies to review what was 
happening already. And so, the lag also contributed to in a longer lag in implementation 
of the programme, but in fact they believed also in the programme”. 
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The change in government from NDC to NPP in 2001 did not stop the reforms, but it brought the 
main thrust to a standstill, as participant G4 from the Ghana Audit service explained:  
There is a bit of problem with ownership. What happens in Ghana is the ownership changes 
with political changes, whereas this was realised and done in one regime, when the next 
regime comes it is lost completely to us. That is the problem we have. You see when 
BPEMs was ongoing I think things were moving pretty well until there was a change in 
government from NDC to NPP and almost everything which was done was rubbished and 
we made sure it deteriorated for a long while before saying now let’s do a new reform so 
that we can attribute it to ourselves. So, what I’m trying to say is that the ownership is 
becoming political instead of a national ownership, which would transcend any 
government, so that is the problem. And so NDC started it, let’s call it somewhere in 1999 
and that, you know, NDC came back in 2008, so around 2009 they started it again from 
BPEMs, they didn’t want the BPEMs anymore, they said they wanted GIFMIS, which I 
think the name was fantastic and the initiative was fantastic but it didn’t take off as quickly 
as we would have expected because what people wanted was to show that the old initiative 
had died …. 
This interesting point partly explains why progress in the reforms has been slow. This is supported 
further by the observation that political parties in Ghana are mostly interested in reforms when 
they are in opposition, which they soon forget when they get into power. This point resonates with 
that made by another key participant who observed that the new administration in 2001 needed to 
undertake reviews of the status of reforms before re-starting it. Then came again a change in 
government in January 2017, where unlike the past years, the new administration has been quick 
in adopting the existing programme, as participant G4 said: 
So, I know very soon when the current administration realises the importance of PFM 
reform of course, fortunately the current minister really understands, I’m surprised at him 
though, because he has been a private sector person for all his work and I was thinking it 
will be difficult to get this man to appreciate where we should go. He really appreciates 
the issues and gives it so much importance…. 
Addressing ownership issues resulted in actions some of which have had unintended consequences 
on the reforms. Such actions include: (i) Rejecting the model of appointing of consultants (albeit 
Ghanaians) to co-ordinate and manage the reform in preference to civil servants, (ii) Distinction 
between IT-technical staff and functional (or domain staff) and providing the functional support 
staff from the civil service; (iii) re-locating the reform secretariat in the CAGD instead of the MoF. 
Issues 1 and 2 are considered as mainstreaming of the reforms in the civil service. The original 
design of the reforms was formulated to enable consultants to bring in knowledge and skills that 
were lacking in government. But it caused problems as civil servants viewed the reform secretariat 
with suspicion, something that was further exacerbated by the fundamental differences in the 
remuneration level of civil servants and consultants. It was therefore no wonder that plans were 
made to engage civil servants as consultants (even when some of them were not up to the tasks). 
Participant G2 said: 
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And so, the ownership issue became a problem because like the reforms belonged to the 
consultants. So, the mainstreaming of the reforms has been a challenge. In fact, there were 
plans to take another set of young officers who were slightly below the directors, train 
them for them to be consultants for let’s say 3 years and then go back to serve the 
government. But one of the reforms, the Fiscal Decentralization Unit, tried that, in fact 
they got officers, one from Budget, one from Local Government and another from the 
CAGD, who went out of their payroll and became consultants for about 3 years and then 
came back. 
The final evolution of that scheme ended in centring all the components under GIFMIS in the 
reform Secretariat in the CAGD and appointing CAGD officers to coordinate the reform efforts. 
Participant (G2) concludes with the affirmation of lesson learning: “So when the reforms were 
relaunched as GIFMIS, they learned from this experience of ownership…” 
Regarding the location of the secretariat: There had been a prolonged uncertainty about the ideal 
home for PFM reform coordination, which has resulted in oscillating the centre of the reforms 
between the MoF and the CAGD. The conflict on the ideal location of the reform secretariat, and 
the desire to relocate it from the MoF to the CAGD goes back to the initial stages of the reform in 
1996/7. The reforms have at various times been branded as solely budget reforms (under 
PUFMARP), accounting computerisation (under GIFMIS), and now as general all-encompassing 
reforms (PFMRP). Ghana PFM reforms were labelled as GIFMIS for about five years (from 2010 
to 2015) and the secretariat was moved from the MoF to the CAGD offices. This move therefore 
highlighting just the implementation of the computerisation in exclusion of all the other reforms 
activities. The reforms were rebranded PFMRP in 2015 to correct this shortcoming: Participant 
G17 from the Ghana Audit Service said: 
Ministry of Finance decided to champion it, champion the reform, and make it the centre 
...so that all MDAs will feel part of it and know that it’s for them as well. So that’s even 
the reason for the change of the new form, GIFMIS [ to PFMRP]. Because the whole 
thinking was GIFMIS, it is an accounting system. It was losing its focus as a public 
financial management system that has GRA (Ghana Revenue Authourity) in mind, that 
has Public Services Commission in mind, as in HRMIS, that have Ministry of Finance 
budget in it. 
Housing the reform secretariat has been a problem and that is rooted in question of ownership. 
Under PUFMARP the housing of the reforms in the MoF and the earlier reform gains made by the 
MTEF component to it being type casted as budget reforms, for which the accounting staff could 
not relate. It’s rebranding to GIFMIS was supported by moving the secretariat to the Controller 
and Accountant General’s department 
This is relevant point as it appears that centralising the reforms have caused ownership problems 
in the MDAs. The PFMRP location in the CAGD continues to raise issues about commitment and 
so on. If the MoF is championing it, then locating the secretariat at least in the MoF is where the 
reforms should go, but it has not reached there yet. The reforms coordination is located and 
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controlled by CAGD staff, making it appear to be about accounting solely. In the CAGD there has 
been rapidly changing project management staff. Housing the integrated financial management 
reforms secretariat in the CAGD raises some issue: At the time of conducting the research 
interviews, there had been rapid changes in the project director role, as noted by participant G4:  
That’s why. See, they’ve been in office for less than ten months and I don’t think it is 
necessarily a political idea but people within it who don’t buy the concept think it is a unit 
of accountant general where you can just change people, which I find ridiculous. So that’s 
why I’m saying that within ten months there were three heads of the place, which is not 
going to help, so the leadership keeps dancing. 
Currently while the reforms are being championed from the MoF, the secretariat continued to be 
in the offices of the Accountant General (CAGD) and the secretariat staff, responsible for the 
project co-ordination, are drawn from the CAGD.  
6.3.7 Commitment by officials to implement reforms as a key constraint 
The PFM reforms have clearly identified fundamental issues the MoF aims to address in successive 
strategy documents. During implementation, questions arose whether there was the political 
commitment to address these challenges.  As participant G11 observed: 
 Are we getting that commitment to work towards the attainment of the objectives that 
meet those fundamental problems? Sometimes you look at previous happenings and it 
informs you a lot. Any time we sign on to any programme or project, we do so well, all 
our indicators improve, the project ends, the IMF or World Bank goes away and turns back 
to the worse situation. They come in again, I'm talking about our history…. 
Commitment pledges are made in official documents and in public statements, but most of these 
statements have proven to be empty rhetoric in Ghana. This resonates with the public statement 
issued by a senior politician in Ghana that it would not serve the interest of politicians to change 
the poor accountability regime in the country32. Commitment to implement reforms can be both 
vague and ephemeral. It can mean anything, including promises made today and taken away 
tomorrow. Scholars have pointed out that manipulation may occur, and officials’ public utterances 
may not correspond to their private behaviour (Oliver,1991). 
 To demonstrate how vague commitment can be, the same participant, G11, observed: 
Yeah. So that commitment level is there, people are doing what they can do… does it? 
Another participant G6 said almost the same thing in a different wat: 
 There’s commitment from beginning, every government that came in knew that there is 
something to be done with our financial management system, so there was commitment, 
 
32 The XYZ News reported in 2013 that “a former Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, Albert 
Kan Dapaah, has stated that politician can’t change the poor accountability regime in the country because 
they lack the will and fortitude to make such contributions” He was quoted as saying: “Everybody is happy 
with the system as it is the people who are practicing it are apparently happy with the system “ 
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but the road to achieving the commitment is a different thing because we’re not the only 
player in there. 
Commitment is hydra-headed in the public sector; it requires the concurrence of myriad principal 
actors at both political and technical officers’ level for reforms to operate well. Participant G7, 
from the MoF declared: 
 So, you could see that once you get the political backing and get a technical officer’s 
backing you are in business. So, in the reform, public reform, if you don’t get the political 
backing or the political will and you don’t get the technical officers also backing and 
providing their capacity and skills, you won’t go anywhere. 
How do you get the backing? How genuine is the backing even when granted top-down? 
At both the political and technical levels, it requires the collective thought of a like-minded group 
for reforms to perform well. Success of reforms cannot depend on just an individual politician or 
an individual senior officer on a crusade.   
6.3.8 Politics of manipulations  
The reforms have had steering committee meetings as fora for championing the planned 
improvements across government. In the PUFMARP reform the steering committee had some 
donors as members, and that made the meetings the forum for impression management and public 
relations by the Chairman (the Deputy Minister-MoF) to impress donors, rather than use those 
meetings for removing reform roadblocks and bottlenecks. Rituals and symbolic performance were 
substituted for technical performance in the PUFMARP steering committee, when the Chairperson 
took decisions that could not be implemented: Participant G26 who partook in the steering 
committee deliberations observed:  
There was a steering committee which was setup. With one, the minister being the overall 
head, and with the Controller being the deputy. But you still found out that decisions taken 
at the steering committee level were not easily implemented, because of this underlying 
issue that sometimes for courtesy sake or in order not to prolong various discussions some 
decisions were made but because of ownership they were difficult to implement. 
That is, whilst the MoF presided over the reforms it could not carry the other government agencies, 
especially the CADG wholeheartedly with them. The frontal assault that was mounted by the 
accountant general at the initial phase of the PUFMARP reforms was replaced with politics of 
manipulation in the course of time, and that made progress harder to accomplish. 
6.3.9 The politics of politicisation of civil servants 
Reflecting on the politicisation of the civil service from a memorandum written by the researcher 
after an interview with a participant who choose to speak off-record. The participant observed that, 
with a very few exceptions, the MOF civil servants had been politicised at the most senior levels.  
Her office driver asked her whether they should be getting ready to attend a week-end retreat with 
the ruling party. Public officials always seek political direction, as participant, G11, from the MoF 
commented:  
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No, it's our culture, which is family orientated, political, everything's politicised, our 
family systems and it's just, in fact, seriously, I think the reforms are good, we are looking 
at technical problems, we are solving it through technology, IT, integrated financial 
management systems, human resource management, Hyperion, we are doing this, we are 
doing this, we are doing that, we are looking at some institutional arrangement, let's create 
a PFM RP, let's create this, let's create this, let's change this, let's do this, but in the end the 
same human beings… who did the reforms in the independence are those who are here 
doing the reforms now. 
Politicising the civil service with political appointees at all levels means that political loyalty is 
more important than professionalism.  
6.3.10 Discriminatory enforcement of rules and regulations and informality 
Participants alluded to a culture of impunity that did not pay sufficient attention to what matters 
most, resulting in misplaced priorities and flagrant violation of the laws. Some areas came under 
scrutiny by participants, all bordering on discriminatory practices in observing norms and in the 
enforcement of laws and regulations. For example, on the willingness to enforce sanction where it 
matters most, such as in applying the newly passed PFM Act 2016, participant G15 said: 
 I think people are beginning to realize that, no, this is something we have to be serious 
about.  
By inference people do not pay much attention to the observance of norms in Ghanaian society, 
and enforcement of laws are done on discriminatory basis (according to political circumstances, 
wealth, and class). The politics of social acceptance and tolerance of “discriminatory behaviour” 
in the Ghanaian society generate informality and selective implementation of the rules and 
regulations. 
The excessive use of informal processes in the management of the budget, running alongside the 
formal process is one of the many areas where the reform actions have not been able to address. 
Dating back to 1998, an internal government evaluation of the MoF found that it’s policies and 
activities were centred around few individuals, therefore making it difficult to distinguish between 
official policy positions from the sentiments of those individuals (CSPIP Diagnostic Workshop on 
MoF, 1998 pp5). Participant G15, from the MoF, suggested that informality could be addressed 
through enforcement of the PFM Acts as per his comment:  
…the issue about the institutionalisation with regards to informality and formality, yes, 
it’s a very important issue. But, again, the way the new law has been crafted, it’s crafted 
in a way that should I say, it has – if you want, codified the processes that we have to go 
through. It’s in the law. Processes we have to go through to ensure that ultimately the 
budget will address some of these problems.  
This comment demonstrated impression management or wishful thinking on this participant’s part, 
as it seemed far-fetched how the codification of processes by law would solve the problems of 
informality in the budget (and PFM) system in Ghana. The problem in Ghana, like other 
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developing countries, is not about the absence of the law, but its’ selective enforcement. It is 
particularly difficult for anyone to rely on the law when at the heart of the problems are the few 
individuals who wield the power to bend official policies and the enforcements of the law around 
their personal wishes.  
6.3.11 Increasing the stakes to circumvent official procedures  
Improving controls without addressing fundamental issues increases the incentive to defeat the 
system by working around it. Participant G2 observed:  
Yes, let me give you a story. I think about 3 years ago, one of my friends came and said 
he has an issue with his employment. He used to work for NADMO [National Disaster 
Management Organisation] as a clerk and... No, as a labourer but he got a job as a pupil 
teacher in the village, which is better, I mean in terms of salaries he has a condition of 
service. So, he decided to take the appointment as a pupil teacher. Meanwhile he had taken 
the biometric registration at NADMO and he was being paid through their system every 
month and because the validation service, when you are employed, it takes a very long 
time before your salary [is paid].So this guy was still collecting his salary, NADMO salary 
and he had started teaching so when he came to do the biometric registration to enable him 
receive his pay as a teacher, already in the system, he pressed his thumb on it and the 
system rejected it and then all his records were pulled, the appointment letter date as a 
pupil teacher and the salaries that he was receiving from NADMO were all thrown up and 
so he was supposed to pay 9,000 cedis before, I mean he... [Laughs] Yeah, so it was a 
refund, so you have to refund, you have to go for a loan, refunded all the 9,000 before he 
was accepted as a teacher. So that is the reforms that have gone on......and so it is only the 
legitimate employees that are paid, and then you realise that are some people without social 
security, so last year, I don’t know whether you heard... 
The significance of this narrative is that the inefficiencies in the system provide incentives to by-
pass controls. For example, the late processing of payment to new employees compels people to 
deploy various means to work around the system. Thus, the system has its own in-build incentives 
to encourage fraud of all kinds. It also points to the constant trade-of between efficiency in controls 
and efficiency in operations.  
More generally the over-use of controls can lead to abuse and paralysis. The observation of a 
participant (below) made references to hierarchies of approval which are reminiscent of the ‘old 
bad days’, noted in the PER 1993 and 1994, when nothing much happened beyond spending the 
budget funds which arrived in an untimely manner and therefore did not achieve the desired results. 
Participant G15 from MoF said:  
Yes, there is, there is improvements in controls, a lot of improvements in controls. A lot 
of improvement in controls. For instance, before your projects enters the budget it should 
be coded, so you have a code in there, and within the systems that we use there is a set-up 
at the hierarchical structure on how the controls go. You bring your request, maybe it ends 
up with the Director of Budget who then sends it to the notification of the schedule officer 
to work on so, you know, there are controls set up in the system aside that, like I mentioned 
earlier now you cannot spend something outside what is on the GIFMIS platform, unless 
you get people to do something. Then even with the coming into force of the PFM Act, 
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even before the law there were processes that you need to adhere to which are also to make 
sure that MDA comply. For instance, minister of education, GES cannot on their own 
apply for the release of funds to them without going through the sector minister…. 
yes.…these are some of the controls. In the budget process there are certain things that we 
have to go to Cabinet for approval, yeah there are certain things, so all these controls, 
mechanisms have a certain place and there are, you know, checks and balances to make 
sure there’s compliance. 
Notwithstanding the accounts of improvements in controls given by this participant, it appeared 
that the references to coding of projects, ministerial approvals, and cabinet approvals as evidence 
in improvements in controls are superficial. Nothing much has changed, with the automation of 
the financial management systems. In a biblical parlance, Ghana’s PFM reforms is like putting 
new wine into an old-wine skin. 
6.3.12 Automating central controls  
Automation has given total control to the MoF, which can be both positive and negative. The logics 
of the new technologies empowers the central agencies, the MoF and the CAGD to exercise greater 
control than before, as a participant G9 explained:  
The impact is heavy. The impact is heavy in a sense that now, Ministry of Finance can sit 
here and say, okay, we’re shutting down the system, nobody is going to disburse. 
Government can decide that funds flow, it’s terrible and therefore the whole financial 
system…, we’re going this way. That is huge impact. Hitherto, we didn’t have that control, 
so people were still doing their own thing. 
In a country of general non-compliance attitude, automating controls could be beneficial. On the 
other hand, the negative effect of excessive controls cannot be overlooked.   
6.3.13 Connectivity challenges and enforcement of protocols 
The focus of the new accounting technology, GIFMIS is mainly to enforce central controls and 
meeting the requirements of central agencies, such as preparing the accounts. The design of the 
new technologies from the beginning neglected to support sectoral business operations in the 
MDAs, and inasmuch as some efforts have been made recently to address this issue, it remains the 
biggest shortcoming of the automation design. Related to this is the challenges of connectivity that 
impedes enforcement of protocols and standards to achieve integration at the sectors level. In ICT 
terms, one of the key objectives of the automated system was to achieve integration within sectors 
and in the whole of government. In situations where users at the lower-level units refuse or are 
unable to use the system for all transactions, integration becomes difficult to achieve.  
A participant at the sector level (one of the larger ministries with a geographical spread across the 
country) argued that at their headquarters in Accra, they need to be able control the operation of 
their information systems in order to perform the strategic role as a central nerve centre of the 
ministry. Being in control means that they could address operational challenges, knowing the types 
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of operational risks they could address themselves at every level, and which one they would refer 
to somebody else, either internally or externally for resolution. With extended operations across 
the country, systems integration requires that widely spread ministries (such as Health and 
Education) are enabled to enforce standard protocol and processes according to the organisational 
rules and timelines. The participant argued that where for some reason standard protocols and 
processes fail, the ministry’s management need to take action to get the system moving. This 
responsibility could not be assigned to another organisation without diluting the ministries 
accountability responsibility.  Participant G13 explained:  
Let me give just a very, very simple one. We are integrated so we must be connected, and 
you are not connected. You are not getting connectivity. So definitely everything they are 
talking about that would help improve this integration and efficiency would not happen. 
You may have to go back and take the paper because you are not connected. There is no 
connectivity that would link you up for the purpose of [integration]. So that’s just one 
example. So, it becomes difficult for you as an individual or a unit or a head. That decision 
sometimes is high above.  
‘Going back to take paper’ means that integration cannot be achieved in ICT terms. Symbolically 
‘going back to take paper’ means that other funds are being managed outside of the official 
GIFMIS systems. At the heart of the matter is the quality of management relationship within the 
sectors, and between sectors and the central agency (MoF).  These factors call for cohesion and 
trust, between government organisations based on logics. The underlying cooperation, conflict, 
and tensions, both technically and politically, between the MoF and the sector ministries is an 
integral part of this thesis which we examine further using the theoretical framework of 
institutional logics. We argue that the designers   and the implementers of the centralized reforms 
and systems assumed a monolithic governmental organisation without tensions and conflicts, 
therefore did not address the specific operational needs of the specific ministries (and the acting 
units within them). 
6.3.14 Software license fees 
The politics of the reform extends to the cost and benefits of either buying a software package or 
developing and running one in-house. For a developing country, like Ghana, the benefits of in-
house development include: (i) the avoidance in making large payments in license fees to a foreign 
company (in foreign currency), and (ii) the added advantage of the government’s using the new 
technologies to spawn local IT-related industries, bridging the international digital divide, and 
creating local employment. The downside on the other hand, include: (i) the potential risk of not 
finding sufficiently qualified local expertise to develop the system, and (ii) the potential cost of a 
total failure of the project to meet the requirements of government. Both in-house and external 
sourced software package have risks and benefits, but in Ghana it was decided in 1998/99 to source 
an enterprise resource planning (ERPs) externally for the PFM system. Buying the software means 
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that you own it, but the service costs can be high, so some countries have decided to develop in-
house programmes. As participant G10 explains: 
Licensing is the service. It’s like buying a vehicle. You’ve bought the vehicle from an 
authorized dealer, you own it, but the vehicle needs to be serviced. So, you can choose to 
go to the one you bought it from to service it or you can decide not to service the vehicle 
at all and use it – find whatever you can do to use your vehicle. That doesn’t take away 
your ownership of the car. 
So, if the software licensing…. and they say we don’t have money to renew the license 
and support agreement that doesn’t mean we cannot use the software. We will use it. We’re 
not in the cloud, we’re on-premises.  
Government of Ghana may own the software 100% but meeting the cost of license fee can be a 
problem. The full exploration of this topic will take us outside the scope of this research, but this 
discussion took place to clarify a point that was brought to the researcher’s attention that on 
occasions Ghana is not able to pay the license fees. In the past there has been an accumulation of 
license fees that potentially could have undermined the running and maintenance of the software. 
Possibility of forfeiting the maintenance agreement for non-payment of crippling license fee has 
implications for the long-term viability of such projects, especially when there is a downturn in the 
economy for instance. As another participant, G9, in the MoF said:  
 We can say yes, there’s a faraway company providing services to the government of 
Ghana. We can continue with that business but it’s huge. And I think that, one; government 
must have full control of its software which, of course, we can have. But for the license, 
that you’re owing licensing fees, sometimes it becomes embarrassing. 
The GoG has been known to not being able to meet local electricity and other utility service cost 
(such as water and telephones) in the past, especially at the district level. But this time the service 
provider is an external company, who are more likely to enforce the contractual terms, and possibly 
grinding government operations to a halt for not paying license fee. An MoF participant said: 
So, you look at it this way, you look at it that way, they’re all a little bad. But who has to 
talk about them? We have to feel it or maybe we have to wait for that time for the calamity 
to happen then we will really appreciate and understand it. 
The strategic consideration is far-reaching, and different countries in Africa have approach this 
issue in different ways. However, countries contracting World Bank loans have had to abide by 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) guidelines and often do not have the choice but to open-up 
their procurement to international competition when the threshold is exceeded. Some scholars have 
pointed out the hegemonic influences on public sector software acquisition in LDCs, especially in 
Francophone Africa (Lassou and Hopper, 2016), but for our purpose in addition to the political 
dimension we consider it as one of the routes through which accounting technologies emerge and 
are maintained in LDCs. 
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6.3.15 Fear of reform fatigue 
Though none of the participants talked directly about reform fatigue there was evidence that 
officials were becoming weary of reform consultants and preferred to carry out their routine and 
non-routine activities without consultants. An MoF official, G7, avers:  
But if you take the budget component, we drove it from here, we are driving it, we didn’t 
get any consultant. 
The statement above shows how much pride GoG officials attach to doing things themselves 
without consulting intervention, thus providing indirect evidence of both consultants and reform 
fatigue. Loading the IPFM with reform components can be detrimental to reforms outcomes 
because it overburdens government staff and results in extra workload, especially when operational 
staff do not perceive that it is solving their problems embedded in day-to-day tasks. The rhetoric 
of the reforms (efficiency, transparency, and accountability) had not matched the actual practices; 
and that made sustaining the reform massage difficult to carry across. Certainly, if the lull in the 
PFM reform activities between 2001 and 2009 was to be explained, it was probably a result of 
reform fatigue. Summing up the impact of over two decades of budget reforms, participant G20 
noted:  
….to be honest with you the budgeting process – the national one is laborious. It’s not 
exciting and at the end of the day you do all the budgeting and can be sure that you don’t 
get virtually anything. So, the incentive to even do it well is not there. 
In this way the participant expressed the tedium associated with going through the formal process 
of preparing a budget that is never implemented as intended. But also, in this message he conveyed 
a professional, and perhaps a personal, disappointment of the missed opportunities in the 
successive reforms to make things work better.  
6.4 TRANSITION: IMPLEMENTING THE IPFM REFORMS 
6.4.1 Implementing reform tasks and activities 
Under three waves of PFM reforms (PUFMARP/BPEMs (1996-2001), GIFMIS (2010-2014), and 
PFMRP (2015-2018)) each has been based on developing strategic and action plans as the first 
step in the implementation process. There was a long lull between 2001 to 2009 before the project 
was rebranded as GIFMIS, but during this time the reform secretariat remained in Ministry of 
Finance.  
In the PUFMARP/BPEMs project, Oracle Financial was procured as the government’s preferred 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERPs) software. However, during that time the system was not used 
for either budget preparation or in process government transactions and accounting for them. The 
period from 2001 to 2009 is significant in the sense that it coincided with the term of office of a 
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new political administration in the 4th Republic of Ghana (NPP first and second term). The 
previous regime had been in power from 1982 to 2000, and 2000 became a watershed in Ghana’s 
political history. It was the first political transition from one democratically elected government 
(National People’s Congress (NPC)) to another (New Patriotic Party (NPP)). The impact of the 
changing of political administration raised issues of continuity of reforms.  
With the changing fortunes of political parties, incoming administrations would review t the 
previous reform activities before adopting it as their own. Reform ownership have run on party- 
political lines, rather than as national programme. At each stage in the reforms project staff had to 
cope with the politics of surviving under changing political administration who tried to vilify some 
of them. The political reviews have had the tendency to slow down the progress of the reforms. 
For example, whilst the project was never entirely folded up, the automation (BPEMs) had to wait 
for the return of the previous regime (NDC) to office in 2009 for it to be resurrected. 
In 2010 the reform secretariat was transferred to the Accountant General’s Department (CAGD) 
and the project re-branded as GIFMIS. One of the officials of the GIFMIS project, participant G1, 
said:  
So, we started with the GIFMIS from 2010 to 2014 where we tried to bring an integrated 
system and look at the budget execution processes. In 2015 we also realized that the 
Activate does not sync very well with the IFMIS, the financials. So, there was the need to 
introduce a new budgeting model which is the Oracle Hyperion model which syncs 
seamlessly with the GIFMIS. All is geared towards enhancing our PFM system. 
It took another four years of implementation before the Oracle Financial got anywhere near being 
deployed to the MDAs. After almost 20 years of development and implementation, even at the 
time of concluding this research in 2019, the system was not fully deployed across all the MDAs. 
As participant G22 from the CAGD said:  
So, for GoG all institutions who benefit directly from GoG [Consolidated Fund] are on 
GIFMIS, because if you do not use GIFMIS you can’t get any money from GoG. So, 
headquarters in Accra, all regional offices, all GoG beneficiaries even from the district, all 
of them are on GIFMIS. Then we came to IGFs, we rolled out to about 50-something IGFs 
institutions, not all of them were using the system fully up until we started this exercise 
where government says, “All IGFs institutions, give up your manual cheque books and 
use the electronic system to pay.” Now, in so doing, most of them have started using the 
system fully. Even though we had rolled about two years ago, a lot of them were not using 
it fully. They were using it at their own convenience. And if whether they were bothered 
or not, they didn’t care. But now, because your cheque books have been taken from you, 
you need to go to GIFMIS and spend.  
The internally generated funds (IGFs) present an on-going challenge to the GIFMIS 
implementation according to this participant. Automation has therefore come to the Government 
of Ghana at a great cost in terms of resources - effort, time, and financials. One of the unintended 
consequences is that automation has been substituted for fundamental reforms (for example 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




addressing institutional conflicts) that are required and should have been given more attention for 
automation to work better. There has also been lost opportunities to benefit from automation of 
system. For example, automation has been turned into further centralising of controls, and a 
straight- jacket that did not support and promote technological development in the wider society, 
in the age of the internet.  
In each instalment of the reforms the MoF/GoG identified the weaknesses in the financial 
management system and developed strategies to address them. The problems in the PFM systems 
are therefore well documented; and the baseline situation established (dating back to 1986) 
(Premchand et al, 1986). All the three waves of reforms have been supported at the presidential 
level and approved by Cabinet.  
6.4.1.1 Building on previous reforms 
On-going reforms have built on previous efforts, and there has been some rebranding of reforms. 
Participant G1 recalled the re-packaging and rebranding of the reforms as follows:  
So yes, we did the diagnosis and in 2009 after the public expenditure review, it was 
realized that that IFMIS thing should be implemented so that we can now be able to bring 
some sanity in our public expenditure management. So, the BPEMS was re-engineered 
and repackaged into what we call the Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information 
System, GIFMIS”. 
The PFMRP built on GIFMIS which built on the PUFMARP/ BPEMs that had preceded it. BPEMs 
wrote the automation documentation and took the procurement decision to implement Oracle 
Financials. The GIFMIS adopted and updated the BPEMs documentation and re-designed the 
segments to allow for separate entity reporting (to enable the MDAs to prepare their separate 
accounts and financial statements). Participant G22 from the CAGD explains. 
When we started the implementation [of GIFMIS} there was only one balancing segment 
called GOG. So, at the end of the day you could only prepare one central account at 
national level when we started. Now, it got to a point where the committee was demanding 
reports that GIFMIS was unable to generate. And we the experts explained to them that 
the decision was taken at the start of the implementation to report at central level because 
people argued from our [Financial administration decree] FAD and [Financial 
Administration Regulation] FAR that Ministry’s department and agencies didn’t need to 
produce a balance sheet. Why would Ghana New Agency want to produce a balance sheet? 
That was the argument. Balance sheet is only meaningful at the government level, GOG 
point of view. Now, at a point, that was creating more noise. So, we the team here now 
decided that every institution that is on GIFMIS will have its own balancing code. So that 
actually was a major reengineering that took place from the system point of view. Even 
Oracle came in and felt it couldn’t be done”. 
Others saw it differently, alleging that recent reforms had re-packaged and re-branded previous 
ones for political reasons. Politicians preferred to make the existing reforms appear to be 
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abandoned, in favour of new ones (the new replacing the old), so that they can claim credit for any 
improvements they are able to implement.  
Some held that reforms the Ghana reforms have had no impact, have not been sustained, and lacked 
depth for its’ inability to deinstitutionalise poor practice and to institutionalise better practices in 
their place [PEFA report, 2013].  For example, the initial progress made with the MTEF reforms 
were quickly reversed before it could institutionalise better planning and budgeting practices. 
Programme budgeting (PB) was built on a very dysfunctional MTEF processes that did not serve 
any of its intended purposes. There is evidence of the lack of impact of the MTEF on budget 
planning; and that the MDAs continued to submit wish-list budgets. Two participants from a sector 
ministry confirm it:  
Participant 13: “… it is the way the [reform] modules are and/or ends. It doesn’t really end 
for you to see. So maybe part of the implementation, the challenges are ‘picked’ [i.e. 
identified].……. and then in the process of making it better, then suddenly a new one 
comes, and then we have to make it look like we are abandoning the old one, but you go 
into it and you see that the structure and contents are the same).  
Participants G14:  Yes. And also, sometimes that is the message that doesn’t come well. 
As if we are moving away from line item budgeting. We haven’t moved away from line 
item budgeting. We have rather improved on it by adding program based (in terms of 
activity analysis) on top of it. So, first all that we analyse is how much of a certain line of 
electricity, travel expenses, that, that, that, that.  Now we have added a bit small on it that 
if you went to do a training how much of it was on fuel, how much of it was travel cost? 
How much was it this or that? So beyond just knowing the total we spent…. one billion 
on fuel. What for? We don’t know. Now you can know how much we spent on that fuel, 
how much the paying of salaries contributed to your program, how building of buying 
something. So that is what has moved up, but we haven’t moved away from line 
budgeting.”  
Internal assessment reports show in spite the progress made in some areas, the impact of reforms 
implemented are limited by the significant institutional, policy, systems and process weaknesses 
that continue to exist (EY, 2017 pp8). Furthermore, initial gains that were made, have been 
reversed within the life span of the reforms, therefore defeating any claim to sequencing. 
6.4.1.2 Introducing techniques and tools 
Reform techniques and tools introduced are only partially institutionalised. Often reforms 
techniques were implemented half-heartedly, and not supported to solve the underlying issues 
before another layer of techniques were introduced. The reforms therefore have become an 
assemblage of techniques, and not an arena for problem solving. Inappropriate new tools have been 
introduced before the ones preceding them are even understood and deployed well. Participant 
G13 from a line ministry said:   
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…. that drove the reform into [the] now program-based budgeting, where they said some 
of it are not necessarily for our consumption [now], but at a certain level we will need to 
link them up. 
That is, the introduction of the new budget planning and preparation techniques, Programme Based 
Budgeting (PBB), introduced between 2011 and 2014 to replace the existing Activity-Based 
Budgeting (ABB), was only partly implemented (loosely coupled) to show that Ghana had adopted 
the PBB approach. An in- depth appreciation of these techniques (ABB and PBB) indicate that 
they are in fact complementary, and they are derived from the same toolbox. One cannot hope to 
get the benefits of PBB if ABB is loosely coupled.  But as the official observed, that message does 
not go down well with the top-down official script that maintain that Ghana has progressed from 
line-item budgeting to ABB, and finally to PBB. Whereas no real changes have taken place, 
especially in the underlying practices.  
6.4.1.3 Reforms sequencing had been misconstrued with phasing and piloting of projects.  
Efforts were made to sequence the reforms, but that did not work well because the concept was 
misconstrued as “phasing” and “piloting” of the project. Sequencing requires a plan laid 
beforehand to build on previous outputs and outcomes within the same project or programme of 
reforms, but at each stage challenging the authourities to push harder against whatever constrains 
them. Pettigrew (2012) has argued that: 
sequencing of change involved challenging and changing the beliefs and idea systems of 
top decision makers, often linked to power changes at the top, followed by enabling 
changes in structure, people, and reward and recognition systems, with the new strategy 
emerging out of this complex and precarious multifaceted change process (pp 1307-8).  
He argued that this discovery challenges the Chandlerian dictum that structure follows strategy, 
which seem to be the unspoken approach of the reforms in the developing countries. In practical 
terms sequencing of reforms aims to reduce fatigue, and to pursue the next step logical step in a 
difficult terrain, having seen the results of an earlier step.  
Building on the previous reforms that had been re-packaged because of their lack of initial impact 
is not “reform sequencing”. Neither is piloting or prototyping. For example, participants observed 
that implementation of the Programme-Based Budgeting (PBB) in Ghana proceeded with great 
caution, to forestall the previous international criticisms (Andrews, 2006) that the government 
‘proceeded aggressively’ (pp137) with previous budget reforms (under the MTEF 
implementation). Participant G1 from MoF said: 
So, we did all these things in the reforms. Even though there are issues, sometimes people 
talk about sequencing, we’ve made sure that subsequent reforms take into account 
whatever the previous reforms did. We didn’t totally abandon them – we’re still doing 
MTEF but now we’re doing program-based, and MTEF started under PUFMARP. We 
revised the chart of accounts……we have harmonized chart of accounts and all those – 
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the ICT-based and the staff and all those things are there. And there are legal frameworks 
too that have been put in place to make sure that some of these things work as expected. 
As a pre-caution the PPB was introduced on a pilot basis. The same participant, G1, said:  
Yes, it’s something we considered, seriously. So even from the GIFMIS time, the budget, 
the HRMIS, - all used a phased approach. You recall that …. at that time, we looked at 
only seven MDAs, we had then considered and tested it with two MDAs before we went 
to seven and brought in education, health and agriculture and those things. After that, we 
still piloted it. So, we did it form 2012, before 2014 we got the appropriations, and we got 
all MDAs without the local level. We went at the local level in 2015 entering in 2016. So, 
we did it from 2014, 2015, almost two to three years before we went local level. 
That approached phased in the PPB, but it does not necessarily mean the introduction achieved the 
project goals, and the outcomes were satisfactory. For the implementation of GIFMIS further 
observed:  
The IFMIS is the same thing, they started at a national level, did the training for national 
level treasurers and MDAs before going to transaction processing centres, looking at the 
cost centres. So, the phased approach was used to get staff hooked onto the system 
gradually. Even though we did a big bang we didn’t go straight away. Now they’re 
deploying to MMDAs. Last year they started with a number, they’ve scaled it up to 55. 
HRMIS, the same thing, they piloted with eight MDAs, looking at GHS, GES, Ghana 
Police and some other institutions to test the system, do the user acceptance testing and 
training and get them to use it, then use the feedback to expand the coverage to all others. 
So yes, we use the phases approach and made sure that – and each of them went with 
intensive capacity building and change management processes. Even with the project, we 
have a change management consultant assisting us. So, we use the phased approach, we 
piloted all the implementation before rollout”. 
Participants referred to sequencing reforms, when in fact they meant the piloting of the project’s 
interventions. The understanding of reform sequencing therefore has been mixed up with piloting 
and phasing in the Ghana reforms with the consequence that institutionalised practices, that are to 
be reformed, are not clearly delineated to form the basis for the next round of the programme 
implementation. PFM reform researchers have however suggested the following sequence (see 
Talierco, 2009 in Chapter 8; DFID, 2005):  
• Addressing the issues of budget credibility in delivering predictable resources 
• Improving Internal controls and holding managers accountable 
• Linking policy priorities to budget planning and implementation 
• Instituting accountability through monitoring and evaluation processes that take into 
account both finance and performance in an integrated manner    
6.4.1.4 Basics First, Good Enough and Reform Sequencing 
 BPEMs was designed to be implemented in phases with in-built piloting., but the initial 
implementation did not work out as planned. The problematics of coordinating complex PFM 
reforms is not unique to Ghana but found in other countries that have implemented integrated PFM 
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reforms. Thus, the question remains how to address the challenge of implementing complex multi-
faceted reforms with several components.  An MoF participant, G15, reflected:  
So, I think from where I sit, program design was probably okay. I think the major difficulty 
was that the program had about eight or so components. 
It has been argued elsewhere in this study that the IPFM reforms in Ghana were subjected to 
external sponsors dividing it up to fund separate elements. Evidence from other places found that 
reforms are “often led by different development agencies, with insufficient attention provided to 
the co-ordination and sequencing of reform” (DFID, 2005). The concept of “platform approach” 
(Brooke, 2003) was promoted by DFID to focus the attention of reform implementer on a few 
milestones at any one time, and to “address the implementation of reforms that frequently fail to 
complement and build upon each other” (op. cit. pp2).  It was applied to a number of PFM reforms 
(for example in Cambodia, India (Orissa State), East Timor and Russia), but it received critical 
reviews and has since been discredited for not providing the panacea to some of the fundamental 
challenges that reformers face (see Allen, 2009)). For example, Allen (2009), found in the case of 
Cambodia that it did not address the issue of institutional dynamics, overloading the reforms with 
activities, and premature movement upwards from one platform to another. Instead, Allen (2009) 
argued that reform implementers should go back to “getting the basics rights” advocated by Schick 
(1998). Nevertheless, the problem of coordinating complicated reform programme from one 
project management unit is problematic (and requires to be addressed).  
6.4.1.5 Technology imposition and diffusion in the MDAs create internal coercive isomorphism 
 Throughout all the three phases of Implementing the ERPs, based on Oracle Financials, the line 
ministries were not given the option of how the new technology could be used as an internal 
management tool. Instead the automated accounting systems was diffused through imposition 
procedures by the MoF and CAGD. The underlying accounting and business practices and 
procedures have therefore changed very little despite the adoption of the electronic systems. A 
well-placed participant from a line ministry, G14, said: 
… – we were there, and they brought it. They said they have to wire that, that without even 
looking at whether we even have the computers, or we don’t have. So those are some of 
the challenges with the implementation. But as far as where we were going to, and the 
understanding of the objectives of the project, it was clear to me.  
An official from MoF/CAGD confirmed: 
So, we did develop the system, we tested and deployed it to all these MDAs. 
From an MDA’s perspective they were not consulted enough about their requirements, and the 
computer systems were imposed on them, as users (even some of the key ones). This is something 
that has held back the non-coercive adoption of the new system. But in addition, it has resulted in 
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some of the MDAs (including Parliament) buying the same or different software licenses for their 
own use. As participant G4 observed:  
…. there is this turf war where people think unless I own the right to the software, the 
network and etc., it is not mine. Therefore, notwithstanding the huge and unnecessarily 
expensive network that we have in government and the software that we have paid for 
which is the Oracle financials, payroll, etc., people are paying for the same right to acquire 
the same software on their own. 
6.4.1.6 Championing the reforms through Steering Committee meetings  
Steering Committee meetings were instituted as part of the implementation mechanisms. The 
reforms established the tradition of involving the Ministers of Finance (or a deputy Finance 
Minister) as Chairperson of the steering committee dating back to 1995/96. Often that leadership 
role is delegated to a deputy. Some ministers however participate in project technical sessions and 
other activities, especially if they have the technical background. In Ghana the steering committee 
practice had the Governor of the central bank as a member, and some of the ministers of key big 
spending MDAs, the Public Service Commission (PSC), and the Office of the Head of Civil 
Service (OHSC). The steering committee meetings were the fora for briefing the minister and 
members of progress, and for the project team to ask for assistance to remove project impediments. 
The sponsoring donors and project financiers were also invited to attend to get the project briefing 
direct from source and to assess progress.  
In the PUFMARP/BPEMs phase if the steering committee arrangements had worked well, the 
reforms would have advanced much further than it did. In the subsequent phases of implementation 
some technically minded ministers even took personal charge of such meetings and did not leave 
it to their deputies. The PFMRP (2015-2018) for example had two management committees, the 
executive and steering committees, essentially playing the same role. But in most cases the steering 
committee became just a talking shop, where ministers micro-managed the project. For example, 
in the BPEMs automation software contracting, the Deputy Minister of Finance compromised the 
government’s position for personal gains, that derailed the project for almost a decade. He was 
subsequently charged and jailed for making payments for a software implementation in the Judicial 
Service of Ghana that never took place (see viewpoint@ghanareview.com).   
6.4.1.7 Implementing performance management formed part of the budget logics 
The reforms attempted to develop a performance-based budgeting as part of the introduction of the 
MTEF through the introduction of activity-based costing and budgeting. However, the 
performance- based approach was not fully implemented. An MoF official, G9, said: 
So, we call it the performance-based budgeting, using the activity budget approach.   
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One critical aspect of performance management is to ensure the budget has been costed properly 
and adequate resources have been made available for a service. This enables the budget to serve 
as a cost control mechanism at the same time. Where the budget has been costed based on 
historically inadequate level and remains incremental it defeats the logics of performance 
budgeting. In Ghana costing practices remains largely ad hoc, undeveloped, rudimentary, and 
unchanged. However, costing seemed to be better understood at the sector level, especially in the 
Ghana Health Service (GHS) where they have had a long experience in developing and working 
with clinical costs.  But centralising the reforms has not always supported separate ministerial 
costing initiatives as it was under the MTEF. However, there are signs that the MoF is beginning 
to improve their approach with the issuance of a costing guidelines in 2017 as part of the 
introduction of programme budgeting33 .  the. Under the activity-based budgeting regime the 
estimates were costed based on a formula of quantity, frequency, and unit cost of the activity. With 
the introduction of programme budgeting, the unit costs are required to be computed for the various 
cost heads that go into the computation of  both activities and outputs cost (see pp8 of the Costing 
Guidelines for MDAs, 2017)These changes require both a greater clarity of direction to be 
provided by the MoF, and capacity across government which appear to be lacking at the moment. 
Participant G15 from MoF made these observations regarding the computation of the unit costs.: 
…. we were actually doing the research with Statistical Service to support us to determine 
this unit cost. But that hasn’t materialized in the fullness.  That’s a very interesting side. 
We’re still waiting for this country to grow. So, if that had come on board and we could 
have standardized the unit cost across board; and which would be used by everybody.  But, 
of course, the variables will differ from MDA to MDA based on their … 
The MoF seemed to misconstrue the concept of unit cost of output produced as the unit cost of 
inputs; and deferring to the Statistical Service of Ghana to undertake surveys to determine standard 
prices for common items, rather than an exercise to be undertaken by cost accountants and service 
managers. 
Over a decade after the MoF introduced the MTEF it was not systematically ramped up, rather it 
declined to an incremental “line-item” budget that existed before. To remedy the decline of the 
MTEF and the ABB systems the MoF introduced the PBB address the failure of the 
implementation activity-based budgeting and the MTEF reforms. The implementation of the 
activity-based budget had become problematic. For some of the MDAs, it was not unusual to see 
a budget book (budget volume) the size of 3 Bibles combined. A ministry like health had over 
15,000 activities that they updated incrementally from one year to another:  
You can do analysis – all that they do is to do the workshop, all that they do is to procure, 
and nobody knows the purpose. So, changing to programme-base was moving people’s 
 
33 MDAs for preparation of costing estimates for the Sector Medium Term Development Plans (SMTDPs) 
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focus from just undertaking the activities to project; and I can say that even parliament 
have not started focusing on the results that MDAs are going to achieve; other than as in 
the previous times where they’re looking at the project that will come into their areas. 
The budgeting system in Ghana, therefore deteriorated rather than improve, over the period in 
which the activity-based budgeting was maintained. The previous attempt to implement 
performance budgeting only resulted in weakening accountability as the MDAs focused on 
spending public funds without showing results. With the recent change to programme-based 
budgeting has only shifted attention to the implementation of infrastructure projects, that seems to 
get the attention of parliamentarians better the overall budget performance. Any hope of improving 
this situation is further aggravated by the poor budget funding arrangements where the available 
cash are rationed to meet the cost of payroll and running expenses leaving very little to run MDAs’ 
programmes. An MoF official, G11, puts it succinctly as:  
But here's a case where probably there is money to pay compensation only; so, you pay 
compensation, but the compensation has a role to play in helping deliver the service, but 
if you pay compensation you've not paid ‘goods and services’. How do you expect the 
totality of the programme to run? 
Therefore, transitioning from one budget system to another in Ghana has been crippled by technical 
weaknesses, ambitions programmes, and poor funding arrangement arrangements. 
6.4.1.8Techno-logics and change management  
Techno-logics drove the change management programmes, that focused on acceptance of 
technology, but it did not address attitudinal change within the public service. There were change 
management programme intended to break down the resistance to use the new technologies. For 
example, the MOF’s working procedures relied on using messengers to ferry large paper files from 
one office to another. To change that required change management training to go with the GIFMIS 
automation. Participant G1 observed:  
Under the GIFMIS, for instance, we have change management component where we have 
a whole team that were doing change management because people have – it’s like the vice 
president saying paperless at the ports and people resisting. So, there was a change 
management because now everything that you need to do, if you want to raise a PO, a 
requisition and all those things should be on the system. Even with the Budget Division 
people were a bit…. – because now you’ll get a notification that an MDA has sent a request 
and you will have to process everything online 
With the roll-out of the GIFMIS, government has gone from running a parallel system of paper 
files and electronic files to using only electronic processes. One of the participants who is 
strategically placed reports of a gradual change in behaviour to what the system required. The aim 
was to make sure that whatever project MDAs wanted to implement was in the budget for the year 
was given a project code and was on the system. Anything that was not on the GIFMIS platform 
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could not be spent. But the threat of reversing is not yet over, especially when a sizeable proportion 
of MDAs’ revenue and spending are still not on the GIFMIS. 
In addition, from our observations there was little evidence of a fundamental attitudinal change in 
the civil service regarding management behaviour in the application of knowledge, development 
of new skills, customer care, and staff welfare, and general conduct of business including 
professionalism. Embracing change makes the system move forward to the target stage, not 
backwards. But that has not been the case with the reforms as participant G1 note the reversal that 
happened with the budget improvement: 
So yes, if you look at the budgeting component, that is also to bring some behavioural 
change in the way we do things. Because the activity-based budgeting, at a point when we 
did the review, has more or less become and incremental in the sense that MDAs do not 
look at what they’re going to achieve at the end of the day even through there are 
objectives, outputs and activities; the concentration was on activities.  
Any drive to bring about attitudinal change, under the PFMRP, has been done through legislation. 
Officials hoped that the promotion of the PFM Act 2016 through capacity building and 
sensitization would bring attitudinal change:  
So yes, behavioural change is one of the things that we’re aiming at. Still under HRMIS 
too, the same. There is a lot of capacity building, a lot of sensitization. When we even did 
the law, the PFM ACT, we’ve gone all over, we’ve trained all MDAs and all the 216 
MMDAs. I’ve been to all the regional capitals sensitizing people, telling them about the 
sanctions, telling them about what the ‘dos and don’ts’ in the law. 
The MoF has adopted market logics in vendor education to ensure better compliance of 
procurement procedures, and ultimately to achieve better budget controls. A senior official in the 
MoF E1 said: 
“And we’ve educated the contractor. If something is not in the budget, you’re not convinced that 
it’s in the budget, you don’t go and execute that contract. You’re doing that at your own risk.  
Thus, where official commit to spend funds that have not been approved in the budget, they do so 
at the cost of being sanctioned for infringing legislation. 
6.5 NEW OPERATIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS  
The assessment of reform progress for this paper has shown that there were many slippages, and 
the reform results have been mixed. From a longitudinal examination of the available evidence, 
we have chosen seven points in the trajectory of the reforms in the last 30 years. These points can 
clearly be identified based on available official documents such as IMF assessment reports, 
Government of Ghana public expenditure review, the PUFMARP/BPEMs design report, and the 
Ghana Public Financial Management reforms reports. The list of official documents that have gone 
into our assessment have been listed in Appendix 1. The various assessments have been 
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summarised in Appendix 11 to give a dynamic picture of areas of concerns and achievements 
within the system as recorded in these official documents:  
1986 IMF report 
1990 IMF Reviews 
1993/1994 PER 
1996 PUFMARP/BPEMs High Level Design assessment report 
2006 PEFA assessment 
2009 PEFA assessment  
2012 PEFA assessment 
2018 PEFA assessment 
The budget credibility had been undermined by revenue underperformance, unreliable forecasts, 
and poor cash management practices. Weaknesses in the collection of tax arrears prevented 
adequate resources mobilisation. The non-integration of the Internally Generated Funds (IGFs) 
into the mainstream of government revenue raised control issues that demonstrated the breakdown 
of accountability and the limitations of the central authorities in the government. The power 
relationships led to established practices that were inconsistent with central-state logics and 
accountability. The entrenched accounting practices presented to officials rent-seeking 
opportunities, while causing resistance to reform. 
Ghana’s budget reforms had attempted to establish better linkage between policy goals and the 
approved financial estimates, and to move away from incremental line-item budgeting to 
performance and programme budgeting. The most recent emphasis of the budget reforms aimed to 
replace Activity Based Budgeting system (ABB) with a system of Program Based Budgeting 
(PBB). However, one of the key reform challenges had been how to institutionalise budgeting-for- 
results and to make it effective. This was a pursuit that have gone on for over two decades. The 
budget credibility continued to be in doubt because of uncertainty in funding the budget and the 
gaming of the system by various acting units within government.  
6.5.1 Improving the treasury function and the application of the International Public 
Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) 
The reforms have attempted to strengthen the treasury functions to enable cash resources to be 
used properly, and to improve reporting by applying the International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards (IPSAS). The current standard of accounting reporting is on a modified cash basis (with 
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on-going debate about the relevance of accrual accounting). Generally, the formats for presenting 
both the budget and public accounts had not been user friendly, and that impacted on the ability of 
the parliament, the public, and civil society to hold government to account. 
The fundamental problem of the Government’s budget management practices (including 
monitoring) was that there had been an over- concentration on financial inputs, and very little 
attention paid to results. As observed in the PEFA 2010 report, there is no clear view of 
comprehensive spending in most sectors (for example in ministries such as Education, and Health). 
The calculative practices and tools provided by management accounting had not been widely 
adopted. In recent years, some attention had been given to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) by 
the executive government in establishing separate units, under the Presidency, charged with that 
responsibility. It is not clear whether this arrangement obviates the need for each ministry to have 
an effective monitoring unit.  
6.5.2 Management controls and internal audit 
There were recognised weaknesses in management controls and internal audit. Ghana tried to 
implement the concept of a unified internal audit system headed by an Internal Auditor General, 
but these arrangements were not effective., There are adequate laws, both in the constitutions and 
the Audit Service Act 2000, to support the independence of the Supreme Audit Institution of Ghana 
(the Ghana Audit Service (GAS)). Generally, GAS made good audit recommendations, but there 
was very little implementation of Public Accounts Committee (PAC) recommendations and the 
follow-up was inadequate. In recent years, the PAC has made gallant attempts to hold MDAs 
accountable in televised broadcast of its proceedings and the PFM Act 2016 requires ministries to 
set up an Audit Committee to ensure that audit recommendations are implemented. 
6.5.3 Enabling a stronger legislative framework 
One of the key project achievements has been in changes in legislation (such as FAA, 2003; PFM 
Act,2016; Procurement Acts, 2003 and 2016), codifying of some of the new processes in the PFM 
law. Participant G15 claimed that the new PFM Act has introduced tougher sanctions that were 
missing in the old law:  
“Apart from that, the law itself – the sanctions regime in the law was not strong in the FAA”. 
Another participant, G5, pointed out that the PFM Act, 2016 has established levels of authourity 
for payment that was not there before: 
Now, it is also designed in a certain way that there are levels of authourity  that people 
depending on your level, what you can do and what you cannot do, so where junior officers 
can effect payment or instruct payment to be made and then it would be difficult for even 
the auditor to trace;  those are the things that we want to do away with, so it is coming with 
a system in such a way that you to get to a point where payment are also effected online, 
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okay, and they’re already paid to the supplier, you get into a system where procurement 
process is going to be based on IT, so you don’t even see the companies that are bidding 
for contracts, what you can only deal with is the name and then those are the issues and 
that is how the system is being designed now, and the process is ongoing.  
There is a legalistic mind-set that has encouraged the reforms’ success to be judged by the laws 
that have been passed (such as the Financial Administration Act, 2004 and PFM Act 2016, 
Procurement Act 2003 and Procurement Act 2016) rather than the achievement of the rationality 
of the reforms. Whilst laws could be a great catalyst for change, often they are not implemented as 
intended. As a result, they have not had any real impact on the introductions of innovations, and 
in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery. The study can argue that 
having stronger sanctions in the law by itself is a good thing, but that requires enforcement. The 
statement that Ghanaians have “less affinity to probably enforce sanctions” resonates better with 
the available evidence, culminating in the appointment of the Office of Special Prosecutor under 
the current government (NPP government of 2017-2020). 
6.5.4 Budget credibility has been enforced using GIFMIS’s techno-logics as a central 
control tool 
The GIFMIS system has been used as a tool to control “wrongful” expenditure submitted for 
payment (G1).  GIFMIS allows only transactions that are on budget to be processed, and it rejects 
any payment that is not on the system (from accumulated unpaid government debt) as “wrongful. 
Participant G17 noted that:  
...discussing on Joy FM News File I think two weeks or three weeks ago…. disallowing 
those transactions that had been tabled to government for payment running into billions.  
It’s bigger than anything you can think of. 
The reform approach has focused on implementing ‘technical’ solutions through computerisation 
of the accounting system to enforce controls, automation is as good as the people who use it. Whilst 
it might improve controls, accuracy, and speed of data collection; it is often expensive to 
implement, it mostly fails, and often it is not used as intended.  
6.5.5 Realising part of the vision of an integrated solution in government 
GIFMIS has enabled the integration of the automated payrolls system and the financial 
management system starting in 2013/2014. Automating the HR system has aided integration 
(dealing with changes in the nominal roll electronically: for retirement, vacated post). But centring 
reforms has meant that staff have had to travel from the far corners of the country to make inputs 
into the payroll system at their Ministry’s HQ in Accra. But no budget provision had been made 
for travel costs, therefore compelling staff to find other ‘ways- and-means’ to meet that cost. That, 
potentially, has been one of the many sources for corrupting officials. This may be a temporary 
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problem, but it has significant implications in operations of the sector ministries (such as Education 
and Health) that have staff spread across the country.  
Automating the systems supported the cleaning up of the payroll of “ghost names”, and that has 
been positive. Adopting these technologies, including the biometric has taken out suspicions names 
that should not have been on the payroll, but participant G2 says some of the names were false 
positives:  
But what is happening is that when you don’t satisfy a condition and your name is thrown 
out of the system, you go back and regularise it, so in 2 months’ time you come back, so 
it’s a cycle. So, you see that the payroll numbers, let’s say this month is 400,000, the 
following month because of some exercise it drops to 350,000 and then it goes to 380,000, 
within 2 months we are back to 400,000. Although, some undesirables have been thrown 
out, genuinely thrown out, but some because of one issue or the other…….” last year for 
instance, there was an exercise and a lot of the directors here (MoF) did not receive their 
salaries, yes. … And so, they will have to go back, regularise, and come back ……... The 
reforms have yielded a lot of results in the compensation area, and what we did last year 
for instance, with those who were receiving allowances on the payroll, who shouldn’t have, 
like directors who, were all thrown out. If you have an official vehicle and you receive car 
maintenance allowance, you will be cut off. So, these reforms have actually paid off. 
The phenomenon of “ghost names” have been in the Ghanaian public service for a long time and 
has resisted these periodic exercises to get rid of them. It seems therefore that this achievement 
was only temporary, so long as the systems continue to generate incentives for fraudsters who 
know the inherent weaknesses in the system to operate. Especially where fraudulent activities are 
considered as errors and it is “taken for granted” they will be regularised without any repercussions.  
The usual response to wrongdoings by well-placed senior officials in Ghana is that it is the system, 
and not the culprit’s fault. For example, during the payroll cleaning exercises several directors in 
the MoF had their names taken out of the payroll for living in government bungalows and still 
collecting rent allowance through the payroll. This is what makes a participant confident to assert 
that the problems of ghost names will be in Ghana for a long time. Participant, G4, said:   
the issue of ghost names is the structure of the payroll, I keep explaining this, that if one 
teacher resigns in say Bumburugu nobody’s going to bring input from Bumburugu to 
Accra, until someone from Bumburungu is coming to Accra for something else, before 
they will piggy-back on him and say “okay, collect this when you go”. If he remembers 
then he delivers, if he doesn’t remember he goes back or throw it something else, that 
ghost name remains on our payroll…. So, given the structural problem that payroll has, 
the ghost name is going to remain with us for a long time. Why are we able to access our 
bank details, transfer, make payment when we are even driving etc., and payroll must 
necessarily be within the Accountant General’s Department situated only in Accra? 
Another instance was ministers who are also members of parliament (termed Article 71 Office 
Holders) receiving double salaries and other overpayments wrongfully in three successive 
administrations from 2001 to 2017. These occurrences were attributed to the systemic and 
structural flaws in the system, where salaries of members of parliament are processed by the 
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Parliamentary Service and ministers’ salaries are processed by the Controller and Accountant 
General’s Department (Daily Graphic Tuesday May 8, 2018).   
6.5.6 Budget reforms has fostered a deeper understanding of MDAs’ mandate 
The implementation of the MTEF budget reforms introduced the conceptual toolbox of strategic 
planning. As a requirement the MDAs had to assess their organisational structures, roles and 
mandates as specified in their enabling legislation. This requirement was re-enforced further by 
the implementation of programme budgeting.  Two senior participants in a sector ministry shared 
their insights below. 
Participant G14: 
I just wanted to add that maybe one of the things that the reforms have brought is also to 
help us really understand our functions. Previously headquarters will do so many things 
going into implementation and others but then agencies all but with this at least with the 
program based we plan based on our core functions. So, headquarters for instance is not 
supposed to do implementation but rather provide administrative support and the supply 
of nature. So, we are moving into a situation where we are using our functions in the 
planning process. And I think it’s a good thing.  
Participant G13: 
As he said, now people are really doing things according to their functions. Because the 
first point of the program-based budget is about your function before you define what you 
do. And so, people now know they have to do things by way of what they are mandated to 
do, which is a good thing, and how those broad areas are costed and implemented. …. 
Now, they must report according to that also. So, they must be able to report what they 
said they would do. Have they done it? And they’ve done it they should see it as meeting 
the output targets that they will set, which they report on the output target. So that makes, 
I said in the beginning, helps you to have a sense of how well you fare meeting your 
functions. But also, how well you are contributing to the higher-level objectives of the 
sector. So, in the past, health sector for example, the only report are indicators. So, if we 
have 30 indicators that is what we are using. Now, we report that in addition to all the 
outputs that are in here.  
Both MTEF and Programme Budgeting required the MDAs to re-assess their mandates and 
functions to justify their budget allocation. A positive consequence has been a better appreciation 
of the roles of acting units within the MDAS in how they contribute to the achievement of the 
organisational mission and vision.   
6.5.7 Building capacity at the sub-national level 
The budget reforms have facilitated the decentralization reforms in building capacity at the local-
government level (in the districts).  Budgeting techniques such as the MTEF required the 
translations of strategic plans to the estimates; and projecting three years ahead within a 
prioritisation framework have all been found to be useful and practical tools: An MoF official (G7) 
said:  
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If you take the Activate software, it is one thing that we introduced that helps them in 
budgeting, and it also has some functionality in it that helps them to project for three years 
for the MTEF, and it also helped them to link the budgets and the plan at a district level as 
well as the national policy framework. So, and also if you go to the Assemblies now the 
budget officer or the budget office is well equipped, and it is leading all these reforms that 
we’re introducing now. So, these are the techniques, small, small things that we introduce 
that has helped us. 
The combined reform activities have given skills to government accountants and auditors as well.   
Participant G12 commented on the spread of skills: 
Yes, particularly with the implementation GIFMIS. A lot of skills have been acquired by 
accounting officers in the ministries and that is one of the biggest achievements. Budget 
preparation practices has also improved because it’s now being supported by software 
called Hyperion. So, we will have to learn how to do proper budgeting before the system 
can accept it. The auditing, Auditor General is changing because they are installing a 
system called Audit MIS to follow the lines of the business, so they can do online auditing 
as well. So, these are all, you know, the skills that I see coming up. 
With this, the study can conclude that while the practical applications of techniques and tools (such 
as strategic planning) have not yet penetrated the delivery of public services to an appreciable 
extent, they have built some capacity within the public service to facilitate further reforms.  
6.6 CONCLUSION 
Based on the processual approach this study has identified that the financial management system 
in Ghana, as an ex-colony, was designed for colonial administration (Priestley, 1974), and not for 
ensuring performance and internal accountability. No wonder dating back to 1955, the UN 
encouraged post-colonial accounting research in the LDCs emphasising accountability relationship 
between citizens and the governments (Premchand, 1975, Abdul-Rahaman et al.1997).  
To a large extent Ghana’s post-colonial experiences failed to transform the government accounting 
systems to support the country’s developmental aspiration. The path of reforms was set in the 
1980’s after the political, economic disasters and financial meltdown of the 1960s and 70s. The 
reforms that started from the 1983 onwards were rooted in neoliberal philosophies and explained 
through neo-classical economic principles to gain international legitimacy (and not necessarily 
local approbation). “Structural reforms” in the 1980s and 1990s paved the way for isomorphic 
reforms of the driven by economic philosophies that emphasised broad macro structures. 
The PFM reforms and the economic structural reforms have not performed well. The key message 
emerging from our analysis and discussions is that whilst the reforms have faced challenges, it has 
been successful in drawing up new legislations and in implementing automated electronic systems 
on a partial basis through coercive imposition. However substantive changes have not happened, 
and temporary improvements in the budget system became moribund. This study has theorised 
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that, it is due to the prevalence of poor institutionalised accounting practices. The credibility of the 
reforms itself has come to depends on the credibility of the budget (by not implementing it as 
intended and approved).  
One of the key issues is the role played by central agencies (principally the MoF and CAGD) viz 
a-viz and the line ministries. The line ministries’ (hereafter referred to as the ministries, 
departments, and agencies (MDAs) contribution to the achievement of sound financial 
management practices have been suppressed even though they are both the subject and object of 
reforms.  
6.6.1 Budget reforms dominated the reforms from the start and alienated the accountants 
The carving up of reforms and the initial successes made in the budget reforms alienated the 
accounting class from the reforms. The low degree of integration of the financial management 
function, coupled with the limited involvement of the Accountant General’s staff in the budget 
preparation and implementation meant that they could not relate to the reforms that had budgeting 
as a leading component and became the dominant successful component in the initial stages. 
The lack of integration of the financial management function within the Government of Ghana is 
reflected in the organisational make-up of the MoF, which performs the role of budgeting (where 
the economists and budget officers are located); viz-a-viz the CAGD which performs the financial 
accounting function (where the accountant staff are located). Institutionally, the government 
accountant being part of the Ministry of Finance but sitting outside of it is a legacy of the colonial 
reforms in the 1930s. To-date CAGD accountants continue to focus on processing invoices, 
keeping bank accounts, and cash books. Exceptions to this role occur only when a professional 
accountant is posted to head the accounting function in a service or agency (such as the Ghana 
Health Service, or the Ghana Education Service) when they may perhaps combine the budgeting 
and financial accounting functions. Even in such situations the budgeting function and accounting 
function do not sit easily together. 
6.6.2 Low pay provides incentives for gaming of reforms by official 
 The low remuneration in the public service in Ghana compels officials to seek salary top-ups from 
externally funded projects, including reform programmes that have been projectized. For example, 
where the reforms had paid allowances to official for them to attend training programmes, or for 
them to perform reform activities, in some instances it had led to the gaming of the reform training 
schemes. On occasions attending training workshops and receiving per diem was considered more 
important by some officials, if not the most, for topping up their salaries. Where the travel and 
transport allowance (T&T) had not been provided, attendances had been low, or they are shunned 
by senior officers as participant G2 from MoF explained the practice:  
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But here we give everybody training………… when you come for the training you are 
given a T and T allowance…. So you’ll realise that the directors will attend the training 
because they will get some allowance and when they go, [they’ll] carry the documents to 
the  guys who come in and do the work; [then] they realised that the quality [of work] was 
not good; So this time around where they’re requesting specifically for training, and 
because over the years we’ve interacted with them, right now I know almost all the 
technical guys in all the ministries and so when we are inviting officers for workshop we 
know the ones we should go for,  so we ask for specific people in addition to new ones 
that are coming, ... 
The appropriateness of paying additional financial incentives to motivate participants to attend 
reform activities is questionable, but such practices have become institutionalised features of the 
reforms in Ghana, and perhaps in other countries where official remunerations are low.  
6.6.3 Re-engaging the office of the Accountant General in the reforms 
The passive resistance offered by the Accountant General’s Department resulted in BPEMS’s 
stuttered implementation for over a decade.  The dynamics of the MoF re-engaging the CAGD in 
the financial management reforms changed the project’s fortune but created other challenges. As 
noted by an ex-Accountant General official (G4): 
We thought it was time to rehash it, because people were looking at it as budget, budget, 
people were really being …. so, people thought it is something about Ministry of Finance, 
so we said let’s look at the globe and see what, is there any better way or something which 
may bring the project back home instead of them seeing it as something happening at the 
Ministry of Finance. So, we introduced the Integrated Financial Management Information 
System and being done in Ghana, we prefixed it with Ghana, so we called it GIFMIS, 
Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System. And so now we were going 
to the people say “no, it’s about your financial management, it’s not about Ministry of 
Finance, it’s about you yourself.  
I went away. But I came back, and it is still ongoing, and I was surprised that it’s still 
ongoing because I thought it’s something, we thought you could do within two to four 
years, actually we were aiming at four years, that maximum by four years we should be 
able to roll it out. Well they claim they have some progress, but not able to answer that 
yet. .... 
As Dechow and Mouritsen (2005) have argued “ERP systems are particularly interesting for what 
they make impossible” but there are hurdles to overcome which they termed as systems-based 
‘blind spots’ and ‘trading zones.’ Furthermore, they argued that “management control in an ERP-
environment is not a property of the accounting function, but a collective affair where local control 
issues in different parts of the organisation are used to create notions of global management” 
(pp691). Further progress in GIFMIS implementation may well depend on the full participation 
and cooperation of the MDAs, therefore making it counterproductive for the MoF/CAGD to deny 
the sector ministries control and ownership in an ERPs target environment. of the other government 
agencies. 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




6.6.4 Centralising logics alienate some MDAs 
Centralising PFM reforms in the MoF and the CAGD tends to cut out the rest of the MDAs and 
defeats ownership at the MDA level, risking of the reforms.  It appears to be appropriate for reforms 
to be driven from the centre, but the actual reforms should be translated into the MDAs business 
operations at the MDA level. This was what was attempted during the first wave of the MTEF 
reforms that gave it its initial success. But that translation was not completed, as any management 
reforms at the MDA level had to be interfaced properly with the PFM reforms. As participant G15 
from MoF observed: 
But if for example because we are championing the PFM processes, MoF, maybe, hijacked 
the whole process there wouldn’t be that ownership. 
For “bottom-heavy” sectors such as health, reforms must embrace a large mass of people, therefore 
making it difficult to direct reforms remotely from above and at a distance. As an official (G13) 
observed to make an impact they need to go on the journey with a large mass of people: 
…. thinking it’s not to the extent that is expected. It hasn’t been able to have that 
knowledge impact. The reason is that you journey with a large mass of people who go 
through this process; and as you’ve seen, the PFM cuts across the procurement, the audit, 
financial management, planning. Each forms a very significant part of the activities of 
almost every unit and hospital facility that we have across. When we talked about the 
planning process, in the past it’s quite heavy. It’s bottom-up. So, you get a district calling 
all the sub-districts and hold meetings to do this, and the region will call all the districts 
together to do this. Then national will call all the regions so it’s quite huge. What hasn’t 
been done which would have helped with is the teams. To be able to keep the teams so 
that they can impact this all the time.  
In defence of the policy to centralize the reforms, the centralising logics appeared to have been 
driven by market logics such as the cost and affordability of reforms. However, forming and 
working with teams is important for institutionalisation of practices and sustainability. Reforming 
is not cheap; and could not be done on a piecemeal shoe-string budgets; neither is it prudent for it 
to be done by borrowing large amounts of money (especially in poor countries).  
In summary the Ghana reforms have decoupled in the sense of the overall programmes being 
symbolic displays to satisfy legitimacy-seeking purposes (Modell 2009). But there has also been 
decoupling of operating-level practices and action such as budgeting and other transactional 
procedures (especially the MTEF, Programme budgeting, and Cash Management) that appeared 
not to confer any internal operational benefits. 
On the other hand, the introduction and diffusion of budget techniques with coercive automations 
has generated skills and knowledge across the Government of Ghana.  
The processual approach has demonstrated that against the historical (baseline) benchmarks of 
PFM’s performance of 1993 and before, the same problems and issues persist in the Government 
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of Ghana’s PFM systems (after 26 years of reforms). A litmus test of whether pernicious 
institutionalised accounting practices had changed was based on observations in October 2019 in 
some government organisations, where officials were still taking brides in processing government 
payments. This observation was not an isolated occurrence, as in the Judicial Service, which must 
have the highest ethical standards, several high court judges were caught and dismissed for taking 
brides in 201534. 
In the next chapter, this study goes beyond the observation of decoupling to conduct a deeper 
analysis of the institutional processes underlining these findings in the case of Ghana. 
Donor influences had been pervasive from the design stage of the reforms, during implementation, 
and to the post-implementation narrative. Such influences on accounting reforms comprised the 
conditionalities that were sometimes imposed, funding constraints and requirements, and the type 
of advice proffered. These influences ensured that only certain types of questions were asked, and 
certain types of issues considered, while other questions and issues were ignored. Such discursive 
issued sets the limits to accounting change (Young 1996). The conception of reforms in Ghana 
showed that co-financing of reforms by external donors affected design of performs leading to the 
fragmentation of reforms that did not pay due consideration to the synergies within the PFM 
systems. The co-financing of the reforms by donors had an in-built logic of demonstrating visible 
contribution to Ghana’s development and influence buying defeated the logic of integration of 
reform components 
Public sector accounting reforms depend on other public sector reforms to have any significant 
impact. When treated in isolation without taking into account the other types of public sector 
reforms, accounting reforms is self-defeating. Problems of reform integration is further 
exacerbated by internal coordination of the myriad public sector reforms that enhances the 
performance of accounting and PFM reforms. In Ghana public sector reforms were ran from a 
central secretariat as a project funded by donor loans and aid. It made the reforms susceptible to 
hi-jacking by politicians and other high-ranking officials in government who capture the financing 
for personal gains. Reform hi-jacking had been a common occurrence in both the MoF (especially 
PUFMARP) and some of the earlier versions of public service and civil service reforms. 
Reformers in developing countries such as Ghana have misguidedly misconstrued the implantation 
of central controls (through technology for example) as reforms. Improving accounting controls 
may be desirable, but it is fundamental misunderstanding to use available tools to impose controls 
without addressing underlying fundamental issues. Such reforms actions have only increased the 
 
34 See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-34814630/anas-aremeyaw-anas-ghana-s-undercover-
journalist-unmasked. The film captured more than 30 judges and 170 judicial officials implicated in the 
country’s biggest corruption scandal. (viewed at 19.06 05/12/2019) 
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incentives to by-pass controls and defeat the reforms. For example, low-pay and the dependence 
of extended family on the few people with regular salaries in Ghana encourage public and civil 
servants to take brides Controls enforcement by itself cannot change improve accounting 
performance, until the underlying condition are addressed. Decoupling in the implementation of 
the ERP solution had resulted in the failure to use the accounting technologies to improve 
operational management. How and Alawattage (2012 pp. 406) have argued that whilst the ‘ERP’s 
potential to integrate, standardise, centralize and routinise, opened up opportunities and facilitated 
changes in the role of management accountants’ this has not happened in Ghana. Both PUFMARP 
and GIFMIS neglected to support sectoral business operations in the MDAs 
The culture of dishonesty and manipulation by key central agencies, especially the MoF and the 
CAGD, characterised the earlier phases of Ghana’s PFM reforms. This manifested in the politics 
of deciding the location of the central control of the PFM project secretariat, the engagement of 
senior MoF directors as reform consultants, paying allowances as intressement to those who were 
favoured to participate in reform project activities. These issues generated unhealthy dynamics for 
the reforms. The politics extended to the role of some key officials occupying influential positions 
in government in making accounting change happen or blocking the type of changes required to 
move the systems and practices to a higher level. For example, decentralising instead of 
centralising of financial management in government to improve budget execution was ignored in 
the 1980s Often well-placed professionals chose the easy path in executing the duties of their office 
(for example in, reconciling accounts, or in presenting accounts). 
While this was not a reflection on all individuals working in the public sector in Ghana (for there 
were some hard working, honest officials who did their work well and made genuine sacrifices), 
overall Ghanaian public officials had been caught up in the culture of Kalabule, and they are still 
yet to emerge wholly from it.  
The implications of the dynamics associated with accounting change is the results evidenced in the 
construction of the reform phases seen from the time of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) 
from 1983 to the completion of this study. The PFM reform phase saw enthusiastic adoption of 
some of the accounting techniques that were later reversed resulting in a silent dismantling of 
reform.  
In this period there had been very little change in the thought collective (Douglas, 1986) of the 
accounting cadre in the public service despite the recent increase in their numbers. The underlying 
institutional thinking has been fossilized, making it difficult to deinstitutionalise the old practices 
and to re-institutionalise new ones. Such challenges have continued to the present times 
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7 DISCUSSIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS OF THE GHANA PFM REFORMS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter discusses the implications of the empirical findings through the theoretical lens of 
institutional logics, which has been adopted as a guide to the interpretation of evidence from the 
empirical data (Ravitch and Riggan, 2012; Creswell, 2005). Fundamental to institutional logics is 
the interinstitutional orders, and the social relationship between society, organisations, and its 
individual members. Buckley (1967) reminds researchers to focus on the relationship of the whole 
to the parts, which is also reflected in the dialectical framework of embedded agency (Benson 1977 
and Seo and Creed, 2002). The empirical data indicated that it is how the whole society (as Ghana) 
has operated that has determined how the reforms (as change and innovations) have emerged and 
became institutionalised or otherwise. 
Underlying the ILA approach is that the world reflects and is constituted by multiple logics because 
of multiplicity of institutions shaping our lives. As Nath has observed, “The concept of institutional 
logics refers to the organizing principles that furnish guidelines to actors as to how to behave, or 
the higher order belief systems that shape cognition and action.” (Nath, 2019 pp 1116). 
7.2 THEORISING ACCOUNTING CHANGE WITH INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS THROUGH THE 
NOTION OF EMBEDDED AGENCY 
The narrative of change, based on the ILA, revolves around how the categorical elements are 
transposed from one institutional order to another within the institutional system. Thus, this study 
asks how, within the constraints of the existing institutional orders, individuals and organisations 
(as acting units) blend the categorical elements? To account for change scholars such as Thornton 
et al. (2012) have mobilised the notion of cultural entrepreneurs in the ILA, as an allied concept of 
institutional entrepreneurs. Institutional entrepreneurs are said to be endowed or can acquire the 
necessary attributes because of where they are placed to blend the categorical elements of the 
institutional orders to bring about change.  
To illustrate how change occurs within the inter-institutional order system, Thornton at al. (2012) 
introduced three notions: “technological disruption”; “combination evolution”; and “cultural 
materials”.  Using these concepts as linguistic tools, they argued that entrepreneurial and 
innovative activities occur at increased rates during a period of technological disruption when 
cultural entrepreneurs innovate using a combination of evolution and cultural materials. “Cultural 
materials” represent technology or institutional symbols and practices, and the more there are the 
more the cultural entrepreneurs are able to invent or innovate. With this they go on to show how 
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cultural entrepreneurs visualise problems and innovate to solve them by transposing logics from 
one institutional order to another or by blending the orders. 
In developing change narratives, logics theorists have mobilised phrasal nouns (such as “dominant 
logic”, “knowledge corridors”, and “pattern recognition”) to describe how cultural entrepreneurs 
innovate or bring about change. The logics language is drawn from the strategy, entrepreneurial, 
and cognitive literatures that point to cross-context innovations that have emerged out of 
contradictions in symbols and practices. These linguistics tools are derived from psycho-
institutional human capital concepts (Thornton et al., 2012). Concepts such as “dominant logic” – 
is said to be a filter that operate on managerial attention; “knowledge corridors” – occur when an 
individual with the appropriate background (knowledge, experience across , and profession) are 
able to recognise an opportunity that others could not see, and act on them; and  “pattern 
recognition”  - that individuals with the right experience are able to recognise and capitalise on the 
prevailing juxtaposition of events to bring change. Narratives are therefore important to how 
institutional logics account for change. The success of a narrative depends on how a story is made 
“available and accessible to the human psyche not at the intellectual, but at the emotional level 
where it is more powerful” and can be activated (Thornton et al., 2012 pp. 105). The ILA change 
narrative is not dissimilar the dialectical approach to accounting for human agency, which will be 
discussed in the concluding chapter (Chapter 8).  
7.3 BUDGET LOGICS: PROGRESS AND MODERNISATION LOGICS 
Within the ILA, this study mobilises the concepts of rational myths (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 
Scott 1991) and modern rationalised polity (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991) to discuss how they 
generate multiple institutional logics relevant to our empirical evidence. To neo-institutionalists, 
change occurs through evolutionary development of institutions; and mechanisms such as the 
modernisation of the world society through structuration of organisational fields (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983 and Meyer et al., 1997), or alternatively through exteriority of society35. 
The notion of progress and the quest to modernise bureaucracies go hand in hand; and accounting 
reforms are part of bureaucratic modernisation efforts in LDCs. This position is reinforced by the 
observation that bureaucracies are the most preeminent institutional form in modern society 
(Zucker, 1983). Scholars have argued that in principle everything is organisable in bureaucratic 
terms (Scott, 1991). But modernisation of bureaucracies has a distinctive set of belief systems and 
the mindset, as institutions, supporting the modern modes of consciousness and are reflected in the 
knowledge systems and cognitive styles (Scott, 1991; Berger, Berger, Kellner 1973). These 
 
35 The ILA offers a non-deterministic, a non-functionalistic alternative for theorising change that is based 
on the exteriority of society (Friedland and Alford, 1991). 
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scholars have identified three set of knowledge and cognitive styles to include: bureaucratic 
administration, technological production, and pluralization of life-worlds.  
Scott (1991 pp.166) has noted that:  
Knowledge systems supporting bureaucratic forms, for example, include beliefs in 
delimited spheres of competence, the importance of proper procedures, and impersonality. 
Associated cognitive styles include an emphasis on orderliness, autonomous 
organizability, predictability, affective neutrality, and moralized anonymity. 
These requirements for formal rationality are only a generalised “ideal-type” symbolic model in 
modern society. For rationality comes in different forms as the concept of rational myths try to 
illustrate. The concept of rational myths posits that rationality does not come in one 
undifferentiated form, rather they come in various forms and guises, shaped and influenced by 
specific values (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1991). There are ‘multiple and diverse examples 
of potential sources of rationalised myths: public opinion, educational systems, laws, courts, 
professions, ideologies, technologies, regulatory structures, awards and prizes, certification and 
accreditation bodies, government endorsement and requirement’. (Scott, 1991 pp. 167). 
Related to the notion of rationalised myth, but quite distinct from it, is the concept of modern 
polity. By modern polity, Jepperson and Meyer (1991) meant “the system of rules conferring 
societal authourity in pursuit of collective ends, establishing agents of collective regulation and 
intervention” (pp. 206). They argued that the construct of modern polity ‘provides many 
opportunities, empowerment, resources and legitimations enabling formal organisation of all sorts 
of activities in terms of the claimed collective good’ (pp. 208). It is an enabling concept that 
mobilise people and their activities through rationalization to produce collective goods that 
otherwise will not be provided. It focuses on (i) collective control and sovereignty, and (ii) 
collective means and ends. These two elements support the rationalization of collective actions 
through legitimation of public agents in society to perform collective tasks or functions. The 
“system of rules” can be narrowly or extensively defined to include conventions, but the idea is 
that they are constructed to cover “polity centres”. Jepperson and Meyer (1991) identified the key 
polity centres to include: (i) the construction and legitimation of necessary goals; (ii) means and 
ends technology (scientific forms of production or education), (iii) standardised and universalised 
resources (monetarisation), (iii) principles of collective sovereignty on property rights;(iv) and 
systems of rationalised control (for example enforcement of contracts).  The polity centres function 
to ensure societal goals such as the pursuit of material wealth, adoption of scientific methods in 
production, monetary rules, property rights, labour contracts and so on, are generated and 
maintained. These are generated from the legal, scientific, cultural, and administrative systems in 
society. Jepperson and Meyer (1991) argued further that there are aspects of the modern society 
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that are not securely linked to polity rules, and that it is crucial to have a wider polity that supports 
social and organisational rationalization. Jepperson and Meyer (1991) posits that: 
When these constructed elements are widespread and linked to universalised depictions of 
the moral and natural worlds, rationalized organising is greatly facilitated (pp. 208). 
It is within these rationalised myths and polity centres that competition and conflict may arise and 
generate different logics that shall termed as modernisation-logics. In the proposed framework, the 
study adapts the LDCs neo institutional elements developed in the previous matrix (in sections 
3.5.4 in Table 3.1, and in Table 7.2 below) into a LDCs inter-institutional order matrix to explain 
the PFM reform through the budget logics. 
7.4 COMPETING LOGICS WITHIN INTERINSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
The budget logics are driven by three ideal-types of institutional orders, which this study 
constructed as follows: (i) national community order (defined as the Ghanaian polity); (ii) state 
order; and (iii) international community order. Some elements in these orders are contradictory (or 
competing), while others are co-operative or both.  
The national community order represents the ‘polity of Ghanaians’, which the study has 
constructed to represent a situation where the state is closer to the community and reflect their 
logics. This order is represented by (i) extended family as a clan (ii) local community as 
neighbourhood, (iii) axial religion (Christianity and Islam) co-existing with traditional ancestral 
worships (iv) local community that perceives market as a specific place (such as Makola in Accra, 
Kejetia in Kumasi)36. The notion of ‘modern polity’ as construed in Jepperson and Meyer (1991) 
included the state, but extended to collective discourse, social movements, and civil society made 
up of private entities such as “corporations, enterprise managers, science, professions, and modern 
individuals” (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991 pp. 208). The flexibility in the notion of modern polity 
enables us to align it to the community order, which I define to include aspects of a unitary state 
with decentralized organs that have delegated financial duties and responsibilities; public 
discourses, social movements, and civil society endowed to represent the community spirit in a 
meaningful way. For the purpose of this study I would distinguish the ‘Ghanaian polity’ from the 
formal state organs (especially the central bodies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Presidency, 
and the others). In addition, I define civil individuals and community leaders as the “acting units”, 
or the focal points, within the national polity. 
 
36 These are examples of markets in the cities of Ghana.  
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The state order has been constructed to represent a state that has been captured by self-interested 
African bourgeoise (Ekeh, 1975) or elite groups37, who have largely jettisoned most of the welfare 
requirements of a nation-state. That behaviour makes the state a vampire-state (Frimpong- Ansah, 
1991), where the political class see the states assets as personal property from which they derive 
their authourity. Another characterisation of Ghana at its best is a corporatist state, when the 
welfare concerns are addressed (Campbell and Pedersen, 2001) or wavering between ‘politicised 
state capitalism’ and ‘politicised market capitalism’, when it relies on markets and privatisation of 
public services (Hopper et al, 2009 pp. 477). From Jepperson and Meyer (1991) schema ( in Table 
7.1 below), Ghana occupies Cell 3 (Segmental state, which is a state outside of society) and 
attempting to move to cell 1.This state order could also occupy cell 2 as a statist state constructed 
to mean a unitary state with direct controls  by the central agencies and less financial delegation to 
other state entities, but civil society moving to perform the social functions of the state (such as 
education and health). The state is therefore not a monolithic whole, but divided into separate 
acting units within the central agencies such as the Presidency, MoF/CAGD and some of the 
powerful sector ministries) 
Jepperson and Meyer (1991) provide a guide to four main types of polity as in Table 7.1 below: 
Table 7.1: Four main types of modern rationalised polity 
 Degree of collective institutionalisation of public functions and 
functional relations  
Degree of 
authorisation of 
social subunits as 
public actors 











Source: Jepperson and Meyer (pp. 216): Four main types of modern rationalised polity 
The international community order is the third ideal-type construct representing the rest of the 
world based on the root metaphor of a global village. We derived this from the construction 
provided by Thornton et al., 2012 to reflect modern Western society with root metaphors of (i) 
family as a firm (that we consider as a nuclear unit) (ii) professions as relational networks; (ii) 
corporation as hierarchical organisations; and (iv) international community of diplomatic agencies. 
This order includes the international financial institutions (the World Bank and IMF) and the other 
United Nation bodies, multi-lateral and bilateral diplomats and development agencies, 
 
37 Ekeh eschewed the use of the term ‘elite’ as a description of the privilege classes in African because “it 
connotes to me a class of men who enjoy autonomy in the formation of their values and in their decision-
making processes, independent of external sources” (pp94). In the absence of the autonomy in the 
formation of values, bourgeoise seems more appropriate.  
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




international multilateral corporations, and networks of foreign interests in Ghana. The influence 
of the international community is exerted through consultative group meetings attended by the 
multilateral and bilateral aid agencies and Government of Ghana officials. 
Table 7.2: Adapted Interinstitutional System Ideal Types for Ghana 
Y-Axis:  X-Axis: Institutional Orders  
 National Community 
Order (decentralized 
state responding to 
community logics) 




Extended Family 1 
 
Local Community 2 
 
Religion: Axial 
Religion and natural 3 
 
Community Market 4 
 
 
Statist and state 
corporatism 5 
 
International Market- 6 
 




International Community -9      
Root 
Metaphor 1 






Axial religious Church 




Roadside stalls; market 










Profession – Profession as 
relational network 
 
Corporation- Corporation as 
hierarchy 
 
International Community - 










Axial religious- belief 





Variety of and 
reliability of supplies 
Stolen elections 
either by vote 




International Market- Share 
price 
 
Profession – Personal expertise 
 
Corporation- Market position of 
firm 
 
International Community - 
International Capital/ 
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matriarchal authourity  
 
Local Community- 
Material wealth, but 
values also count 
 
Axial religious- 




Status conferred by 
capacity to purchase on 







Profession - Professional 
association 
 




International Community - 
faceless, local, and international 





Hometown by lineage 















economic class: By 
money or education 
and international 
networks 
International Market- Faceless 
 
Profession – Association with 
quality of craft Personal 
reputation 
 
Corporation- Bureaucratic roles 
 
International Community - A 
mixture of diplomats and 




























Profession – Membership in 
guild & association 
 
Corporation- Employment in 
firm 
 
International Community - 
International diplomacy and 




Status in household/ 
Status of interest 
group/connection 
to elites 
International Market- Status in 
market  
 
Profession – Status in 
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Status in market 





Corporation- Status in hierarchy 
 
International Community - 











Increase status & 
honour of members 
& practices/ Enhancing 















good/ control of 
citizens and 
biopolitics 
International Market- Increase 
efficiency 
profit and market capture 
 
Profession – Increase personal 
reputation and knowledge of 
local terrain  
 
Corporation- Increase size & 
diversification of firm, transfer 
pricing, 
 
International Community –, 
local charity for hearts and 
minds, aid to influence policy, 
diplomacy, and hegemony 






Extended Family - 
Family politics/ 
personal achievement 
(education or money) 
 
Local Community- 
Visibility of actions/ 




Worship of calling/ 
Sub-groups / aura 
 
Backroom politics/  
patronage 
International Market- Industry 
analysts 
 






International Community - aid 
for policy influence  
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Clan affiliations and 























International Market- Market 
capitalism 
 






International Community -   
International capital and IFIs  
 
Table 7.2 outlines the multiple logics influencing the Ghanaian society. Scholars have asserted that 
in a situation of multiple logics, one of the logics will dominate by acting as a filter on managerial 
attention (Stafford and Stapleton, 2018). This study argues that, to a large extent, the international 
community logics dominate managerial attention of both the state order and national community 
in Ghana. The rest of this chapter discussed how the impact of the domination by the international 
community has been unfavourable for the PFM reforms in Ghana  
7.5 THE BUDGET CREDIBILITY LOGICS AND PFM REFORMS IN GHANA 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I discuss the budget credibility logics through the 
framework we have developed based on institutional logics approach. The traditional political 
economy analysis of reforms through the lens of neo-classical economic framework, (see Fritz at 
al. 2017), attribute the performance of reforms to questionable commitment by politicians and 
officials to reforms, and their rent seeking behaviour. With a few exceptions (Manning and 
McCourt, 2013) the practitioner-literature tends not to explain the role of the international donors 
on the reforms. Scholars have intermittently drawn attention to the role of the Western countries 
and their agents in developing countries. Often these roles are examined through theoretical lens 
of the political economy and neo-colonial interest (Lassou and Hopper ,2016; Tinker 1980, Cooper 
1980). In this thesis we argue that the roles of both state officials and the international donor 
community are more complicated than what it is often portrayed to be.  
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In the discussions in this section, I link the interinstitutional orders to the appropriate categories 
from our empirical data (in Table 5.1 in Section 5.3) to discuss the explanation of the budget logics. 
The budget logics are driven by three forces (National Community (or polity) Order, State Order, 
and International Community Order): some are contradictory (competing), while others are 
cooperative or both.  
Table 7.3: Budget Credibility Logics of Ghana Reforms  
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38 For details of these categories see Appendix 5: The Mapping of the 69 categories 
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Note 1: This order represents the Ghanaian polity as a pluralist ideal-type society. This construct therefore 
partially includes ‘decentralized’ state organs that are enabled and respond to the community logics 
In the discussions that follows from section 7.5.1 to 7.5.9, this study asks whether the three 
institutional orders identified in Table 7.3 above are co-dependent, or they are 
competing/conflicting logics. This analysis often brings out the domestic and international 
challenges to state legitimacy (Goldstone, 1991) 
7.5.1 Root Metaphors 
The notion of ‘a vampire state’ captures the essence of why the behaviours of successive 
governments in Ghana have fed into the logics of budget credibility. Ghanaian politicians have had 
the tendency to treat the state assets as personal property, distort budget appropriations from 
welfare programmes into ‘politicised priority programmes’, and bypass budget controls during 
implementation. Budget allocations are vired to the office of the President, while some departments 
do not receive their approved allocations. A parliamentary participant, G5, observed:  
Yes, because you see the Office of the President: They will see their budget boom, while 
some ministries are suffering, they are suffering. When we are approving this 2018 budget 
most of the Ministries, some have been given 40% of allocation of their budget, that’s at 
September 40%, some are given 50%, some even 30-something per cent. It means that by 
the end of the year the amount they get, is I guess only 50% or 60% (of their budget). 
Where is the money for the difference? Meanwhile the total expenditure, they have not 
exceeded, but it’s almost the same we have approved for them, so how? What happened? 
So that is where the problem is”. 
 Distorting the budget to support the Office of the President is not consistent with the national 
community aspirations, and the international community would not support that. Undue resources 
being allocated to the office of the president and their unplanned activities often derailing the 
budget implementation are ubiquitous practices, irrespective of the political party in power. 
Another participant cited the distorting effect on the budget funds by a former president’s frequent 
week-end trips to Kumasi (his home constituency) as an example. Another egregious example is 
how state-owned enterprises (SOE) have been managed by successive government, and the threat 
they pose to the fiscal stability of Ghana (PEFA, 2018). The behaviour of officials, in distorting 
the management of the budget, contradicts one of the root metaphors of the international 
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community (as sponsors of governance and democratic reforms). However, the same behaviour 
enhances the hegemonic domination of the international community (their other root-metaphor). 
For this reason, they are prepared to tolerate and support any governmental regime that reasonably 
enhances their hegemonic influences, if they do not embarrass them. To control the excessive abuse 
of power by national politicians, the relationship between the ‘Vampire State’ and the international 
community is grounded in aid and loan conditionalities that often require specific reforms: As 
participant, G15, said:  
A lot of our programs, PFM programs, are supported by donors. DFID is supporting. I 
think USAID also supports. So, donors are in there. But if donors are supporting, I think 
it’s only natural that they would come with some requests or prior actions or certain, should 
I say requirements. That because I am supporting you must do A, B, C, D. It is possible. 
Researchers have found that some of the reforms recommendations provided by the international 
community in Africa since 1980 are ‘over-specified simplistic solutions’ that do not address the 
underlying issues in accounting and auditing (Hopper and Lassou, 2016). Others have asked: “. . . 
how on earth can the IMF and the WB persist for so long in pursuing the wrong policies that 
produce such poor outcomes?” Chang (2007, p. 35). 
 
The answer seems to lie in the financial and technical influences donor countries and organisations 
exert through the neo-colonial relationship with the former colonies. The medium of exchange is 
“aid” and “the underlying assumption is always the economic and technical superiority of the donor 
country’ (Oyugi, 1986 pp 270). Critical scholars such as Oyugi have argued that underlying the 
‘lopsided’ relationship between the international donors and their ex-colonies is a psychology that 
guide all transactions in which recipient countries like Ghana are conditioned to accept a position 
of inferiority. Such countries are placed in situations where they can neither manipulate the 
relations nor control it to their advantage. But that does not mean that recipient countries do not 
attempt to manipulate the relationship. Oliver (1991) has shown that in response to institutional 
pressure to conform, a resource dependent organisation, instead of passive conformity, may adopt 
various strategies including proactive manipulation. But active manipulation is not left to the 
resource-dependent state alone. The international community is often complicit in such 
manipulations, as the economic recovery programme (ERP) archival records show:  
The Chairman indicated that in the past, praise for success in implementing the economic 
recovery programme came from the international community, especially our external 
collaborators. Internally there was scepticism about this success because the gains were 
not visible particularly in terms of remunerations. The unpleasant situation currently is that 
both the external and the internal constituents are sceptical about the sustainability of the 
ERP…. (Review of the Economy, 3 December 1990, MFEP) 
The relationship is often a game of the familiar international diplomacy between nations states. 
The process of relationship building between the host country and the international diplomats 
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underpins the lopsided relationship and the maintenance of the structure of the unequal 
transactions. Oyugi describes the process as: 
 the resident ambassador establishes a very cordial relationship with the Head of State or 
with certain key ministers in the government. The relationships soon begin to acquire an 
informal character. The informal out of office meetings become more frequent; the 
frequency of social gatherings increases and known passions (such as golf-playing) are 
taken advantage of. Sooner or later, a symbiotic relationship emerges that is exploited by 
both sides but especially by the stronger side (pp 271).  
Both economic and political ideologies are integral part of this relationship.  To meet the 
requirements of their financial sponsors, resource dependent countries (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978), like Ghana, have centralized financial and management controls, and have adopted 
politicised state capitalism (Hopper et al., 2009).   
In Ghana, the dynamics of these relationships have often impacted on both the management of the 
budget and the programme of financial management reforms.  
7.5.2 Source of Legitimacy  
The legitimacy to manage the budget is granted to the government in power through the political 
processes and the regulatory framework. As an MoF official, G11, explained:  
There's a legal framework, yeah. Unfortunately, we started the implementation of some of 
these reforms before the PFM law was passed, that's Act 921, yeah, we started some 
activities before 921 was passed. So, in terms of the relationship between Minister of 
Finance, cabinet ministers, the MDAs themselves and the role they are supposed to play, 
as part of the reforms the PFM Act spells clearly what we're supposed to do, even the 
reporting requirements and all the roles that each of the institutions are supposed to play. 
So, as part of the reforms, I think we've tried to address that institutional arrangement, and 
there are even timelines assigned when specific reports are supposed to go. 
The law since 2016 has been strengthened, building into its fiscal responsibility provisions which 
require the minister to take personal responsibility for the budget. However, it is not just the 
legitimacy of the Minister of Finance to manage the budget that is often questioned (even by his 
own colleagues)39, it is the legitimacy of the whole government that is often questioned. The state 
needs for gaining legitimacy (from both the domestic constituents and the international financial 
backers) has always been high because of the nature of electioneering in Ghana, which is 
characterised by vote buying and rigging of the election results. The state logics in Ghana often 
lead to a high pre-election public expenditure that is opaque. In the design of a technologic solution 
to address the budget management the BPEMS/GIFMIS techno-solution focused on aggregate 
expenditure reporting from the consolidated fund account (reporting by the Controller and 
Accountant General), rather than on both management and financial accounting and reporting 
 
39 From conversation notes taken with one of the gatekeepers. 
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(meeting the business requirements) at the MDAs-level. This focus on external reporting is partly 
historical but has emerged partly also from the adoption of solutions to gain legitimacy, especially 
from the international community. Such solutions often eventually turn out to be inappropriate for 
ensuring how resources are allocated and disbursed. The BPEMs design offers a clear example 
where, financial reporting requirements were manipulated to suit the Controller and Accountant 
General. The design of BPEMs reiterated the requirements of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, that 
all funds inflows to the government of Ghana (with the exception of trust funds) to go into the 
Consolidated Fund of Ghana (CFG) held at the Bank of Ghana. PEFA 2018 observed:  
Due to the way the Financial Administration Act (2003) was formulated, the annual 
financial reports prepared by CAGD cover only expenditures financed out of the 
Consolidated Fund, into which the revenues collected by GRA are deposited (pp. 5) 
To produce complete public accounts for the Government of Ghana required the CAGD to report 
on a broad conception of CF (including all revenue collected by ministries, some external inflows, 
and statutory funds). But the department found it difficult to produce the information required 
(PEFA 2018) and resorted to a minimal and restrictive interpretation of the constitution for its own 
legitimacy. The restrictive interpretation was further legitimised in the FAA 2003, which 
reinforced the narrow interpretation of the CFG, and essentially bifurcated the meaning of public 
funds (and reduced the scope of the Consolidated Fund reporting)40. In addition, the CAGD as an 
acting unit, influenced the BPEMs design to focus on the CF reporting in exclusion of the reporting 
requirements of the MDAs. This narrow direction that had been given to BPEMs was reversed 
only after the software licenses were acquired, and during the second phase of the project, under 
GIFMIS-stage and a new leadership in both the CAGD and MOF. As an official, G22, in the 
CAGD reported: 
When we started, reporting was an issue, but a lot of those hurdles have been ‘skipped’. 
So, they don’t only generate their trial balance, they (MDAs) are able to generate all the 
other statements of accounts on the system. Initially, this is one major reengineering that 
took place. When the system was setup, if it was set up to look at reporting from a central 
point of view, the Oracle technology is defined such that there’s something called a 
balancing segment in the chart of accounts. Now, if I give a code for that balancing 
segment, everything must balance in terms of debit and credit around that code. When we 
started the implementation there was only one balancing segment called GOG. So, at the 
end of the day you could only prepare one central account at national level when we 
started. Now, it got to a point even GIFMIS was unable to generate reports. And we the 
experts explained to them that the decision was taken at the start of the implementation to 
report at central level because people argued from our FA and FAR that Ministry’s 
department and agencies didn’t need to produce a balance sheet. Why would Ghana New 
Agency, why would they want to produce a balance sheet? That was their argument. 
Balance sheet is only meaningful at the government level, GOG point of view. Now, at a 
point, that was creating more noise. So, we the team here now decided that every institution 
 
40 The has since been remedied in the section 48 of the PFM Act (2016), that states: “Any revenue or other 
money raised or received for Government shall form part of the Consolidated Fund”. 
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that is on GIFMIS will have its own balancing code. So that actually was a major 
reengineering that took place from the system point of view. Even Oracle came in and felt 
it couldn’t be done. (CAGD official). 
To obtain legitimacy from the international community, from 2005/2006 onwards the design of 
PFM reforms in LDCs have had to adopt benchmarks and best practices based on Public 
Expenditure Financial Accountability (PEFA) diagnostic tool in order to get endorsement and 
financial sponsorship from the international community (WB/IMF). In this institutional element, 
the ICs’ logics do not conflict because the second pursuit is to ensure that the government reports 
enable them to fulfil their fiduciary requirements. The potential conflict in logics is that the notion 
of “best practice” has been critiqued (see Andrews 2006, 2012, Grindle, 2013, 2017) as not 
supportive of credible reforms.   
Enacting legislation to impose performance management within the civil service is another 
example of the introduction of inappropriate reform techniques. Any effective performance 
management has three basic canons of accountability: (i)ability to determine and measure outputs 
and outcomes (as policy ends); (ii) adequate and reliable flow of resources to implement activities 
(as means); and (iii) ability of the principal to provide a creditable feedback to the agent (or the 
performer). In the absence of a credible budgeting systems, the first two conditions cannot be met, 
and the third becomes just an empty ritual. Ohemeng (2011) has noted that Ghana attempted to 
implement a ‘voluntary’ performance management system in the 1990s (see Dodoo, 1997), which 
failed. Without addressing the conditions-precedent the government legislated to impose a 
performance management system, when a voluntary one failed in 2008, that continues to falter. 
Ohemeng (2011) describes attempts to legislate to institutionalise performance management 
system in the public service as ‘chasing a mirage’. Such findings in Ghana public sector are 
consistent with the argument made by both DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan 
(1977/1991) that organisations adopt practices due to pressure in the environment to obtain 
resources to survive lead to lose coupling and decoupling. Similarly, several studies have 
highlighted the problematics of the use of performance measurement and management (PMM) 
techniques in NPM reforms whether used on voluntary basis, such as the balanced scorecard, or 
diffused by means of coercive pressures to public sector organisations Modell (2009). 
7.5.3 Sources of Authourity  
Ghana being a unitary state, in the period before automation (GIFMIS), the government had a 
manual centralized management system where all transactions (except petty cash) were channelled 
to the Accountants General’s Department for payment. This created payment bottlenecks, which 
the reforms aimed to address (BPEMs Design Report, 1997/98). When the budget funds were not 
released by the MoF and the CAGD, the MDAs’ management could by-pass the central controls 
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to incur expenditure. This had unintended consequences such as arrears and debt accumulation, as 
G6 explained:  
So, it was contributing a lot to the serious high deficit in the accounting, in the budget 
processing and, you know, in the subsequent years, so there was a lot of deficit financing. 
It’s contributed, yes, but right now, what I mean is that currently the ability to implement 
that module, Procure to Pay is contributing to the transparencies, and then capturing 
electronically whatever is allocated in the budget, and so you reduce the excessive 
expenditure that you make in those days that they didn’t record this on the system. 
But under the manual regime there was an equitable balance of power between the MDAs and the 
MoF/CAGD, because if the MoF did not disburse funds, the MDAs could still incur expenditure 
and retain the invoices for later payment. That alone served as an incentive for the MDAs to resist 
reforms that did not improve the budget execution system but supported the enforcement of the 
prevailing centralized controls. Under GIFMIS all payment transactions (including local 
government but excluding some IGFs-funded transactions) are controlled electronically through 
the GIFMIS. The design of the automation of the budget execution processes has therefore been 
used to enforce the authourity of the central management agencies (such as the MoF and the 
CAGD). Participant G9 observed that the system is effective:  
The impact is heavy. The impact is heavy in a sense that now, Ministry of Finance can sit 
here and say, okay, we’re shutting down the system, nobody is going to disburse. 
Government can decide that funds flow, it’s terrible and therefore the whole financial 
system we’re going this way. That is huge impact. Hitherto, we didn’t have that control, 
so people were still doing their own thing…. What stops them is the controls that has been 
introduced. 
While these changes have been effective, the imposition of technology solution, norms, and 
reporting requirements has been a source of coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; 
Scott, 1991), and that in some jurisdictions, and in Ghana also, they haves been difficult to enforce. 
However, this have not stopped some scholars from arguing for coercive isomorphism as a way of 
bringing about change in PFM in LDCs (see Andrews, 2009). In Ghana, several PFM and 
procurement laws have been enacted, but it has been difficult to enforce. The imposition of techno-
solution by the central state online ministries has on occasions conflicted with the requirements of 
the IC working in the sector ministries. The ICs in such situations adopt parallel systems in 
implementing their projects and in so doing undermine the state systems. But the logics point to 
the ICs supporting the GIFMIS because the enforcement of controls would check corruptions as 
participant G17 argued:  
The reform, once controls are strong, means that corruption will go down and there will 
be more money in the hands of government for developmental projects. 
 On the other side, the line ministries finding that the centralising logics to be restrictive align their 
needs to those of parliamentarians’ inklings, in setting up statutory funds and protecting the 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




revenues they have generated internally from central bureaucratic domination. This resulted in the 
IGFs law in 2007 which granted authourity to the line ministries to retain a portion of their IGFs’ 
for internal use without paying it into the Consolidated Fund. 
Another source of authourity comes from how the professional groupings in the public or civil 
service are classified and controlled. Professionals in the civil service are however realistic about 
the limits of their authourity as expressed by participant G15 when talking about managing 
government programme: 
You are able to in a sense, direct where certain government programs or projects should 
be. You have a say in it. You may not be a final authourity, but your work actually informs 
it. 
In the public service the ultimately source of authourity rest with politicians, and public servants 
are always conscious of this, even where the law empowers them by giving them specific 
responsibilities. 
7.5.4 Sources of Identity 
March and Olsen (1984, 1989) have argued that logics guide action and that logics are tied to 
identity. The ruling elite in Ghana are identified by their social and economic interests established 
by their wealth, educational networks, or both. As inferred in Nakpodia and Adegbite (2018) elites 
refers to superior social groups who are influential because of their wealth, power, or privilege in 
society. In Ghana recruitment into the public service is often done by ‘quotas’ granted to the elites 
who may be politicians and senior officials, or by personal introduction and other acts of patronage, 
rather than on merit. As a result of the recruitment mechanisms, to a large degree, professionalism 
in the public service has eroded with time, and with that have been the loss of professional skills 
and knowledge. An MoF Official, G11, stated. 
I think that professional identity is not there, it's missing, and to me, that is the gap that we 
need to see how best we address, first and foremost, the success of any undertaking, to me, 
depends on the human being, you can take a company, change the staff, bring in new staff, 
and they can turn the whole company around. You can keep that same staff there, do 
whatever you want to do, maybe the company will not change because the people who are 
there themselves are the problem”. 
Professional failure is therefore at the heart of the poor performance of the public financial 
management and its reforms. But it is a moot point whether the practices of the international 
community, whose interest is better served by recruiting from the limited pool of local 
professionals, has exacerbated the problem or promoted greater local professionalism. Often these 
local professionals are employed and deployed by the international community as part of the new 
‘face’ of their organisations. This practice exhausts the pool of the available professional talents 
available in the public service, but these persons can also become role models and rallying point 
for greater local professionalism. The co-optation between the professional groups in the central 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




state and the international community in the LDCs/EEs, including Ghana, can produce stability in 
the status quo and unchanging institutionalised practices. But it also has the potential to produce 
change when competition of interests arises between these elements. Analogous to the argument 
made by scholars such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that the state and the professions are the 
great rationalizers leading to homogeneity in structure and culture. With the failure of the Ghanaian 
state to play this role properly, the international development community, in effect, make up for 
this failure the ‘State’ in rationalising accounting practices in Ghana. 
 Professionalism is a source of rational myth that creates zone of competition and conflicting 
logics.  It is linked to theories of ethics and values that are based on theory of personal construct 
(Kelly,1963). At the micro level, the behaviour of the individual is important for the operation of 
financial management reforms. But the individual agent also operates as part of a collective, which 
defines his identity. Both automation and financial management re-engineering as reform actions 
highlight the interaction between the individual as a governable person versus the society of which 
he/she is part. This is reflected in the person as a professional financial manager and his 
professionalization in a collective organisation. Research from emerging countries have pointed 
out that better professional arrangements in managing public finances would accomplish the goal 
of accountability than passing numerous legislations and setting anti-corruption commissions. In 
the words of Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010 pp361): 
Accountability in public expenditure can more easily be realized within the context of a 
sound accounting infrastructure and a robust accounting profession and not in the 
multiplicity of laws and anti-corruption agencies; all of which are reactive in nature. 
They argued that when non-qualified personnel oversee accounting functions and positions, as in 
the case of LDCs public service, including Ghana, the effect is ‘accountability blindness’. 
On the other hand, professionals by belonging to an organisation could hinder institutional change 
Zucker (1977) especially where the professional organisation is set to defend the existing status 
quo. 
7.5.5 Basis of Norms 
In most cases preserving the existing status quo provides the basis of norms. Whilst the basis of 
belonging to Ghana is by citizenship, equality before the law and opportunities for all is heavily 
skewed towards the educated and the elite groups. The tools for ensuring equality is a neutral and 
depoliticised public service in a secular state, but increasingly these attributes are being eroded 
away. Some senior civil servants (especially above director level in the MoF) have been drawn 
into the two main political parties (NPP and the NDC), according to accounts given by some well-
placed participants. This element of the logics of a centralising state works co-operatively with a 
community logic of politicised extended family system where political largesse is spread among 
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family members, expressed as ‘mechanical’ solidarity in Durkheimian terms (De Graft Johnson, 
1986). The position of the international community is ambivalent in this inter-institutional order 
because it has at least two elements in competition with each other. Firstly, the international 
community aims to align local politics to self-interest through diplomacy, of which in Africa most 
are propelled by corporatist’s and neo-colonial interests. They therefore work in promoting local 
elitism such as supporting status quo traditional rulers (chiefs) and conservative politicians. In the 
pre-independence period, the native authourity councils of chief and elders had found favour with 
the British interests and they alongside with the intelligentsia (lawyers and merchants) were being 
prepared for political power (Austin, 1976). It was these groups that were pushed aside by popular 
movements led by Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party to the dismay of the colonial interest.   
In direct opposition to promoting local elitism by the international community are the international 
norms that are driven by principles that are to be seen to be fair and progressive in the best case, 
and neutral in the worst case. In these two conflicting institutional elements the corporatists and 
neo-colonial interests are in conformity with the “Vampire state” logics, while the second element 
of the international community (the progressive and neutrality norm) competes with the 
politicisation of public servants and the patrimonial extended family political systems.      
7.5.6 Basis of Attention 
The basis of attention in society is gained through status in a network and wealth. Among the 
various “classes” in the civil service, pay scales determine the differences in attention given to 
accounting staff and doctors in the Ghana Health Service (GHS). Often this has been a source of 
tension between the accounting class and the professional class that controls a public sector 
organisation in Ghana, as participant, G20, said:  
And that is what is creating the issue. For example, as at now, if you’re a chartered 
accountant and you’re in the Ghana Health Service your take-home pay is about GHS 
3,000. But if you’re with controller, they would put you on IRS or whatever it is, so you 
get more comfortable. And as for remuneration, you can’t discount it. Even in the hospital, 
when the doctor knows he takes GHS 6,000 or GHS 7,000 and he knows you take GHS 
2,000, why should he respect you? 
The pay differential between qualified accountants in the public service sector and the accountants 
in the Controller and Accountant General’s department has also emerged, where the latter are paid 
through another organisations (Ghana Revenue Authourity ’s) payroll in order to circumvent civil 
service pay restrictions. This is an example of official dishonesty and gaming that has undermined 
the system, as participant G18 said of pay differential between accountants in the service sectors 
and CAGD accountants who are on IRS payroll:  
That is what is happening. …. when you charter then Accountant General sends you there 
[IRS, now part of the Ghana Revenue Secretariat] and then asks them to second you to 
this place. Then they put you on their salary, not on their budget. They put you on their 
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payroll. And because you’re not on their budget we are mandated to send the monies they 
pay these staff to them…. Yes, we’re on the single spine here. But the chartered 
accountants are sent there and then they’re instructed over there .... Ghana Revenue 
Authourity is instructed to give them some other form of appointment letter and send them 
to Accountant General so they can be on Internal Revenue salary. Meanwhile, they are not 
drawing that salary on their budget because we send the money back to them…. In Ghana, 
secondment per the Public Services Commission is for two years. You can be seconded to 
an institution which needs your services, the skills you have which they don’t have, for 
two years. 
Contrary to the regulations, these are permanent staff of the Controller and Accountant General 
Department, yet they are ‘seconded’ to another organisation and ‘transferred’ back to their parent 
organisation at the same time. 
Status in the MDAs is often conferred on professional staff who are considered as part of the ‘inside 
group’ within the organisation. Where this insider status is not possible for those professionals 
classed as ‘external’ it is important that they get support to withstand the onslaught of the 
management (such as CAGD accountants or external auditors). But this does not work well for 
Internal Audit staff who are posted by the Internal Audit Agency (IAA) compared to their 
professional colleagues from the Ghana Audit Service who have more clout. Internal auditors are 
often considered as a mere appendage to a minister or the internal management, and in some cases 
are abused for expressing professional opinion when they would be told by an MDA senior 
management “Hey, are you part of us? You either belong to us and change that your language or 
just go!”  as participant G4 said. The consequence is the low status of internal auditors resulting in 
low morale among their ranks, and the widespread loss of confidence in their work. 
 The basis of attention of a state that is controlled by elite groups, and treats most of its citizens as 
subjects, is through the networks of those in power. Access to state power has become the singular 
source of corruption in the Ghanaian society. This is manifested in local contractors trying to secure 
government contracts through extended family systems, or financial resources, or personal 
reputation in community, or axial religious affiliations. Members of   the international community, 
on the other hand gain access to the political establishment through politically visible projects, 
diplomatic ranks, and status in the international network. The multi-national corporations on the 
other side of formality sometimes offer facilitation fees to officials to gain access to senior 
politicians therefore promoting corruption, and in so doing the derailment of reforms41.  
 
41 At the time of completing this research in 2020, the Airbus scandal had surfaced in which the company 
confessed to a High Court in London of paying huge bribes in order to secure contracts in Ghana, between 
2011 and 201. The company was fined three billion pounds (£3bn) as penalties. (General News of 
Monday, 3 February 2020 Source: www.ghanaweb.com) 
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The basis of attention is also determined by the limited budget funding, and the poverty that 
conditions Ghanaian public officials to be concerned with the immediate and pragmatic issues. As 
de Graft Johnson (1986 pp.224) argued from his experiences of dealings in Ghana:  
Long-term plans are not produced because few feel any concern for it. Administrators and 
planners who try to incorporate a future of say ten years or more in their programmes get 
little concrete support. And anyone who suggests a fresh and strategic approach in policy-
making process is likely to be dismissed as a “mere theoretician”. 
Short term planning has thus been institutionalised, elevated to a status above medium to long term 
planning. Controlling this shortcoming explains why the medium-term expenditure framework 
(MTEF) planning-budgeting approach appealed initially to many public officials in Ghana. But the 
institutionalised short attention span partially explains why forward estimates were never taken 
serious in that environment and could not be institutionalised. In the initial stages the MTEF had 
an initial appeal as a novel concept but it most of its critical elements could not be sustained 
because they required sustained medium-to long term planning. 
7.5.7 Basis of Strategy 
Whilst the goals of the government of Ghana are developmental in nature, the basis of its 
management strategy is through control, of which technology is deployed to make it more efficient 
and effective. The strategy of control prevails throughout the system, from budget preparation to 
budget execution, and accounting to audit. This strategy cuts through to the reform processes which 
aim to improve controls.   
The reforms were designed to address weaknesses that arise in a manual environment, as 
participant G1 alluded to: 
The rationale, …. the current PFM reforms what we’re doing, the main objective is to 
improve budget management, financial control, and reporting. And this is targeted at 
enhancing fiscal discipline, making sure we have strategic allocation of resources and 
service delivery efficiency. And this is going to be done through the systems and processes 
that we put in place including capacity building. So mainly, the PFM reforms to a large 
extent are targeting to improving on the management of our budget, ensuring that there is 
effective and efficient financial control and efficient financial reporting as well. 
 Official government documentation of the Ghanaian public service reforms has observed that ‘the 
present management strategy has internal systems designed to maintain the status quo thus making 
it difficult to introduce innovation and manage change in response to policy reforms to stabilise, 
recover and accelerate the economy” (NIRP, 1996 para 2.4). Among the key characteristics of the 
Ghanaian public service are that management decisions are often centralized, and leadership is top-
down; and these determine the power structure which is hierarchical. These by themselves are not 
unusual for the public service, but what makes the system static is the culture of command and 
control communication structures that accompany them.  
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In Ghana there is a tendency to pay more attention to international community interests in neglect 
of the local community, perhaps in fulfilment of the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). The centralist state, instead of increasing community goods, straddles a space 
between increasing its own prestige and resources and the control of its citizens through biopolitics 
(Foucault 1997; Lemke,2001).  
In Ghana this plays out in terms of ensuring that the local political opposition is impeded through 
financial pressure, by denying official contracts to potential and known members of the political 
opposition and taking steps to cripple them financially. The practices of any government in power 
feed into the limited capacity of local companies to participate in large government contracts, while 
enhancing the opportunities of multi-national corporations (MNCs) to bid for national contracts. 
An MOF public expenditure review found that foreign companies were able to win major 
government contracts because they have access to credit and better turnovers than their local 
counterparts. Access to credit and better turnovers put them ahead of the competition as they were 
classified in a higher category (PER 1994). When it comes to payment the foreign contractors did 
not face the same injustice meted out to their local counterparts, the government the PER (1994 
para 49 pp. xiii) reported:  
It is in the light of the advantages to the foreign contractors that Government in 1994 had 
to settle huge amounts emanating from disputes with some of these contractors. The local 
companies by their contract terms are qualified for compensation. However, this does not 
usually reflect in their contracts. 
The MNCs further avoid taxes through transfer pricing of goods to increase profits and market 
capture. As a senior minister declared at the IMF conference in 2018, explaining how Ghana earns 
almost nothing from international mining companies (gold and oil), those in telecommunications, 
and others through avoidance and abuse of tax exemption devices.  For the case of the gold mining 
companies he said:  
Mr Minister, I don’t think we are earning enough revenue from the people I call our big 
boys. And here I’m going to call them – I have a way of sometimes offending people. 
Now, because of lack of know-how on our side we are being cheated by the mining 
companies in taxation. Because we are not able to audit them properly. It’s a pure – we 
have tax evasion and tax avoidance. The IMF will tell us that the avoidance one is not a 
crime. It is the evasion part that is. am I right Mr Minister? And therefore, businessmen 
will want to avoid. Whatever they can do to push you out and pay the minimum they 
would. So, we need the GRA to have crack auditors to be able to audit well the mining 
companies. Look at what the vice president told us, that for about five to six continuous 
years we have 10% carried over interest, and we’ve earned zero from it. So why don’t we 
leave the gold underground, if we are not getting anything from it as a country, so that our 
children will come and exploit it later. Why do we exploit it now and earn nothing from 
it?  
For the oil mining companies:  
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So, we need to have another way of protecting our interest. Not our interest in a form of 
you telling us the whole of the thing is zero. Next year it’s zero. The following year it’s 
zero. No. That cannot be. If it is zero, then don’t operate. Now the oil companies, it’s not 
different. We are not able to audit them well and therefore they are not getting the 
maximum of our revenue. 
For the telecommunication companies: 
You’ll be in Washington and call your wife or somebody in Ghana, and the call will be 
coming from where – the call will be coming from Libya. Have you noticed it? Am I right? 
Why should it be so? Please let us be serious. We are not getting our required amount of 
revenue from these telcos [telecommunication companies]. Either we don’t understand 
their operations, or they don’t understand it. We need the technical know-how to make 
sure that we get the best out of it. Mr Minister of Finance I think I will say that I want us 
to look at areas where we can block loopholes. 
For tax avoidance and tax exemption granted to foreign companies he said:  
Mr Minister I think we are losing a lot of money with this type of free zone business and 
you should say no to the free zones as they stand now. We give them time and ask 
everybody to adjust to, move to a particular area where we want them to be and then we 
start again afresh so that we can benefit from the tax exemptions. The amount of tax 
exemptions we give at Cabinet – Mr Minister of Finance – everyday he is on the list 
because all tax exemptions must be brought by him, and he is the one who needs the 
revenue. And he is the same person who also is forced to give the tax exemptions. So, you 
see the contradiction. We have a lot of tax exemptions and some are of course abused. So, 
we need to administer the tax exemptions also very well. 
In recent years, the government has embarked on providing vendor education on GIFMIS 
requirements to national contractors as means of ensuring compliance with financial management 
and procurement regulations and increasing the efficiency of government contracting and budget 
implementation. While vendor education gets more local companies involved in public 
procurement, there is co-optation between local vendors and international companies who are 
better equipped to participate in large scale government contracts.  
The international donors have adopted several strategies to influence policies in LDCs such as: 
establishing aid agencies such as the Department for International Development (DFID), United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), and so on.  These agencies 
have established field offices as clearing houses in developing countries, often given a lot of local 
autonomy and supporting budget to operate and to finance projects (Oyugi, 1986). Through these 
field and local staff mechanisms the international agencies can leverage their position LDCs in 
exerting policy influence and enforce the psychology of technical superiority.  
An aspect of this relationship was the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the modalities 
of aid as argued by Whitfield (2010)  
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7.5.8 Informal Control Mechanisms 
Informality prevails in government operations including the management of the budget. Ghanaian 
officials argue that the parliamentary approved national budget is only a guide, and that has become 
a taken for granted practice. The unfortunate consequence is that it has allowed the MoF to divert 
funds from one ministry to another within the approved amounts by Parliament by simply holding 
back the funds and releasing to another ministry 
Informality is also a defining characteristic of how business is transacted in government, and that 
extends to the implementation of the budget. These institutional elements have emerged from the 
larger societal influences that support and facilitate the recruitment of government officials through 
the networks of extended family and lineage. Informality is promoted by local community ethics 
in public offices (Ekeh, 1975) and the influences of axial religious groups (Swidler, 2013). 
The source of informality comes from the ‘politics’ of negotiating routine transactions in ordinary 
situations in Ghana public sector. Participant G11 observes:  
No, it's our culture, which is family orientated, political, everything's politicised, our 
family systems and it's just, in fact 
The culture of introducing politics into everything means that people pay attention to trivial issues 
(Seiler (1966) while they do not pay sufficient attention to serious matters with dire consequences 
that might appear to be remote until they suddenly emerge. The informal culture also means that 
official appointments and performance appraisals are made based on incorrect performance 
criteria. For example, where both the supervisor and the supervisee do not understand what is 
required of them many situations arise that are not understood in their proper contexts and do not 
get addressed (Ohemeng et al., 2015) 
 In this elemental order, the central state logics and the community logics are not in competition, 
therefore creating the stability and persistence of practices.  
The high degree of informality in government operation supports the influence buying of the 
international community through aid for policy. As it has been shown the pore powerful nations 
buy votes from the temporary members on the UN security council for IMF loans (Dreher et 
al.,2009) 
Often informal control mechanisms prevail because of the high degree of patronage in engagement 
of public servants.  The PUFMARP/BPEMs design report identified several weaknesses in the 
public service of Ghana, especially people issues, that impacted on financial management 
practices, and have persisted. The report found that there was a ‘mismatch between the competence 
of existing staff and the demands of the function. Low pay and inadequate career structures and 
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training were generally identified as contributory factors. For example, it noted that the low 
remuneration package of civil servants had encouraged apathy and tolerance of non-compliance 
without enforcement of sanctions (pp. 5 of PUFMARP High-Level Design Report, 1996, 
Government of Ghana). 
7.5.9 Economic System 
The economic system in Ghana is mostly dominated by subsistence living (through farming and 
petty trading)42 by the local community and a state sector that is aid-dependant. From the time of 
the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1983, Ghana has implemented neo-liberal economic 
policies laid out according to the terms of the international development community. The 
dominance of neo-liberal values in the world today is not contested (Hellstrom and Lapsley, 2016), 
and the state has worked closely with the IFIs and donor agencies (such as the USAID, DFID, 
CIDA, DANIDA, EC) to implement market policies, including austerity government programmes 
under the SAP. In defence of the neo-liberalism, neo-classical economists have argued that, market 
failures notwithstanding, markets are best for signalling needs and directing productive resources 
towards satisfying those needs. On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the aim of NPM 
reforms in spreading neo-liberal creed is a guise for extending neo-colonialism of which 
accounting is implicated.  
The interactions between the inter-institutional orders of the local community and the international 
community are ambiguous, but mostly supporting the application of markets principles. This is 
because Ghanaian have grown accustomed to fending for themselves. The Government of Ghana 
has not been able to support a viable welfare state on a sustainable basis, and most state support 
has been provided and received by citizens on neo-patrimonial terms. Under state capitalism in 
Ghana, market principles have been extended to every dimension of society to balance the 
government’s budget. There are toll charges on ever-deteriorating poorly constructed trunk roads, 
and those who can afford it would choose private schooling and private health care. With a few 
exceptions, the so-called private schools are staffed by underqualified teachers operating with sub-
standard facilities, but nonetheless providing alternatives to the poor state schooling system. In the 
hospitals patients, who have contributed to a recently introduced state health insurance system, are 
provided low-priority hospital care, as opposed to a slightly better treatment for fee-paying 
counterparts. Mostly, private hospitals do not accept the state’s health insurance patients. 
From the time of the ERP, the state has consistently implemented neo-liberal economic policies to 
gain the approval of the international community in terms of loans and grants. But as we have 
 
42 This constitute the informal economy. As Akobeng (2018) has estimated of the 1.2 million taxpayers in 
Ghana’s population of 30 million, 1 million are in the formal sector and 200,000 are in the informal sector.   
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argued in Section 4.5, dating to pre-independence liberal economic policies did not result in 
anywhere near the estimated foreign capital inflows required to transform the Ghanaian economy. 
Donor financial pledges had often been peppered with various conditionalities resulting in 
unfulfilled pledges. In recent years, these unfulfilled pledges have contributed to the difficulties of 
managing the budget.   
The effects of the failed pledges by the international community on the budget logics has been 
twofold. Firstly, by complicating the scenario in predicting the cash resources to support budget 
execution. Implementing robust cash management practices, instead of rationing government cash, 
has been one of the several reform efforts that has eluded Ghana for over two decades (since 
PUFMARP in the 1990s, if not before). The poor cash management practices have become a self-
fulfilling prophecy which has undermined the predictability of budget releases, at the same time 
causing distrust between the MoF/CAGD and the sector ministries. There has been an 
institutionalised practice of the MoF in cutting back ministries’ parliamentary approved budgets 
with little or no notice given to them. The dating of the commencement of such practices is not 
exact, but the signs are that they emerged after the stand-off between the military government 
(Acheampong’ regime) and international lenders resulting in the economic decay that started from 
1972.  
In response, the MDAs evaded these arbitrary MoF’s cutbacks by committing funds without 
getting the required approvals from the MoF. As MoF (G15) said:  
There are also cases when you’re operating a budget system where you have a lot of 
surprises with regards to commitments that you’re not able to control. That’s the 
expenditure side. In other words, you’ve passed the budget, you’re implementing the 
budget but unfortunately your systems are in a manner that some MDAs are able to make 
some commitment outside the budget which eventually stares you up in the face as arrears 
or as judgment debt or etcetera. So that’s another feature that we’ve been contending with 
in the past 
Over time the sector ministries have taken steps to establish alternative funding outside the direct 
control of the MoF, sometimes through national revenue apportionment (as statutory funds), and 
other times through retaining their IGFs (which was finally legitimised by law in 2007). These 
actions reduced the degree of discretion the Minister of Finance had in allocating budget funds 
since the statutory funds were not strictly under the control of the Minister of Finance; and the 
IGFs were often not even captured in the budget presented to the MoF. The total situation was 
succinctly summed up by an MoF participant, (G2), who explained:  
I think of one of the issues, of credibility over the years, okay, it has become more 
pronounced, is the credibility of the budget. MDAs play their part, and then ceilings are 
given to them, they use their ceilings to do their costing, okay. I can’t say implementation 
because implementation depends on the cash flow, okay. Sometimes a lot of issues crop 
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up because of the mounting debts, because let’s say you have to pay l salaries, government 
cash position is not good, so they go to the market, okay, every week there is OMO [open-
market operation] meeting and building the domestic interest. So, in fact, one of the 
expenditure items, if you take debt assessment issues the interest, domestic interest, it has 
grown more than anything, and so increasingly Goods and Services [budget items], as for 
salaries, it is semi-statutory so you’ll have to pay, and then we see, there’s so many 
statutory funds because anything that happens, they can set up a fund. So, the discretionary 
powers of the Minister of Finance are growing smaller and smaller; and so, what suffers 
are Goods and Service, and then the Capital Expenditures, so contractors have done their 
work, and payment is held up, and huge arrears build up. All the expenditure which could 
go through in December, the last two weeks of December were charged against this year’s 
budget and from the start it has created a lot of problems and so a lot of the ministries 
cannot go through with their programmes, because they will not get funded, although it is 
in their budget, so there’s a huge budget [credibility gap]….. But it’s cash. …. Yes. And 
the availability of cash to support budget implementation. 
 
The reduction of the discretionary powers of the Minister of Finance has been accompanied with 
such mounting debt, and massive interest payment on borrowing, huge arrears build-up and often 
the government not being able to pay contractors after they have done their work (especially in the 
road construction sector). The train of repercussions is a long one, built around the failure to 
institute adequate cash management arrangements to support a credible budget execution system.  
Ultimately the beneficiaries of this situation are the few multi-lateral conglomerates who 
understand this terrain and are supported by both their home governments and the local political 
elites.  
In return to the gaining legitimacy, successive governments have granted international companies 
with numerous tax exemptions to attract direct foreign investment. In the words of a minister of 
state (G23) talking about free-zone tax exemptions:  
That’s how our law is, and it is allowed. So, they are showered with all kinds of tax 
exemptions and they are free zones. Supposedly exporting 75% of the product and they 
don’t export anything. They sell all in the local market.   
The economic system as enacted by various Ghana governmental regimes in the past has operated 
as a vampire that sucks the blood from their living citizens and feed it to the international 
corporations, which are allowed to operate in extracting both human and material resources and 
contributing as little as possible into the system. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
Within the institutional logic framework presented for discussing the empirical findings of Ghana’s 
PFM reforms there was an implicit argument that without a wider polity, important social and 
organisational rationalization such as reforms to ensure budget credibility will not occur. This 
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study has argued that the notions of rational myths and modern polities are related, and they help 
to explain how budget credibility and accounting change is impacted by society as a whole. The 
construct of modern polity explains how authorisation is granted by society for specific agents to 
mobilise collective means to achieve ends such as the production of public goods which otherwise 
will not be performed. But that process involves definite cognitive styles (albeit with variations) 
regarding how bureaucracies are organised which can be explained through the notion of rational 
myths. The central frame is that budget and accounting changes come from the modernization 
logics generated from the tensions within the interinstitutional orders. explained through 
rationalised myths and polity centres   
The competing logics within the interinstitutional orders of Ghana have had the tendency to 
maintain sub-optimal accounting practices rather than to make changes when required. The three 
interinstitutional orders of the national community, the state, and the international community 
failed to generate sufficient competing logics to cause fundamental changes because the state acts 
on a vampire basis, and it is in turn a victim of external hegemonic interests. In this regard this 
chapter’s observation of Ekeh’s argument that the privilege classes in Africa are not true elite, but 
only act as a class of bourgeoise is very profound.  
The essence of politics and culture, Gramsci argued, was the struggle between different 
"hegemonic forces" or political consciousness. This chapter has established that the international 
community exercise hegemonic influence and that guides the relationship between the 
interinstitutional orders in Ghana. The case in Ghana being that the international community is 
privileged over the state, and the state in turn is privileged over the national community. These 
privileges are enforced not just through material resources but by military force when the state or 
the international consider using it to be expedient. As a result, a fundamental condition of the 
institutional logics is breached when one order is privileged over the others (as previously 
explained in Chapter 3). Gramsci had argued that behind hegemony is always the potential for 
physical coercion in the background seems appropriate (Richardson, 1987, pp.350). The 
international hegemony structures the way in which people perceived social reality in Ghana.  
In the absence of overt military actions, the national budget becomes the battle ground or the arena 
for the international community to exert hegemonic control. This chapter has provided a 
framework to explain the nature of the relationships between the state, the international community 
and the national community and how they impact on the PFM reforms through the budget logics. 
The relationship is lop-sided that leads to the acceptance of lower status by the state and the 
national community (in a partnership of development). The dynamic of this relationship underlies 
the manipulative behaviour by state officials (either as politicians or bureaucrats) that has made it 
difficult to implement fundamental changes. The institutional logics framework shows that there 
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is a clear link between the root metaphors of the three orders and the rest of the institutional logic 
categories on the y-axis: source of legitimacy, source of authourity, source of identity, basis of 
norms, basis of attention, and the basis of strategy, the informal control mechanisms, and the 
economic system operating in Ghana 
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8 CONCLUDING CHAPTER 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research, as explained from the beginning, was to examine the context and 
conditions under which public sector accounting change occurs in the developing and emerging 
economies, using Ghana as an example. The study aimed to create a deeper understanding of the 
IPFM reforms and to contribute to both the literature on accounting change and PFM reform 
practices. Implementing financial management reforms, either to improve, or to transform 
planning and budgeting, accounting, and auditing practices, in developing and emerging 
economies is intended to enhance the delivery of public services and to promote economic 
development in LDCs. However, the reforms usually perform poorly or often have had 
unintended consequences (Hopper et al., 2016, Burns and Scapens, 2000; Bhimani, 1993; Miller, 
1991) that have resulted in the misapplication of accounting practices (internally) for coercion, or 
to gain undeserved legitimacy (externally). Reforms therefore negative connotation (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1994) instead of it being seen as rational tools for supporting democratic accountability 
(Hopper et al.,2009). 
The primary focus of this concluding chapter is to show how the theoretical assemblage and the 
empirical evidence collected have addressed the research questions of the thesis. In addition, it 
provides a brief review of recent scholarly works on PFM that have emerged since I began this 
research; and state the contribution of the thesis to the literature in accounting research, and policy 
and practice. In this concluding chapter I also discuss the limitations of the study, and the potential 
new paths for accounting research that have emerged from this research.  
8.2 RELATING THE WORK DONE TO ADDRESS THE RESEARCH QUESTION (RQ) 
This study has brought together empirical data from Ghana PFM reforms and various theoretical 
insights to address the central question in this study which sought to examine how accounting 
practices emerge in the public sector, how they have been maintained, and how attempts to improve 
or transform them have fared. Thus, the study aimed to explore what was going on with the reforms 
and to explain how and why sub-optimal accounting practices persist in developing countries, after 
several years of reforms, by referencing Ghana’s case. These questions were addressed by 
investigating how the public financial management reforms have been implemented and what 
explained the results experienced in the DCs. Intellectually, various puzzling questions related to 
our theoretical framework emerged from the study. Firstly, it opened up the question as to what 
relationship exist between individuals’ commitment to action and collective commitment to action 
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such as reforms (which has been termed the question of collective action in a latent group). 
Secondly, it threw up the question about how if actors’ behaviours were shaped by institutions, 
how they could possibly change them if their intentions and actions were shaped by the very 
institutions they wish to change (the question of embedded agency).  
The research explored these questions theoretically and empirically by mobilizing institutional 
logics and a processual narrative to the ramifications of the research question, which fundamentally 
amounted to how new institutions were created, or how existing one’s changed (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991) in a situation where the logics produced and reproduced the existing order.   
8.2.1 Persistence of sub-optimal financial management practices 
From the data collected and analysed in this study, it was found that sub-optimal financial 
management practices persisted in the line ministries of the Government of Ghana for many 
reasons. Amongst them, from the line ministries’ perspectives, was the tendency of the institutional 
rules to be categorical and general, and that conflicted with the logic of efficiency (Meyer and 
Rowan,1977). Some of these rules (for example employment rules that stifle efficiency) were 
agreed with external agencies such as the IMF as a particular government regime sought legitimacy 
and needed resources. Government of Ghana PFM reforms and its visible outputs such as the 
financial management regulations are isomorphic within the broad institutional environment of 
development countries. Inasmuch as some of the outputs have been found to serve internal needs, 
most of the practices (such as the establishment of the internal audit agency, or performance 
contracts) have been sub-optimal in the Ghanaian environment. Regimes of government adopted 
these practices to enhance their reputation, and for that they were rewarded by the IFIs and the 
donor community with grants and loans to boost their re-election chances. The conflict between 
legitimacy and efficiency requirements (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Seo and Creed, 2002) have 
tended therefore to prevent regimes from adopting appropriate practices suitable for the current 
needs of Ghanaians. Scholars have suggested that the size and persistence of efficiency gap 
increase with environmental uncertainty (Seo and Creed, 2002); and that is evidenced in the 
Ghanaian context where the government has lounged from one spending crisis to another, with 
ever increasing national debt that has not resulted in the provision of adequate infrastructure.  
A maladaptive syndrome is a common cause of sub-optimal persistence of institutional practices 
associated with organisational interdependence (the weak condition), and resource dependence (as 
a stronger condition). Institutional theorists have argued the weaker case where organisations (or 
country) persist with sub-optimal practices and become maladaptive as a result of economic 
interdependence (Powell, 1991, Seo and Creed, 2002). Economic interdependence encourages 
organisations to get locked-into common practices that cut across organisational boundaries.  
These lock-in practices may prevent or reduce the flexibility of subsequent adjustments.  The 
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stronger case is where economic dependence (partial or full) leads to adoption of practices that 
could make a country maladaptive. Seo and Creed (2002) provide two appropriate examples: 
Path-dependent patterns of development (Arthur, 1989) and "competency traps" (Levitt & 
March, 1988) are good examples, in which initial technical choices preclude even those 
future options that would have been more effective in the long run. As adoption spreads, 
the technical investment becomes irreversible; because of this lock-in feature, later 
competitive improvements cannot be capitalized on easily… (pp 227). 
In Ghana, the stronger case of economic dependence on foreign donors reduces the flexibility of 
adjustment, which has set the country on a path-dependent patterns of development that is 
manifested in almost all its institutions including public financial management practices.  But there 
were also manifestations of competency traps, as evidenced in the automation of the public sector 
budget module where the competencies acquired in the implementation of the Activate Software 
held back the implementation of a comprehensive ERP for more than a decade.  
Scholars have argued that when sub-optimal practices begin, they lead to the decoupling of the 
technical core from institutional practices in the first instance, but they are followed by institutional 
crisis in the long run when decoupling becomes an inadequate or infeasible response (Seo and 
Creed (2002). In Ghana’s case, the evidence of institutional contradiction has been demonstrated 
in the analysis of the logics (in Chapter 7) that has resulted in several coup d’états (some successful 
and some unsuccessful), a revolution, and successive IMF programmes of austerity. Such 
manifestations are not idiosyncratic events, rather they the results of systematic outcome of 
institutional contradictions.  
8.2.3 Embedded agency  
This research has brought together both theoretical insights and empirical data to address the 
paradox of embedded agency which was one of the key meta-theoretical principles undergirding 
the ILA discussed in Section 3.4.5. The significance of this paradox is to explain the role of human 
agency (as individuals or organisations) in bringing about institutional change. The question arises 
as to how individuals and organisations nested in institutions can envision and enact changes to 
the very context in which they are shaped (Greenwood and Suddaby,2006). 
Explaining how the embedded versus agency paradox has been addressed, and by implications 
how its resolution translated into accounting change was one of the central questions of this 
research. The paradox emerged from the structure-agency dichotomy which had been one of key 
concepts to understanding social science investigations. In this research, the unravelling of paradox 
helps to explain whether the results of the reforms that has been investigated was as a result of 
structural constraints (imposed by the institutional environment); or was as a result of the resistance 
to change by human agency; or a combination of the two. In this sub-section I explain how the 
paradox has been addressed by theorists and to position the explanation that emerged from the ILA 
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framework of this research. I conclude this sub-section by briefly discussing the significance of 
the implications of the paradox for accounting and organisational change in Ghana. 
8.2.3.1 Elaboration and resolution of the paradox 
Various scholars have contributed to explaining the paradox of embedded agency (Granovetter, 
1985 Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Battilana, 2006; 
Thornton and Occasion, 2008, Thornton et al., 2012). Initially, the new institutionalists were 
concerned with explaining stability and not change, therefore the questions of institutional change 
and the potential role of active agency came as afterthoughts. Concerns about agency only came 
up in discussions to get a better balance between the structure-agency dichotomy to be able to 
reconcile the contradictions between stability and change, and embeddedness and agency (Seo and 
Creed, 2002). Neo-institutional theorists drew on Bourdieu’s practice theory and Giddens’s 
structuration theory (as in Hirsch and Lounsbury,1997), or Giddens (as in Barley and Tolbert, 
1997) to create a better understanding of these issues, but left several important questions, at best, 
only partially answered. For example, Seo and Creed (2002) illustrated a common neo-
institutionalists’ position about institutional change by referring to Barley and Tolbert (1997) who 
had suggested: 
that a critical number of actors must make a collective, conscious choice before they can 
make a multilateral departure from established patterns of social reproduction (scripts) 
and, second, that a bigger contextual change (e.g., technological and economic shock) may 
be necessary before actors can make such a collective choice” (Seo and Creed, 2002 pp 
225).  
This was critiqued, firstly, for not addressing the question of the source of the contextual change - 
whether technological or economic shocks would emerge exogenously or endogenously; and 
secondly for not explaining how the actor would “collectively come to that conscious choice 
point—presumably, a point where they recognize the need, the opportunities, and the appropriate 
courses for collective action for changing existing institutional arrangements?” (Seo and Creed, 
2002 pp. 225). That is, in Barley and Tolbert’s explanation of change, one is left guessing on these 
two critical context issues. It is well accepted amongst institutional theorists that factors such as 
technology and economic shocks came as a “jolt’ (Meyer, 1982) from exogenous changes in the 
environment. But the question of the role of an active human agency was left unanswered.    
Seo and Creed (2002) approached the institutional change and the paradox of embedded agency 
as a dialectical issue by adopting a framework developed in (Benson, 1977) for organisational 
analysis. The dialectical framework departed from the conventional neo-institutionalists’ 
approach that mostly relied on Bourdieu’s and Giddens’s theories to explicate institutional 
change and to balance the embeddedness and agency. Instead, institutional change and the 
paradox of embedded agency are explained through four basic principles that guided dialectical 
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analysis: social construction, totality, contradiction, and praxis. Seo and Creed (2002) offered a 
succinct narrative of how these four principles work together to provide a comprehensive 
solution to the paradox of institutional change and the paradox of embedded agency by stating:  
Various institutions—organisations, organisational fields, or states—can be understood 
as the multilevel social arrangements that are continually produced and reproduced by 
social interactions (social construction). However, these ongoing, multilevel processes 
produce a complex array of interrelated but often mutually incompatible institutional 
arrangements (totality). Such institutional incompatibilities provide a continuous source 
of tensions and conflicts within and across institutions (contradiction). The ongoing 
experience of contradictory reality reshapes the consciousness of institutional 
inhabitants, and they, in some circumstances, act to fundamentally transform the present 
social arrangements and themselves (praxis) (Seo and Creed, 2002 pp.225) 
 
In Benson’s and Seo and Creed’s scheme43 institutions are social constructions produced and 
reproduced through human interactions as a continuous process. It is total, because it embraces 
whole societies and their multiple, interpenetrating social structures operating at multiple levels 
and in multiple sectors. Whilst these social structures are connected, their linkages are neither 
complete nor coherent, therefore allowing for loose coupling. Contradictions arise from the 
ruptures and inconsistencies both among and within the established social arrangements in an 
ongoing social construction process. The final element, praxis, brings into the scheme the 
element of active human agents who may resort to creative reconstruction of themselves and 
social patterns of organisations or its institutions through reasoned analysis of both the limits and 
the potentials of existing institutional arrangements. As Seo and Creed (2002) declared these four 
principles work together and they cannot be ‘understood separately, but taken together, they 
constitute an overall perspective on the fundamental character of social life”. (pp 225) 
8.2.3.2 The dialectics and the ILA  
This study argues that the ILA-SI framework as a meta-theory encapsulates the dialectical 
perspective adopted in this concluding chapter to discuss the paradox of embedded agency and to 
explain accounting change (as an institutional change). For example, both frameworks are social 
construction theories, that treat the society as a whole made up of individuals and organisations. 
More significantly they both rely on the force of contradictions to explain institutional change 
and the paradox of embedded agency. Their outcomes are also similar in the sense that they both 
produce non-deterministic outcomes. The only major difference is that the dialectical framework 
brings an additional dimension of praxis as an organising mechanism for collective action that is 
missing in the ILA approach. The relative strengths of the ILA are in the detailed approaches in 
explaining the contradictions within the inter-institutional system. 
 
43 Whilst Benson laid out the four principles, it was done in the language of organisation change, and Seo 
and Creed developed it further into institutional narrative.  
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.   
The empirical evidence of this study, based on the IL’s inter-institutional orders, identified the 
sources of institutional contradictions and their dynamics within the Ghanaian reforms 
phenomena as discussed in Chapters 4 to 7. Specific contradictions and tensions in the financial 
management system and the budget systems were highlighted as between the MoF and line 
ministries, between civil servants and consultants, between the various classes in the public 
service, and the host government and the international community leading to manipulations, for 
example (Oliver, 1991).The dialectical framework  and the ILA are essentially the same, as they 
both rely on the logics of contradictions to explain change and to resolve the paradox of 
embedded agency. Both the dialectical framework and the ILA are notable for overcoming some 
of the old problems in new institutionalism by infusing interests and power into day-to-day 
human interactions. By allowing the possibility of loose coupling, the framework generate 
frictions, tensions, and contradictions that shape the consciousness of actors about the limits of 
the current social forms and the need for change.  
 
Seo and Creed (2002) offered four sources of latent contradictions, including: (i)1efficiency 
contradictions as a result of institutional restrictions affecting performance levels; (ii) non-
adaptability contradictions resulting from “locked-in” patterns of behaviours and thoughts not 
allowing organisational field to adjust to exogenous jolts; (iii) interinstitutional incompatibility 
contradiction arising from mutually held values that are  inconsistent; (iv) misaligned interests 
contradiction of the interests of those privileged and those disadvantaged by the existing logics. 
In this sense the framework does not depend on exogenous shocks or ‘jolts’, such as technology 
and economic shocks to explain change. Finally, praxis brings into the framework both social 
and political creativity that leads to non-deterministic outcomes. But the key points are that 
actors are assumed to be partially autonomous (Seo and Creed, 2002) and out of the 
contradictions flow change. The most acute the contradictions the more likely change will occur 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006).  
 
These contradictions can be explained further by considering actors as either individuals or 
organisations in organisational field Theoretical considerations from Seo and Creed (2002) 
argued that the force of contradictions propel actors from being unreflective to being an 
imaginative critic of existing arrangements to taking practical action for change. At the 
individual level, the prospects of an individual playing the role of institutional entrepreneur is 
enhanced by their social standing within an organisation (Battilana, 2006). At the organisational 
level, organisations may be considered as being part of a network. The central organisations in 
the organisational field are more likely to be highly embedded than the periphery ones. As 
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Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) argued, the periphery organisations would be: (i) less likely to 
be aware of institutional expectations; (ii) less likely to learn the norms and expectations from 
others because they are less connected to the network; (iii) they are more likely to engage in 
context changing activities because they have more to gain by changing it than maintaining the 
existing arrangements. Greenwood and Suddaby asserted that:  
Thus, although institutional entrepreneurship may emerge anywhere, it is generally 
thought more likely to emerge from less embedded organizations at the periphery of a 
field (pp. 29) 
 
These theorists make a clear distinction between matured and emerging organisational fields 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006, Maguire et al., 2004). For example, Maguire et al. (2004) 
examined conditions for exercising agency in emerging field and found that their requirements 
are different from those in matured field. The conditions for exercising agency to change context 
require actors to have interests they wish to advance, be organised, and have sufficient resources 
to leverage on the contradictions that become apparent .Institutional theorists therefore tend to 
agree that institutional change is a political process (Seo and Creed, 2002; Maguire et al., 2004) 
that brings together the power and interest of organised actors. A key ingredient in this social 
construction is the ‘subject position’, which goes beyond the bureaucratic position of actors to 
their legitimated identities in the field (Maguire et al., 2004 pp658). The subject position 
provides the actor with both the institutional interests and opportunities, and sometimes the 
resources to exercise power in a given field. This theory implies that the more socially 
legitimated actors have a greater credibility to bring change. But much depends on the degree of 
embeddedness, in the sense that lowly embedded actors are more likely to engage in context 
changing activities than highly embedded actors.  
 
However, the empirical evidence from mature fields contradicts insights from the degree of 
embeddedness theory. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) found that institutional change emerged 
from the centre of an organisation field, in which elite actors (as individuals and organisations) 
were highly embedded. In their study of the big five accounting firms, Greenwood and Suddaby 
(2006) found that elite accounting firms adopted multidisciplinary practices (MTD) because their 
central position, in a network, sharpened their senses of awareness of alternatives rather than 
dulling those senses as the theory predicted. They argued that the central location of elite 
organisation exposed them to the contradictions in the organisational field because such actors 
performed boundary bridging activities; and their position made them immune to the coercive 
and normative forces within the organisational field.  
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By implications, the empirical evidence showed that when organisations are not easily whipped 
back into line, for example by market forces, they can easily engage in boundary misalignment 
activities. Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) study showed that change can emerge 
endogenously, and these actors could impose institutional change from within the organisational 
field. Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) declared that: 
The proposition from the existing literature, then, is that new ideas occur at the margins 
of a field because it is there that organizations are less embedded, less privileged, and 
more exposed to institutional contradictions. Organizations at the field’s center, in 
contrast, are more informed, continually socialized, better advantaged, and thus more 
embedded and resistant to change. Several studies support this basic proposition … 
(pp.29) 
8.2.3.3 The significance of embeddedness to Ghana PFM reforms 
The insights from organisations at the field centre and the periphery, and the distinction between 
matured and emerging organisational fields has implications for the findings of this research. The 
characteristics of developing countries, like Ghana, within the international system appear to 
resonate with the case of organisations in an emerging field. Whilst the internal make-up of the 
state bureaucracies resembles matured fields, in reality their position vis-à-vis the IFIs and the 
international donors make their positions not very dissimilar to emerging organisations.  
The characteristics of emerging fields lend themselves better to the studying of institutional 
entrepreneurship in developing country context, especially where the ‘subject positions’ of actors 
are either being dominated or dominating. In the developing world, the nation-state is often being 
dominated by hegemonic external influences. Internally, some of the governmental entities are 
being dominated by other entities.  
 
Such characteristics of emerging field include, firstly, a greater scope for strategic actions from 
the opportunities generated by uncertainty in the institutional order; secondly, considerable 
rewards for successful change, as their structuring will provide some actors with significant 
advantages; and thirdly, their emerging structures present different sets of challenges than those 
found in matured fields (Maguire et al.2004). Unfortunately, that is where the resemblances 
between the emerging field and the nation- states in developing countries as emerging field end. 
Maguire et al.,2004 argued that:  
For example, isomorphic pressures will be less relevant if there are no established 
patterns or leaders to mimic; the widely shared values associated with normative forces 
have yet to develop; and diffuse power makes it difficult for individual actors to coerce 
others”  
However, in the developing countries, the nation-states are subject to greater isomorphic 
pressures and these pressures have been relevant in the design of accounting change, as they are 
influenced to mimic Western countries. Secondly, the norm and values have been developed 
elsewhere within the neo-liberal ideologies and foisted on these countries. These countries 
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institutional entrepreneurs are confronted with conditions of a matured field without the benefit 
of either. Potential institutional entrepreneurs, even as elites, are likely to operate in limbo 
without the benefit of the taken-for- granted symbolic and material resources of a matured field, 
or the exciting opportunities and risks of an emerging field. 
 
Embeddedness in Ghana’s public sector accounting institutions is more identifiable at the 
organisational (or line ministries) level. For examples of there are traces of agency when the line 
ministries take non-compliance measures to counter GIFMIS automation directives that are 
issued by the central agencies (such as the MoF). There are also instances of organisational 
entrepreneurship when line ministries lobby parliamentarians to approve the setting up of agency 
funds (such as Petroleum Fund, Energy Fund, GETFund, Road Fund, and the others) to by-pass 
central budget rules that are restrictive and do not work well. Individuals also attempt to bend 
restrictive financial management rules through creative non-compliance measures. Whilst it is 
the duty for auditors and law enforcers to sift through these activities to decide which ones are 
criminal, for accounting change researchers an institutional environment that is full of 
contradictions provide another opportunity to research. For some of the infractions that may be 
breaking the rules may count as Schumpeter’s creative destructive measures that qualify the 
wrongdoers as institutional entrepreneurs as defined in Battilana (2006). 
8.2.3 Addressing the paradox of collective action in latent group in Ghana  
The dynamics of moving from individual commitment and actions to collective commitment and 
actions present a particular challenge in the public sector accounting change and public sector in 
Ghana.  
Conventional analysis based on functionalism does not deal with this problem well. As argued in 
section 2.4.2 orthodox theorists working in the rational choice tradition generally consider 
institutions as epiphenomenal and interpret collective action as an aggregate consequence of 
individual choices which is asocial (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Their approach assume that 
individual self-interest adds up to collective interests without offering an adequate explanation. 
This results in situations where in Ghana, like other LDCs, comprehensive accounting and 
organisational reforms are conceived by the leadership as a rational choice but never delivered as 
intended for reasons that contradict the original intentions of politicians.  In practical terms, 
practitioners working in the functionalist’s tradition tend to assume that once an individual 
(especially highly placed politician or a high ranking official) makes a commitment to action, 
that automatically translates to collective commitment and action. They therefore get bemused 
when reform actions do not happen when resources have been committed and there is an open 
declaration of those intentions.  
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           





In the dialectical approach collective human agency is explicated through human action or praxis 
(Benson, 1977; Seo and Creed, 2002). Seo and Creed (2002) avers that praxis is the key 
mediating mechanism to explain institutional change under the condition of divergent interests 
and unequal power. 
They declared:  
Since either the ongoing reproduction or the change of institutional arrangements is the 
outcome of political contests among people with divergent interests and unequal power, 
a dialectical theory of agency has to show how these contradictions can give rise to a 
form of political action capable of challenging and transcending institutional constraints. 
A dialectical framework provides a unique theory of action—the theory of praxis—to 
explain social change in the midst of social embeddedness. 
 
Here, scholars make a distinction between ‘human behaviour’ and ‘human action’ in the sense that 
human behaviour is the routine day to day activities that contribute to the automatic reproduction 
of institutions, whereas action is a sub-set of human behaviour that is conscious and purposeful 
departure from institutionalised social pattern (Jepperson, 1991; and Seo and Creed 2002). Seo and 
Creed (2002) defined praxis as “political action embedded in a historical system of interconnected 
yet incompatible institutional arrangements” (pp223) or as Benson declared: “praxis or the free 
and creative reconstruction of social patterns on the basis of a reasoned analysis of both the limits 
and the potentials of present social forms” (Benson, 1977 pp5). 
The process theorists, (such as Buckley,1967) share with the Marxists the view that history is a 
dialectic process whereby the new structures emerge from conditions inherited in the previous 
ones. But they depart from the Marxists, by holding the position that the outcomes of group or 
collective actions are not deterministic because they find that highly structured human associations 
are relatively infrequent. “In sum, institutionalised patterns constitute only one conceptual aspect 
of society, and they point to only part of the ongoing process” (Buckley,1967, pp.22). In addition, 
they see the role of interests in social processes and their conflict and adjustments as the true key 
to a dynamic sociology. There is therefore a linkage between the processual approach and 
institutionalism, particularly the “old” institutional theory and institutional logics in explaining 
change. 
The process approach therefore shed light onto the intellectual puzzle of collective action. Buckley 
summarises this by saying that the process approach, irrespective of the theories that contributes 
to it, aims to solve one basic problem: “how do interacting personalities and groups define, assess, 
interpret, verstehen, and act on the situation?” (ibid pp. 23). To Buckley it doesn’t matter whether 
our cognitive theories are converging or diverging, mathematical or non-mathematical, 
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congruence, balance, or conflicting, so long as the researcher focuses on the group’s decision 
processes of understanding and acting on their common problem 
Symbolic interactionists explicate human collective behaviour in accountability terms, in the way 
people individuals interpret and consider each other’s actions. Accountability underlies how an 
individual construct his conscious actions in line with “group actions” of a community. Mead and 
Blumer asserted that group or collective action consist of the alignment of individual actions; and 
this alignment is a social action that is accomplished by individuals fitting their respective lines of 
action to each other’s through the process of interpretation. This contrast with conventional views 
of sociological analysis that treats human groups as “social systems” and regards collective actions 
as created by social systems and structures (Parsons,1951, 1968). 
In both the literature and the empirical evidence from Ghana, the dynamics of (accounting change) 
were clearly manifested in the interactions between individual and collective action and also in 
accountability relationships. For example, peer-group accountability puts pressure individuals to 
behave positively or negatively (in for instance taking brides) (Silitonga and Dujin, 2019). 
Similarly, in Ghana, the experiences of line ministries’ internal auditors demonstrate peer-group 
pressure when they are asked “are you one of us” when they attempt to be professional and assert 
themselves.  
This study has argued that the ‘pragmatists’ answer to the collective action consist of the alignment 
of individual actions through the individual interpreting and considering each other’s actions. This 
departs from the sociological approach which treats collective actions as explained in the structures 
and systems of society. As Mead has shown, human society is made of individuals who perform 
as acting units. These individuals construct collective actions (sui generis) to cover the various 
polity centres in society. These polity centres may be various or limited in each society, but the 
more developed they are the better for collective action. The import is that the efficacy of reforms 
depends on developing the polity centres in society as I have previously presented in this thesis 
based on the arguments of Jepperson and Meyer (1991) on polity centres and rational myths in 
Chapter 7. 
8.2.4 Further discussion of the empirical evidence in addressing the research question 
The empirical evidence that emerged in this study indicated that, in Ghana like other developing 
countries, various actors may pro-actively and skilfully utilize the ambiguity associated with the 
PFM reforms to advance various interests in reciprocal interplay with institutionalised structures 
(Modell, 2009). Such tendencies cannot be explained within the framework provided by neo-
classical economics and rational choice theories. In other words, the conventional narrative and 
explanations of PFM reform performance that are based on methodological individualism could 
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only provide a partial asocial narrative. The arguments presented in this thesis go beyond that of 
the traditional rational-irrational explanations into the transrational. For example, it helps to 
explain why in winner-takes-all democracy in Ghana, politicians have often promised far reaching 
reforms (including financial management and to fight corruption) when out of power, only to 
renege on promises when in power. The framework of this study would explain that opposition 
politicians see and feel the contradictions in society, which mostly dissipate when they get into 
power. The explanation of reforms performance is based on the contradictions in the inter-
institutional orders and the power dynamics in allocating resources.  
The empirical investigations of this research have provided a casual explanation of how budget 
credibility has become a binding constraint on accounting change and the PFM reforms. The notion 
that the budget system can lead to a rational budget allocation requires co-ordination between plans 
and budgets, with planning in the lead (Wildavsky, 1975). Planning and budgeting in Ghana, as 
presented in this thesis (for as in Appendix 6), show that over-ambitious political promises 
intervene in the regular management of the budget, leading to budget failure. This study therefore 
related the budget credibility, as the central category, to the main categories through selective 
coding to develop a substantive theory on PFM reforms in Ghana.  
The centrality of budgeting credibility in the initial phases of PFM reforms is consistent with 
insights provided by other researcher-practitioners (for example Talierco, 2009). Generally, 
scholar avers the centrality of budgeting in both post-industrialised countries and LDCs alike 
(Hopper et al.,2009; Enthoven, 1982). Covaleski et al (2013 pp 338) has argued that ‘the core 
document within the public administration arena which influences the ability of an organisation 
resources from one use to another is the budget’. For this reason, this study attributed the causal 
explanation of why sub-optimal practices have persisted in Ghana to a budget credibility gap that 
has been created by an accountability and transparency failure. The evidence was derived from the 
application of grounded theory informed methods to the collection and analysis of the empirical 
data.  
The processual narrative of Ghana PFM reforms showed how and why sub-optimal practices have 
persisted. Historically, most LDCs/EEs accounting systems have emerged from their pre-colonial 
legacy systems that had been skewed toward delivering accounting reports to meet the 
requirements of external users. In so doing, priority has been given to financial accounting over 
management accounting. Such are the institutionalised practices from which the current public 
sector accounting systems have emerged (Hopper and Lassou, 2016; Lassou et al. 2019; Lassou, 
2017; Hopper et al. 2009; Abdul-Rahaman et al, 1997). The arrangements where the colonial 
officials reported externally to the metropolitan centres (both in government and in business) have 
persisted after decolonisation in the form of neo-colonial reporting mentality within LDCs. But 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




tailoring financial reports for external users, and not internally and primarily for own consumption, 
often lead to inaccurate and misleading accounting practices. 
Public sector accounting in LDCs has taken a form that requires it to be transformed to serve the 
internal needs of users first (economic and social development) before assigning other priorities to 
it. As Lassou et al., 2019 quotes a World Bank official as saying 
A Medium-Term Expenditure Framework that Ghana and most [developing] countries 
have started developing . . . are not based on any realism and are ‘donor-driven’ and a lot 
of funds are put into these activities. . . [In practice] the MFEF and the programme-based 
budgeting are one thing but in terms of reporting it is only financial report[s] [that count] 
which have no bearing on the programme-based budget or the MTEF; thus, in the end 
there is no link to any development priorities (pp. 10). 
As a corollary to the focus on financial reporting, the development of management accounting 
practices and internal management reporting have been side-lined, especially in the public sector 
in Ghana. These weaknesses from the underutilisation and underdevelopment of management 
accounting have been reflected in the trends of the academic research literature that were produced. 
Hopper et al, 2009, and Abdul-Rahaman et al, 1997 found that the earlier scholarly papers were 
mostly on financial accounting. In governments, in Africa for example, it is reflected in the 
separation of budgeting from accounting in physical and institutional arrangements (including the 
management of the chart of accounts, assignment of organisational roles and professionalism. 
Financial accountability lines are therefore fuzzy, with MDAs’ management focus being on 
funding and the budget funds ‘released’ by the Ministry of Finance44.  
The third unintended consequence of placing too much emphasis on financial accounting is the 
failure of accounting to play a relevant role in socio-economic development in LDCs. Citing other 
scholars, Hopper and Lassou (2016) have argued: 
A recurring research finding is that whilst basically sound accounting and accountability 
systems were often adopted and maintained, in actuality they played a ceremonial role to 
gain legitimacy from the populace and external funders and played little part in ministerial 
and parliamentary scrutiny or decisions. Meaningful accountability often never occurred 
(pp. 4) 
Management accounting development is driven from internal requirements to produce information, 
primary, for internal management decision making. The development of management accounting 
therefore depends on reform activities that make it possible to direct attentions to internal decision 
making. Hopper and Lassou (2016) building on Ghartey’s (1985) have noted that effective 
accounting requires good governance, without which it cannot flourish.  
 
44 MDAs’ management put very little emphasis on budget performance information 
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Conception of accountability in LDCs is flawed by the prevalence of the central financial reporting 
of the overall government accounts over those of the line ministries, departments, and agencies 
(MDAs). The internal reporting arrangement within government organisations to the Ministry of 
Finance and Parliament are therefore weak. Most often the only reliable financial reports available 
are prepared by the Controller and Accountant General Department (CAGD) based on the control 
totals from the general ledger, rather than the reconciled accounts of the MDAs at the MDA-by-
MDA level. Most of the time the CAGD’s accounts cannot be reconciled to the budget, because of 
the disparate sources of funding the MDA budget. The empirical evidence shows that the national 
budget is funded from the consolidated fund, that often exclude a portion of internally generated 
fund at the MDAs level and other ear-marked funds (labelled as statutory funds) which are set up 
by different statutes as special funds controlled by boards. 
Theoretically I have discussed the implications of the empirical findings through a framework of 
interinstitutional orders with elements that explains actors’ behaviours in Ghana within 
institutional fields. This thesis argues that there are potential insights to be gained in the explication 
of accounting change in the development context from the application of the ILA as meta-theory, 
that encapsulate a dialectical framework. The study therefore mobilised institutional logics and 
institutionalism, grounded in the empirical data from the field, to theorize the reforms in Ghana 
for both instrumental and intrinsic reasons. Ghana’s reforms as an example of public sector 
accounting change is instrumentally useful because it has been one of the countries in LDCs/EEs 
where the current global NPM-type reforms were initiated in the 1980s. Its background of colonial 
and post-colonial experiences provides a rich social milieu to support an evolutionary processual-
type analytical narrative, and casual type explanations of public sector accounting change, from 
the ground-up. These steps served as antecedents to the analysis and discussions of this study based 
on institutional logics.  
I have argued in this thesis that for research based on the application of institutionalism to be 
relevant in the LDCs/EEs it has to recognise and address the shortfalls in neo-institutionalism. 
Based on this argument this study has brought new insights and extended the accounting literature 
by applying institutional logics to explain accounting change in the LDCs/EEs.  
The empirical findings of the budget credibility logics as a binding constraint on the reforms is 
exteriorised by the actors in the institutional orders to reproduce individuals’ and organisational 
behaviour. Through this mechanism, isomorphic reforms initiatives produce uniformity that work 
across organisations thereby overriding any diversity that the local environment would support 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). In Ghana, this process simply takes place when an previous group 
( in the MoF, the ministries , parliament  and elsewhere) passes on to the next generation that that 
is how things are done here, therefore actors behaviour become unreflective and routine, influenced 
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by the collective mind-set through peer-group pressure ((Silitonga and van Duijn, 2019). This 
research therefore have shown how and why individual commitment to reform does not translate 
into collective commitment, rather it is the collective practices that exert pressures on individuals 
to conform, which is found at all levels in Ghana – as citizens, politicians, or public servants. The 
logics in the Ghana reforms indicate that there is only a limited autonomy of action as the behaviour 
of the state itself is endogenized by the overwhelming influences exerted by the international 
community. This circumscribes the potential for institutional or cultural entrepreneurs to change 
the system from within. Rather actors are influenced by the situation in which they find themselves, 
while the contradictions grow, and actors become more aware of them. 
While this explains why and how accounting and organisational practices have persisted, it also 
shows the conditions for possibility of change through praxis and in individuals resisting the 
‘tyranny’ of the collective.  
8.3 RECENT WORKS IN PFM REFORMS  
The unproblematic view of accounting still prevails in development practice, partly because the 
agenda is driven by economists and other policy makers who consider that ‘accounting is technical, 
unproblematic, and flows automatically from market relations’ (Hopper et al.,2009). The strategic 
importance of accounting reforms appears not to have gone down to the collective consciousness 
in LDCs where economic macro-categories such as unemployment, inflation rate, exchange rate 
and balance of payment command more attention in policy discourse.  
Accounting scholars have noted that the desire to implement accounting change has been a long- 
standing item on most LDCs post -independence agenda as in the industrial countries (Adhikari 
and Mellemvik, 2011). The difference is that while the terms of the debate have shifted in the 
OECD countries from whether a particular accounting technology is relevant to how best it (for 
example accrual accounting reforms) can be implemented, in the LDCs its relevance is still being 
debated. This accords with observation by scholars that in the developing world ‘negotiations over 
even simple matters may never reach a conclusion, or at best may extend over long periods of 
time” Seiler (1966 pp 655). Adhikari and Mellemvik (2011) have noted that in the case of Nepal:  
There were many talks about accounting reforms in the 1990s but nothing significant 
happened to change the existing practice. However, the pressure for public sector reforms 
increased at the outset of the new century as the country plunged into a difficult financial 
situation (pp. 131). 
Thus, while the discussions on the relevance of accounting change has not gone down to the local 
community level, financial crisis has given the impetus for interventions by external donors. At 
the time of conducting this research (2016 to 2019) a few studies have emerged on the Ghana 
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reforms (Lassou, 2017; and Lassou et al., 2019). Other major pieces on the PFM reforms can be 
found in Alsharari et al., (2015); Goddard et al. (2016); Alkaraan, 2018 and a swathe of literature 
reviews on academic papers on PFM reforms (van Helden and Uddin 2016, van Helden and Ouda, 
2017). There have also been recent ‘normative studies’ sponsored by the World Bank/IMF based 
on five country cases studies (see Fritz et al., 2017) and Woolcock et al., 2018. Some of these 
papers, individually and jointly, have conveyed the pervasive role of foreign sponsors in LDCs/EEs 
reforms.  
These papers are representative of two broad strands of recent developments in public sector 
accounting research in LDCs that is worth noting: (i)The normative literature driven by the IFIs 
and the others in the international community sponsoring reform in the LDCs/EEs. This strand 
tends to be inspired by political economy and management practices; (ii) The theory driven 
literature of which social theory dominates, with neo-institutional theory emerging as a specific 
development within that. In terms of theoretical developments, Alsharari and Abougamous, 2017 
paper appears to be the only one that has mobilised a unified framework of neo-institutional 
theories to explain the PFM/NPM reforms in the LDCs. 
I have already reflected the direction and content of accounting and institutional change research 
the literature review in Chapter 2 of this thesis. In this section I critique the key recent literature 
that has emerged to position the theoretical and empirical contributions of this research within 
these developments, especially alongside the insights created by Hopper, Lassou, and their 
colleagues based on neo-colonialism and globalisation. Firstly, I consider the direction in 
LDCs/EEs research provided in the normative literature stream as found in Fritz et al.,2017 and 
Woolcock et al. (2018) 
Fritz et al.’s (2017) paper represents the ‘realist’ traditional research approach based on political 
economy analysis. Its audiences are policy makers and practitioners, and it has normative 
orientation drawing on neo-classical economic theory to explain reform outcomes and advice for 
better implementation. This paper was written by sponsors of PFM reforms, and whilst diagnosing 
PFM reform performance, they tend to reflect external agents’ (etic) perspective of reforms. Fritz 
et al. 2017 considered ‘nontechnical’ drivers and constraints of reforms to include institutional 
incentives and constraints, as well as political commitment, capabilities, and demand to pursue 
reforms, interacting with institutional aspects’ (a footnote on page x). In this study, consideration 
of these ‘non-technical’ drivers for PFM reform performance were then nuanced into sequencing 
of the implementation of reform components as part of the package of managing the ‘basics first’ 
(Fritz et al., 2017). In another paper by the WB staff, explaining the success/failure of particular 
public sector reform efforts, they attributed the performances to technical policy reform design, 
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leadership and political support, and implementation capability of public servants (Woolcock et 
al., 2018). Reform performances were couched in terms of technical dependencies between these 
three factors. In conclusion they stated: 
 …that neither political will, nor technical design, nor capacity can be seen in isolation, 
but as multiple strands of a single reform effort, interacting in dynamic ways across the 
reform journey. Understanding the complexity of these interactions implies that external 
funders, partners and supporters of reform need to be just as ready to take an iterative 
approach to their assistance strategies as reformers do in implementing their reform 
programs (ibid, pp. 16) 
In both Fritz et al. and Woolcock et al. I found references to ‘technical’ aspects of reforms, which 
appear to be distinct from ‘non-technical’ aspects. I have argued in this thesis that such distinction 
is not helpful to provide a holistic account of reforms. Secondly, such studies often fail to recognise 
the complex role played by the ‘external’ influencers on PFM (some of them negating positive 
change). By focusing mostly on the internal and technical factors that decouple reforms these 
studies only succeed in creating partial and static explanation of the performances of public sector 
reforms. 
It is in the light of the dominant and complex role played by ‘external agents’ that Lassou et al.’s 
(2019) paper on Ghana PFM reforms mobilising political economy is important for factoring in 
neo-colonial political theory (Finau, 2019). Whilst examining Ghana’s PFM reforms, it asked 
different research questions and employed different method-philosophical approach.  
Lassou et al. (2019) found that the rent seeking behaviour of officials and the hegemonic influences 
of neo-colonialists in both Ghana and Benin (another West African state) decoupled reforms. Their 
paper went further than most in providing a theoretical explanation of the IPFM reforms, however, 
their mobilisation of institutionalism was limited, and they did not address the myriad institutional 
issues that inform neo-patrimonialism and patronage behaviour.  Many factors appear to be 
subsumed into patronage- such as, informality and lack of professionalism resulting from 
recruitment processes that were not addressed. I have argued that if they had taken into 
consideration other factors (such as knowledge or income levels between the two countries) he 
might have found that patronage was not context independent. 
However, Lassou et al.’s approach failed to provide a balanced explanation of how patronage 
works in the context of reforms. From their analysis patronage always works in a negative 
direction, wherever it appeared (in Ghana and Benin) and as such it is context independent. Grindle 
(2013) has found that the effect of patronage is not inevitably negative, and in fact it has been 
positive in some cases in the US and some Latin American countries in facilitating reforms. So, 
context does matter. Others have provided a more positive view of informality as an organisational 
resource (Firey,1948). Lassou observed that, on paper, Francophone based-systems are supposed 
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to be stronger than the Anglophone based- systems. There are so many checks and balances in the 
Francophone systems he argued. However, in practice the Ghanaian system (Anglophone-based) 
seemed to perform better (reports are produced, even if weak, and audits are done, and Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) held hearings even if their recommendations were not often 
implemented). However, they found that in both contexts, reforms to improve transparency and 
accountability decoupled. It seems Lassou had not considered the effect of Pritchett’s (2013) 
isomorphic mimicry. If he had done so, he would have realised that, may be, the reasons decoupling 
occurred was because the two countries were both implementing ‘best practice’ reforms in 
different contexts. Or maybe they both operate in the same context - poor developing countries- 
and not what he argued as different context.  
I have argued in this thesis that context is complicated and needs to be unpacked to isolate and 
fully explain the forces at work. For example, Ghana may be a ‘flailing state’ and Benin a 
hegemonic state. As Pritchett has shown India is a good example of a ‘flailing state’- so advanced 
in developing democratic institutions, and even has capacity to embark on space programmes, yet 
in many important areas it cannot join the dots to advance its socio-economic development. Ghana 
in some ways is not dissimilar to the India case in this respect. The two countries (Ghana and 
Benin) are at about the same level of income and they are jointly affected by factors such as poverty 
(some of which are beyond their control, and others which they can control). Their financial 
management context may be different, but they may face similar or dissimilar binding constraints 
that need to be investigated.  
In a paper preceding the Lassou et al. (2019), Lassou treated context as a homogenous in his 
explanation of decoupling of reforms (Lassou 2017) (pp. 489). The homogenous assumption, based 
on Western culture might have been simplifying for the institutional context in Meyer et al. (1997), 
and the organisational context in DiMaggio and Powell, 1983. As Thornton et al., (2012 pp. 18) 
have argued this assumption does not always apply. In the case of Africa, the influence of the IFIs 
are so ubiquitous to the extent that this study can assume that there is a heterogenous institutional 
environment for public sector organisations (one from the international, and the other national). 
However, there has not been much attempt to investigate the institutional orders and their impact 
on accounting reforms in LDCs.  
To take the argument one step further, others have observed that decoupling takes place in both 
developed and developing countries (Pollitt, 2013 pp. 411). So, that leaves us in a position where 
either patronage is everywhere and so does not explain anything, especially the performances 
differences between countries; or its effects are so pervasive that it joins up with other factors, that 
work to nuance these effects. Lassou’s paper did not take into consideration these factors and did 
not explain their effects. For example, the real difference between the Anglophone and the 
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Francophone systems is that the former is a principles-based approach whereas the latter is rules-
based approach. But the issues of convergence (as a latent force exerted by the IFIs activities in 
LDCs) means that differentiation between the two accounting systems is increasingly becoming 
nominal.  
In Lassou et al.’s (2019) view patronage, corruption, and neo-patrimonialism function as an 
institutional structure that decouple reforms, but it does not explain the mechanisms through which 
they impact on change or stability. In short, the paper does not pay much attention to how social 
order shape actors’ behaviours and how they in turn shape their structures. A more satisfactory 
analysis would take into consideration the stratification of society, its rituals, and symbols that 
maintain the order (Collins 1986) which makes reform decouple (See also Douglas, 1996; 1986). 
Following this path requires a more systematic theorising drawing from institutional theory, 
particularly from institutional logics to demonstrate the tensions and contradictions they generate. 
The comparative study, undertaken by Lassou, between Ghana and Benin assumed that both 
countries operate in a homogenous ecology. Yet it is widely acknowledged that each country has 
different conditions (see Douglas, 1986), therefore providing different context within which the 
reforms are have been implemented. Equating the reforms from one-country to another over-
simplify the understanding of their dynamics, rather each country requires independent evaluation 
and theorising (Yang and Kassekert, 2009). However, Lassou, 2017 did not question the 
assumption of homogeneity implicit in the isomorphic-decoupling theorising. Observing that there 
are globalisation forces, neo-colonialism, and patronage operating to decouple reforms led him to 
give too much weight to institutional structures. These studies therefore provided only a static 
account of reforms in a highly institutionalised environment and did not give us sufficient 
understanding of the role of agency. The combined unintended effects, unfortunately, create the 
impression that LDCs governments are “passive, inefficient manipulators of symbols rather than 
substance” (Powell, 1991 pp 183).   
The recent literature has drawn attention to hegemonic influences resulting in LDCs implementing 
inappropriate accounting technologies (Lassou et al.2019) building on Hopper et al., 2009. This is 
an interesting line of theorising on which we have built in this thesis. Neo-patrimonialism taking 
the form of patronage, nepotism, clientelism have been cited for contributing to the poor reform 
outcomes in LDCs. This line of theorising of societal behaviour can be traced back to Weber 
through to Merton’s interpretation of structural tendencies in society to maintain itself. Merton 
made a distinction between ‘manifest’ functions (which are results that people consciously try to 
accomplish), and ‘latent’ functions (which are produced by the social system itself) (Collins 1994). 
The latent function of the social order manifests itself in these ‘dysfunctional’ tendencies (Merton, 
1968). Merton argued that “culture must be recognised to have multiple consequences, some of 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




them functional and others, perhaps, dysfunctional” (Merton, 1968, pp. 90). But Collins has 
observed that:  
Unfortunately, this terminology does not get us very far. It merely puts a value judgement 
on it, admitting that that things can be bad instead of good, but it misses Durkheim’s central 
point that sociology ought to show the conditions under which structures produce one thing 
rather than another. To go around and label things as functional does not answer the 
question of why certain structures happen to exist to serve that function rather than 
something else (Collins, 1994 pp 199). 
One could find a function for anything therefore it is misleading for us to argue that 
neopatrimonialism functions to maintain social order and stop there as Lassou (2017) did. This is 
especially unsatisfactory explanation, as Collins has argued, when the neopatrimonialism is not 
serving the whole society but certain individuals and ‘monopolistic groups’ within it. 
The defects in some of the existing traditional line of theorising called for a better explanation of 
how social order is maintained in the societies in which researchers are interested. As Spencer saw 
it, modern societies have emerged from competition on the market guided by freely made contracts 
(Collins 1994). In that sense society needed contracts to maintain social order. But in a society of 
contractual laissez-faire, Durkheim questioned how such contractual society will work if people 
did not trust each other, because an advantage will always be on the side of the side that cheats. 
These discussions raise a number of themes that have been raised in public administrative reforms 
in the LDCs (and elsewhere too) about performance contracts, societal values such as trust, and 
peer group pressure (Silitonga and van Duijn, 2019).  
Social order theorising attributes reform performance to either structural or rational actors (as 
individuals), or both as in post-structuralism. For our purposes in this research post-structuralism 
takes us beyond the insights gained from either utilitarian/rational explanation or structural-
functionalism theories. Thus, this study rejects explanations of reform performance based solely 
on ‘methodological individualism’ (such as corruption) and structuralist accounts (such as culture) 
to accept the position of post-structural explanations, which is currently in the ascendency 
(Alawattage et al., 2016).  It is these inter-disciplinary post-structuralist perspectives that I have 
brought together under the rubric of institutional logics. 
Further insights into the inter-disciplinary theory driven accounting research in the LDCs have 
been provided in reviews by van Helden and Uddin (2016) and van Helden and Ouda, (2017). Both 
called for more qualitative research on accounting reforms. 
 Van Helden and Ouda (2017) framed public sector accounting in emerging economies as an 
interplay of three group of factors, namely: pressure by western development partners to introduce 
NPM reforms; local values and interest; and constraints of resources, including institutional 
capacities. According to their account, pressure is exerted by the international agencies, both 
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bilateral and multilateral agencies operating in the LDCs to introduce reforms (‘of privatisation, 
marketisation, decentralization and output orientation’ (pp.1). These policy reforms are often 
prescribed on the terms conditioned by aid offer. They argued that given the resource constraints 
in the LDCs, these countries take the aid with the conditions, but they are not able to implement 
reforms that do not favour the interest and values of local communities; that, in any case they do 
not have the capacity to implement because the reforms are advanced for their circumstances. In 
their scheme cultural values work into the system through informal dealing by officials and 
gaming.  
Whilst the schema is useful, other alternative explanations are possible, even within the context of 
the interplay of the same three group of factors. 
For example, donors offer their prescriptions because local officials and politicians are either inept, 
or they do not care enough, or they are simply self-interested (Parker (2003); the NPM is not 
intrinsically bad, it is the way it is unpacked and implemented that has generated the poor results, 
and it could serve the interest of the community by reducing poverty and improving public services, 
and supporting economic and social development (Abdul-Rahaman, et al, 1997; the officials have 
the capacity, but are influenced by peer group pressure and existing institutional practices to seek 
rent and not to implement reforms (Silitonga and  van Duijn, 2019).  
The truth is somewhere in the middle of these assertions.  
In explaining technical change, such as in public sector accounting, this study draws attention to 
the dichotomy of ‘evolutionary’ theories (which emphasise past history) and a future goal 
orientation (neoclassical economic theories, of means and ends) (Elster 1983 pp. 10). In the 
evolutionary theories the use of current techniques is based on past events (rational or irrational), 
whereas in the means-ends scenario changes occur as a deliberate rational choice (Hindess, 1988).  
Starting with the latter, if the means are not available, it is difficult to achieve the ends. For 
example, there is the often-cited factor of capacity constraints in LDCs: a charge that are not 
patently false but is only speciously true (Merton 1949). Most accounts of capacity constraints are 
prestidigitation as there are pockets of adequate managerial capacity (Rahaman and Lawrence, 
2001a) 
Reviewing the accounting research literature led Abdul-Rahaman et al.(1997) to observe and 
question that approach by saying:  
Much of the literature, as is evident from the citations in the text above, stresses the 
deficiencies, weakness and inadequacies of the public sector accounting and financial 
management systems of developing countries. This common thread reflects an overly 
Neurocentral theoretical perspective of the subject focus. Researchers have tended to seek 
to analyse and describe the public sector accounting and financial management systems of 
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developing countries from a perspective shaped in and through the experience of the 
developed world. In this respect it is of concern that the descriptions and comparisons of 
writers in this area are scarcely empirically developed (cf. Blondal, 1988; Craner and 
Jones, 1990). Our view is that a more balanced approach is required which would steer a 
path between the tendencies of excessive relativism and crude ethnocentrism (Abdul-
Rahaman, 1997, pp. 54). 
In this debate several strands of arguments have emerged that may be categorised into three main 
groups: Those who have questioned whether the assumptions underlying the prescriptions made 
by the IFIs- inspired advisors apply in the context of LDCs; those who do not challenge the 
assumptions in the models, but argue that they are not fit for purpose in the public sector in general- 
whether in developed or developing countries; and those who question the motives behind the 
prescriptions- as using the reforms as a Trojan horse that are being introduced to promote neo-
liberalism and western values in the LDCs. There is also a latent fourth group who do not question 
the motives of the external sponsors of the reforms.  
The first group argues that the prescribe solutions are based on rational choice and neo-classical 
economic theories some of which are questionable. Within this group are those who find these 
principles unsuitable for the development needs of LDCs for neglecting the social context of 
development and focusing excessively on economic benchmarks, of which accounting reforms are 
implicated. At the extreme end are those, within this group, who base their argument on cultural 
differences between the North and South: saying that the underlying assumption of individualism 
in western rational models (such as accountability that is based on principal-agent contracts) does 
not apply to Asian and African cultures that rationalise collectivism (Sealyham and Perera, 1996). 
The second group are those who argue that the models and techniques (such as accrual-based 
accounting or programme and performance budgeting) themselves are flawed, in the sense that 
they not fit-for-purpose as they do not work well in the public sector, whether in the North or South 
(Wynne, 2007, 2008). Among this group are those who put forward the capacity constraint (both 
human and funding) in the developing countries as justification for not embarking on these 
reforms, as the resources could be put to better uses. The less extreme narrative advanced by a sub-
section within this group are those who say that the models are fit-for-purpose but the LDCs do 
not yet have the capacity or their circumstances are not conducive for these prescribed solutions 
(Schick, 1998).  
The third group questions the motives of the external agencies who sponsor these reforms. Among 
them are people who reject western prescription on ideological grounds (neo-liberal creed), 
domination and hegemonic influences of the West. In this group are the growing list of critical 
accounting scholarship such as found in Hopper et al, 2009 and Lassou et al., 2019, Lassou and 
Hopper, 2016.  For example, Hopper et al., 2009 have argued that: 
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Rich countries have shaped politics and policies in LDCs from colonialism, and today 
international aid institutions’ prescriptions often include (or presume) MASs framed in 
institutional contexts and rationalities not invariably found within LDCs. But many LDCs 
depend on external finance and cannot ignore its providers’ strictures. Thus, when Western 
MASs are applied, they often assume unanticipated roles or are ignored (Hopper et al., 
2009, pp. 473). 
This influence of the international institutions (WB/IMF/WTO) and the international aid agencies 
on reforms (promoting neo liberalism and modernism) has led to the charge of neo-colonialism 
and reinforcement of neo-patrimonialism against external sponsors of reform in LDCs.  
For the fourth group who do not question the motive, they do question the approach of external 
agents such as the WB and other international agencies alike. For example, they question the WB’s 
internal incentives and their approach of leading from the front in proffering solutions rather than 
some other alternatives (bringing together interested parties to solve problems on reforms). They 
have argued that the WB internal incentive systems have become an ‘iron-cage’ preventing them 
from playing the role of honest brokers of reforms (Polidano, 2013). Within this group include 
some of the current and past staff of the WB and the other agencies (Manning and McCourt, 2013) 
To conclude this section, I have sketched the underlying issues and tensions and how previous 
researchers have approached them, on which I have built this study’s empirical explanations and 
theoretical insights. Based on the empirical evidence from this research I argue that it is safe to 
conclude that the main problem of introducing accounting techniques into LDCs is not because 
they are grossly inappropriate, but the problem is that poverty brings distinctive uncertainties 
(Hopper et al. 2009). Hopper et al.,2009 reviewing research of several scholars have not found 
different accounting techniques in rich and poor countries, or that LDCs import grossly 
inappropriate practices. They found that “most problems lie in the interplay of MASs and their 
cultural, economic and political context. Poverty brings distinctive uncertainties, e.g. exposure to 
the elements, undiversified economies, and a dominant (but not necessarily effective) state” (pp. 
473).  
It is based on these theoretical and empirical insights that I position this research and our 
contribution to both the literature in accounting, policy, and practice as I explain in the next section.  
8.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
Form the review of the extant literature, as far as I could see, not much research has been done to 
develop a rigorous conceptual framework to explain how foreign and local interests are interwoven 
to influence PFM reforms in LDCs/EEs. This research has contributed to the literature by 
developing this conceptual framework to close this gap by providing both empirical and theoretical 
explanation of reforms. Firstly, the research has provided an example of applying rigorous 
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framework for relating the empirical elemental categories to provide a causal explanation of the 
reform phenomenon (Elster, 1983). This study has provided this by developing and relating 
categories such as budget credibility, professionalism, accountability, donor intervention and local 
politics, automating, financial re-engineering, reform credibility to each other within the paradigm 
model (Strauss and Corbin, 1998)  
Secondly, I have expounded on the notion of modern polity (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991) in the 
LDCs and incorporating it into social order theorising in the analysis of accounting reforms, to 
create a deeper understanding of accounting reforms in LDCs.  
Thirdly this thesis has proposed some elements of institutional orders and have shown how they 
become embedded in the development context. I have extended both the institutional logics and 
accounting research literature taking interinstitutional orders into non-Western context to explain 
accounting change phenomenon in LDCs, using Ghana as an example. 
8.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY AND PRACTICE 
The contribution of this research extends into areas of both policy and practice by showing how 
the local community (family, religion, traditional markets) influences the state, and how it plays a 
greater role than the institutionalised notion of Western markets. Furthermore, our research shows 
the logics of how the international community sometimes collaborate with the government of 
Ghana and sometimes compete with it to implement reforms. But it also shows that the local 
community is not entirely neutral and can exert influences on the dynamics of change, behind the 
scenes through collaboration or competing logics with the state or the international community. 
The paper therefore shows how logics impact on PFM reforms, and their implications thereof on 
the design, implementation, and evaluation in the developing and emerging economies context. 
8.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA 
Throughout this research I adopted an emic stance to reflect the views of the Ghanaian participants 
(and our data were mostly derived from government officials or ex-government official who have 
played key roles in reforms). I collected the data by contacting gatekeepers in the government of 
Ghana and adopted snowballing techniques. I made efforts to include the key representatives of 
the international community, such as the World Bank and the IMF offices using previous contacts. 
But they did not respond (except obtaining the views of an expatriate consultant, and in honouring 
an invitation from the IMF to attend a joint IMF-GoG conference in 2017). While acknowledging 
the possibility of unbalanced representation of views from the international community and the 
resultant potential biases, I have expressed elsewhere in this thesis that it was the conceptual 
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categories that I aimed to identify from research participants, and not necessarily the factual ‘truth’. 
For this reason, it was sufficient to obtain the views of participants based on their knowledge of 
the reforms, and not from where they have emerged. In addition, there are numerous research 
publications from the IMF and WB and the international community on Ghana reforms and other 
countries to provide sufficient insights on their views.  Future research would be more 
representative if it could include representatives of the international community from all levels 
(corporations, individuals, multilateral and bilateral agencies) as primary sources of data gathering. 
It would also benefit from including representation of nationals, outside of the state. 
8.7 NEW PATHS BASED ON FINDINGS, METHODS AND CONCEPTS FROM THIS RESEARCH 
Notwithstanding the long-standing awareness that the deterministic-unproblematic view of 
accounting is often misleading, it continues to occupy the underbelly of current IPFM reforms in 
developing and emerging economies where the reforms are often considered in purely technical 
terms. As a result, accounting changes are “black boxed”; and there is very little insight into how 
the accounting craft changes and might change under the reforms. Institutionalism and institutional 
logics research, and how they might impact on public sector accounting reforms has been limited 
in the LDCs.  
This research has advanced propositions regarding the elemental orders in the institutional orders 
that I have argued have been influencing PSA reforms in Ghana. More studies both with 
quantitative and qualitative methods could be conducted to confirm some of the elemental orders 
in Ghana, but also in other LDCs/EEs  
 This study also departs from other studies emerging from the LDCs that were based on the neo-
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) that assumed homogeneity. Our research 
advances heterogeneity in institutional fields, calling for additional comparative studies in the 
developing and emerging economies to confirm the proposition made regarding the elemental 
orders.  
In addition, I would urge other researchers on LDCs public financial management reforms, 
adopting grounded theory informed- methods to confirm and test some of the categories uncovered 
in this research. There should be more institutional based research in LDC contexts focusing on 
providing better understanding of institutional orders and institutional effects, the specific 
constraining factors; and framing of middle range theories in explaining accounting change. 
In our data analysis I have shown the link between the emerging categories and sub-categories of 
the IPFM in Ghana and in the process have developed a substantive theory based on budget 
credibility. The limitation on this study is that it is based on the conditions of the reforms as I found 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




them in Ghana, and I do not expect the theory to apply in other countries. However, the methods I 
have used can be extended to other countries to explore the binding constraints on their IPFM 
reforms inductively. 
 This study adds to the emerging literature calling for professionalization of accounting practices 
in developing and emerging countries to promote better reform outcomes. In this research I have 
pointed the way for future research in developing a deeper understanding of the institutional 
conditions and context of the IPFM reforms by applications of institutional logics and 
institutionalism. I conclude with discussions whether a better understanding of LDCs’ social and 
cultural, political and legal environment will make any difference to reform implementation 
The debate has two parts, the earlier debate by scholars in the 1970s and 1980s: and the second 
round of debate by scholar- practitioners in post-NPM in the 1990s and 2000s. The earlier literature 
in the 1970 and 80s debated whether making management accounting choices based on 
understanding LDCs social and cultural, political, and legal environment will make any difference 
to the efficacy of accounting (Hopper et al.,2009). There were three strands in this debate:  
Firstly, there are those who argued that a better a better understanding taking the specific context 
in consideration in making accounting choices will make a difference (Needles (1976) and Gray, 
1989). Gray emphasised taking the environmental factors into account, but his methodology on 
cultural modelling was based on Hofstede’s approach that has been questioned. Scholars have 
objected to Gray's framework, arguing that it gained authourity and prominence in international 
accounting research largely because of subsequent researchers’ unquestioning acceptance and 
application of this methodology (Heidhues and Patel, 2011). Importantly, I proposed that 
international accounting research may be further enhanced by considering the contextual factors 
such as political, legal, social, and historical environments of countries. 
Secondly, there were those who wanted an adaption of western models incorporating indigenous 
non-Western development models. For example, referring to ancient Egypt, they wanted to 
incorporate traditional disclosure practices into western accounting disclosure practices Mirghani 
(1982). This argument is difficult to sustain because of the reference to ancient Egypt rather and 
more specific indigenous accounting innovations in modern times. Any such enhanced role 
through integration between indigenous practice and international accounting would require a 
better research agenda.  
The third group comprised those who thought addressing the pre-conditions, for example good 
governance, was a sine qua non for better accounting (Ghartey, 1985). Hopper et al (2009) noted 
that Ghartey’s argument was to put good governance in place first. I argue that in the light of the 
recent experiences Ghartey’s point has been proved right in Africa, but ‘good governance’ is too 
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broad and needs to be unpacked. These comments are made in the light of Ghana’s experience of 
implementing good governance and liberal policies for over almost three decades, but not having 
leaps of improvements in financial management performance.  
In the post-NPM world, in the light of recent experiences the search for better accounting has 
shifted to the understanding of the local context in the implementation of the accounting reform 
(Manning & McCourt, 2013; Grindle, 2013; Pritchett and Woodcock, 2013). Some contributors to 
the contemporary debates advocate the merit of incorporating more ‘‘participatory’’ approaches. 
(Pritchett and Woodcock, 2004). Perhaps to complement that they have proposed ‘problem-driven 
iterative analysis’ as one way of bridging the gap. (Pritchett and Woodcock, 2013). 
The fundamental argument in this thesis is that the exiting accounts of the conduct and performance 
of reforms in LDCs (the exiting theorising) have neglected to take into sufficient account of ‘the 
discursive elements that shape political and economic perceptions, the definition of actors’ 
interests and, ultimately, behaviour.’ (Campbell and Pedersen,2001). For examples in the case of 
the UK Ezzamel et al. (2007) show how discourse was the carrier of institutions and institutional 
change in accountability in school staff and their organisations in the Local Management of 
Schools (LMS) in the 1990s.  
 Referring to the influences of scholars such as Foucault, Latour, Woolgar, Ricouer and others 
Campbell and Pedersen,2001 have argued how discourse and linguistics analysis have shaped 
social theories and have had impact in Europe and has the potential to impact in other places. Citing 
the example of Denmark, Campbell and Pedersen argued that scholars incorporating “discursive 
elements shape political and economic perceptions, the definition of actors’ interests and, 
ultimately behaviour. Moreover, they believed that differences in the discursive side of institutions 
helped explain variations in public policy and economic performance among corporatist countries. 
For example, they credit Denmark’s remarkable success in reducing its budget deficits during the 
mid-1980s to the ability of its leaders to utilize the principles of a well-institutionalised discourse, 
stressing social cooperation and consensus building, which enabled the major social partners to 
redefine their interests in terms of bringing the budget under control”. (Campbell and Pedersen, 
2001pp. 6). 
In addition to institutional theorists, Campbell and Pedersen have noted that other theoretical 
traditions in political economy (for example Bourdieu) have incorporated the discursive approach 
into their work. The discursive elements have a general application that could impact on the 
relevance of accounting research and accounting practice in the LDCs. This important 
development appears to have had only a marginal effect on theorising of LDCs accounting reforms, 
but there are signs that it is beginning to emerge (Alawattage et al, 2016). 
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checking non-compliance issues in Education: Proceedings reduced to minor infractions (an 
Education accountant had to travel the length of the country to explain a query on about $200) 
when this matter could have been dealt with internally and explained by the accounting officer if 
there were still outstanding issues. It is good to spread the accountability chain across government 
and to haul lower ranking officials to explain their actions. But those details mean that the PAC 
meetings becomes an auditing process, rather than focus on higher level policy issues. The overall 
impact is that process becomes tedious for members (wonder if they get any research briefings 
from Parliamentary staff); the process begins to accumulate a backlog; and officers depart from 
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF MEMOS 
Write-up of Analysis from the Analytical Memoranda 
In the memoranda I did not aim just to describe. I compared and analysed the similarities and 
contradictions between participants’ accounts of the reform phenomenon drawing on archival 
materials, current official documents, and other sources. The topics and sub-topics are listed below:  
1. Ghana is seen as a reform minded country 
2. Initiation and Design of the Reform 
What was PUFMARP and how was it designed?  
Defining PFM  
Diagnosing issues in the PFM system to support reform  
Design of reforms  
Design of reforms meant different things to different people  
Designing the financial management reforms  
Initiating the reforms as a home-grown solution  
Design: Claims about the reforms being homegrown 
The design of the PFM reforms being government led  
Donor support is indispensable to Ghana 
PFM reforms and national strategic document 
Rejection of the central integrated solution by parts of the governments: 
Problematization of reform issues  
The reform design claimed to address PFM issues comprehensively, but to others the issues raised 
albeit important, were selective 
Integrated solution  
Seeing the reforms as top-driven 
The human factor dimension rather than just systems  
Being empathetic of MDAs involvement in the PFM reforms  
Relationship issues between MoF and the sector ministries  
Seeking to do things better at the sector level as a re-occurring theme 
MoF tends to blame the MDAs without always acknowledging their failure to play their part  
Seeing the reforms mostly in terms of automation  
Drawing a distinction between automating systems and financial reform policy implementation  
Design and project ownership: both the automation and reforms  
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Imposing the automation of the accounting system on the users at the MDA level 
Challenges of connectivity impedes enforcement of protocols and standards to achieve integration 
Reform programme are re-branded and re-packaged to make them appears new  
Re-packaging and rebranding the reforms 
Building on previous reform efforts through sequencing  
Developing reform strategies and action plans under the 3 waves of reforms from PUFMARP to 
GIFMIS to PFMRP 
Using a phased approach to implement the reforms  
Documenting GIFMIS design  
Centralising the PFM system  
3. Implementation: addressing a range of managerial and technical challenges 
 Commitment  
Reflecting on reform commitment  
Requiring commitment at both political and technical officers’ level for anything to work  
Demonstrating political commitment to reforms through ministerial participation at executive 
committee and steering committee  
Compromised Oracle negotiation – by-passing the project management team to the Minister to get 
executive decisions  
Attempting to develop a performance-based budgeting as part of the introduction of the MTEF  
Costing of the budget has been incremental, and practices remain largely ad hoc.  
BPEMs was designed to be implemented in phases, but the initial implementation did not work 
out as planned. 
Holding that the implementation was not piloted and became a problem  
Limitations of the Oracle Financial Package at the time meant the Public Sector Budgeting could 
not support activity-based budgeting  
The low degree of integration of the financial management function and the low commitment of 
the CAGD in BPEMs 
Paying allowances has led to the gaming of the training system  
Explaining the stalling of reforms between 2001 to 2009  
Involving the Accountant General in the financial management reforms changed the project’s 
fortune 
Risks of MoF keeping the reforms too close without sufficient MDAs involvement  
Bottom-heavy sectors such as health reforms must embrace a large mass of people for reforms to 
be successful 
For sustainability reforms should be supported by business cases: 
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Change management has focused on acceptance of technology, but not on attitudinal change  
Vendor education to support reforms  
Developing accounting and reporting with the chart of accounts 
Managing the payroll cost  
4. Project’s Achievement 
The PUFMARP reforms were impacted by attempting to implement components in parallel.  
Project achievements are shown in terms of changes in legislation which is never implemented as 
intended  
Using the GIFMIS system as a tool to control wrongful expenditure submitted for payment.  
Establishing levels of authourity for payment in the PFM Act 
Automating the HR systems has aided integration of the payroll into the financial management 
system 
Cleaning the payroll have shown many positives  
Reforms helping unplanned effect of letting MDAs know their functions better 
Introducing techniques of linking planning to budget under the MTEF has been helpful at the 
district level  
Acquiring skills especially by Accounting officers  
Remaining sceptical about enforcement of rules with the promise of a strengthened sanctions 
regime  
Taking things seriously keeps coming up, by participants reflecting on various aspects  
Developing an economic classification system  
The PFM reform agenda was crowded by the World Bank and the development partners  
Improving controls without addressing fundamental issues increases the incentive to defeat the 
system  
Automation gives total control to the MoF, which can be both positive and negative 
Over-use of controls leads to abuse and paralysis  
Assessing if the reforms have been worthwhile  
5. Planning 
Clamouring by the people of Ghana for a long-term plan 
Justifying the need for long term planning 
 Not needing to cost medium-term plans for them to be useful  
6. Budgeting 
Preparing budgets based on ‘a wish list’ of projects and programmes from sectors’ medium term 
plans  
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The timing and involvement of the Cabinet in the budget process  
The role of the Economic Management Team (EMT)  
The role of the Vice-President in the budget process  
Optimal deficit targeting set out under the IMF programme imposes the budget constraint  
Budget Programmes are not expected to run according to their schedules  
M&E systems 
Coordination 
Impact of new political priority programmes on other programme budgets  
Special programmes  
The role of programme managers  
Relating PFM reforms to other service delivery policies in government.  
Recognising that reforms should be addressing delivery of MDA programmes  
Budget calendar and supplementary budgeting 
Legislating for statutory funds to by-pass MOF’s straight-jackets and inefficiencies  
Recent politicised projects reducing the scope of discretion further  
Budget management supports mostly the public service payroll (or compensation is a popular term 
used)  
Attempting to make ‘false’ savings through reforms impact on perceptions of PFM reforms  
Relating procurement to the budget system 
MoF thinking of introducing inputs price guidelines for the MDAs Budget  
Effect of cash rationing is that sometimes budgeted funding does not get to the frontline services-  
7. Budget Credibility signalling reform credibility 
The consequences of separating the budgeting from accounting, with budget execution function 
shared between the MoF and the Accountant General 
Budget credibility and reform credibility come together 
Reforming for credibility  
Undermining the budget system by poor releases of funds  
Budget credibility narrative 
Even improvements in budget practices get reversed with time 
Linking reform to policy credibility 
Separating Budgeting from Accounting and Reporting  
Capital expenditure procedures remain underdeveloped  
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Producing poor quality budgets knowing that there are no personal consequences - ignoring 
guidelines 
Reflecting performance measurement in the current budget is meaningless until the budgeting 
system is made credible  
Executing the budget as planned will motivate staff to do it even better.  
Arrears have a first call on the budget- 
Making the budget system worthwhile requires resources to flow (in a predictable way) through 
the system 
Generating and using reports from GIFMIS is lagging  
8. Reforms as donors’ intervention 
Reforms are mostly externally propelled projects and officials may or may not willingly buy into 
them.  
Funding constraints from the WB for reforms mean that reforms would have to be centralized to 
control activities in the project lifespan  
Reviews are carried out, driven, and financed by the donor community, mostly for their 
consumption 
Applying donor conditionalities results in using donor systems and foisting TAs on countries 
In defence of donors conditionalities and the use of foreign consultants to provide technical 
assistance 
Uneasy relationship with consultants especially TA foreign consultants  
Rejecting the notions of a special court for ARIC  
Resisting imposed Technical Assistance  
Driving budget component by own efforts  
Unwinding of reform outcomes after cessation of project activities  
Using out-crops of foreign think tanks  
Funding software acquisition with WB loans possibly influenced the choice of software  
9. Professionalising the financial management function 
Growing the number of professional accountants with the reforms  
Professionalism  
Reforming the relationship between other professions and the finance and allied functions 
Professionalization  
10. Transparency 
Whitewashing fraudulent practices in Ghana, 
 Lacking overall transparency; and the sectors themselves complicit in obscuring government 
financial dealing -  
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The PFMRP stretches to look at the oversight function through strengthening the PAC  
Improving committee reports to the House  
There is no clarity who is directly responsible for managing the finances in the MDAs and for what 
they are accountable.  
Making sure that everybody who manages public money is held accountable  
GIFMIS promotes transparency and accountability  
Audit Reports are issued on time contrary to the existing notions 
Training auditors to respond to their task  
12. Reform co-ordination 
Rejecting the model of appointing of consultants (albeit Ghanaians) to lead and manage the reforms  
Uncertain home for PFM reform coordination:  
Oscillating reforms with no certain home.  
13. Ownership 
 In reforms ownership is political ownership and that is linked to transitioning between reforms–  
Buying and running a software for the PFM system  
Software license fee- 
14. Internal Controls 
Introducing Risk management echoes that the MoF does not have the appropriate structures to 
manage reforms and weaknesses in internal control function  
Improvements in internal controls that would never come– 
15. Extending reforms to Local Government from the central government reforms 
The scope of the research has changed from focusing on the central government to the general 
Public Service 
Extending reforms to fiscal decentralization (local government) but the reforms are restrictively 
centralized 
Developing social accountability as part of the reform J2 
Incorporating the local government (Assemblies) budget into the national budget  
Giving grants to local government appear to lack clear enforcement mechanisms  
Dovetailing fiscal decentralization to central government reforms  
Building fiscal decentralization on a weak central government reforms is challenging to both  
Proposing local government borrowing bill  
Composite budgeting  
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On-going IGFs strategy work for LAs  
Developing the inter-governmental fiscal relationship by Roy Kelly (from Harvard University)  
Constructivism - Hungering for improvements, but mediocre changes  
Evidencing the impact of reforms at the local level  
Checking compliance of the LAs to the DDF  
Superficiality of reforms, just going through the motions  
Questioning the performance of District Assemblies  
Privatising revenue collection solutions for local government  
Embracing urbanisation for its revenue potential  
16. Sustainability  
Sustainability weighs on the conscience of the WB  
17. Inappropriate structures in the MoF centrally and in the MDAs to support 
professionalization of financial management 
Reorganisation the Budget Division in the MoF as part of the problem and any solution  
Mainstreaming the reforms in the civil service 
 Inappropriate structures of the MoF to support reforms:   
The low degree of integration of the financial management function,  
Organising the management units in the ministries to support budget management  
More collaborative work between Budget and Macro-Economic Research  
Segmenting the government departments into functional specialisations where other professional 
specialists cannot develop their careers  
Professionalising the CAGD is still lagging 
Centralising accountants in the CAGD versus sectoral accountants 
Ad hoc reforms 
Questioning whether there are better alternatives than pretending to reform and squandering public 
funds 
Accrual accounting is hardly understood beyond a few people in the accounting circle  
Making the introduction of accrual accounting as a technique and a tool pre-mature- 
Compelling MDAs to come on board reforms 
Making costly mistakes for attempting to centralize all government of Ghana reporting 
18. Other considerations 
Official assertions are often misleading: for example, on revenue projections  
Doxa 
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Accepting long standing practices as the norm  
Misleading (Abuse of) accounting language 
Labelling the current budget practice as either programme budgeting or performance budgeting is 
misleading  
Looking at the spectre of “black boxes” because of the way things are done in Ghana  
The financial management reforms have also ‘black-boxed’ sector financial management issues:  -  
Superficial reforms safeguarding the status quo  
Attrition of knowledge in a dynamic world  
Initiating changes in management styles, but limited to individual managers’ innovation  
Corrupt practices and malfeasance by Public Accountants  
There is constant official gaming of the PFM system  
Gaming the system 
Calling for seriousness in our government business dealing – playing Charles Skelly  
Inventing devices within government to by-pass controls (official gaming)  
Reforming the salary structure  
Paying top-up allowances to civil servants for engaging in reform activities 
Paying allowances has led to the gaming of the training system  
Paying allowances for participating in the reforms 
19.  Notes on Methods 
Using a topic guide for participants  
Reflexive piece on switching-off the tape in the middle of the interview and getting to the end of 
the session  
Procurement practices emerging from international 
Limiting the power of Parliament to make inputs to budget to only after the budget has been 
presented to Parliament. 
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APPENDIX 4 REVISED INTERINSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM IDEAL TYPES 
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APPENDIX 5: THE MAPPING OF THE SIXTY-NINE CATEGORIES TO THE SIX MAIN CATEGORIES 
No
. 
Sub-sub-category Sub-categories  Categories  Core category 
1  Learning    





   














6  Procurement  
 
  





8  Selecting consultants    
9  Knowledge translation/ 
Diffusion 
  
10  Commitment to reforms    
11  Capturing financial 
transactions in GIFMIS/ 




12  Health Sector Financial 
Management reform 
  
13  Making Payment    
14  Keeping and rendering 
accounts  
  
15  Keeping the Balances of the 
Consolidated Fund 
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19  Budget Planning and 
formulation  
  
20  Improving reporting, 
accountability, and efficiency  
  
21  Coordination of budget 
preparation 
  
22  Budget Execution (on Internal 
Control, Improving budget 
management, financial 






   
24  Keeping the Balances of the 
Consolidated Fund  
  
25  Reform ownership and 
championing  
  
26  Audit reforms    
27  Changing identities of auditors, 
accountants, and budget staff  
  
28  Integration solution    
29  Sustainability of reforms    
30  Design of computer systems    
31  Medium Term development 
planning 
  
32  Fiscal Decentralization    
33  Composite Budgeting    
34  Social Accountability    





into LA reforms 
   
37 LAs Performance 
Assessment  
   
38 Collection of 
Local Revenue 
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40  Financial Management in 
sectors (MDAs)  
  
41  Sector reforms    
42  Oversight    
43  VFM    
44 Trajectory of 
reforms  
   
45 Buying logistics to 
support reforms  
   
46   Professionalizati







47  Rent seeking behaviour of 
some reform staff  
  
48  Improving Auditing    
49  Institutional reforms    





51  Programme Performances    
52  Transitioning between reform 
initiatives (Moving from 
PUFMARP) 
  
53  Budget Rigidities    





   
56  Reforming for Fiscal 
Discipline  
  
57  Transitioning from Activity-
based to Programme-budgeting  
  
58  Fiduciary role of managers 
public finances  
  






60  Strengthening financial 
management within a sector 
  
61  Performance monitoring    
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63  Performance management 
(budgeting) 
  
64  Using technology to manage 
financials  
  
65  GIFMIS and PFMRP M&E    
  Domestic Revenue   
  the MTEF   
68  Introducing IPSAS   
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APPENDIX 6: THE EMPIRICAL EXPLANATION OF THE SUB-CATEGORIES OF BUDGET 
CREDIBILITY IN GHANA 
This appendix provides the empirical sub-categories that explains the central phenomenon of 
budget credibility weaknesses in the government of Ghana 
Long Term Planning 
The people of Ghana have clamoured for a long-term development plan for the country 
(Constitutional Review Commission’s report completed, 2011). As an official from the National 
Development Planning Commission (NDPC) observed:  
Particularly the constitutional review commission indicated in their report that wherever 
they went Ghanaians were calling for the long-term plan that all parties would subscribe 
to, and not we having to have the situation where this one comes, he implements a four or 
eight-year plan. Another one comes – as if you don’t know where we are going. So, the 
commission’s report – the constitutional review commission’s report was emphatic on that 
– the need for a long-term plan. 
With no consistency in development policy direction, the desire by the people for a more robust 
planning system is not surprising. A casual glance at the state of infrastructure (especially the 
roads) in Ghana will not fail to reveal the failure of short-termism in policy development and 
implementation. To reinforce the point the NDPC participant went on to argue: 
Yeah. Spatial planning in particular; and infrastructural planning. They are such things 
that should be long term. Because if you take let’s say development of rail network the 
gestation period can be around five years. The study period, the feasibility before 
construction. That would be about four years, and if you are a government your term is 
over. So, if you do that the government will not be interested in either infrastructure 
because they won’t finish. And the next government perhaps will come and continue and 
take the glory. But if you have a national long- term plan with infrastructure we all know 
– the infrastructure. The direction for infrastructure development. Any government that 
comes will proceed along those lines.  
Development scholar have long debated the value of long-term planning in developing countries45. 
However, for the purpose of this present enquiry, Lewis distinguishes between ‘indicative’ and 
‘controlling’ plan. Indicative plans only seek to give guidance in contrast to controlling plans as in 
communist countries where the plans give authorization and compels officials to deliver on them. 
Lewis argued that:  
The figures in the Development Plan indicate expectations, aspirations, and intentions, but 
are not binding commitments. This (as we shall see later) is one reason for the irresponsible 
tendency to use grossly inflated figures, intended to impress the reader, without 
committing the writer. On the other hand, the fact that the indicative Plan does not commit 
 
45 It is outside the scope of this enquiry, but for an introduction to the discussions see Arthur Lewis in 
Development Planning: The essentials of economic policy 
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helps it to ride changing circumstances better than a document which seeks to effect 
control (Lewis 1966, pp. 20). 
Ghana has operated with indicative medium-term plans, but their links to the annual budgets have 
been tenuous.  There is neither ‘indicative’ or ‘controlling’ long term plans, even though Ghana 
Governments signed up to the MDGs; and presently the SDGs are part of the wider influences on 
its development policy. 
Planning and Budget formulation  
Instead of long-term development plans, in the most recent past Ghana has had successive medium-
term plans that are intended to support budget planning.  Wildavsky has pointed out the notion that 
the budget system can lead to a rational budget allocation requires co-ordination between plans 
and budgets, with planning in the lead; and “to understand contemporary budget reforms, therefore, 
one first must try to comprehend national planning” (Wildvaksy 1975 p.255). 
Going back to 1992 at the commencement of the 4th Republic, Ghana developed medium plans 
(Vision 2020, GPRS I and GPRS II) but none of them was successfully implemented. The failure 
to sustain a robust medium-term planning has been both a cause and a consequence of budget 
credibility. Apart from the intellectual argument advanced by scholars such as Lewis (op cit.), 
years of preparing unfunded development plans have eroded the credibility of planning. Budgets 
are prepared by ministries (namely, the MDAs) based on a ‘wish list’ of projects and programmes 
from sectors’ medium term plans knowing that the probability of getting funding is very low. In 
turn, the medium-term plans have not been taken seriously by the MDAs because of unreliable 
funding.   
Participant G1 from MoF summed up the situation as follows:  
So, there are issues about credibility when we also look at the planning stage of the budget 
formulation. MDAs need to prepare their sector medium term plans. Now the plans that 
they prepare, it’s been observed that the plans are becoming more or less a wish list where 
MDAs come up with a tall list of projects and programs without looking at the resource 
constraints of the country. So, it is a very big weakness that transitions into the budget 
itself. 
Attempts to improve budget planning aimed to address the wish-list budgeting approach. In a 
country where there are many urgent needs, it is not surprising that the MDAs have a ‘tall list of 
projects and programmes’ that they present to seek resources. Emerging from lower levels across 
the country and aggregating it upwards, projects multiply in numbers by the time they reach the 
headquarters level. 
The concept of ‘a wish list’ implies some laziness in the preparation of the plans and budget; 
therefore, requiring redress through more rigorous project and programmes development 
processes. It requires the MoF to provide the necessary guidelines for the MDAs’ projects and 
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programmes to pass through specific ‘testing processes’ or ‘stress-testing’ before been accepted 
into the approved list that can go to the budget.  However, opinions are still divided on one of the 
key criteria regarding whether medium-term plans should be costed and given price-tags before 
they are approved. The view often advanced by the IMF and other development partners is that 
medium term plans should be costed, and that appears to the line that officials in the MoF follow. 
An opposing view is held by the National Planning, who argued that the medium- term plans do 
not need necessarily to be costed to be useful. A participant from NDPC, G29, expressed: 
The PBB is usually like a plan. Because it has everything it takes. It has the vision, the 
mission, functions of various ministries and then it has the programmes that they are 
implementing within the context of their plan – the programmes that they are 
implementing – how much it will cost. So that one will limit them to what they can do 
within the resource limit.  
But the ones that we asked them to do it’s as if there is no limitation. So, we have these 
two documents coexisting. The one being the bigger one but some of us have been arguing 
that well, that is fine. This PBB determines what you can do with government resources. 
But what we asked them to do is something that the private sector, civil society, everybody 
can buy into outside the limits that has been set by Minister of Finance. 
The participant argued that costing as a tool for staying within given resource constraint but that 
should not be used to check the development of strategic choices in the initial stages of decision 
making. It is in this sense that the argument advanced by the NDPC should be seen.  
The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
The MTEF component of the reforms, starting in 1998, built on the existing diagnoses and 
proposed several changes to address the poor budget credibility and other challenges in the system 
that have been identified in the Public Expenditure Reviews of 1993 and 1994. For example, it 
proposed the merger of the recurrent and development budgets, forward estimates, prioritisation 
of expenditure, strategic planning as an essential step in the budget preparation process and so on. 
These solutions were mostly quickly adopted officially but never implemented as intended.  
The MTEF proposed solutions appealed to the key actors in government (both the MoF and the 
MDAs) for different reasons. But its initial appeal did not last because of its potential impact on 
the existing practices implication, especially in the way the MoF manages the budget. For the MoF, 
the MTEF had an appeal because it had the potential of improving existing practices (such as policy 
hearing) and providing new tools prioritisation of expenditure, and an enhanced budget calendar) 
to regain control on a situation that had deteriorated over time. For the MDAs officials, the MTEF 
reforms provided new tools such as (strategic planning and activity-based budgeting) that 
reinforced their organisational mandates and gave them better control over their sectoral 
programmes. What both the MoF and the MDAs had in common was that the MTEF introduced a 
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better language for dialogue (integrated budgeting, forward estimates, linking expenditure plans to 
the estimates, prioritisation, consultation) that did not exist before.  
The MTEF challenged some existing notions. For example, by handholding all MDAs in 
workshops to develop their strategic plans, that had 3-years duration, the MTEF questioned the 
notion of the existing planning system and the role of planners who have been ensconced in the 
National Planning Commission. The strategic planning tool went further to highlight the uneasy 
co-existence of the NPDC who has the constitutional role to undertake planning but, in the eyes of 
the MDAs, not the financial clout to back it up. Funding came from Ministry of Finance, and that 
further undermined the NPDC’s ability to compete with the MoF for attention. This uneasiness 
still exists, but attempts have been made lately to build bridges between the medium-term planning 
and the budgeting.  
Policy choices is an essential part of any credible budget system. This is enhanced when there is a 
transparent process of prioritisation the allocation of national resources to individual MDAs; and 
the MDAs in turn allocating their resources to activities, projects, or programmes. The MTEF 
procedures trump an annual budget which offers a narrower fiscal space for funding all government 
priorities. By providing MDAs annual resource envelope looking at 3 years ahead, the MTEF had 
the potential benefit of enabling MDAS to prioritize their needs over the medium term. However, 
for the forward estimates to be useful in any form, it had to be binding in some form, therefore 
requiring the MoF to improve its performance in forecasting resource envelopes. It also required 
the MDAs to undertake a proper full costing of their needs looking three years ahead. Given the 
limited capacity to even implement the annual budget as intended, it seemed far-fetched to 
maintain a credible profile of revenue and expenditures over three years. From the time it was first 
introduced in 1998, the forward estimates were never implemented properly as resource envelopes 
to be approved either by Cabinet or Parliament, or both; and to be taken seriously. The estimates 
contained the forward estimates which were mostly derived incrementally and never approved. 
Parliament continued to approve the annual budget.  
Problematizing the line-item budgeting was appropriate because public funds were disbursed 
without knowing for what purpose they served. By introducing the MTEF (as a means of showing 
the activity and outputs of sectors) the budgeting system was going to support the streamlining of 
governmental organisations and aligning their funding to their functions. As Wildavsky’s (1978) 
has argued, it is easier to cut a line item without organisational changes, whereas you cannot 
eliminate an objective from the budget without eliminating the organisation that is responsible for 
producing it.  
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With the introduction of the MTEF the process for “cutting” the budget was to be done through 
prioritisation and re-prioritisation of MDAs estimated needs, instead of arbitrary reductions. But 
that re-prioritisation within a fixed resource envelope and alignment of submissions to the 
mandates of the MDAs did not work well. The MoF continued to resort to arbitrary cutbacks of 
the budget submissions sometimes through “gaming” and fudging. In the Ghana Education Service 
(GES) for example, the payroll would be underprovided in the budget by the MoF, causing an 
overspent during implementation that would be curled from the “Goods and Services” budget lines. 
This would result in the under provision of funds for operational activities in their offices and 
schools. As participant, G27, said:  
And then the education sector tries to kind of insist that we have no choice about these 
people who are already enrolled in the system. And then Ministry of Finance still takes it 
down but knows that they are going to have to spend more than allocating the budget. So 
that to me would suggest it’s a failure of the budget preparation process. It’s not honest 
enough to say what the actual need is…. 
It’s at senior political level. As the top level of Ministry of Finance to actually have an 
honest allocation in the budget rather than getting it wrong by 20% and knowing they are 
getting it wrong. Because then when it comes to execution that 20% has to come from 
somewhere. And normally that means that it comes out with the good and services and 
investment or whatever else 
This gaming has not been one-way. In the reverse direction some of the MDAs (such as the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture) would commit government by awarding contracts based on their 
budgets, and not necessarily on the cash allotment provided by the MoF cash committee. In a 
situation where the cash allotments are often less than the approved budget, arrears would be 
created within the system to be paid by the MoF at some future date. So, whilst there may be 
insufficiency of budget allocation, the cash allotments become the more critical determinant of the 
budget credibility.  
Under the MTEF sectors were encouraged to explore other ways of delivering their policy 
mandates either by using the private sector or enabling non-governmental organisation. In addition, 
the government sought policy consistency through ‘policy hearings’ from sector groups 
(encompassing a number of MDAs in the same sector). Policy hearings, like other reform 
initiatives, were implemented only superficially because the MDAs intuited that the MoF would 
not completely follow through and make changes from the outcomes of those sector group 
meetings. 
Not implementing the budget as planned has been institutionalised as a “rational myth” (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1997; Scott, 1987). Misconceptions mixed with inadequate preparation, and over-
politicisation of the budget funding processes (termed in Ghana as ‘budget releases’) ensured that 
the required changes never took place. The budget book for the MDAs (called budget volumes) 
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under the MTEF became truly voluminous. Every activity undertaken by a ministry was listed as 
part of the budget, perhaps naively with the hope of securing a bigger budget, that never 
materialised. The most important principle of aggregating at output levels was not adhered to. For 
example, in almost all the key MDAs purchases were misleading listed as budget activities in the 
budget book. This made the budget book extremely voluminous and meaningless. Instead of 
refining the MTEF processes further through improvements, it was left to operate for almost 12 
years in a decayed form until the ‘diluted’ practices lost their relevance. 
Despite the initial success of the MTEF in Ghana it did not make any lasting impact on expenditure 
planning. The MTEF was never fully and properly implemented, and together with the activity-
based budgeting they were problematized with the view of introducing changes under programme 
budget reforms. 
Transitioning between the Activity Based Budgeting (ABB) and Programme-Based Budgeting 
(PBB)  
While the reforms have introduced programme budgeting the appropriateness of implementing this 
type of reform in Ghana is doubtful. The practice of releasing funds, during implementation, on-
line-item basis (under the guise of programme) continues, and again without knowing for what 
purpose the money is to be used. The funding processes remain almost intact except for the 
automation, and opinions were divided, even within the MoF whether programmes budgeting is 
being practiced in Ghana. At the sector level a similar picture emerged that the claim of having 
moved away from line-item budgeting is a pretence, when participant G13 said from the Ministry 
of Health said: 
And also, sometimes that is the message that doesn’t [go down] well. As if we are moving 
away from line item budgeting. We haven’t moved away from line item budgeting. We 
have rather improved on it by adding program-based in terms of activity, analysis on top 
of it. So, first all that we analyse how much of a certain line of electricity, travel expenses, 
that, that, that, that. Now we have added a bit small on it that if you went to do a training 
how much of it was fuel, how much of it was travel cost? How much was it this or that? 
So beyond just knowing and total we spend one billion fuel. What for? We don’t know. 
Now you can know how we spent on fuel. How paying of salaries contributed to your 
program. How much for building of buying something. So that is what has moved up, but 
we haven’t moved away from line budgeting. But line budgeting is not the main medium 
of our planning now. It’s more activity, and now program based. So, you must have a 
program to improve the health of the people, and then how do you do it? And then you 
come to the inputs on what inputs are needed to do it. We were working only from inputs. 
I need to communicate so we need mobile phones. We bought a thousand mobile phones. 
In the planning process there is nothing to show how the thousand phones contributed to 
improvement in health. Even in [improving] communication, and then in health. But now 
with program-based budgeting you are able to know how the thousand phones improved 
communication between service providers and then led to improved service delivery in 
terms of and then improved maybe health outcomes. 
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The message does not go down well because the official script is that there has been a move from 
line-item budgeting, whereas there has not been any change in practice. Programme budgeting is 
a procedure where budgets are approved by Parliament at programme level and the associated 
funding it provided at that level to programme managers. Wildavsky (1978) has argued that line-
item budget is so resilient because it is easy to operate, it will always bounce back when attempts 
to replace it are incomplete. So, the question for reformers in Ghana is to decide whether their line-
item budgeting can co-exist with programme budgeting. 
Having introduced the presentation of the budget in programme terms, the MoF continues to 
manage the budget through a process akin to line-item budgeting. Programme managers have been 
appointed for each programme, but they do not play their expected roles because cash resources 
are rationed, and programme do not run according to their prescribed plans. An MoF official puts 
it all down to the limitation of cash resources when he said:    
“Yeah, if the money is there, and we are not doing any form of cash rationing. I mean, you take a 
programme, budget management programme, just give it to them and leave the programme 
managers to manage the budget and do what they want, but unfortunately the money is not 
there[laughs]...” 
But the problem runs deeper, including the neglect to address adequately the accountability 
mechanisms between budget holders in the MDAs that weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation 
by budget holders.  
Executing the budget 
The most important factor undermining the budgeting system in Ghana are the institutionalised 
practices associated with budget execution. Discourses on budget execution extends to efficiency 
in the execution of transactions, how data are captured and controlled, and how results are 
monitored and evaluated. These procedures invariably involve the work of internal auditors who 
ensure that the internal control arrangements are sound and effective.   
The budget implementation system in Ghana is often riddled with gaps and conflict between 
governmental organisations. Internal auditors are abused for expressing professional opinion when 
they are told by MDA senior management “Hey, are you part of us? You either belong to us and 
change that your language or just go!” [Participant G4 from Ghana Audit Service]. The 
consequences of the low status of internal auditors are low morale among their ranks and the 
widespread loss of confidence in their work.  
Notwithstanding the recent reforms the internal audit function Ghana government appears to be 
placed in an organisational quagmire. Administratively they report to the head of an MDA, but 
functionally they report to the head of the central Internal Audit Agency. The Internal Agency is 
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merely an organisational structure that has not been effective protecting the professional interest 
of internal auditors posted to the MDAs. For example, the requirements of internal auditors were 
not factored into the GIFMIS, because they did not play any role in its implementation; neither 
were they given any specialised training as auditors. 
The reforms have brought in improvements such as the development of an Audit Charter which 
requires internal audit units to submit their work plans and budgetary needs every year to an Audit 
Recommendation Implementation Committee (ARIC) (now simply termed as the Audit 
Committee under the PFM Act 2016) to consider before it goes to an MDA management. This is 
to ensure that internal audits get the resources to implement their work plans, but generally the 
Audit Committees have not been effective in exerting any influence on MDAs’ management let 
alone with the MoF. The consequences are that considerable delays are encountered in updating 
internal audit manuals with developments such as new technologies and new legislations 
(currently, the Public Finance Act 2016 and the Internal Agency Act). The delays were attributed 
to the lack of budgetary resources to support this work.   
One aspect of internal audit practice in Ghana, which has undermined its potency is pre-auditing. 
It appears to be incongruous to the environment in which it is supposed to operate, but the discourse 
on that has been limited. The justification often given to pre-auditing practices in Ghana is that it 
ensures non-financial budget holders can perform their fiduciary responsibilities without infringing 
regulations. The supposition behind the arrangement is questionable. It assumes that non-financial 
managers are financially illiterate (which generally may be the case in some sectors, but not all); 
but more controversially it is supposedly to check the work the accountants have done before 
approval. This procedure therefore calls into question the trust between the accountants and service 
managers; but worse still, it involves the internal auditors in the very financial transactions they 
would be required to audit in future.  
The practice of pre-auditing is mostly found in Anglophone public sector systems if financial 
management practices are weak. In the UK for example, it was found in local government 
authorities where financial management systems were characteristically old-fashioned than their 
more advanced peers. In the LDCs that inherited financial systems from the British, it not clear 
whether this practice was part of the colonial legacy or whether it had arisen by borrowing practices 
from Francophone systems (or generally the ‘Continental Systems’) where this practice is the rule 
rather than the exemption. Pre-auditing practice often goes with centralization of financial controls 
as opposed to systems that rely on a greater decentralized approach. In Ghana for example internal 
audit was department in the CAGD until the Internal Audit Agency was established circa 2000. 
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For this reason, whilst some practitioners have advocated for convergence of financial 
management systems46, pre-auditing appears inconsistent with the Anglophone accountability 
tradition where a greater spending autonomy is granted to public sector managers through 
decentralization and delegation. In the Anglophone tradition emphasis is placed on post-auditing. 
Pre-auditing not only compromises the integrity of internal auditors but is also represents a misuse 
of limited audit resources. In addition, it becomes a source of institutionalised corruption when the 
additional approval step creates bottlenecks in the transaction process. It can also sometimes take 
away the responsibility from the Spending Officers, who ultimately is accountable for the budget 
and all actions related to its management. 
However, the transition from pre-auditing to systems audit and post-auditing has not been clear-
cut in Ghana resulting in weakened internal audit function as participant G4 from Ghana Audit 
Service explained: 
Let me say a particular one which we are bringing to the attention of government this year. 
This year our focus is on internal audit. It’s so weak from our point of view such that we 
can call it non-existent more or less. Because the depth to which external auditors have to 
go is unprecedented. Otherwise as an external auditor you go into an organisation……if 
you have good internal auditing system after evaluating, and the thing is a good one, you 
normally look at their reports and pick issues from there, do a quick walk through the 
system and you go. But this time when you go you just have to put the internal audit aside, 
because you even know before entering the place that it’s useless. So, we are bringing to 
the attention of government how weak the internal audit is. A very clear example again is 
the situation where ministry of finance will many a times refer big claims against 
government to the auditor-general to verify for him. And, I say why auditor-general? You 
have internal auditors. That’s part of your internal processes. Subject it to it. But because 
they have lost confidence in the internal auditors. Let me be quick to address that it’s not 
because the internal auditors are incompetent. I don’t think so. It’s not because they are 
incompetent, but I think they have a structural problem. 
The structural problem highlighted by the participant was that there was a mistaken identification 
of who to champion the cause of internal auditor. It might have seemed glamorous and enabling to 
put the IAA Director General under the presidency, instead of the Minister of Finance. But they 
did not take account of the political nature of the “Office of the President” that would not allow 
the Director General to have ready access and support of the president and the key cabinet member. 
The designers of the financial management reforms in Ghana have not taken time to understand 
the local environment in designing the internal control reforms.  
The consequences of that failure to understand the political nature of the Presidency, and placing 
the   IAA under it, had resulted in it being caught in the crosswinds of powerful political forces 
without a clear political champion.  There are signs of failure of internal audit everywhere in 
 
46 Convergence philosophy is implied in the work of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) in 
the development of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) 
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Ghana, and that continues to impact on the budget and policy implementation.  As a participant 
said “and soon it may be almost gone, and nobody would like to be an internal auditor” in Ghana 
public service. If the structural issues are not resolved it could lead to the total failure of internal 
audit, and along it the failure to improve the budget system.  
Procurement 
Procurement practices play an important role in the credibility of the financial management system. 
Budget credibility is implicated because when payroll is excluded, it has been estimated that about 
80 per cent of the government’s tax revenue is spent on procurement related items (World Bank, 
CPPAR-2008).  Procurement are enacted from international practices to support anti-corruption 
drives. As expressed by an MoF official: 
So, in 2016 we amended the procurement law taking into consideration the current trends 
and then the best practices that are happening in other parts of the world to amend the 
public procurement law. 
Two pieces of procurement legislation47 have been enacted under the reforms, both of which were 
promulgated on the bases of best international practice but have not succeeded in changing the 
fundamental underlying challenges in tendering and contract management practices.  The 2016 
Procurement Bill merely tinkered with the previous legislation, thereby confirming a widely held 
view that legislation is easier to change than practice. But the epithet of best practice is often 
invoked to convey legitimacy in situations where no genuine progress has been made in the reform.  
Ameyaw et al (2012) found no significant evidence to show that the passage of the Public 
Procurement Law and its implementation has made any impact in curbing corruption in public 
procurement in Ghana. 
Misconceptions abound, including perceptions in procurement practices in Ghana. Value for 
money is often construed in inputs cost terms (cheapness) in neglect of other considerations that 
yield best value. For example, the pursuit of economy has led to an inkling to standardize in the 
budget process the unit cost of inputs at low levels for school building, and other facilities, 
including infrastructure (for example roads, trains, and housing). Participant G15 from MoF said:  
Ideally, we are supposed to have gone through best practice in setting caps. … Setting 
standardizations to guide the choosing of our programs and activities. Ideally that’s what 
it should be. It should be that maybe when you are building some schools, or you are 
embarking on a school project for a certain community there must be some thresholds 
beyond which you cannot go. Or if you are building some bungalows or houses for teachers 
there must be some thresholds beyond which you can’t pass. We are not there yet. 
Such practices have contributed to the construction of shoddy and dangerous school building, 
badly constructed and maintained road network, poor housing and badly maintained government 
 
47 In 2003 and 2016, 
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building; while the more influential Ministries, like security and foreign ministry, arguably are 
able to put up more elaborate headquarters buildings. 
The MoF has traditionally focused, exclusively, on administering budget inputs and therefore tend 
to be misled onto the path of monitoring inputs cost rather than taking steps to engage in monitoring 
the overall performance of the budget. By saying this I am not suggesting that Ghana should 
necessarily jump into performance budgeting but begin to put steps into improving the 
management of the budget. One way of doing so is to allow managers of public services to manage 
their budget and to be subjected to the scrutiny of auditors on cost of purchases and other value for 
money considerations. Misconceptions of unit cost of the service provided (output costs) rather 
than input cost has come to dominate the thinking of some officials who do not realise that 
checking MDAs from over-exaggerating the cost of procurement is ultimately the work of auditors, 
not budget officers in the MoF. In their attempts to check the cost of inputs an MoF official, G15, 
said: 
So, it’s possible for us to do a budget where prices are exaggerated and it’s also possible 
for us to embark on procurement process where prices are over-exaggerated. It is also very 
possible. …In other words, we don’t have any guidelines with regards to how – whether 
they are goods, or they are services, or they are whatever, what it will actually cost. Proper 
guidelines. We have to move towards it. …. But that notwithstanding, maybe a first level 
of check is the ceilings. So, we say no matter what you do we are giving you a ceiling. So, 
at the budget preparation level at least these are respected.  So, they prepare a budget. They 
make sure that they are within the ceiling. But I agree, the budget is not just about budget 
preparation within respective ceilings. 
Before the MTEF was introduced the MoF used to provide exchange rate and inflation assumptions 
in the Budget Circular to guide the MDAs in the budget preparation. It only fuelled incrementalism 
in the line-item budgets, and as result the MoF dropped that practice. Providing input cost standards 
guidelines to standardise inputs across government geographically is not the best use of policy 
space. Rather there is room for the MoF to give guidelines on costing of outputs/ and programmes 
if that is what is intended.  
Official discourses often mix-up input cost and output cost; costing and pricing. Similarly, in 
another interview a participant said that programme budgeting was introduced because ‘activity 
budgeting was becoming incremental’. By saying that he implied that the MDAs in preparing their 
budget would simply add a percentage figure on their previous year’s activity-based budgets. Thus, 
the MDAs had gone backwards to start thinking of ‘activities’ as they used to think about ‘line-
item inputs’ in the 1990s. The MDAs would therefore propose the number of workshops or 
procurement they will undertake without any reference to results (either in terms of achieving 
objectives or producing outputs). 
Oduro PhD Thesis Chapter                                  June 2020                                           




There is another way that official discourse on procurement interlinks with budget credibility. 
Sound public procurement practice requires that public procurement spending be rationalised by 
combining procurement processes with public finance managements (OECD Recommendation of 
the Council on Public Procurement)48. In Ghana this creates a difficult situation for managers in 
the MDAs when they cannot procure whilst the budget has been approved but the funds have not 
been approved by the MoF. In a recent PAC hearing, the Ministry of Justice and Attorney General’s 
Department had in 2015 attempted to go past the procurement law by embarking on procurement 
when they didn’t have approved funds. The depart complained about the non-release of the budget 
funds from the MoF [GTV: Public Accounts Committee meeting. 11.30 am Tuesday 12 March 
2019] 
A PAC member expressed an opinion that they could not hold MDAs accountable for such 
practices, including the non-performance of their responsibilities if their approved budgets were 
not released to them by the MoF. That member wanted the PAC’s report to the House to reflect 
this issue but the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee held the opinion that it would not 
change anything because in his opinion the budget figures are only ‘indicative’ subject to revenue 
realisation. This is a contentious opinion, but it is the prevailing official view that makes budgeting 
not credible. Institutionalisation of budgeting culture is consistent to what Zucker (1977) has noted 
about the transmission, maintenance, and resistance to change of highly institutionalised actions.  
Budget rigidity 
Conventionally the annularity of budgeting provides the flexibility to re-programme the 
discretionary budget to priority sectors, or project and programmes in the medium term. The budget 
is said to be rigid when the discretionary element is limited and continues to remain so different 
periodic episodes. Whilst the boundary line between the discretionary and non-discretionary 
budget is not fixed permanently it could prove to be almost impossible to change despite prior 
actions. In Ghana’s case a limited proportion of the budget is discretionary, as most of it is taken 
up by non-discretionary payments (debt amortisation, statutory payments, compensation, and 
others). These are reflected in the statements from a MoF participant, G15, as below:  
Rigid budget structures (putting together non-discretionary and near-discretionary 
elements amount to 107% of the budget) …the budget is so rigid in the sense that if you 
take personal emoluments or let’s say compensation of employees, you take interest 
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The three items (payroll, interest payment, and earmarked funds) may be almost non-discretionary 
in the short term but should be made to move into the discretionary zone in the medium to long 
term.  
Budget management supports mostly the public service payroll (or compensation is a popular term 
used). The problematics of managing budgetary resources in Ghana is noted by participant G11 
from MoF: 
But here's a case where probably there is money to pay compensation only; so, you pay 
compensation, but the compensation has a role to play in helping deliver the service, but 
if you pay compensation you've not paid [for] goods and services. 
The bureaucracy becomes a self-serving entity invoking the title of a “vampire state” (Killick,2008; 
Frimpong-Ansah 1991), where paying officials is the only things that it can barely sustain. Again, 
people are socialised into thinking and behaving in a self-serving manner.  Most young public 
servants at the start of their careers may be eagerly willing to serve and contribute; but have their 
hopes quickly dashed from days, weeks, and months sitting in their offices without any resources 
to operate 
Interest costs continue to go up because of borrowing to finance large scale projects that are not 
integrated into developing local capacity (skills, knowledge, and local industries) 
Using earmarked funds to exclude part of the general revenue inflow to parochial interest interests. 
Unfortunately, the time span of politicians is short-term, and that is why the problem persist and 
becoming worse from administration to administration. For a country like Ghana, that is why there 
is something to be said for the IMF ‘diet plan’ (which attempts to force the hand of the government 
to tackle these elements). The IMF’s programmes therefore serve a useful role, like engaging 
external consultants to do a dirty job that cannot be done internally. 
Parliament keeps approving statutory funds, so long as they satisfy their narrow interest, without 
fully considering the consequences. Parliamentarians in knowing where their interests lie resist. 
This is an example of the history of the present: failing central funding mechanism, resulting in 
MDAs using pressure to usurp the authourity of the Minister of Finance (as it was in Zimbabwe 
and other countries) 
An example here is the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), as explained by participant 
G15:  
Yes. It got to 5%. Constitutionally it’s been since it is 5%. So, we did 5% up to some time 
and then I think sometime in the early 2000s it was moved 7.5 because a big case was 
made in parliament. And then getting it back to 5% has been a hell. Because both the 
government MPs and then the opposition MPs together would not agree, because I think a 
share of the DACF is to them, so they usually would not agree. So, it’s not about one 
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political party. It’s about all parliamentarians saying no, you know what. You can’t touch 
this.  
These statements indicate why accountability are even more difficult to maintain in Africa under 
parliamentary democracy (for example as the experiences of Nigeria and Kenya parliament show) 
than other forms of government. Parliamentarians in Africa often support what enables them to 
pursue their personal and party agenda rather than the greater national interest. 
Enacting statutory funds to by-pass MOF’s straight-jackets and inefficiencies  
From the MoF’s perspective statutory funds have been an impediment to improving on the budget 
rigidity. However, from the MDAs’ perspective enacting statutory funds is a way to assert their 
independence from the straight jacket of the MoF. Participant G7 said: 
Yeah, what we are doing is to cap …. DACF have been brought back to 5% instead of 7½ 
%, and then you take NHIS, Getfund, Road fund, they have all been worked on so that 
they are aligned to government policies and programmes, because it doesn’t make sense 
for central government to be looking for money at the same time, because it doesn’t make 
sense for central government to be looking for money at the same time when fund is there 
that can do infrastructure, that can support what do you call it, scholarships, it’s all the 
same government money, it’s not going to do anything different.  
The bureaucracy in the MoF have not been able to address the fundamental issues that have led to 
the desire to set up earmarked funds. These funds, to a large extent, have been set up by the 
sponsoring MDAs to bypass the MoF bureaucracy. 
Recent politicised projects have reduced the scope of discretion further  
Under successive administration in Ghana political programmes and projects are sometimes 
‘catapulted’ into the budget during implementation, and that undermines the implementation of the 
existing budget. On occasions funds are taken away from the existing programmes to the 
‘catapulted’ programmes, and supplementary budgets are passed during the year to regularise the 
situation. When the political programmes are introduced as part of the regular budget the negative 
impact on other existing programmes if all the programmes are subject to a political prioritisation 
process at the approval stage. In the present situation there are several political programmes called 
special initiatives as participant G17 confirmed: 
 In 2017 we had introduced a number of projects. School feeding program, one district one 
factory. All those are special initiatives, and then some capital projects as well.  
However, in a cash rationing situation, as in Ghana, the impact could still be negative if, 
consistently, they are given funding priority during the budget implementation.  ‘Politicised’ 
projects distort the budget planning processes as well as its programme of implementation.  
Monitoring performance 
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Performance monitoring of the MDAs’ budget management is done in quantitative terms with the 
CAGD publishing the MDAs spending against approved budget on their website. There was very 
limited evidence of qualitative monitoring of performance from the MoF and CAGD. But some of 
the more advanced financial management sectoral ministries have dedicated teams undertaking 
performance monitoring. For example, the Ministry of Health has about thirteen members of staff 
distributed geographically who undertake performance of the budget. The central planning unit 
coordinates the planning function, but the structure for planning has not changed much with the 
introduction of the various reforms. The central unit liaises between the central agencies (mainly 
the MoF and NDPC) with the various agencies under the ministry, who have their own planning 
and budget units that undertake their planning and budgeting functions. Through this process new 
developments in planning, budget preparation, and budget implementation are conveyed to the 
lower units. Whilst the reforms have changed much what clinicians do, they have created better 
awareness and is helping them to do better planning. Participant G14 from MoH confirmed: 
… the reform to me, what it has brought is that …. people are aware and it’s also helping 
the clinicians to do better planning. Because now they know which areas that is taking 
away their money and those areas that is bringing in more money and what they have do.  
Performance monitoring therefore takes place within the sectors, like Health, at the operational 
level and aggregated upwards to the HQ level. However, it does not easily translate to systematic 
monitoring at the MoF level where budget officers are more focused on releasing budget funds 
than monitoring performance. 
Domestic revenue 
Domestic revenue remains the special challenges to the orderly implementation of the budget. The 
causes of poor revenue performance according to an ex-minister of finance is attributed to: 
• Not earning enough revenue from ‘our big boys’ made up telecommunication companies, 
mining companies and including oil and gold.  
• Granting tax exemptions in Cabinet brought up by the Minister of Finance  
• Establishing free zones in many areas of the country with a whole host of tax exemptions  
The consequences are that Ghana earns very little from its mined mineral resources, and domestic 
revenue is mobilised by imposing additional taxes like VAT. The empirical evidence indicated that 
the conditions in which the domestic revenue collection takes place disadvantages GoG and 
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promotes the foreign companies cheating the Ghanaian taxpayers. Others have attributed it to the 
large informal sector, making it difficult to bring people into the tax net (see Akobeng, 201849). 
Managing cash and the treasury single account (TSA) 
The effect of cash rationing is that sometimes budgeted funding does not get to the frontline 
services- A senior official in the MOH said:  
So, what has been approved for the year is based on that you do quarterly. They don’t all 
the time release what you have requested quarterly. Just because they also have their cash 
management issues on how much revenue may come in in the first quarter and across all 
ministries. But whatever they release then we can also look at it. And when they don’t 
release all they would adjust our cash plan to reflect what they’ve released by the program.  
The MoF rations the cash available among sectors and when it gets to the MDA level the 
management rations what has been made available to the various agencies under it. The released 
funding for the sector, if insufficient, is distributed on a discretionary basis among their 
programmes, giving priority to political priority programmes.  In rationing the cash resources, the 
MoF may or may not consult the MDAs, as a sector participant G13 indicated: 
Well, usually they might consult us but sometimes also there are some urgent priorities 
that they know. For example, within it where they know there are priority of government. 
The cash allocation usually works well for a sector that has targeted government programme, and 








49 Online post: https://www.modernghana.com/news/874013/set-challenging-revenue-targets.html 
downloaded 17.50pm 24/04/2020- “Only 1.2 million out of the 30 million population in Ghana are paying 
taxes. Out of the 1.2 million, 1 million are in the formal sector and 200,000 are in the informal sector”. 
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APPENDIX 7: THE EMPIRICAL EXPLANATION OF THE SUB-CATEGORIES OF THE CAUSAL 
CONDITIONS OF BUDGET CREDIBILITY 
This appendix provides the empirical sub-categories of the causal conditions that explains the 
events, incidents, happenings that lead to the occurrence or development of budget credibility 
weaknesses in Ghana. The empirical explanation is the lack of transparency and accountability 
failure, of which I identify their specific dimensions within the overall PFM system. 
The budget of Ghana has not been credible because of adequate revenue inflows coupled with 
over-ambitious development budget causing a resource gap. But technically financing the budget 
should not have been an issue if the government treasury was organised well and there was an 
adequate efficient and effective cash management system. This situation is aggravated by the 
constant gaming that goes on between central government agencies and the sectoral MDAs. Year 
after year the Ministry of Finance has not been able to provide funds to the MDAs to perform their 
functions efficiently and effectively. The approved budget is therefore not implemented as 
intended. Some participants presented an ‘official script’, usually issued by the MoF that says that 
revenue projections are not an exact science, to explain why the projected sums do not materialise 
in the year. The picture is however more complex than that because that response does not question 
the existing system of incentives for the revenue collection agency (Ghana Revenue Authourity) 
to achieve their performance targets. It also does not question the management and technical 
capacity of the MoF to produce adequate revenue forecasts to support cash management and the 
budget. 
Under the existing arrangements the revenue agency negotiate collection targets with the MoF; 
and it retains a percentage of collection to meet their operational costs. It is therefore to the benefit 
of the revenue agency to negotiate lower targets and over-collect, than to negotiate a higher target 
and under-collect.  The MoF on the other hand, wishes to set high revenue projections (that may 
be unrealistic) to match ambitious spending plans. In the ensuing game the revenue target is 
negotiated based on new revenue initiatives and an incremental projection of growth in existing 
measures (Akobeng, 2018)50. When the projected revenues are not collected, the official script 
usually attributes it to poor revenue projections, whereas underlying it is the politicisation of the 
revenue targets. Recently the Minister of Finance said: “We are in tough times. Maybe you and I 
are not paying the taxes we should be paying; maybe I was too optimistic with regards to my 
revenue projections. Be that as it may, I think revenue has gone up on average between 15-20 
percent each year since 2017. Even in these doldrums, we are up by 11 percent compared to last 
 
50 Set Challenging Revenue Targets.https://www.modernghana.com/news/874013/set-challenging-
revenue-targets.html downloaded 17.50pm 24/04/2020 
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year. But we are certainly missing our targets and we need to do something about that. That is clear 
to all of us especially the new leadership that we have brought to the GRA. We’re truly expecting 
great things from the people we have put in place,” 51 
The Minister’s observations were made after various initiatives and structural reforms in the GRA 
including, appointing a new Board Chair to lead the revenue growth, rotating the three 
Commissioners for Domestic Tax collection, Customs Division, and Support Services Division; 
and changing the postings of more than 1,400 GRA personnel in June 2019. Despite these measures 
taken in 2019 the actual performance was GH¢26.8 billion (7.7 percent of GDP) as against the 
agreed revenue target set for July 2019 of GH¢31.8 billion (9.2 percent of GDP) (Citi Business 
News, 2019)   
The current strategies to raise more revenue include adding some 10,000 recruits to drive revenue 
collections from the informal sector, but the minister of finance acknowledged that that strategy 
had not worked well either.   
The second underlying factor was the process of controlling spending commitments during the 
year. Until recently, before GIFMIS was implemented, it was fairly easy for the MDAs to commit 
funds by placing orders, without prior approval from the MoF (sometimes the MoF would give the 
initial approvals and withhold the final approval at the payment stage). Successive cash rationing 
regimes have required the MDAs to get prior approvals through control devices such as budget 
allotments and financial encumbrances procedures. Through various manoeuvring the MDAs 
could side-step some of these control procedures, therefore committing and receiving the goods 
that eventually turned into payment arrears if the MoF was unable to release enough cash during 
that year to pay. In this gaming process the MoF would make the previous year’s arrears the first 
claim on the subsequent year’s budget, therefore reducing the budget and cash flows to that MDA. 
The MDA in turn incurs expenditure that eventually turns into arrears that are claimed to be 
‘unanticipated’ and ‘unknown spending’.  
There is a political angle to the occurrence of unanticipated expenditure commitments that has 
plagued the system. Not paying enough attention to identify needs during the budget preparation 
stage causes unplanned items, largely political in nature, to be introduced in the year during 
implementation. Such expenditure items could emanate from anywhere, but especially from the 
office of the president. These unplanned expenditures usually displaced planned and regular items 
in the budgets of other ministries.  
 
51 Business News of Thursday, 31 October 2019 Source: Citi Business News 
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The GIFMIS was designed to ensure that all expenditures go through the system to check such 
practices and to support reconciliation of spending against budget. Thus, a lot of faith has been 
placed in the automated system that it would make commitments and arrears controls more 
efficient. Were this to be obtained, and all government payments went through the automated 
system, then the budget systems would become more credible. However, there are sceptics who 
hold that a large percentage of expenditures (the statutory funds and donor funds) are still outside 
the budget, with the responsible agencies politically resisting change. In addition, there are other 
ways that could be used to by-pass the controls by initiating transactions outside the system and 
introducing them into it at later stages for payment. Whilst this could be done, officials are now 
careful because the audit trail is easier to trace GIFMIS. A participant G1 from the MoF recalled 
a recent incident and commented that: 
…. so now even the ministers are careful. It happened this year with Special Development 
Initiative Ministry where they put 800,000 – even though it was not in the system, but the 
details they requested for, they brought it and you’re using GHS800,000 for just 
developing a website. And it created a lot of –  
Budget credibility issues begin at the budget preparation stage and carry through all the stages 
through implementation to monitoring and evaluation, accounting and reporting, and audit. Whilst 
the MoF provides budget ceiling to the MDAs to develop their budgets, it is not unusual for the 
MoF to cut down budget numbers without adequate consideration what the money is used for, and 
sometimes without recourse to the MDAs. In addition, whilst there are procedures for prioritising 
and reprioritising the budget by the MDAs, it does not happen as it should because of the 
insufficiency of funds to meet needs, therefore reducing the incentive to pay a closer attention to 
the details, thereby undermining the budget planning process. 
Causal Conditions of accountability and transparency 
The absence of accountability and transparency prevails because of the inadequacy and 
inappropriateness of institutional structures to ensure that finances are delivered according to 
Government's priorities; that there is value for money and the money goes where it's intended to 
go; and that the fiduciary responsibility of managers of public finances are enforced. In the absence 
of these institutional structures, including effective enforcement mechanisms to deter, have 
emerged a culture of impunity. Historically, accountability failure can be traced back to corrupt 
behaviour in Ghanaian society, but also to the post-independence behaviour of ministers and party 
officials alike in the 1960s (Austin, 1976). But for our purposes, analytically, I focus on the 
interactions between the executive and parliament.  
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Article 179 of the Constitution of Ghana (the1992 constitution as amended in 1996) provide for 
the President to lay “at least one month before the end of the financial year, estimates of the 
revenues and 
expenditure of the Government of Ghana for the following financial year” (pp91). Parliament is 
not required to be consulted at any stage of the budget planning process until the president presents 
his/her budget, but the constitution vaguely mandates that “Parliament shall prescribe the 
procedure for the presentation of Appropriation Bills (article 179 section 8 pp.92). There is an 
implied limit on the power of Parliament to make inputs to the budget, and what changes can be 
made can only happen after the budget has been presented to Parliament. As a parliamentary 
participant, G5, confirmed:  
Now, the Parliament involve in the budgeting process, our Constitution is so restricted that 
Parliament is not involved until we have come to the budget presented in the Article 179 
to Parliament, it is only when that budget, the document is read by the Minister of Finance 
on behalf of the President that Parliament can make an input. 
In presidential systems the budget is presented to parliament as the “President’s budget”. In the 
USA’s presidential model that Ghana has borrowed from, the budget is taken as “dead” on arrival 
in Congress. It is there afterwards that Congressional members engage in pork-barrel politics by 
loading the budget with their requirements. The designers of Ghana’s constitution wanted to have 
a hybrid system positioned between the British and American systems, reflecting the colonial 
legacy as well the country’s republican aspirations. For example, the President appoints his 
ministers from both inside and outside Parliament. This creates an uneasy tension for effective 
parliamentary scrutiny of the executive, especially where the president’s party command a majority 
in the House. The president’s influences over the house is further re-enforced by his powers to 
appoint MPs as ministers from the ranks of parliamentarians as well as from outsiders. The 
president is therefore able to influence the house through the aspirations of members of parliament 
to the position of ministerial ranking to enjoy better facilities and remuneration that would 
otherwise not be available to them. This makes the work of the majoritarian e party whip easier to 
accomplish, ensuring that the executive effectively controls parliament. In this sense the Ghana 
government organisational system has been designed to enhance paternalistic/political paradigm 
in neglect of the other possible paradigms such as that of parliamentary accountability 52. As Huber 
and McDaniel (1986) have observed “perhaps the earliest approach to organisational design 
 
52 Huber and McDaniel (1986) have identified four type of organisational design paradigms, namely 
political/ paternalistic, accountability/authority paradigm, the workflow paradigm, and the decision-
making paradigm  
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involved the tribal leader's allocating tribal resources, including human resources, according to 
blood ties or political allegiances” (pp.572). 
Accountability in the government of Ghana was eroded away with the backlog of un-scrutinized 
audit reports waiting for the attention of the PAC. In the inherited Westminster tradition, that the 
PAC is chaired by a member from the opposition minority party. What has happened in Ghana 
with the backlog of un-examined audit reports, party members would preside over their own cases 
(or the cases from their party colleagues). Backlogs are caused by a chain of delays: in completing 
the accounts, the audit, and in Parliament itself. Attempts were made to clear backlog of audit 
reports between 1993 and 1999 (see da Rocha 2001) and subsequently successive Auditor Generals 
have made attempts to submit the reports timeously. But the effectiveness of parliamentary 
scrutiny of the executive has been weak, especially in the enforcement of PAC recommendations. 
To address some of these issues the PFM Act 2016 attempted to embody the parliamentary 
oversight function in the legislation- As G12 said:  
 “…. managing to make sure that all the sections that would strengthen parliament’s oversight of 
the budget was included in the act, [all the upstream planning and the downstream”.  
 In the PFM Act (2016) has enacted more elaborate sanctions so that the recommendation by the 
PAC of Parliament, for instance, would just not be a mere report but some include measures taken 
to surcharge or impose other types of penalties. 
The World Bank Project Appraisal Document (WB-PAD) for the last wave of PFM reforms under 
the PFMRP (2015-2018) provided that: 
Sub-component 3.2: Legislative Oversight (US$0.6 million). The objective of this sub- 
component is to enhance the capacity of the Legislature to exercise appropriate oversight 
over both upstream and downstream PFM processes to ensure transparency and 
accountability in public financial management.  
38. The main activities financed will be: technical assistance to strengthen the technical 
capacity to support Parliamentarians in performing budget analysis as well as analysis of 
audited public accounts and reporting on audit report reviews/hearings; enhancing the 
technical and professional capacity of clerks of the two committees, equipment supports 
and website improvement.  
The current reform under the PFMRP stretches to look at the oversight function through 
strengthening the Parliamentary Accounts Committee of parliament (PAC)  
Addressing accountability challenges has been further compounded by the non-clarity in the 
current PFM Act 2016 regarding who is directly responsible for managing the finances in the 
MDAs and for what they are accountable. The current law makes the Principal Spending Officer 
responsible for the budget, but it does not address the accountability relationship between him/her 
and the Principal Account Holder (who is the sector minister).   
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The approach to accountability in the Anglophonic system requires the accounting officer to have 
control over his management team (including his accountant who has the delegated power to 
manage the finances) and to take full responsibility for his actions. This delegated power may be 
enacted into a separate law that makes the Finance Director liable for his actions for which he 
could be sanctioned under the law and by professional standards. In English local government for 
example the S151 officer (Director of Finance) is appointed to give some independence and power 
to finance managers, but still accountable to the chief executive. There are also guidelines 
supporting the work of central government finance directors. The Francophone systems places the 
responsibility of accounting on centrally appointed Accountants as Credit Controllers (see Lassou 
2017). Anglophone-Africa has attempted to combine aspects of centralized and decentralized 
accounting. The system is still evolving and there are contradictions in practices and in the 
legislation. Holding accounting officers responsible is key to public sector accountability practices, 
but it is diffused in the PFM Act 2016 without clarity, as participant G4 from the Ghana Audit 
office observed: 
 This is the most important law, to hold heads of institutions accountable and where they 
are not involved in authorising then whoever made the payment can be held responsible. I 
don’t find that in the new PFM Act. So, I said “against what are we now going to say why 
is that the vote is for the head of a secondary school and he was not there, and you spent 
it?” And the guy’s answer is going to be “who says if he’s not there we can’t spend it and 
what instructions are you talking about? 
The practice of spending large sums of operational money on behalf of institutions (in Ghanaian 
public service) dilutes accountability. Large procurement is defended by the desire to achieve 
economies of scale in purchasing. However centralizing procurement promotes corruption, dilutes 
accountability 
Persistence lapses in the law weakens accountability as observed by participant G4 below:  
… currently I must say that … I’m quite involved in the financial management …, not 
from accounting side of the issues. I must say that my considered opinion is that the 2003 
Financial Administration Act that was promulgated I think it’s still a better law than the 
PFM Act 2016 which is currently in place... I have a few reasons for that. One of the 
reasons is because if you look at Section 15 of the Financial Administration Act [2003] 
you see it creates an obligation, especially Subsection 3, it’s place obligation on the 
accountant general and his team, everybody working on his behalf to ensure that before 
payments are made the expenditure is a lawful charge against appropriation, there is a 
budget for it, and those who are authorising it has the right to authorise, for who you can 
hold culpable if they didn’t ensure that before making payment. Now you can’t find that 
in the current PFM Act, so under what law are we going to hold people for making 
wrongful payment because the obligation to ensure that that expenditure is a lawful charge, 
that is the money was appropriated for that, there is a budget for it and the one authorising 
is the person who’s supposed to authorise before we pay, that requirement if it is no more 
there then, and against what are you going to hold those officers and the treasury 
responsible for not honouring what the law requires of you? 
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Adding to the confusion about who is responsible for the spending the budget, at the Public 
Accounts Committee sittings, departmental Ministers or their deputies take the lead in answering 
questions on the management of the budget on behalf of their Spending Officers. Ministers 
therefore see themselves as the de facto accounting officer (AOs) in addition to their policy 
responsibilities. This is because Ministers take the lead in directing not just the policy 
implementation in the ministries, but in managing the finances as well. Some of them feel 
compelled to come to the PAC because according to the PFM Act, they are the principal account 
holders.  
In one of PAC sittings a curious line of questioning by members suggested that the PAC hearings 
were used as the fora for members to lobby for their constituency projects to be undertaken by the 
executive. In addition, at the PAC meetings members were pre-occupied with minor non-
compliance issues. For example, in one case an Education Ministry accountant had to travel the 
length of the country (to the capital - Accra) to answer a query on about $200, when this matter 
could have been dealt with internally and explained by the accounting officer if there were still 
outstanding issues. It is good to spread the accountability chain across government and to haul 
lower ranking officials to explain their actions. But those details mean that the PAC meetings 
becomes part of the auditing process, rather than the fora for discussing higher level accountability 
and other policy issues. From the observations it appeared that members were not sufficiently 
briefed by Parliamentary research staff, 
The overall impact was that the process became lengthy and tedious for members. This observation 
helped to explain how the processes lead to an accumulation of backlog cases resulting in officers 
departing from the service before they are called to account for their actions to the committee. 
Lacking transparent and accountability  
Accountability has been found to be weak in the Ghanaian public service, and transparency has 
been lacking. Accountability ensures that those who manages public money are held to explain 
their actions. One of the reasons for the reform was to improve transparency through improvement 
in data capture, as participant G6 said: 
To establish transparency, to establish good allocation and reporting system, and credible 
data, yes, because you don’t allocate and get errors in reporting, it wasn’t good enough, 
they didn’t make for credibility, and even though the allocations may have been 
transparently made, if the accountant is not capturing it, but I don’t want to use the word 
fraudulently, but not erroneously capturing it because of lack of technology information 
systems to capture it as it’s allocated, one is likely to think that there are fraudulent things 
going on but it’s just that there are errors in capturing 
The reforms have also introduced some changes to strengthen accountability, for example the 
introduction of the notion of Audit Committee in the PFM Act 2016 to improve existing 
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arrangements. It stipulates that the Minister of Finance will determine the number of audit 
committees to be established, and each committee shall be made up of five members. Of the five 
members composing the audit committee three independent members shall be nominated by the 
Internal Audit Agency and the Institute of Chartered Accountants (Ghana) and two members by 
the Principal Account Holder (who is the Minister of the sector). The members shall elect a 
chairperson from among the three independent members, even though the principal account holder 
is given the responsibility to appoint the members and the chairperson. The audit committee is also 
granted the right to co-opt a senior management personnel to be part of the committee. The main 
function of the audit committee is to ensure the implementation of the recommendations of the (i) 
internal audit reports; (ii) Parliament’s decision on the Auditor-General’s report; (iii) Auditor-
General’s Management Letter; and (iv) report of an internal monitoring unit focusing particularly 
on financial matters raised. The audit committee is required to issue an annual statement of 
implementation status report, and statement “of the remedial action taken or proposed to be taken 
to avoid or minimise the recurrence of an undesirable feature in the accounts and operations of a 
covered entity” with timelines for the achievement. These reports are to be endorsed by the relevant 
sector minister and distributed to Minister of Finance, Parliament, Office of the President and the 
Auditor-General within six months after the end of each financial year.  
Transparency is affected by corruption and fraudulent practices in government. Participant G4 
from the Ghana Audit Service explained why it was difficult to achieve PFM objectives in the 
presence of corruption:  
…we say we can’t do all these things if you don’t keep a good eye on corruption. 
Corruption had become pervasive and so prominent in public financial management that 
we can’t assume that we can achieve anything without putting an eye on corruption, yeah. 
So, some of us have advocated strongly that we need a fourth one to minimise or eliminate 
corruption. If we can’t eliminate, we should minimise corruption because without 
minimising corruption all the three, none of them is going to go get anywhere. 
Corruption and opacity of governmental operations support each other. Overall, transparency in 
the management of public money is lacking. 
The notion of social accountability has also been promoted as part of the reforms. This was 
presented as the solution to accountability and transparency issues in local government as a 
participant G7from the MoF said:  
That’s social accountability… so we’re trying to gradually build demand for accountability 
from the citizens. For me my belief is that the citizens demanding for accountability’s 
more effective than central government demanding for accountability, because you don’t 
live there with them, they give you reports, what is in it whether true or not we don’t know, 
but if they said we’re going to build a school in this room and they didn’t do it, we live 
here, they didn’t do it, why didn’t you do it, so then they have to explain, but if they send 
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a letter to us that oh here’s our reports, oh we checked, they build a school for, you know 
they didn’t even build a school. It happens, sometimes. 
 Central government is better placed to have the required tools to monitor local government. But 
where central government is weak, and does not open itself up to be accountable, it is difficult to 
achieve social accountability even at the central level 
Weakening local accountability by direct control of local government budgets 
Incorporating the local government (Assemblies) budget into the national budget weakens local 
accountability. The Ghana decentralization reform, as a sub-component of the PFM reforms, 
appears to have had the opposite effect, rather centralising local government instead. Capturing 
local authorities (LAs) budget as part of the central government budget system leads to micro-
managing their finances and weakens local accountability (see Bahl and Bird, 2018)53. Participant 
G7 from MoF avers: 
And then so when the budget is ready and approved by the Assembly, then we capture the 
budget inputs into the national budget… because before then, before the composite budget 
was introduced and then this unit was set-up, the national budget guideline did not give 
recognition to the Assemblies, but now when you pick the national budget guideline it says 
that each Assembly you are entitled to A, B, C, D, E, they are all in the national budget 
guidelines. 
Given that the national budget is never implemented as intended, it is not clear what purpose the 
extension of its coverage to local government will serve. It seems pointless for the MoF to issue 
budget guidelines to LAs when at present it has limited capacity even to guide central government 
departments and agencies. That notwithstanding, the MoF persists in directly controlling and 
managing local finance, as stated by participant G7: 
So, they (local government) use that the budget guidelines to prepare their budgets. And 
then when they submit the budgets here, so one of the things when we go to support the 
regional hearings is that we ask, we find out whether they complied with what is in the 
budget guideline. That’s 1. 2, want to find out whether the budget responds to the needs 
of the community, 3, whether the budget responds to government policies, because 
government’s also have an agenda to achieve, but that agenda is not to defer from the 
community needs, so if it responds, fine, then we are okay, if not we ask you to go back 
and make some changes. So, but they are not obliged to take the recommendation, by law 
the budget is for them. 
Gaming the system and dishonesty  
There is constant official gaming of the PFM system by the principal actors as explained by a 
participant (G27) about the process in the agreeing the Ministry of Education budget: 
 
53 Fiscal Decentralization and Local Finance in Developing Countries, EE Elgar, 2018 
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“The [budget] lines from both Education Finance, and the Ministry of Finance person 
basically corroborated this. It was that they – the Education Sector does present the actual 
need in compensation. And then the Ministry of Finance takes it down. And then the 
education sector tries to kind of insist that we have no choice about these people who are 
already enrolled in the system. And then Ministry of Finance still takes it down but knows 
that they are going to have to spend more than allocating the budget. So that to me would 
suggest it’s a failure of the budget preparation process. It’s not honest enough to say what 
the actual need is”. 
Traditionally the GES payroll budget gets overspent by 20% to 30%, which is then deducted from 
their Good and Services budget leaving them very little operational support.  
Equally all payment arrears (even when they are within budget) are deducted from the following 
year’s budget. These arrears are not overspending, but because the MoF did not release the 
cashflow in time before the end of year. The cash arrears therefore become another way of cutting 
back the budget which has been agreed and approved by parliament.  
Another area of gaming is where the CAGD accountants are recruited and paid outside the CAGD 
payroll through the Ghana Revenue Authourity. As a CAGD staff explained:  
Yes, we’re on the single spine here. But the chartered accountants are sent there and then 
they’re instructed over there – this time, Ghana Revenue Agency. Instructed to give them 
some other form of appointment letter and send them to Accountant General so they can 
be on Internal Revenue salary. Meanwhile, they are not drawing that salary on their budget 
because we send the money back to them. So, I would advise that you add this to your 
research, which part of the world this is done? 
“That is what is happening. …. when you charter then Accountant General sends you there 
and then asks them to second you to this place. Then they put you on their salary, not on 
their budget. They put you on their payroll. And because you’re not on their budget we are 
mandated to send the monies they pay these staff to them. 
This micro-practice is evidence of the lack of transparency in government dealings. In addition, it 
is ethically compromising for qualified government accountants who are exposed to potential 
corruption through this mechanism. The government reformed the salary structure sanity into the 
rewards system yet there is official obfuscation and that has not addressed the accounting class 
issue of putting staff on the GRA payroll. Participant from the MoF, G2, observed: 
“The wages and salaries aspect, because of the reforms in the salaries structure, you know, the 
government introduced Single Spine Salary Structure to replace the GUSS, Ghana Universal 
Salary Structure and so like a spine, everybody was supposed to fit into the Spine”. 
This is hardly a solution for solving a fundamental issue as the public sector reward system that is 
meant to be transparent to the presidential level. s not everybody is on it. There has also been a 
reported incidence of ministers who are parliamentarian (termed Article 71 Office Holders) 
inappropriately receiving two pay cheques, one from the President’s payroll and the other from the 
Parliamentary payroll. Hardly reforming the system…This area is outside the scope of the project, 
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but if there is the opportunity extend the conversation to the achievement and challenges of the 
single spine 
Paying-top allowances for reform activities 
Paying top-up allowances to civil servants, on a discretionary and discriminating basis, for 
engaging in reform activities add to an opaque public sector renumeration system, with disguised 
pay scales.  
It undermines confidence and professional development. It is also difficult to determine whether 
staff are really committed to make a difference or they are being falsely induced to perform, and 
the effort will not be sustained when the allowances are no more paid. But also, it creates a situation 
of ‘them and us’, and those left out of reform activities complain, and may undermine the reforms 
as explained by an MoF official: 
Yes. So, what made the difference was that they will be given a top-up allowance, okay, 
which will be paid every quarter, so that was the agreement, so every quarter since 2010 
these officers are given a top-up, paid by GOG, Ghana government. The previous reforms, 
the consultants were paid from the grants and the loans and DFID or the World Bank, but 
this time around every quarter, the key guys on the reforms are paid. 
Allowances are also paid to public servants for attending training events and workshops, that has 
also led to the gaming of the reform training activities, as explained by MoF (G1) 
So overtime and you realise that the directors  will attend the training because they will 
get some allowance and when they go carry the documents to the  guys who come in and 
do the work, they realise that the quality is not good; So this time around I go to a town 
where they’re requesting specifically for training and because over the years we’ve 
interacted with them, right now I know almost all the technical guys in all the ministries 
and so when we are inviting officers for workshop we know the ones we should go for,  so 
we ask for specific people in addition to new ones that are coming….I have been privy to 
the system. Just last week, at least I got some little allowance for participating in the budget 
process. So that is an indication that it has continued. 
Due to the poor remuneration, some staff attended workshop for the allowance they would receive, 
rather than the knowledge and skills they would acquire. As a result, in some cases very limited 
learning took place. The indication is that training events are provided to impart information as 
well to serve as an incentive system to motivate staff through the allowances that are paid. In 
situations where allowances are not paid to staff, motivation goes down and the process it affected 
as stated by s participant, G2:  
For some time now, they’ve not been motivated or given something for that tedious work 
they do. So that also affects the process. 
This situation has become a dilemma for reformers in Ghana- whether to pay allowances or not. 
Once paying attending allowances has become institutionalised, it presents difficulties to reverse 
it.  
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APPENDIX 8: THE EMPIRICAL EXPLANATION OF THE SUB-CATEGORIES OF BUDGET 
CREDIBILITY MANAGEMENT -CONTEXT 
Strauss and Corbin (1998 pp96) explain that the context represents the set of conditions within 
which the action and interaction strategies are taken in the reform programme. From the empirical 
analysis, professionalization of public sector accounting function emerged as the main contextual 
category, which had the following properties:  
• Professionalising financial management identities 
• Professionalising the financial management function 
In the empirical analysis participants equated professionalism to professional identity, though 
others expanded the meaning to include technical competence, while others have added ethics and 
conscience of public official. 
Over the years the professionalism in Ghana public sector has deteriorated from the high level, it 
was once held, to very low standards because of low renumerations and conditions of service. 
While those who could find greener pastures departed from the service, those who are recruited 
are often selected on the bases of ‘who they know’. There is an informal quota system for allocating 
vacant positions to senior public/civil servants, politicians, and other notables. For this reason, 
public servants often owe allegiance to somebody. Participant from the MoF, G11, has observed: 
“Come to the public service, and the human beings in the public service may owe their allegiance 
to somebody…. this is based on me and my experience. I think that professional identity is not 
there, it's missing, and to me, that is the gap”  
This tendency in the recruitment of public servants has eroded professionalism away. The basis of 
appointments has not necessarily been on merit, but on the informal network of family ties and 
other social networks.  
The second contextual factor is that until recently the Ghana CA qualified accountants recruited 
did not have public sector accounting training as this participant, G18, from the CAGD observed:  
“.. until 2010, 2011, there about, CA Ghana was not doing public sector accounting, it was purely 
commercial accounting. So, all those who have gone through that qualification, those who have 
been trained by CA were all commercial accountants” 
CA qualified professionals therefore learned received their public sector knowledge as part of their 
on-job training, However, this shortcoming has been addressed through the polytechnics offering 
public sector financial management options for the accountants preparing to work in the public 
sector.  
But there are still the disparities in the grading and ranking of recruited qualified accountant and 
graduates in the CAGD, as participant G18 explained the situation that used to exit before: 
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.. if you chartered and you’re were in the house doing nothing, you can be working on your 
farm as a farmer and it dawns on you to come and work in the government sector and you 
came in as a chartered accountant, you’re given chief accountant. Without practice and 
without any background you’re given chief accountant. And if you were in the house or 
you were doing anything else and you come in after five years you were given director 
At that time graduates were given a grade of an accountant. This resulted in situations where 
qualified staff were put in exacting positions (say as a District Accountant) that required 
experiences and knowledge that they did not have, and therefore could not perform the role. What 
made it more difficult was that they could not be seen to be learning from their staff who may well 
be experienced graduates or technicians. As the participant explained further: 
So, some of us we asked, what is this wisdom in this? Someone charters, he’s idling 
somewhere, he comes, and you give him chief accountant. And after five years you give 
him director. Does it make sense? And someone who comes with a masters are still given 
accountant. First degree, second degree; accountant. So, some of us spoke against it. And 
it got to a point they brought it down to senior accountant. If you’re chartered and you 
come, you’re made a senior accountant. And if you’re a graduate and you come in…. 
you’re given assistant accountant. I don’t know the reason behind that.  
These grading disparities have been a hindrance in the defining the professional identifies in the 
CAGD, which has a scheme of service that classifies qualified accountants as professional, but 
they may not have the requisite knowledge and experience to be placed in a challenging 
environment. Participant G18 explained: 
That is a big problem in the department. They prepare the scheme of service and you don’t 
know what informed them …..I have asked those who prepared it to give us the philosophy 
behind it and they’ve not been able to do that….Per the way they’re considered, it means 
even the first day of employment you can put him in a very challenging environment.. 
Some are chiefs, some are principals, some are seniors. And only a few are chartered 
accountants, only a few. About 300 in the whole department are chartered accountants… 
Most of them are not in the MMDAs, they’re in the MDAs. Only a few re in the MMDAs. 
Currently there are 3,800 employees in the CADG out of which 300 of them are chartered 
accountants. 
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APPENDIX 9: THE EMPIRICAL EXPLANATION OF THE INTERVENING CONDITIONS OF BUDGET 
CREDIBILITY 
This appendix provides details of the structural conditions bearing on action/interaction strategies 
that pertain to budget credibility. Three conditions were identified including: (i) the impact of new 
political priority programmes; (ii) donor interventions, and (iii) the acceptance of long-standing 
practices as the norm. These conditions facilitate or constraints the strategies taken within a 
specific context.  
(i) The impact of special or priority programmes on other programme budgets  
Reflecting political manifestos in the budget is a normal practice of any government. But the way 
that is done, especially where the new political programmes displace existing ones, is important. 
Any displacement should be done during the budget preparation and not during implementation of 
the budget. As participant G11 said:  
“even though we know the school feeding project, or school feeding programme, was a priority of 
Government, we have assigned the resource to that priority of Government and said two million 
[cedis], which is spread in one million [cedis] first quarter, one million third quarter. The money 
going to the right place hasn't been met, so the programme hasn't been done…”  
Some projects have been labelled as “government priority programme”; and they are given ‘first 
call’ on cash flow during cash rationing. The implementation of these projects is given priority 
during the year and affects the rest of the MDAs’ programme implementation. Such practices 
indicate the poor state of budget management.  Prioritization should happen at the budget planning 
and preparation stage, and rarely if ever done during budget implementation through cash control. 
All items approved in the budget should be considered as prioritised and should be given equal 
treatment, rather than labelling some as special programmes and given priority funding over others. 
Participants G2 explained the problems it causes: 
Yes, earmarked funds, all are there. You take all those things out and our debt repayment 
– so what is left for MDAs to embark on their program activities sometimes becomes a 
challenge. So yes, it has gotten a significant improvement in the way we do things – 
MDAs, the way they do things because now we’re doing performance-based budget, you 
have to report on your performance. But to some extent, because of this fiscal challenge 
they’re not able to – if you ask the MDAs, and I know when you go to the MDAs, they 
will tell you this one was a major, major factor. All of them will tell you it’s a major factor 
because we believe that we could have made significant strides if resources – but I think 
this new government is also doing well in trying to – government programs, yes. IPEP and 
all those things, Infrastructure for Poverty Eradication Program, the One Dam One 
Factory, and others.   
So, all these things – the resources that we’re given both at the national and the local level, 
some have been channelled through the implementation of these programs. So, in 
preparing their budget you make sure that your design program structure, take into 
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consideration…. If it’s about planting for food and jobs; Ministry of Agric, maybe you 
have a program for food security, make sure that the planting for food and job is catered 
for. If it’s about fertilizer subsidy, which is a government program to improve – you make 
sure that it’s programmed, budgeted for – and these programs we make sure resources are 
released. But the routine things are sometimes some of the things they don’t get enough 
resources and they complain. But it has, to a large extent, helped improve upon 
implementation of government project. 
The MDAs respond to the priority accorded to special programmes by making sure that they are 
factored into their budgets to get the funding. But as the participant has explained there is a negative 
impact on the routine programmes of the MDAs.  
(ii) Donor interventions 
Donors do not simply fund reform projects, but they conduct reviews, propose consultants, and 
impose conditionalities. Their interventions in reforms are both direct and indirect, Reviews are 
carried out driven and financed by the donor community, mostly for internal use only as participant 
G8 observed: 
Even currently there is a review taking place. We call it health-check, on all the systems. 
The GIFMIS, HRMI budget systems, procurement, and others. All the components under 
the PFMRP would be – so the consultants I think they have just one month to go, to finish 
with the review. That’s an external review. Internal reviews are being carried out as well. 
On donor conditionalities a participant from the MoF, G15 explained:  
...a lot of our programs, PFM programs, they are supported by donors. DFID is supporting. 
I think USAID also supports. So, donors are in there. But the donor support – if donors are 
supporting, I think it’s only natural that they would come with some request or prior 
actions or certain, should I say requirements. That’s because I am supporting you must do 
A, B, C, D. It is possible? 
The relationships are between reforming countries and their development partners who sponsor 
reforms are complex, as some see donor conditionalities as a problem, whereas others argue that 
it is necessary to bring forth progress in LDCs. Participant G4 puts this in perspective:  
When people think conditionality is wrong because the situation really is if you want to 
live in that situation and you want to pace what you are going to do? It will not work. So, 
I say “okay, I have this for you, you must have to change something and then come for it”. 
So normally it comes with that but the other side of it is that it comes with a lot of foreign 
knowledge and expatriates who are not too conversant with the local environment and 
local knowledge. And finally, they, some of these expatriates also have their own agenda 
turning their consultancy many times into employment, so they remain with us for so long 
a time and of course if the programme gets solved, he is no more in debt, so the problem 
stays on and on and on and on and on.  
The relationships between Ghana government officials and their development partners sponsoring 
reforms were captured in their relationship with technical assistance provided as conditionalities, 
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and the nature of advice given by advisers. The activities of expatriate consultants raised questions 
about their commitment to provide impartial advice. This relationship is further complicated by 
public servants who compare their emoluments., skills and knowledge to consultants, thereby 
generating tension between the two. 
(iii) The acceptance of long-standing practices as the norm. 
Practices that have taken place over a long period of time, are institutionalised, and become have 
accepted as the norms. Participant G11 said: 
And it is because of the norms and the practises, they're institutional. For instance, if you 
believe that: ‘yieh as for salary, if you don't pay people their salary, there will be aluta in 
the country, …there will be war in the country. 
Doxa is where people are socialised into practices by institutions.  Also distinguish between 
management accounting rules and routines as long-standing practices (Burns and Scapens, 2000). 
As Burns and Scapens (2000) argued “institutions comprise the taken-for-granted assumptions 
which inform and shape the actions of individual actors. However, at the same time, these taken-
for-granted assumptions are themselves the outcome of social actions, i.e. they are socially 
constructed.” (pp. 8) 
This is a complicated example of institutional norms; but is a good one to have a discourse on as 
discursive and non-discursive practices. Any organisation that fails to pay its workers cannot 
exists, so by definition government administration should not put the livelihood of staff at risk. On 
the other hand, if workers do not work, they should not be paid, and government has an equal 
obligation to make sure that their workers work to meet the expectations of taxpayers. Where you 
have poor management of existing resources, as the case is in Ghana, civil servants get paid but 
are not given adequate resources to perform their duties (policing, education, health, infrastructure 
etc). The discourse should be on how to have a more rigorous budget management processes than 
what is prevailing. 
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APPENDIX 10: THE EMPIRICAL EXPLANATION OF THE STRATEGIC ACTIONS/ INTERACTIONS 
OF BUDGET CREDIBILITY 
This appendix provides strategies devised to manage, handle, carryout, respond to budget 
credibility under s specific set of perceived conditions (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). I identified two 
separate categories impacting on the actions and interactions of budget credibility, namely 
automating financial management systems: and re-engineering financial management system.  
Automating financial management systems 
Automating the financial system has been one of the central focus of the integrated financial 
management reforms. Automating systems arose out of obsolescence of existing systems (such as 
the BPEMS); perceived needs to enhance the budget system, such as in the implementation of the 
Hyperion; modification to the system or changing requirements such as the GIFMIS. The need for 
automating the processes and procedures arose because in the manual systems, government was 
confronted with three key institutions of government not necessarily having the same cash balances 
at any time. As participant G26 explains:  
“By that I mean the Ministry of Finance, the Controller and Accountant General Department, and 
the Bank of Ghana did not necessarily have the same figures on the cash position of government”. 
Re-engineering financial management system 
In Ghana what has been the foremost concern of reformers is to improve efficiency and 
transparency in financial management. The inefficiency in the current system causes misallocation 
of resources, a lack of efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery, and fiscal discipline 
leading to overspending, arrears, and debt.  
APPENDIX 11: THE EMPIRICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF BUDGET 
CREDIBILITY 
This appendix provides the outcome of results of actions and interactions. Our examination of the 
Ghanaian IPFM context shows that reform credibility and budget credibility are co-joined. It may 
be unstated but implied from participants’ responses that a way to judge the performance and the 
seriousness of the MoF intentions, as the champion of the reforms, is to judge the one thing they 
are responsible for: the budget. There have been claims and counterclaims of the credibility of the 
reforms. In this section I analyse the responses of participants: first, to demonstrate why the reform 
credibility has come to depend on budget credibility in Ghana (as consequence); and secondly 
explicate why both the budget practices, and the IPFM reforms suffer credibility gap. 
The link between budget credibility and reform credibility 
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I start by explaining that link, by showing how and why the reforms are to be judged by the 
behaviour of the MoF in its budgeting practices. After decades of financial management and budget 
reforms budget practices have not changed much and the MoF continues to prune the MDAs 
budget request without adequate consultant. Participant G4 sums up the current situation that has 
been around persistently by saying: 
Yeah. You see… when we look at the accountability chain, I think Ghana does well in 
budget formulation. They [MoF] go through all their consultation processes, try to 
massage your ego and say bring what you want, etc., but at the end of the day they will cut 
it without recourse to what you will use the money for; which beats all the process because 
after you have gone through rigorous  planning because first and foremost it requires that 
you should have your what you call midterm objectives and goals and activities, we go 
with it. So in three years or four years now, they made it four years, you want to achieve 
so and so, so the first year you must be able to tick off here so the second year you are 
there, there, there, and fourth year you are there, so you’ve done all those beautiful things 
academically, beautiful. At the end of the day they consolidate all their estimates, which 
come to Ministry of Finance, then there is a cut, I’ve been trying to cut, which has no 
reason to do with, and I ask them do you foresee somebody be able to buy half of a 
computer, so you just don’t cut. What you do is you come to me and say: “look my friend, 
yes, I’ve seen your request, but we don’t have that money, this is where we can meet you 
so go and reprioritise within it.” Because either I buy that computer, or I don’t buy that 
computer but don’t give me a fraction of the money for the computer. I say: “can you walk 
into a shop and say I want 80% of my computer, please give that to me?” It’s not like 
buying water or buying cocoa, I want this fraction.  
This statement goes to reinforce the earlier statement by a senior MoF official stated that if they 
approve budgets and they do not give them, then the MDAs loose interest in what the MoF is 
doing. The focus of reforms has been in adoption of technology (BPEMS, GIFMIS, Hyperion, 
IPPD, and HRMS) and changing laws (PFM Act 2003, PFM Act 2016 and regulations, 
Procurement Act, 2003 and Procurement Act 2016, Internal Agency Act, GRA Act 2009, and 
others).  These activities are time and resource demanding, and as much as they are useful, they do 
not address the core substance of reforms: improving the way business is done in government to 
achieve pre-planned result. There was an acceptance that the problems in the PFM system have 
been diagnosed properly, but there is some doubt whether the reform actions are truly providing 
solutions to the diagnosed problem. Participant G11 said: 
The challenge... maybe we may come to it later, but I'll pre-empt it, the challenge about it, 
the fact is whether what we are doing is actually solving the diagnosed problem, but I think 
the diagnosis was done very well, so there are no other problems. 
The same participant from the MoF observes:  
The reforms are addressing technical issues, they are addressing some aspect of 
institutional issues, but I think the reforms should go beyond that and try and address the 
human issues as well, which is very difficult to look at.  
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The evidence indicates that PUFMARP stalled for various reasons, including political commitment 
and in-fighting, but within it, the MTEF was a credible approach that was unintentionally, or 
perhaps deliberately made to fail. In its damaged form, the MTEF staggered on for several years 
in the form of the continuing deployment of the software (Activate) it introduced, but otherwise 
very little else of its planned improvements were maintained. The first phase of automation under 
BPEMS brought out the internal conflict within the central agencies of government. In the second 
phase (GIFMIS) the research sees some of the more knowledgeable MDAs rejecting the central 
automation solution. GIFMIS’s success is couched in terms of automating the accounting systems, 
and pushing on to implement programme-based budgeting, but as participant G4 said: 
 But if people are paying monies and receiving monies outside the system which is never 
even captured, and you are talking about programme-based [budgeting] what programs 
are you talking about? 
Contrasting this statement to the assertion by those who falsely maintained that all payments go 
through GIFMIS it there is an official script that wants to paint a rosy picture, by saying that all 
expenditures are on GIFMIS. Others reject this assertion:  
But I was like, when we are talking of programme-based budgeting and the audit report is 
showing that 40% of their expenditure is not in their books, what is doing program-based 
budgeting about? Let’s first capture all the revenue and expenditure. When we do that then 
we will go to the programme basis. 
Programme budgeting seems so inappropriate at this stage as participant G4 declared: 
Ask them [MoF] to tell us how much is below the budget expenditure, and how much of 
revenue goes unaccounted for? Not what they have budgeted for. Total revenue for the 
government. Ask them, the schools. How much school fees do they collect? The hospitals, 
do they collect. Even ministries and MDAs’ Internal generated funds, we don’t even know 
how much they are collecting. Then you are talking about activity-programme based 
budget. 
Reforms are driven by international development partners based on observed large variances 
between budget and actuals: As a senior official in MoF has observed:  
I'm beginning to suspect that sometimes the need for the reforms is not generated from us. 
Somebody comes from outside, says that our budget is not credible because it takes what 
you have budgeted for and what you spent, do variance analysis, and say your budget is 
not credible. I'm using the budget as an example because budget is just a subset of PFM; 
and based on that they say, “Okay, because your budgets are not credible, we need to 
ensure that we make your budget credible, so let's implement these reforms. 
This statement questions the reform ownership and rejects the idea that the reforms are “home-
grown” solutions.  
How and why the Ghana IPFM reforms are not credible 
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Government programmes are not expected to run well, if at all, because after payment of wages 
and salaries there is very little cash left to distribute to the MDAs for operational activities (termed 
“Goods and Services”). Officials have come to accept that government programmes will not run 
according to schedule and that has become a self-fulfilling tendency; the reforms are not addressing 
this tendency. Participant G11 said:  
.… so ideally to undertake efficient programme-based budgeting……. [if] I am the 
programme manager for expenditure management programme, the compensation, the 
assets and the ‘goods and service’ all come to the programme manager as expenditure 
management programme. But here's a case where probably there is money to pay 
compensation only; so, you pay compensation, but the compensation has a role to play in 
helping deliver the service, but if you pay compensation you've not paid ‘goods and 
services…How do you expect the totality of the programme to run? 
If official know that programmes are not going to work well, then it raises the question of why did 
they introduce programme budgeting, which requires more elaborate planning sequence, in the 
first place? The answer lies in the decay in the budget practices that had come about after the failure 
of the MTEF reforms. The budget practices had regressed to what it was before the MTEF where 
money was issued on a line-item basis (falsely called activity budget), without knowing for what 
the money was used. The solution required going back to re-problematize the line-item budgeting 
to explain why the practices had the tendency of becoming that state, rather than attempting to 
build on a ‘bastardised’ form of activity-based budgeting in the name of progress.   
For example, Wildavsky (1978) argued that it is easier to cut a line item budget without 
organisational changes, whereas you cannot eliminate an objective from the programme budget 
without eliminating the organisation that is responsible for producing it. Could it be that officials 
shun organisational changes, and therefore resisted the activity-based budgeting (ABC) that the 
MTEF introduced? Or perhaps there was a limited capacity to implement anything beyond the 
traditional line-item budget. Official reviews however problematized the “activity-based 
budgeting”, that was in place, and attempted to address its obvious shortcomings by introducing 
programme budgeting. Not perhaps realising that programme budgeting is even more demanding 
than what had gone before it. For example, Betley et al.,2012 in the case of Ghana, have pointed 
out that in some cases: “One response to challenges in implementing reforms, piloting, sometimes 
became an end in itself (rather than a means to an end), to be replaced by something new, rather 
than learning and adapting, based on the initial implementation lessons”. 
Whilst there are claims by officials that they have learned from the failure of pass reforms, the 
impact of the reforms itself and accounting practices are minimal.  
MoF monitoring of government programmes inadequate 
Another consequence of budget credibility and reforms failure is that there is a limited formal 
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feedback mechanism to the MoF of the impact of such reforms on the programme of the MDAs. 
Existing financial management practices (such as budgeting and accounting) in the MoF does not 
challenge officials to examine the impact of their performances on MDAs programmes. The day-
to-day business of budget officers, who are supposed to be sector economists in other jurisdictions, 
do not take them into programme implementation. These officials may undertake some project 
inspection activities, but such activities do not take them into assessments of the overall impact of 
programmes in the MDAs. The issue being that there is very little recognition that the PFM 
structures and systems do not exist for their own sake, but rather as mechanisms to facilitate 
implementation of MDA's programmes. The way in which the budget processes work and how the 
budget is managed, say, in the school feeding programme have direct impact on that programme. 
There was very little evidence to show that officials were making attempts to relate sector 
programmes to the implementation of the reforms. 
 The implications of understanding the impact of reforms on MDAs programme implementation 
is a useful entry point for critical scholars to raise and address larger issues, such as the social and 
economic relevance of reforms. Examining the ideologies (covert or overt) that drive the way 
government does business in poor countries is currently being smudged by technocratic 
rationalities, which come as side-shows but eventually amount to decay, deprivation and wanton 
abuse of power by rulers. For example, could the lack of penetration of reforms so far be attributed 
to the foresight of knowledgeable pragmatic reformers who implicit reject the NPM-type reforms 
that draw on the neo-liberal creed: privatisation, markets (market testing), or competition, 
agencification and “accountingization” (Hood 1995). Alternatively, there may be some genuine 
learning taking place, that requires time and space to germinate. I found some evidence of both in 
our data, and it is not impossible for them to co-exist even in the same person. 
Ownership impacts on coordinating reforms with consultants 
Reform co-ordination has been an issue in Ghana reflecting the relationship between civil servants, 
who feel underpaid and unappreciated, and the reform consultants. It has been a feature of the WB-
sponsored reforms in Ghana and elsewhere, that a central secretariat located in the MoF is charged 
with the responsibility of co-ordinating the reform. The PUFMARP reforms for a period of four 
years were run by a three-person secretariat of Ghanaian consultants with technical financial 
management, information technology, and project management experiences. These skills were not 
readily available in government at the time when the number of qualified accountants in 
government were not more than twenty-five (in contrast to over 300 now); and both IT and project 
management skills were limited. As the reforms progressed more IT-skilled consultants were 
recruited from Ghanaian in the diaspora to work alongside functional experts in government. An 
MoF participant G2 observed:  
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Yeah. But the functional guys will be taken from the system of the ministries. 
Rejecting the model of appointing of consultants (albeit Ghanaians) to lead and manage the reform 
in preference to civil servants, participant G4 explained how the previous arrangement bred apathy 
in civil servants: 
But the problem is it’s [the reform] normally driven by people form the private sector or 
people from the outside and the average civil servant who is already paranoid because he 
thinks he is getting a peanut and these people who maybe at times he thinks he has the 
same qualification and skills with, are pay so much, are brought in; they fold their arms 
and say you ‘do it  and let’s see’, if your mandate actually enters my office, let’s see, and 
that is the cost of most of what, I think we need internal champions, that was the concept 
which was developed with the GIFMIS was started. This realisation came and said look, 
let’s get a GIFMIS director who is a member of the team from government… 
Reflexively having been appointed to manage the reform secretariat as one of the first three project 
managers I think that the dynamics between civil servants and consultants is an uneasy one in the 
reforms, often fraught with envy as reflected in the statement by the participant above. With the 
low pay and poor conditions of service most civil servants, even in rich industrialised economies, 
aspire to become consultants especially toward the end of their careers. For many, becoming a 
consultant remains only an aspiration. My personal background was a former public servant in the 
UK and Ghana for several years as a chartered accountant prior to joining the MoF as a reforming 
consultant. My two other colleagues came from the private sector with, as diaspora Ghanaian with 
considerable IT project management experiences. Our background helped to break down some of 
barriers in the MoF and helped changed some attitudes. This encouraged senior civil servants in 
the MoF and the other departments to want to be part of the reforms. As an official from the MoF, 
G2, explained: 
...they selected three senior directors, one had just retired and two had two years [to go], 
and so with the help of DFID they decided to let them take an early retirement so they 
could consult... so they took an early retirement and of course their remuneration was very 
good so the motivation was very high for them and so they became the face of the reforms 
and so they trained all the MDAs and especially those who were with the Ministry of 
Finance, the Budget Division and then also there was one aspect of this, because they were 
consultants and they had led the system they come from and they were being paid very 
well, I think they got over ten times what they used to receive…as civil servants, okay. So, 
when they became consultants and started being paid well the other civil servants who 
were not part of the reforms, they didn’t like it so much.... And because they had a lot of 
motivation still, they were pushing them to work hard and the civil servants were not well 
motivated, okay and so it caused a lot of resentment. So, I realise that even in the time they 
were training, the other participants from the other ministries took part in the training, they 
were very serious but the budget officers from within the Ministry of Finance, which we 
call the Schedule Officers, who just attend the meetings and they were not too committed, 
they were not too committed. 
Despite the participants claim that the ex-director turned consultants got motivated to work hard, 
some of these directors embodied the old budget practices in their very beings and became part of 
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the on-going problems for the reforms. There was a dual edge that became a decision dilemma. 
The system needed these directors (despite getting near to the retirement age) to accept these 
changes (and not to resist the interventions). On the hand by bringing them on board, the reforms 
risked them over-turning the new ideas and practices. They were eager to take an early retirement 
from the civil service to join the secretariat and were trained as facilitators, especially to carry the 
MTEF message across. In my view, that risk later materialised and changed the dynamics of the 
progress of the MTEF reforms. They became the ‘old wine skin’ into which the new wine was 
poured; and they were sufficiently plugged into the MoF decision making circles to be able to over-
turn the changes (especially in changing the orientation of the MoF in budget execution) that were 
required to get the benefit embodied in the new processes. Apart from failing to carry their more 
junior colleagues in the MoF with them, they created the dynamics of getting paid consulting fees 
which triggered emotional responses from their former colleagues. In addition, they did not have 
credibility within the colleagues who saw them to be part of the problem.  
More generally the reforms around the world bring in international consultants to provide the 
missing knowledge to build up skills. Often attitude of the indigenous public servants in developing 
countries towards donors (development partners) and their consultants is ambivalent. Especially 
when consultants are attached to the reform funding as a conditionality, as noted by participant 
G15:  
So normally it comes with that (consultants) but the other side of it is that it comes with a 
lot of foreign knowledge and expatriates who are not too conversant with the local 
environment and local knowledge. And finally, they, some of these expatriates also have 
their own agenda turning their consultancy many times into employment, so they remain 
with us for so long a time and of course if the problem gets solved, he is no more in debt, 
so the problem stays on and on and on and on and on.  So that has been some of the 
challenges that I think the reforms have gone through. We did not take time to learn how 
to fish ourselves. You see the change comes like “oh some people can do it for you”, yes 
I agree, but if people have done it already and I already make, not to contradict myself, 
say we don’t need to reinvent the wheel, we don’t need to reinvent the wheel, but those 
people who have invented a wheel who now have to show us how to develop it ourselves. 
Managing consultants, including foreign ones, to get the best out of them is a challenge that is not 
explicitly acknowledged by reformers, therefore has received very little attention. However, it is 
an ever-present issue within the development arena where international sponsors of reforms have 
spun a total industry offering reform advice to LDCs/EEs. The reform projects, when financed by 
international agencies often come with consultants who are both carriers of knowledge and skills, 
but also embody the values of these agencies which may be consistent or in contradiction with 
local values. The more successful recipients of foreign technical aid (Japan for example, after the 
second world war) are the ones who have been able to balance their needs against those of foreign 
consultants. 
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The IPFM reforms faced uncertainty on where to locate the secretariat 
There has been much uncertainty where to locate PFM reform coordination, making them 
oscillating reforms with no fixed location. From its inception the architects of the reforms in MoF 
and the CAGD had struggled over where the co-ordination and management of the reforms should 
be. The struggle of location and leadership led to one of the main architects, the then Controller 
and Accountant, resigning before he was pushed out. But his successors carried on the fight as 
participant G26 has expressed:  
Yes. First of all, we had a challenge about who should own the various modules of the 
software. The Controller and Accountant General Department felt that because they were 
accountants to government, they should have ownership, because key was the accounting 
aspect of what the work – the expenditure aspect of the work. But then there was the 
budgeting part of it which comes under the Ministry of Finance that, you have to prepare 
the budget before you expend, right? 
So, the ministry held that they should own the software, because you have to go ahead 
with the budgeting part. And that did not help us. Because even though the Controller and 
Accountant General initially acquiesced to it we felt that it did affect their level of 
participation or enthusiasm in the project…. We had a compromised solution whereby at 
one stage both the Controller and Accountant General and minister in the Ministry of 
Finance had more or less joint ownership of the project. 
These struggles did not stop there until BPEMs (PUFMARP) were re-branded as GIFMIS in 
2009/10 and the location of the project and the secretariat was transferred to the Controller and 
Accountant General’s Department. As a result of these struggles, in the convoluted history of the 
reforms, at various times the reforms have been branded incorrectly as solely Budget reforms 
(under PUFMARP), accounting computerisation (under GIFMIS), and now as all-encompassing 
reforms (PFMRP). But housing the integrated financial management reforms secretariat in the 
CAGD is problematic for a reform project that involves the MoF itself, the Auditor General, and 
Parliament. Locating it in the CAGD has meant that the secretariat is treated as one of the units in 
the CAGD where they rotate the secretariat leadership among accounting staff, as expressed by 
participant G4:  
That’s why. See, they’ve (the new Government -NPP) been in office for less than ten 
months and I don’t think it is necessarily a political idea, but people within it who don’t 
buy the concept think it is a unit of the Accountant General where you can just change 
people, which I find ridiculous. So that’s why I’m saying that within ten months there were 
three heads of the place, which is not going to help, so the leadership keeps dancing. 
Further he adds: “So these are some of the things I have intention of meeting with him (the 
Minister of Finance) to say, ‘look leadership is very important in reform, you can’t be 
playing Charles Skelly [children’s game} with the leadership, over the past ten months 
I’ve seen three heads of GIFMIS, are we kidding?”  
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During the time when the reforms were labelled as GIFMIS, people talked about the reforms as if 
it were the property of the CAGD alone. By rebranding as the PFMRP the MoF aimed to correct 
this impression, as another participant G17 explained: 
Ministry of Finance decided to champion it, champion the reform, and make it the centre 
and make components and so on. So that all MDAs will feel part of it and know that it’s 
for them as well that’s even the reason for the change of the new form, GIFMIS. Because 
the whole thinking was GIFMIS, it is an accounting system. It was losing its focus as a 
public financial management system that has GRA in mind, that has Public Services 
Commission in mind, as in HRMIS, that have Ministry of Finance budget in it 
Under PUFMARP, the location of the secretariat in the MoF and the earlier reform gains made by 
the MTEF component lead to the reforms being type-casted as budget reforms, which made it 
difficult for the Accountant General’s staff to relate what was going on. By rebranding the reforms 
as GIFMIS and moving the secretariat to the Controller and Accountant General’s department 
(where is now located) changed the ownership dynamics but did not resolved the problem. The 
reforms have stuttered on, raising questions on how committed government is towards the reforms. 
If the MoF is the champion of reforms, then locating the secretariat at least in the MoF is where 
the reforms should be. The reforms coordination is located and controlled by CAGD staff, 
continuing to create the impression that it is about accounting solely.  
Political ownership of reform 
Reform ownership in Ghana has been construed in political ownership terms rather than in national 
ownership terms. The issue with political reform ownership is that has changed with political 
administrations, whereas national ownership would have ensured the continuity of the reform 
agenda. Where reforms ownership is in political ownership terms, the programme suffers as 
political administration changes. Participant G4 expressed this in stark terms: 
So, what I’m trying to say is that the ownership is becoming political instead of a national 
ownership, which would transcend any government, so that is the problem. And so NDC 
started it, let’s call it somewhere in 2009 and that, you know, NDC came back in 2008, so 
around 2009 they started it again from BPEMs, they don’t want the BPEMs anymore, they 
said they want GIFMIS, which I think the name was fantastic and the initiative was 
fantastic but it didn’t take up as quickly as we would have expected, because what people 
wanted it to show was that the old initiative had died, and we are not quick enough.  
What happened in Ghana is that BPEMS was going reasonably well with all the challenges until 
there was a change in government in 2001 from NDC to NPP when the programme was reviewed 
and almost everything was set aside. As participant G4 said: 
You see when BPEMs was ongoing I think things were moving pretty well until there was 
a change in government from NPP to NDC and almost everything which was done was 
rubbished and we made sure it deteriorated for a long while before saying now let’s do a 
new reform so that we can attribute it to ourselves 
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This is a very interesting point. It explains partly why progress in the Ghana PFM reforms has been 
slow in institutionalising new practices. This is supported further by the observation that political 
parties in Ghana are mostly interested in reforms when they are in opposition. Soon to be forgotten 
when they get into power. This point resonates with that made by another key participant who 
observed that the new administration in 2001 needed to undertake reviews of the status of reforms 
before re-starting. Then came again a change in government 2016; though the new administration 
has been quick in running with the reforms, it is taking time for them to also own the process 
because that initiative came before them. 
Over-loading the reforms with the Fiscal Decentration agenda diverts attention from de-
concentration and dilutes reform effectiveness 
Stretching the reforms to Local Government stretches the capacity of central implementers and 
over- centralizes the administration of the country. Ghana’s PFM reforms cover Ministries, 
Departments and Agencies (MDAs) represent central government organisations. Metropolitan, 
Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) represent local government.   
The reform components include fiscal decentralization (local government), but the reforms are 
restrictively centralized. Participant G4 clarifies a point that seems to be not well understood by 
other officials: 
 … the whole decentralization, it’s within this area. It’s not even Accra because that would 
not be fair to the people of Accra, it’s within Accra because it doesn’t even cover Accra, 
it’s within just 1 or 2km square. That is about Ghana’s decentralization. It doesn’t make 
sense to a teacher or a contractor who have to come all the way from Paga to Accra, 
whether it’s going to health or education or finance there’s no difference. So, for it to make 
meaning to them you bring service…., by the way we have already created regional 
administrations and treasuries and whatnot, we have created district administrations, 
treasuries and whatnot, so they have become wasteful because the purpose, the role they 
are supposed to play they are not allowed to play. That is the biggest challenge. 
The reforms have not enabled the decentralization of central government to the local level, instead 
it has been construed as spreading of central government practices (such as the MTEF, GIFMIS) 
to local government. While this may be required to spread financial management knowledge and 
skills to local government, it does not constitute the de-concentration of central government 
services across the country. Missing the de-concentration with fiscal decentralization to local 
government has led to the dilution of the central reforms by stretching the limited capacity at the 
centre, and not focusing on the core problems that have made de-concentration difficult to 
implement. In addition, dovetailing fiscal decentralization to central government reforms affects 
the developing of democratic pluralism at the local government level.  Participant G7 said: 
, so whatever reforms that are taking place at the district level dovetails into the national, 
and the national reforms also influences the reforms at the district level, so now you could 
see that what is left still we have to do which we are working towards, is to get the 
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Assemblies IGFs into the fiscal, into the fiscal table, apart from that all other revenue and 
expenditure is captured in a fiscal table and then so when we are reporting we are heading 
towards, now heading towards general government by accounting and reporting, that’s 
what we are heading towards now. 
It seems the reforms are ad hoc, replicating other reforms sponsored by the WB without addressing 
the problematics of sub-national government, appropriate to Ghana. Building fiscal 
decentralization on a weak central government reforms has been challenging to both central and 
local government alike, especially in a situation the central government reforms do not provide a 
solid platform on which the LAs reforms (as fiscal decentration) can be built. Rather, the blame of 
the failure to deliver government service has been shifted to local government, as evidenced by 
participant G7 from the MoF questioning the performance of local government: 
District Assemblies, they are our biggest challenge, that they are not delivering, and they 
are a huge cost to their state. A government is visible or not visible based on the 
performance DA. The roads are dirty, no drainage, rubbish is everywhere and yet we have 
a whole bureaucracy running around pretending they are working. 
Such narratives have led to proposals to privatise local government revenue collection, and a 
myriad of other potential solutions to a problem which is probably ill-defined and not well 
understood, but outside the scope of this study.   
Improvements in budget practices get reversed with time 
An example of improvements in budget practices being reversed:  
If, yes, if you think out of the one million you will get only one hundred, tell me so that I 
can plan. That is all that we are saying, predictability, being able to know that within this 
month “oh finance is going to give me this”. It’s not been done. And mind you that’s why 
I say that these reforms are killed by changes in government, as far back as 2007, 2005, 
2006, 2007, we introduced that, and we are releasing monies to MDAs without them even 
applying because we said “look, let’s look at our cash position and project what we can 
pay”. So, come the date we credit you, if you remember there is something you call bank 
transfer advice, we introduced it at that time, so we will inform you that so much has been 
transferred to your account, so you can operate. So, to relieve this, it has all been reversed. 
The impact of the poor cash management is that almost all government do not run as expected. 
Participant G4 has noted:  
They get delayed. They don’t get delivered. Every government programme, tell me one? 
Almost every government programme is hanging somewhere. They will start this one and 
immediately, look yesterday I saw front page graphic, somebody say Senior SHS likely to 
collapse, if you saw it, those were the words of the chairperson of the CHATS, that is 
Secondary Schools Association. 
Performance management is superficial 
Part of the basis for undertaking performance measurement has been set up with the introduction 
of programme budgeting, as an MoF participant, G2, said:  
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Yes, and you see, we have all the projections, the base year, and then the indicative year, 
and the output indicators are all specified, so the measurement aspects and the performance 
are so strong. 
Having established the platform to undertake performance management by determining the 
numbers and inputting them in the system is only part of the picture. All the numbers do not mean 
anything until the budget is implemented credibly as planned. 
Executing the budget as planned will motivate staff to do it even better.  
The budget systems had been demotivating in its impact on some of the officials in the sector 
ministries, as confirmed by participant G20: 
But because people do the work; they plan, they do these things and at the end of the day 
what they have planned and what they have done is not used they get demotivated. And 
that sucks the energy that has been injected by [indiscernible 0:47:30] and it leads to wear 
and tear. Attrition. People are demotivated so why keep the job, then they move to other 
areas and stuff like that. 
Thus, whilst the budgeting system has the potential to incentivise staff to perform better, with the 
present set-up it sends the wrong signal to officials.  
Sustainability of reforms is an issue 
Often the gains from past reforms, such as activity-based budgeting that was introduced to 
overcome incremental input-based budgeting, were reversed. In Ghana public sector budgeting the 
notion of ‘activity-based budgeting’ came to, incorrectly, represent input-based budgeting. That is, 
it came to take on the characteristics of the very thing it was supposed to displace. 
In the GoG, several projects have been implemented that left no traces after the projects have 
folded up. A participant explained that sustainability of the reforms has weighed on the conscience 
of the World Bank with them granting the government further loans to ensuring that GIFMIS is 
sustained to become part of the MDA’s activities. As participant G8 said the WB reasoned that: 
if you’re going to stabilize the infrastructure then there’s the need for us to give you more 
money to see that this GIFMIS project does not come to an end but continues and see how 
best we can sustain it so that it becomes part of the MDA’s activities. So there and then, 
the World Bank approved that component. And that component alone took about $32 
million – the component 2.  
This demonstrate the link between ownership and sustainability. But also shows that reform 
ownership at the MDA level is key to the reform’s ultimate success and sustainability. 
Accounting techniques considered as technical and that makes it hard to implement popular 
reforms   
Accounting is often considered as technical techniques that accountants apply and only a few 
macroeconomics can articulate the issues in accounting practices. For example, the concept of 
accrual accounting is understood only by a few officials beyond the accounting circle. Officials 
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admit that the GIFMIS was implemented by “forcing institutions to come on board” with the 
consequence that the systems are not deployed as it should, especially in producing reports for 
management use, as explained by an MOF participant, G9, referring to the introduction of accrual 
accounting and GIFMIS: 
The system will push people into it. But before you do that, like I’m saying, if you have 
just about 5% to 10% of the MDAs using the various reports from the system; that is a 
concern.  Unless that also happens then the full accrual or that kind of thing we can – but 
right now – these days you say you don’t even want to call them accountants, you want to 
call them financial officers because of the performance aspect which is creeping into it–  
This makes the introduction of accrual accounting as a technique and a tool pre-mature to 
implement in the GoG. MDAs may be compelled to come adopt the systems, but it does not mean 
the practices have been institutionalised. 
Making costly mistakes 
The reforms have been implemented at great costs in human effort and financial resources. There 
have also been costly mistakes for attempting to centralize all government of Ghana financial 
reporting, by excluding the requirements of MDAs’ reporting. The difficulty arose later, was not a 
technological one, because the technology allowed for the MDAs reporting, but a management 
decision that was taken at the beginning: Explaining how Oracle technology works G9 observed: 
 If you go into any environment where Oracle ERP is being used, you will realize that in 
that chart of accounts they put spare segments. Why? Because your chart of accounts is 
not something you can switch on and switch off. it wasn’t even a redesigning of the chart 
of accounts. We only took the initial balancing segments, which was only one. And now 
in our reengineering from the technological point of view said okay, now systems should 
look at multiple balancing segments as against one balancing segments. But that was a 
technological challenge. Because once you’ve done your chart of accounts it’s your 
reemployment again. Good. That was what Oracle was suggesting.  Oracle said you can’t 
readjust your chart of accounts. But we had some specialists in our midst with team who 
did it. So, we called it a chart of account switch. What we did was a change of account 
switch. 
While this should have been done in at the beginning between 1998 to 2000, it took about fourteen 
years for the importance of MDAs reporting to dawn on decision makers. The change of accounts 
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APPENDIX 12: GHANA PATH OF PFM REFORMS (1986 TO 2018) 
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54 This period detailed are taken from Premchand and Talat, 1986 
55 Taken from page 7 of the report with slight modification to the wording where necessary to enhance meaning. 
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